Talk:Reactor-grade plutonium

Untitled

Hey! There's no actual definition of reactor-grad plutonium here. Specifically which two or more isotopes does it contain? Qwertie (talk) 23:53, 19 June 2016 (UTC)

Details

It would be very interesting to know:

• the date of this particular test

• the series and/or name of this test

and probably knowing either will give us the other, see

http://www.ga.gov.au/oracle/nukexp_query.html

It would also tell us whether or not this test is already listed at List of nuclear tests#1945–1963, and enable us to link the list to this page. Andrewa 00:02, 4 June 2007 (UTC)

From my research it appears highly likely to be test shot Tendrac of Operation Storax as I've detailed in the article of late, as that was an US-UK joint test, it was one of two joint tests conducted in 1962, and it's cited yield was "low", which is identical to the description of the yield by the Carter Administration in 1979. I'm not ruling out the possibilty that it might have been some other unlisted US test in 1962, but Tendrac would be my best bet. I find it curious why no one else has ever uncovered Tendrac of Operation Storax as the most likely culprit, as it really wasn't that hard to look up all US tests.

I've thought about looking up 1962 seismic data collected by numerous sources to see if I can get a ballpark value of the yield, but I've put that on the long finger as it would probably take an hour or two to find and analyze and my spider sense tells me it was probably no more than 9 kilotons, with the most likely being ~2 kiloton, but that's just a guess going on the data from the N.Korean tests of late.

On a related note, surely there is a burn up rate(+100 GWd/tU maybe) that would result in the reactors plutonium content being too low in Pu-239 & Pu-241 to create even a fizzle nuclear explosion, right? Something akin to the respective, Uranium 20% enriched U-235 value, with anything below that 20% being considered LEU and therefore that isotopic mixture being regarded as not directly "weapons-usable". Although that 20% appears pretty conservative, as I'd bet the practical value is around 40% enriched uranium, and below which it wouldn't create an explosion either. Uranium hydride bomb data would probably be highly relevant to that question.

Why a similar value for plutonium isn't available I know is due to "national security", but surely it occurs when the Pu-238, Pu-240 and Pu-242 values get up into the 15+% range and the combined Pu-239 & Pu-241 percentage drops below 40%. I have read that plutonium with 80% Pu-238 is not regarded as weapons-usable, but that, like the definition for LEU, seems pretty conservative, I'd be surprised if the practical "non weapons-usable" percentage wasn't a good bit below that.

86.41.146.36 (talk) 19:55, 11 December 2013 (UTC)

There's a handy table of Pu-isotopes content of spent fuel at various burnups, including Magnox, on page 19 of the UK Pu Options doc.[1] Would probably interest you. (This doc has a full cite in the MOX fuel article as [12].) Rwendland (talk) 02:09, 12 December 2013 (UTC)

Thanks, I'll take a look at that!

Some info on the UK Totem/Totum tests (part of Operation Totem 1953) would probably make the article less US centered.

http://left-atomics.blogspot.ie/2008/08/two-four-six-eight-we-dont-want-to.html

http://theenergycollective.com/charlesbarton/28509/nuclear-proliferation-devices-and-weapons

Isotopic characteristics of Totem devices (1963 UK tests): http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/1996/october/aoct96.html#a2

It would appear that N.Korea's more recent (2009-2013) nuclear tests coincide fairly well with the yield of Totem I & II conducted way back in 1953. This is probably no coincidence seen as both were seemingly produced by magnox reactors.

Improvements

Mention to the fact that all the concern coming from Ted Taylor etc back in the 1970s was during an era when the best burn-up value acheivable for a PWR was ~ 20 MWh/ton. It is now over twice that. As can be seen in the IAEA's nuclear power status 2005 picture found here. In non-pdf form, although you can always look the full pdf up if you are skeptical.

Secondly, books & journal papers with the following term: "HNED's" hypothetical nuclear explosive device. Should be included. Like this paper by Kessler in 2008 HNED potential

Thirdly, Cohen has a good article on the apprehension surrounding the terrorist use of this material that should have its points mentioned. http://www.phyast.pitt.edu/~blc/book/chapter13.html#1

Fourthly, mention to the isotopic ratio of reactor grade plutonium(of typical burn-up values) after 100,1000 & 10,000 years is required as there is the issue that if geological repositories are implemented for the spent fuel of typical PWRs/BWRs etc*, then in the future these repositories would turn into weapons-grade plutonium mines due to the relatively fast decay of Pu-238 to leave Pu-239 etc, and that's to say nothing about the even more concerning suggestion of putting MAGNOX & AGR spent fuel* directly underground.

Fifthly, that breeder reactors like the Phénix reactor etc have demonstrated, on 1 hand, the ability to burn-up, MOX with 3 recycles, thus rendering the term "reactor grade" stretched to much lower Pu-239 values. While on the other hand, papers in science and global security(S&GS) have analyzed the Russian BN-800 reactor as producing pretty-much weapons grade plutonium in their core blanket fuel/various geometries. | here's the paper. Moreover the Indian PFBR would rather have RgPu over WgPu as to start with Pu-240 breeds Pu-241, a superior fuel to Pu-239 & S&GS have also analyzed its ability to also breed WgPu.| here(PDF). While I find Ramana & S&GS rarther, selectively antagonist towards breeder reactors, they seem to my untrained eye, produce reliable calculated data.

lastly, the varying weapons "attractiveness-level" of breeder reactor spent fuel, pg 4-5 of this JAEA pdf — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.251.153.186 (talk) 10:05, 10 July 2015 (UTC)

Can someone fix this sentence, I can't even make sense of it, under the picture of the tower for the test that fizzled:: "Commentators have noted that, as this is also the most probable yield of a similar explosion, generated from a device reliant on reactor grade Plutonium, that was the product of the once-thru fuel cycle, a device of this type, would not be very much more powerful than its own weight in conventional dynamite" 2601:14D:8300:BDF4:DD42:DDCA:2FF8:1AD0 (talk) 00:41, 9 June 2019 (UTC)

Weapon-usability

This article seems overly skeptical about the weapon usability of reactor grade plutonium. The official U.S. government view (cited here) is:

The degree to which these obstacles [to using reactor-grade plutonium in weapons] can be overcome depends on the sophistication of the state or group attempting to produce a nuclear weapon. At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential proliferating state or subnational group using designs and technologies no more sophisticated than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons could build a nuclear weapon from reactor-grade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that). At the other end of the spectrum, advanced nuclear weapon states such as the United States and Russia, using modern designs, could produce weapons from reactor-grade plutonium having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons made from weapongrade plutonium....Proliferating states using designs of intermediate sophistication could produce weapons with assured yields substantially higher than the kiloton range possible with a simple, first-generation nuclear device.

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Official U.S. Study on Plutonium Disposition

The document that is the source of the Bunn/Holdren article is an official U.S. study entitled "Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives," available online here. It says (see Box 3-1, pp 37-39) that plutonium of almost any grade (excluding nearly pure Pu-238) can be used to make a nuclear weapon, and that a sophisticated designer could make a nuclear weapon of reliable yield. Given the credibility of the source (the U.S. Department of Energy, responsible for the design, production and maintenance of U.S. nuclear weapons), this seems to invalidate the speculation in this article about the non-weapon-usability of relatively low-grade plutonium. No time to fix right now, but in the meantime I invite comments. NPguy (talk) 01:20, 7 May 2018 (UTC)

You mean those who advocate the “dilute and dispose” strategy (Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team, 2015). This process involves mixing the plutonium with an unspecified proprietary material (referred to as “star dust”) and disposal of waste packages in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant – the US transuranic geological disposal facility? The very facility that had the basic chemistry, organics+nitrates equals incendiary kitty-litter accident? Was this their "star dust"?

What was being referred to in the 1970-90s was a "reactor-grade plutonium" produced via a burnup of circa 25 to 35 GWd/TU. Nowadays in ~2015 the average burnup is closer to 50 GWd/TU and it is increasing, primarily due to LEU enrichment increases and plutonium put into the twice-thru/re-use in reactor cycle in the form of MOX and other future forms. This translates into vastly different wholesale statements being made about what is possible/reliable to manufacture with "reactor-grade plutonium". Indeed this article as it stands now, an article I've heavily edited recently, visually depicts an actual overestimate of the most likely yield of "nuclear weapon" a first-generation design, might be able to achieve with 2015 "reactor-grade plutonium".

So as I see it, the article does not speculate on what you seem to think it does, the if "weapons" could be made question, that is not debated instead in contrast the article focuses entirely on the question of just how capable of getting over that threshold 0.2 kt barrier in yield, how this is increasingly unlikely with improvements in burnup. That at least to me, is really what the article focuses on, the "reliable" part. Not whether or not you can "make a weapon out of it". As you know yourself NPguy you could even make "a nuclear weapon" out of 50% pure Pu-238 and you wouldn't exactly be in the nuclear-club with what amounts to nothing too different from a radiological dispersal device either.

It truly appears that there was a point to all this "weapons-usable" concern in the 1970s but now in 2015+, proliferation-wonks have been churning up ancient reports and making a career out of the inherent ambiguity and uncertainty in the phrases -"can-be-used-to-make-a-nuclear-weapon"- and this sinfully uninformative and prone to re-definition phrase -"reactor-grade plutonium"-, careers and political deadlocks created for well over 3 decades now. When a rational appraisal returns the unmistakeable fact that the true proliferation problem is in weapons-grade-plutonium and the aging-wine, it-only-gets-more-attractive-with-time "plutonium mine" concern.

I mean, you can take the control rods out of any thermal-reactor and produce a reactor-excursion that technically could too, be classified as "a nuclear weapon". Chernobyl produced a few tons of TNT equivalent when this very thing, was essentially done. So if groups are worried about high-burn-up fuel/that is modern reactor-grade plutonium and the "weapons that could be made from it[right now]". Then it seems strange to me that they are essentially silent on what they should actually be far, far more worried about, [which is, someone this skilled] just noticing that a natural-uranium-fueled-reactor surrounded by a bunch of graphite blocks, could be turned into "a weapon" much easier. If explosive yield is clearly not your motivation, then a reactor-excursion would be much more up your alley.

As in this latter case, there is no need to mount any kind of suicidal trip to steal spent-fuel, no one would be mounting Tom Clancy-esque, search-parties for you and so on. This latter possibilty has always been with us...yet somehow no one has ever bothered doing this. Why do you think that is? It's kind o telling isn't it. All you need is a few tons of natural uranium and pure graphite blocks...and if you don't lose patience but run the reactor for a bit you can follow in the footsteps of CP-1/X-10 Graphite Reactor... so anyone truly motivated enough and skilled enough to make a "substantial weapon" from modern "reactor-grade-plutonium" is going to have the technical skill to say - "you know what, better just make a reactor and produce weapons-grade plutonium instead" - and would you believe. That's what everyone skilled in every-country-ever, has done. Why do you think that is?

Furthermore, if you are a Nuclear Weapon State(NWS), a sophisticated state with access to tritium for boosting, then inherently you have access to a reactor, a reactor you could use to make weapons/fuel-grade plutonium, centrifuge the RGPu, or what most ""sophisticated" states actually use the RGPu for, which is to fuel a fast-breeder reactor with a blanket of natural uranium/thorium...so what's the bother with all this laboring about how "weapons-usable" modern reactor-grade is, exactly? No one, not even NWSs, have ever made a nuclear explosion out of it, let alone "a weapon" and for good reason. There are truly much more "sophistication" uses for it.

So to summarize, (A)if you just want a low yield explosion with a lot of radioactivity/mass distruption device and you have the "technical sophistication" to design a "contemporary defined-RGPu weapon"...then you'd actually find it a hell of a lot easier to just build and then take the control rods out of a natural-uranium-fueled-graphite-moderated reactors(Or you know don't waste the reactor and actually produce WGPu like at Hanford.)

If (B)you are a NWS and want to make a big-boom then you'll not waste your tritium supply and what would be a dicey unreliable affair as it stands with modern reactor-grade plutonium, you'll instead do what every NWS has the "sophistication" to do. Which is use the stockpiles of RGPu in a weapons-breeder-reactor to generate WGPu...they leverage their large stockpile of RGPu to generate more of both the potential quantity-and-quality of the weapons you'd otherwise have produced, with this misapplication of thought put into this so called "RGPu weapons-sophistication". As, isn't that kind of what the BN-350 reactor was all about? Several tons of so-called "ivory-grade," premium plutonium were produced from the equivalent of "low grade, starting fissile material".

"The fuel that is used in a (weapons)breeder is a mixture of natural uranium and RGPu in the ratio of 7:3 or more. The core could be surrounded by a blanket of U-238 or thorium (Th-232). Neutrons from the RGPu fission (which produces energy) would be absorbed by U-238 (in the core and the blanket) to become Pu-239 and by Th-232 (in the blanket) to become U-233. That is, it breeds more Pu-239 than it consumes and the ratio is a little over 1...the more significant aspect of a breeder is that, even though you start with RGPu, the plutonium that comes out is weapons grade."

So how "sophisticated", truly, would anyone be to try forging a "weapon" out of RGPu alone? Is it not far more likely for "sophisticated" non-state/state actors to start a reactor from stratch? Or to use their stolen or inherited RGPu with technical sophistication, to breed actual WGPu and more of it? That's what every "sophisticated" group does and will continue to do. Along with burning up the RGPu and coming up with ways to foster international stability, compassion, respect and courtesy that would completely eliminate the motivation to produce weapons to begin with. Though there is little time for true "sophistication" these days. So proliferation will remain a worry for some.

Boundarylayer (talk) 14:23, 15 May 2018 (UTC)

You seem to be in a state of deep denial. This is not an ancient study. It was done by the U.S. Department of Energy in the 1990s as part of an authoritative and systematic analysis of the nonproliferation impacts of various options for disposition of excess plutonium at the end of the Cold War. It concluded that there was not much benefit to isotopic degradation of weapons-grade plutonium because a sophisticated (including U.S. or Russian) designer could still use it to make a reliable nuclear weapon. And reliable doesn't mean a reliable fizzle. It means a reliable full-yield weapon.

More recently Bathke et. al. have developed a "figure of merit" that attempts to quantify the "attractiveness" of various fissionable materials for weapons use. These studies clearly point to high burnup reactor-grade plutonium as readily weapons usable material. NPguy (talk) 02:52, 16 May 2018 (UTC)

Denial? Where did I say it wasn't "weapons usable"? and how would you actually define that? If you can juice 0.001 kiloton of nuclear energy from a core. Is that still "a weapons"? Or just 1000 kg of high explosive equivalent. So it really depends on what you regard as a "nuclear weapon"...you need tritium, that is fusion boosting to make the device worth the effort. Just look at the N.Korean tests from 2006-2009 for literal evidence of that fact with their purer fuel-grade plutonium. Without boosting, modern reactor-grade Pu is an "overblown apprehension". As if you had both RGPu and tritium on hand, then you're obviously pretty, what's the word they use- "sophisticated"- if you're that sophisticated you'll actually do what every country does. Which is use the Reactor-grade Pu to breed weapons-grade Pu and make more of it in kilogram quantities than you perhaps started with, of RGPu. That's a "Win-Win".

By the way, I know of Battke's "attractiveness" scale. I'm the one who added the reference to it in the article. It was some weeks ago, remember? The question on "weapons usable reactor grade plutonium" is the same as 19.99% Low enriched uranium. It doesn't become magically "non-weapons usable" and "unattractive" at that point either, yet that is how it is described by Battke and co, no one has likewise ever succeeded in making a core with the apparently magic, 20.1% enriched uranium, whereupon it is instantly re-classified as "weapons-usable"/attractive and thereby the beginning of Highly enriched uranium commences, ooh scary. Not even with fusion boosting will that massive "HEU" core go anywhere but a one way ticket to sub-sub-kiloton land. You may also get some nuclear yield out of it but it won't be much more than the actual weight of high-explosives you just used, you just used to scatter the "20.1% HEU" about the place. Highly "attractive" Battke classifies it as, "attractive".

Speaking of denial though, we burn coal, coal that is the substance from which toluene is derived from, toluene, which is the last T in TNT and in our cars, we drive around with 90% of the material needed for napalm everyday. Yet somehow the world keeps turning. It'll only be with perhaps the reparations for colonialism and most fundamentally the embracing of compassion and sincere humility, could we as a species ever hope to see a brighter tomorrow together. All these vain attempts to essentially try and close down potential "napalm stations"/not "fuel stations", at every street corner will be how future generations will truly see this "attractiveness scaling" and I'm actually being extremely generous with this analogy. As, at this point, no one has ever made a genuine reactor-grade "nuclear weapon". So this situation we're in, it'll only be even more bewildering to them.

Boundarylayer (talk) 01:56, 19 May 2018 (UTC)

Short description?

Would you say this is the type of isotopic grade of plutonium made in a nuclear power reactor? I just can't seem to summarise it properly. Qwertyxp2000 (talk | contribs) 02:05, 5 February 2021 (UTC)