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Finished draft from Bob K31416

Linguistic frameworks

According to Rudolf Carnap, to discuss a kind of entity requires relevant terms which are part of a linguistic framework that includes rules for the use of the terms. In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions. Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” The answer can be found by the empirical method of looking at the desk. Another example is the linguistic framework of 'natural numbers' and an internal question could be, “Is there a prime number greater than 100?” The answer here can be found by a logical method. Linguistic frameworks are either factual or logical, depending on whether the answers to internal questions can be found using empirical or logical methods.

Existence questions that are not asked inside a linguistic framework are called by Carnap 'external questions'. These are questions asked by philosophers and tend to be general in nature, such as "Do numbers exist?" or "Do material objects exist?" These general questions could be asked as internal questions, but then the answer would be obvious in the relevant framework. For the two example questions, the answers found within the framework of everyday language would be trivially "yes, numbers exist" and "yes, material objects exist". However, when a general existence question, like the two example questions, is asked and discussed by philosophers as an external question, there are lengthy arguments that don't result in any generally agreed upon answer. According to Carnap, external questions should be reinterpreted as practical questions about whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework, or philosopher's could construct one. In any case, there is no resulting gain in understanding the reality of the related kinds of entities as viewed from outside the framework.

--Bob K31416 (talk) 17:33, 4 June 2013 (UTC)

[I modified citations in my above draft,[1] per discussion with Snowded below. --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:53, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Hi Bob: How about this change. Instead of

"Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, ‘Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?’"

could we use:

"Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in a linguistic framework based upon 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, ‘Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?’" Brews ohare (talk) 03:11, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

Thomasson(2013) and Carnap(1950) are referring to only one linguistic framework regarding everyday language, so I wouldn't want to make that change. --Bob K31416 (talk) 23:17, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: That is simply not true. The idea that there is only one linguistic framework regarding everyday language is an unsupported and incorrect assertion that no author makes. Carnap has pointed out:

"“The acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. (Thus, for example, the thing language contains certainly words of the type of "blue" and "house" before the framework of properties is introduced; and it may contain words like "ten" in sentences of the form "I have ten fingers" before the framework of numbers is introduced.)”

IMO, he makes perfectly clear that words are brought from ordinary language into a framework where they are provided with a new set of definitions and rules. Brews ohare (talk) 00:05, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Also, how about this change. Instead of:

"In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions."

could we use:

"Questions that can be answered within a 'framework' are called internal questions."

The restriction of 'internal' questions to 'existence questions posed within a framework' is misleading in that all questions posed within a framework are 'internal', not just existence questions. Brews ohare (talk) 17:13, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

In Thomasson(2013) and Carnap(1950), the term 'internal questions' doesn't include questions that are not about existence, so I wouldn't want to make that change. --Bob K31416 (talk) 23:17, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: you don't want to extend the definition of internal questions beyond existence questions because that is all Thomasson talks about. Carnap says: "Once we have accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., "Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?" Do you think what Carnap is asking is "Does a white piece of paper exist on my desk?" or is he asking "Is the while piece of paper located on my desk?" Maybe this is overly ambiguous, but it would seem more natural to ask if 'paper' exists or 'desk' exists, than if 'paper on the desk' exists. The contrast between 'internal' and 'external' questions is described as "external questions cannot be settled within a framework, but rather concern the status and legitimacy of the framework itself." We also have this explanation: "Internal questions may concern definitions or facts, and thus may be decided through either logical or empirical mechanisms (that is, they may be analytic or synthetic); what distinguishes them from external questions is the fact that they presuppose the linguistic framework in which they are asked." The huge emphasis in discussion upon 'existence questions' is because most philosophers are not interested in the trivial tautological aspects but in the ontological (i.e. existence) implications. Brews ohare (talk) 23:57, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob I would be happier with a secondary source for the first part, but otherwise its an improvement on what we have at the moment. Brews I think you are making an artificial distinction its all about existence. ----Snowded ^TALK 00:24, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Au contraire, mon cher; I am insisting that 'internal' questions go beyond existence questions. Brews ohare (talk) 01:56, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Actually, all of the first part, i.e. first paragraph, is supported by the secondary source Thomasson(2013). I can make that clearer by removing all the current citations and placing the following footnote at the end of each paragraph.

1. Amie L Thomasson (2013). "Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology". §1. Carnap's approach to existence questions. Retrieved 06-04-2013. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help) To be published in Ontology after Carnap Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.)

(Section 1 of this reference by Thomasson is summarizing and explaining "§2. Linguistic frameworks" of Carnap, Rudolf (1950). "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 4: 20–40. Reprinted in Carnap, Rudolf (1956). "Supplement A. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". Meaning and necessity: a study in semantics and modal logic (2 ed.). University of Chicago Press. pp. 205–221. — On-line version.)

--Bob K31416 (talk) 05:54, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

OK, go with it ----Snowded ^TALK 06:31, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

(edit conflict)I made this change in my above draft.[2] --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:53, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Although Snowded has endorsed your paragraph, he has not engaged at all in discussing its content. As I have pointed out earlier and more emphatically below (see this) there are unresolved issues here regarding Carnap's meaning for 'internal' and 'external' questions that require full discussion. It is insufficient to rest all authority upon one discussion by Thomasson that is focused narrowly upon existence issues. Brews ohare (talk) 12:40, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Two important issues

The most glaring problems with this paragraph are:

1. The statement: "In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions." While true, it is more generally true that all questions posed within a framework are 'internal' questions.

2. The statement: "Existence questions that are not asked inside a linguistic framework are called by Carnap 'external questions'." While true, it is more generally true that all questions posed outside a linguistic framework are 'external questions'.

I have provided this quotation from a third party in support of these more general statements:

"Internal questions may concern definitions or facts, and thus may be decided through either logical or empirical mechanisms (that is, they may be analytic or synthetic); what distinguishes them from external questions is the fact that they presuppose the linguistic framework in which they are asked."

It is clear that matters of 'definition and fact' are not limited to simple existence issues. For example, in the framework of geometry, the question "Is a square a rectangle?" is not an existence question, but it is a question internal to the framework of geometry.

I also have included the following remark from a different third party:

"External questions cannot be settled within a framework, but rather concern the status and legitimacy of the framework itself."

Clearly, questions about the status of a framework (for example, whether Euclidian or Riemannian geometry apply to some particular situation) go beyond simple existence issues. Carnap would call such a decision a pragmatic matter of practical concern, the only sort of external question he allows as having significance.

Now perhaps, Snowded, you would object that these sources lack sufficient stature in your mind. Bob may feel the same way. But that is no reason to simply ride roughshod over these views and avoid all discussion based upon the fact that Thomasson's article Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology happens to focus upon the existence issues. These matters require a full and proper discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 12:21, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Here is a discussion from one more source:

"So long as we can identify a specific language, in whatever way, we can also draw Carnap's internal/external distinction. For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal questions within it, and the general internal questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific notion of logical consequence; and we can also identify a practical external question about whether we should adopt such a language."

Brews ohare (talk) 13:26, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Let's look at the issue regarding 'internal questions' first. In all the quoted excerpts you gave regarding this, could you reread them with 'internal existence question' substituted for 'internal question' and see if they still make sense? --Bob K31416 (talk) 14:58, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Is it your notion that none of the sources intend to state the general position that 'internal' means internal and 'external' means external? Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

This 'test' you propose seems to me to amount to this: if a statement is true not only of a set of objects but of a sub-set, then it is preferable to adopt the more restricted view that the statement applies only to the sub-set. Brews ohare (talk) 15:18, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

To be less argumentative about this, the answer is 'no'. I see no way to restrict the sentence: "For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal questions within it, and the general internal questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific notion of logical consequence"; to being strictly true only of existence questions. And there isn't any doubt that Euclidean geometry is an example of a framework, and that 'Is a square a rectangle?' is an internal question within this framework. Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

To elaborate further, when it comes time to discuss Quine and the notion of 'analytic' statements (those that are true by virtue of semantics, and not by virtue of the nature of the world we live in), the idea of 'internal' questions must allow inclusion of analytic statements and questions. Otherwise, there is just nothing for Quine to talk about. Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Re "To be less argumentative about this, the answer is 'no'. I see no way to restrict the sentence: 'For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal existence questions within it, and the general internal existence questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific notion of logical consequence'; to being strictly true only of existence questions." — Using this sentence in a follow-up of my previous message, here it is with the substitution of 'internal existence question' for 'internal question',

"For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal existence questions within it, and the general internal existence questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific notion of logical consequence."

Does this sentence make sense? --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:44, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Of course it does make sense. It also makes sense in the original and more general form: "For once we have identified a language, then we can identify particular internal questions within it, and the general internal questions whose answers follow logically from the former, given a specific notion of logical consequence." Maybe I have the wrong idea here, but I think you are headed in the direction that a narrower interpretation being true, it is more correct than the original broader formulation that naturally included the narrower one. In a different example, "Murder using a weapon is wrong" includes "Murder using a knife is wrong". Brews ohare (talk) 00:18, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

When you posted this quoted excerpt and the others using 'internal question', I thought your point was that in the context of those excerpts, 'internal question' couldn't mean just 'internal existence question' because it wouldn't make sense. If that wasn't your point , then what was the point of providing all those excerpts? --Bob K31416 (talk) 00:34, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Sorry I was not clear. My point was that internal questions are not limited to questions of existence, but include any and all questions of whatever nature that can be posed using the vocabulary of a linguistic framework. An example I have used is: "Is a square a rectangle?". This is a question of an analytic nature, not an existence question like: "Is there such a thing as a square?" or: "Is a square real?". It is a question 'internal' to the framework, and is answered using the rules and definitions of whatever geometry we have selected.

If some uncertainties remain, please let me know. Brews ohare (talk) 03:59, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

A different example posed internal to the system of natural numbers would be "Is 6 greater than 5?" It is not a question like "Does the number 5 exist?" or "Is the number 5 real". It is an internal question decided by the rules and definitions of the system of integers. Brews ohare (talk) 04:08, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Re "My point was that internal questions are not limited to questions of existence" — Here's an excerpt from the first paragraph of "§2. Linguistic frameworks" of the source Carnap(1950) where Carnap explicitly defines the term 'internal question'.

"And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions."

Do you know of any excerpt where Carnap has explicitly modified this definition of 'internal question' to include questions other than just questions of existence? --Bob K31416 (talk) 04:44, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Hi Bob: We are becoming real lawyers over this eh? You will notice that the first sentence "And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence" explicitly restricts the discussion to questions of existence. That of course does not suggest that there are no other kinds of questions. The reason for this focus is that a major subject of debate with Quine is 'ontology' which deals with existence issues. I believe that my lengthy exposition based upon Carnap quotes illustrates some situations that are more general. However, I'll look at this harder tomorrow. Am I to understand that you do not wish to entertain the other authors I've quoted? Brews ohare (talk) 05:17, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Re "You will notice that the first sentence 'And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence' explicitly restricts the discussion to questions of existence." — Yes, it is a discussion of existence questions, and the term 'internal question' is defined as "questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework". No other definition of 'internal question' is given in Carnap(1950) that includes questions other than questions of existence.

Re "Am I to understand that you do not wish to entertain the other authors I've quoted? " — No. You can quote other authors and we'll see if any of them explicitly modify Carnap's definition of 'internal question' to include questions other than questions of existence. --Bob K31416 (talk) 05:45, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob, I'll look further into this, although I think the point has already been made. Your statement: "the term 'internal question' is defined as ‘questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework’." over-reaches. What Carnap says verbatim is : “And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions.” You have chosen to ignore the topic sentence: distinguish two kinds of questions of existence and taken the subject instead to be inclusive of all and every type of question. It isn't; it is a discussion of the types of existence question. I emphasize this point lest you think Carnap has defined out of existence what are usually called analytic statements, which would make the argument over the analytic-synthetic distinction unintelligible. Carnap and indeed nobody would argue that a question like "Is 6 > 5?" exists as an external question. You would argue that it also is not an internal question, so apparently the division into 'internal' and 'external' is not all-encompassing and there are other kinds of questions that cannot be classified either way. Brews ohare (talk) 15:15, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

In fact, the accurate statement is that 'existence' questions of all types do not exhaust the population of all questions, while the classifications of 'internal' and 'external' together & jointly include all possible questions. Brews ohare (talk) 16:58, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Would it settle the matter if it is shown that internal questions encompass all analytic questions (like "Are all bachelors unmarried"), not just existence question? Brews ohare (talk) 15:24, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

If you have something in mind, I'll look at it. --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:05, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Here are four quotes from Carnap's Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology

1. “To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing accepting or rejecting them.”
2. “If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question.”
3. “The acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. (Thus, for example, the thing language contains certainly words of the type of "blue" and "house" before the framework of properties is introduced; and it may contain words like "ten" in sentences of the form "I have ten fingers" before the framework of numbers is introduced.)”
4. “After the new forms are introduced into the language, it is possible to formulate with their help internal questions and possible answers to them. A question of this kind may be either empirical or logical; accordingly a true answer is either factually true or analytic.”

I believe this sequence of quotations introduces the subject and the definition of 'internal' questions. Brews ohare (talk) 15:32, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Here is Kate Stafford:

"According to Carnap, discussing a new kind of entity requires the construction of a linguistic framework, defined as a new set of rules governing the ways in which these entities are described and referenced. A linguistic framework is thus a way of organizing human communication about particular sets of experiences or observations. For every linguistic framework there exist two types of questions: internal questions, which are asked and answered within the framework, and external questions asked of the larger system within which the entities are supposed to exist. [...] Internal questions may concern definitions or facts, and thus may be decided through either logical or empirical mechanisms (that is, they may be analytic or synthetic); what distinguishes them from external questions is the fact that they presuppose the linguistic framework in which they are asked. Thus “Where did I leave my keys?”, “Is ice frozen water?”, “Who was Julius Caesar’s father?”, and “What kind of quarks are protons made of?” are all internal questions with respect to thing-language."

Brews ohare (talk) 16:03, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

Here is Juhl & Loomis (my underscore):

"Properly executed, an explication would show us how what looked like meaningful philosophical statements were in fact the result of confusing ‘internal’ questions about what is true within a particular language (such as analytic truths of that language) with ‘external’ questions about a system of language as a whole. In fact, Carnap argued, only internal questions are genuine, but internal questions do not require philosophers to answer them"

Brews ohare (talk) 16:46, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

• The Kate Stafford paper is not a reliable source since it was a paper by a student (Kate Stafford) for an assignment in her college class. (See the section "Examples of Student Work" in the lower part of this webpage.)
• The only explicit definition of 'internal question' that I could find in Juhl & Loomis was a quote of Carnap on p. 61 that was mentioned previously in this discussion,

"First, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions."

The quote in your last message seems to be using 'internal question' in a more general sense than the above definition, but since the quote in your last message isn't an explicit definition of the term, I don't think we should overrule Carnap and Thomasson by doing original research to construct a definition of 'internal question' from it. --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:05, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

I agree with you as to the status of the Kate Stafford source. However, you will agree that she sees things exactly as I do. Apparently she and I, in your view, have a common defect of understanding. I have no idea how you arrive at Juhl & Loomis as extending Carnap's meaning. They themselves think they are presenting Carnap's position, and you will be very, very hard-pressed to present anything from Carnap that contradicts them. (Bob, in the interest of objectivity, try this exercise. It cannot be done.)

I've provided quotes from Carnap and others about a more general meaning for internal questions. Apparently the failure to classify analytic statements like ‘squares are rectangles’ as internal questions does not trouble you, nor indeed the looming prospect in the next section of making sense of how the analytic-synthetic distinction was connected by Quine to the internal-external definitions.

I can support your saying that the vast majority of the literature is about ontology and has no other interest in the internal-external distinction beyond existence questions, because that is what ontology is about. I'd agree if that aspect were emphasized.

But I cannot agree with the idea of actually saying that Carnap and Thomasson support the view that the common-sense notion that 'internal' means internal to a framework and 'external' means external is wrong outside the realm of existence questions. That goes beyond anything they (or indeed any other sources) support.

Bob, your comment that we should not overrule Carnap and Thomasson is a wrong description of your suggestion. You do not accept that Thomasson's discussion is merely limited to 'existence' questions, but prefer to interpret it as a discussion that is somehow a limitation upon internal questions, although she (and no other author, either) says anything of the kind. Brews ohare (talk) 23:33, 7 June 2013 (UTC)

We don't seem to be communicating, so this ends the discussion for me. --Bob K31416 (talk) 00:16, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob, I don't think you read my reply - another TLDR, eh? Brews ohare (talk) 04:36, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

FWIW, I've read and considered every word of your messages in our discussions. The TL;DR comment I made to Snowded previously was referring to the problem facing editors other than you and me. I think there may be a lot of self deception in your personality in order to cope with the psychological challenges involved in editing Wikipedia. --Bob K31416 (talk) 13:25, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

Well, Bob, I am glad you read what I had to say. Mostly it agrees with you. The fundamental point of disagreement is simply that the statements by Kate Stafford and by Juhl & Thomas that you dismiss along with mine are not in conflict with Thomasson and Carnap, but compatible with them. That is not your position, but you have not found anything in Carnap or Thomasson to support incompatibility.

It may indeed be a personality disorder on my part to take such a matter seriously - how much concern should be given to yet another problem with presentation in Wikipedia? Brews ohare (talk) 14:52, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

A last remaining issue

The remaining issue I have with this paragraph is the statement:

"Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'."

This statement is almost verbatim from Thomasson, who says:

"Internal questions Carnap initially characterizes as “questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind [asked] within the framework”; they include questions (asked within the framework of everyday language) such as “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” (1950, 207)... "

However, in this case Thomasson has chosen words similar to Carnap's but has changed Carnap's meaning. Carnap says:

"Once we have accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., ‘Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?’"

Now Carnap explicitly says this question is to be asked within the "thing language", which is identified as "the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events". The 'thing language' is not everyday language, although it uses words that are also used in everyday language. The 'thing language' is not called 'everyday language' because it is not a synonym for 'everyday language'. Rather it is a linguistic framework.

The issue of whether 'everyday language' is a framework can be compared with Wittgenstein:

"I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all language. ...To repeat. we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.)" (Philosophical Investigations §65. §69).

In other words, to make a meaning sharp and relations precise, one has to abstract from 'everyday language' using a boundary upon meaning and relationships that serves a special purpose, in other words, a 'linguistic framework'. I am not suggesting that Wittgenstein is directly addressing Carnap in this instance (although he has done so elsewhere). The point is just to draw attention to the difference between usage for a special purpose and usage in everyday language. Brews ohare (talk) 14:51, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

This is a classic. You object to the secondary source on the basis of your interpretation of Carnap's meaning. Then you bring in your interpretation of Wittgenstein. This is clear original research. Otherwise I realise that not agreeing with you means I am not (in Brew's speak) engaging with the problem. The simple fact is that I am not prepared to engage in discussion about primary sources. I am readily prepared to agree with an editor who uses secondary ones ----Snowded ^TALK 14:58, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

These remarks have been clearly identified as an attempt to convey the issues here for purposes of discussion. On the other hand, Snowded, your remarks are interpretable as an attempt to block discussion of this matter by introduction of hostility and derision. Brews ohare (talk) 15:08, 6 June 2013 (UTC)

How to proceed

Snowded, Considering the long discussions that I have been having with Brews ohare, it doesn't seem worthwhile for me to continue working on this article. --Bob K31416 (talk) 00:37, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

I an understand that fully. Once he has decided on an interpretation or an approach he will not let go. Hence his block record. I'm loosing the will to live over multiple articles so I'm really just policing at the moment to make sure we don't get a mass of original research and/or synthesis. However you showed more patience than I so kudos! ----Snowded ^TALK 01:13, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: As is your wont, rather than contribute to understanding of material or between editors, you step in to help widen any rift with no comment about content or assistance with meeting of minds. Instead it is just one more opportunity for slander and self-congratulation. Brews ohare (talk) 14:56, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: The length of the discussion between us is not a problem; the problem is its course.

We have a situation where you wish to assert that Carnap's and Thomasson's discussions about 'internal existence questions' are an indication that the only internal questions are internal existence questions.

I wish to assert that is not the case, that 'internal' questions include questions about how the framework is constructed - like "Are squares rectangles?".

Now how is this to be reconciled? I have tried three approaches to meet your objection: (i) providing sources that agree with me. You discount them. (ii) providing quotes from Carnap that support me. You ignore them. (iii) providing the logical point that discussing internal existence questions is not tantamount to saying other kinds of internal questions do not exist. You ignore this point.

So, from my standpoint, the reason for the length of our exchange is that I have tried several ways to reach you, but you do not respond directly. Could you do that? Brews ohare (talk) 15:48, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

I have inserted one word 'existence' into your text that, in my opinion, makes it factual although not as illuminating as it might be. If you consent to this change, I'll close our discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 16:16, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded inconveniently removed the text with my additions of the word 'existence' so you may find it here. A few other minor changes were made that have no effect upon your meaning. Brews ohare (talk) 22:18, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

There is no point in agreeing something on the talk page if your first reaction to not having wider changes accepted is to attempt to qualify the agreed text. its time wasting. You don't think Bob responds directly, you don;t think I respond to your content discussions. Well take that revert as a response. If you can't agree something on the talk page leave the article alone. ----Snowded ^TALK 22:22, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

I am unaware of any agreement so far, and my changes were, I thought, a minor change that would meet Bob's approval. You, Snowded, were anxious to intervene where intervention was unnecessary. I think Bob can look after things quite well. Brews ohare (talk) 02:34, 9 June 2013 (UTC)

My above comments stand ----Snowded ^TALK 08:46, 9 June 2013 (UTC)

The analytic/synthetic distinction

The section Meta-ontology#Carnap_and_Quine refers to the focus of Inwagen's introduction of the term 'meta-ontology' as being motivated by the presentation of Carnap's and Quine's positions on the analytic/synthetic distinction. This is the idea, then, as to why the presentation is set up in this way.

However, the subsequent discussion of Carnap's position does not mention the analytic/synthetic distinction.

It would appear some additional remarks are needed about Carnap's position on the analytic/synthetic distinction in order to follow through with the ostensible purpose of bringing it all up. Brews ohare (talk) 18:47, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

It may be that as an alternative the first sentences should be changed to characterize Inwagen's discussion of the Quine-Carnap debate differently. That might avoid the need to go into the analytic-synthetic question. Brews ohare (talk) 19:21, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

I am bewildered to find that Inwagen's work actually refers neither to the analytic/synthetic distinction nor to the internal/external distinction. He has one footnote (number 10) that says "See for example Quine’s discussion (Quine 1951) of Carnap’s distinction between “internal” and “external” questions." which is a footnote to Inwagen's reference to Quine's treatment of "quantification in ontological contexts", whatever one wants to make of that. He says that " Quine’s meta-ontology comprises such propositions as his theses on quantification and ontological commitment and he goes on to list 5 aspects of this work that he thinks are meta-ontology. It begins to appear that we need a different way to connect the Quine-Carnap dispute to meta-ontology. Inwagen is not going to do it. Maybe Thomasson will do it? Brews ohare (talk) 20:24, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

It illustrates the subject Brews, it is not the subject ----Snowded ^TALK 20:34, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

It is hard to understand your remark, Snowded. The evaluation of the ontologies presented in the Carnap and Quine sections is intended to illustrate meta-ontology, but the connection has not been made so far. Brews ohare (talk) 20:53, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

Inwagen's description illustrates his use of the term 'meta-ontology' which is what this is all about. You constantly seek to extend that into a detailed discussion of the Quine-Carnap debate. The problem with this has been explained to you by at least two editors in your posting on primary sources at the RS discussion but you seem not to be listening/paying attention to that. Also you need to think about how many actual edits you are managing to get into the articles you are working on, the lack of support from other editors and the sheer length of your postings on talk pages. Its getting too much and you are therefore getting minimal responses and engagement. That is only going to get worse over time unless you keep it shorter and within policy ----Snowded ^TALK 22:07, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

As you often do , Snowded, you have misrepresented the point of my remarks in their entirety to make some room for a rant about my behavior that contributes nothing to the evolution of this article. Brews ohare (talk) 22:22, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

Its not a rant Brews, its advice ----Snowded ^TALK 22:24, 8 June 2013 (UTC)

You are so kind to look for my welfare. I'd rather you attended to contributing to the article. Brews ohare (talk)

The advise related to your contributions and it stands ----Snowded ^TALK 08:47, 9 June 2013 (UTC)

Thomasson on Carnapian metaontology

In her Prospects paper, Thomasson refers to Price's distinction between use and mention as an interpretation of the internal/external division. One can use a term only within a framework, but in discussing frameworks one can mention a term without need for a particular framework. Quoting Price: "The only legitimate external questions simply mention the terms in question." She speaks about the Carnapian approach to metaontology, and I'd propose that it is this that we want to point out in the Carnap section of the article on meta-ontology. She claims that Carnap has restricted the existence of entities to existence within a framework, but there is work to be done in explaining how conceptual choices between frameworks are to be made. These are pragmatic issues, discussed by 'mentioning' concepts, not inquiries into what really exists. That is the Carnapian deflationary ontology. How is this matter to be presented? Brews ohare (talk) 17:49, 9 June 2013 (UTC)

In order to include that material you would need to show how it applies specifically to the article subject. The purpose of the material on Carnap is to illustrate the subject, this is not an article on Carnap per se. We also need to remember that metaontology is a post Carnapian term so talking about Carnapian metaontology makes no sense. ----Snowded ^TALK 22:44, 9 June 2013 (UTC)

It's great to hear from you Snowded, but you are again taking it a bit too easy on yourself in identifying the ridiculous and the impossible. Although the word was coined after the era of Carnap, it doesn't mean that it can't be applied to some of his activities, as is in fact done by Thomasson. She would be hurt, I imagine, to hear your judgment. Brews ohare (talk) 00:54, 10 June 2013 (UTC)

And if we look at Thomasson's use in so far as it illustrates the topic of the article that is fine Brews. Try and read before you respond ----Snowded ^TALK 01:25, 10 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: do you have any particular comments to make about the above presentation of Thomasson's views about Carnapian meta-ontology? In her introduction she says "the prospects for a neo-Carnapian meta-ontology are really rather good" One might suppose that a neo-Carnapian meta-ontology presupposes a Carnapian meta-ontology. Do you agree? She continues by discussing the 'internal-external' separation of Carnap. I gather that the Carnapian meta-ontology is the meta-consideration that an ontology consists of two parts - the internal part related to frameworks and the external part that prevails outside frameworks. It is 'meta'-ontology because it is not about a particular ontology but a view of ontologies in general, regardless of their particular assertions about what is. At any rate, apparently Thomasson thinks this is meta-ontology and, when it is combined with Carnap's views about the nature of the two portions of all ontologies, calls it "Carnapian deflationism". BTW, Price entitles §2 of his paper: 'Carnap's Deflationism' and also focuses upon his internal-external division of all ontolgies. Brews ohare (talk) 15:37, 10 June 2013 (UTC)

Propose an amendment and I will look at it Brews, but I am not prepared to waste anymore time engaging in general discussion of the topic ----Snowded ^TALK 20:39, 10 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: A preliminary problem is the introductory sentence "Inwagen exemplified meta-ontology by analyzing Quine's critique of Carnap's analytic/synthetic distinction" because it is incorrect. Inwagen's notion of meta-ontology was concerned with Quine's methodology in applying quantification and ontological commitment. In contrast, Thomasson's concern is with the internal-external distinction, which is what she calls Carnap's meta-ontology, and what she and Price call 'Carnapian deflationism'. Deflationism is a form of meta-ontology, which in Carnap's case depends upon his internal-external distinction. So we first have to determine whether you agree with this appraisal. I have laid out the basis for the latter. Inwagen's own paper is adequate basis for the first. You can just look at the situation and decide what you think is going on, or suggest what needs to be done to establish the point in your opinion if these three sources appear to you inadequate. Brews ohare (talk) 14:49, 11 June 2013 (UTC)

I have changed the leading sentence to provide a more accurate description and segue to the following sub-subsections. Brews ohare (talk) 15:07, 11 June 2013 (UTC)

I have added a summary paragraph to the section on Carnap with additional sources. Brews ohare (talk) 15:46, 11 June 2013 (UTC)

The article should not be an extended article on the Carnap-Quine debate, it is here only used as an illustration. We really need to cut that section back to a one/two paragraph summary not extend it. I have simplified the first sentence and removed your additional paragraph. ----Snowded ^TALK 20:48, 11 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your explanation here for reverting useful changes to the section Meta-ontology#Carnap_and_Quine based upon simply your personal conception of how long the section should be is completely arbitrary and simply your personal taste. Your predilections (already expressed in your merger proposal) are not WP policy. Brews ohare (talk) 14:00, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

The summary paragraph you removed and I have replaced serves several purposes. Among them, it identifies what is Carnapian meta-ontology, which should be done as this article is about 'meta-ontology', and it supplies supporting references for this identification. It also introduces the term 'Carnapian deflationism', with sources for its identification, a form of Carnapian meta-ontology that goes further than his internal-external division and also belongs in a section about Carnap's position. Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your version of what Inwagen said and did is incorrect. Brews ohare (talk) 14:10, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Brews you are in my opinion expanding this material beyond its purpose of explaining the term, You are writing essays and your explanation if the summary paragraph confirms this. You may have your own 'arbitary' views of the article that exhibit your own 'personal taste' but I am afraid I disagree with you. So I have reverted while we resolve this. ----Snowded ^TALK 20:03, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

It appears the 'we' who have to resolve this consist of you and I. Inasmuch as you have afforded no explanation of just why you think this contribution is a personal 'essay', which I find no grounds for saying, and a matter of 'personal taste', again unsubstantiated, can you provide anything more substantial in the way of opposing this contribution? Brews ohare (talk) 20:51, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Just above your last entry, I have pointed out the purpose and accomplishments of the summary paragraph, and it is all sourced, not a matter of my opinion at all. Can you make any objective comments about it? Brews ohare (talk) 20:54, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

I have stated clearly that in my opinion the article is about meta-ontology and material on Carnap-Quine is only relevant in so far as it explains the subject. Your paragraph (and other material) was an expansion of said debate that adds nothing to the article. As I also said if anything the material should be shortened and summarised If you don't find that clear then I'm not sure how else to explain it to you. As to terms like 'personal taste', don't use them and try and recognise irony when you see it, the quotation marks were there to help you spot that.----Snowded ^TALK 21:07, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your opinion that this article should be not only shortened but merged with Ontology are perfectly clear. What you do not recognize is that your desires are not based upon any substantial argument. If 'personal taste' is irony when you use it, well, right back at you. Brews ohare (talk) 21:16, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Your claim that the summary paragraph makes no contribution to the article is refuted by what has been said already: "Among its contributions, it identifies what is Carnapian meta-ontology, which should be done as this article is about 'meta-ontology', and it supplies supporting references for this identification. It also introduces the term 'Carnapian deflationism', with sources for its identification, a form of Carnapian meta-ontology that goes further than his internal-external division and also belongs in a section about Carnap's position." Brews ohare (talk) 21:19, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

You have already driven one editor who tried to work with you from participation; not sure if you have learning any lesson from that. I've increasingly lost any motivation to explain things to you again and again when you don't listen to anyone who disagrees with you. The issue of merge and relevance are separate ones as you should know. In respect of your second paragraph, you make my point well. You are trying to make this a general essay on Carnap rather than its use as an exemplar or illustration of the use of the term meta-ontology. It is essay writing and also WP:Synth in respect of what you are choosing as important. ----Snowded ^TALK 21:24, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: You have never undertaken to explain anything beyond your personal opinions based upon nothing at all. Your remarks about the above summary are in direct conflict with its content and my statement of its purpose. Brews ohare (talk) 02:57, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

To support my assertions, notice the following points. The proposed summary paragraph points out specifically that Carnap's meta-ontology consists of two parts: his internal-external distinction and his deflationism. The material preceding the summary does not do this, so the summary is useful in clarifying the connection to the article's subject: Meta-ontology.

You have not argued about this; instead you launch again into your refrain about my personal deficiencies (as you see them) and your noble patience in avoiding all useful activity. Critique the material, not its contributor. Brews ohare (talk) 13:51, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

Read the above, then read Mark 7:5 Brews. The explanation is clear, you either don't want to, or can't understand it. I've had enough of repeating myself in the face of obduracy ----Snowded ^TALK 20:42, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

Mark 7:5 " And the Pharisees and the scribes asked him, “Why do your disciples not walk according to the tradition of the elders, but eat with defiled hands?” " What is the relevance here, Snowded? It appears to me that it has little to do with critiquing me instead of the material. The proposed summary paragraph points out specifically that Carnap's meta-ontology consists of two parts: his internal-external distinction and his deflationism. The material preceding the summary does not do this, so the summary is useful in clarifying the connection to the article's subject: Meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 00:13, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

Matthew not Mark - sorry Brews my memory failed me there I should have looked it up. Mind you I rather like the error, raises interesting questions ----Snowded ^TALK 10:22, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

One more instance of a common occurrence: quotation of scripture to duck issues and avoid thought about the issues. The proposed summary paragraph points out specifically that Carnap's meta-ontology consists of two parts: his internal-external distinction and his deflationism. The material preceding the summary does not do this, so the summary is useful in clarifying the connection to the article's subject: Meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 14:09, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

Quine's approach

The section Meta-ontology#Quine's approach jumps from the internal-external distinction of Carnap to the analytic-synthetic distinction as though these two ideas were the same. That is not so, and the relation between the two has to be established if the analytic/synthetic distinction is to be brought up. Quine's Two dogmas of empiricism, often taken as his definitive critique of Carnap, is all about the analytic/synthetic division. However, it is addressed to Carnap's book about logic, his Meaning and Necessity, and Carnap's formulation of his meta-ontology, his Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, does not mention this subject at all. Brews ohare (talk) 15:53, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Yablo calls this "guilt by association". Carnap includes both analytic and synthetic statements within 'internal questions', that is, internal questions may concern definitions or facts, and thus may be decided through either logical or empirical means. According to Decock "The construction of logical frameworks led to a distinction between logical statements and descriptive statements. This was called the analytic-synthetic distinction, and it can be regarded as the successor of both the Kantian analytic/synthetic and a priori-a/posteriori distinctions." According to Alspector-Kelly "The role of the analytic/synthetic distinction in Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology is independent of the internal/external distinction and of Carnap's repudiation of external questions." Graham Bird accuses Quine of a mistaken identification of the two: "Now it is one thing to claim that the analytic/synthetic distinction can be used to support the external/internal distinction, and another to claim that the contrasts are effectively identical. Yet it is the stronger claim which Quine also indicates..." Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

My suggestion about how to treat this issue is to point out Quine conflated the two distinctions, and several authors have pointed out that this is a mistaken view. Brews ohare (talk) 16:33, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

A problem impacting this discussion of the analytic/synthetic distinction arises from its apparent exclusion implied in the preceding discussion of Carnap in Meta-ontology#Linguistic frameworks. This discussion contains an ambiguity allowing the mistaken implication that all internal questions are existence questions. That interpretation excludes all 'analytic' statements, and vitiates any consideration of the analytic/synthetic distinction. I've suggested this ambiguity be fixed by inserting the adjective 'existence' in the statement (underscored addition): "questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal existence questions" Brews ohare (talk) 16:48, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

I've incorporated some of these sources and a brief statement in the section Meta-ontology#Quine's approach. Brews ohare (talk) 17:28, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Please stop opening multiple and lengthy threads, its seems designed to break up discussion and discourage other editors from participation. ----Snowded ^TALK 20:05, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: It is a separate issue, and there is no reason to delay its discussion while other matters are underway. As usual, you have made no comments about the specific content of this (or any other) proposed material. Brews ohare (talk) 21:09, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Same issue, expansion of material beyond that relevant to the article name. ----Snowded ^TALK 21:14, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

It is (as I am sure you know) ridiculous to say in an article that discusses meta-ontology that pointing out that Quine's objections to Carnap's meta-ontology are known to be an erroneous conflation of internal/external with analytic/synthetic, for which three sources are supplied. I am afraid that your main objection to this material is that I am involved in its contribution here, especially as no alternative reason in line with WP etiquette or policy is presented by you. Brews ohare (talk) 21:27, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

My objection is as stated Brews. Your statement shows that you are attempting additional commentary over and above what is needed. Further that what is there is excessive and needs to be summarised into a paragraph or two. Your involvement over many articles is highly disruptive, but where you have made a useful contribution I have not reverted. The fact that you seem unable to learn from interactions with multiple editors over time is your problem not mine----Snowded ^TALK 22:13, 12 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your reply above is pure blather without one word of content. Brews ohare (talk) 02:55, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

Having examined this dispute, I would have to say I concur with Snowded. Please stop reverting. FreeKnowledgeCreator (talk) 07:51, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

FreeKnowledge: In common with Snowded, you make no substantive comment about the proposed additional material, but simply add a ‘me too!!’ Let me point out what you are subscribing to. The last half of the present section on Quine is about his arguments concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction. No connection is made between this topic and meta-ontology, the subject of this article. Carnap's meta-ontology concerns the internal-external distinction, not the analytic-synthetic distinction. Confusion over the connection between the two is historically important, so probably the topic should be brought up, but if that is done, it requires clarification.

The proposed material, which Snowded and now yourself object to, points out these facts, and provides three impeccable sources to back it up. So, what is the objection, specifically? Brews ohare (talk) 13:39, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

Brews, the point is that this is an article about meta-ontology, not one about the connection/difference between 'distinctions'. So if you want to remove material that would be welcome. At most we should have one/two summary paragraphs ----Snowded ^TALK 20:36, 13 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: The added material about Quine is about about a confusion over what Quine objected to when he made meta-ontological assertions about Carnap's approach - the analytic/synthetic viz a viz the internal/external. I think you should read the material again, perhaps a little more slowly so it can sink in. Brews ohare (talk) 01:51, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

No Brews I won't. I have made a point that you don't accept. Just repeating again and again and again and again that you think you are right is not going to make a difference. The edit is not agreed ----Snowded ^TALK 10:20, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: It is odd that you tire of 'repeating over and over again' your 'point'. Your 'point' as stated above is that Meta-ontology an article about 'meta-ontology'. We all know that. To progress further it would help to know how the proposed material fails to qualify as being about meta-ontology.

You say, Snowded, that pointing out that the 'analytic-synthetic' argument is considered by many philosophers as not correctly used by Quine in addressing Carnap is not significant. The 'analytic-synthetic' argument underlies a very large part of Quine's work and reputation and is the basis for several articles on WP: among them radical translation, indeterminacy of translation, holophrastic indeterminacy, inscrutability of reference. So, without the analytic-synthetic arguments, we are left with (possibly) ontological commitment and existential quantification. Apparently you think the treatment of Quine's meta-ontology need not alert the reader to any of this background, because "it is not 'meta-ontology'". The weak basis for this position leads me to think your resistance is for other reasons, not the nature of the material you object to, which clearly does fall under meta-ontology and is discussed as meta-ontology by Inwagen, Thomasson, Price, Eklund, Bird ... Brews ohare (talk) 14:02, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

The material is only relevant in so far as it illustrates what the term means Brews. You seem to what to use this article for an extended discussion which is not related to that. I have made no comment on the relevance of the analytic-synthetic argument to Quine's work and reputation ----Snowded ^TALK 20:24, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your comment is baffling. You say "material is only relevant in so far as it illustrates what the term means". I simply do not understand how that applies here. The subject is meta-ontology. The article discusses the analytic-synthetic distinction. Is that meta-ontology? Should it be in the article?

Quine and many others argue that the analytic-synthetic distinction is untenable. Fine. They also argue that this has a bearing upon Carnap's meta-ontology. That is debatable, inasmuch as Carnap's meta-ontology is about the internal-external distinction, and places the analytic-synthetic distinction entirely within the internal part of this division. Hence, at least from Carnap's viewpoint, the analytic-synthetic distinction is not about the internal-external division of Carnap's ontology.

So I ask you: isn't the above paragraph all about meta-ontology? Isn't it, therefore, part of the subject of meta-ontology? And so, shouldn't it be in the WP article on Meta-ontology? What is going on here? Brews ohare (talk) 18:19, 15 June 2013 (UTC)

Sorry you are baffled Brews, but the position is very simple, this is not the place for an extended discussion on something which is used to illustrate a topic. ----Snowded ^TALK 18:31, 15 June 2013 (UTC)

Well, Snowded, you string words together that sound like English, but they aren't. Brews ohare (talk) 19:39, 15 June 2013 (UTC)

This discussion is becoming tendentious and unproductive. I think the bottom line here, Brews, is that you should not be trying to press through changes that don't have agreement on talk. FreeKnowledgeCreator (talk) 04:12, 16 June 2013 (UTC)

FreeKnowledge: I am not 'trying to press through changes'. What I am trying to do is obtain something about how the proposed Quine material is not acceptable. Snowded makes only airy assertions unrelated to this material, mostly about my poor character as an editor. You could help a lot here by identifying anything objectionable in this material, so I can fix it. Brews ohare (talk) 19:03, 16 June 2013 (UTC)

Or continuing to make personal attacks. Brews I think you either don't want to or can't understand the point. Its very similar to things you did not understand on Physics articles on 3 RfCs on Philosophy articles. Maybe its time to realise the problem is you not other editors. If you don't then I think the community will run out of patience again ----Snowded ^TALK 08:24, 16 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: There are certainly elements of a lack of productivity here. However, you just don't seem to think my confusion is genuine. I do not understand your criteria for what is relevant to Meta-ontology. My interpretation of your words as ordinary English seems to be different from yours.

To me, the article is open to discussion of various meta-ontological approaches (like Carnap's internal-external divisions, Quine's analytic-synthetic & so forth) and also to comparing and contrasting approaches. You apparently do not agree with this view, but I don't understand how your criteria lead to exclusion. Your wording "material is only relevant in so far as it illustrates what the term means" appears to me to include what I want to include.

Maybe (I'm guessing) 'illustrates' is intended to say "not every important discussion but only the bare bones needed to establish the meaning of the word 'meta-ontology'?" If that is your criterion, why would this article be restricted in this way? It's not usual. WP:WINAD.

So don't rant about 'my problems'. It isn't that I can't hear you; it is that you have not articulated clearly what you want to say. Brews ohare (talk) 18:37, 16 June 2013 (UTC)

I have tried to explain why I'm having trouble with your exclusion of the Quine material. You haven't answered any of my questions. You have not critiqued the proposed material on Quine. You simply complain about me, and say nothing specific about the content. Brews ohare (talk) 18:48, 16 June 2013 (UTC)

I have been very specific on content Brews but your refusal to listen means that sooner or later its necessary to comment on the behavioural issues. I will repeat the content point for the upteenth tim. An article on meta-ontology is one on meta-ontology, it is not the place for an extended elaboration of one debate used to illustrate that theme. Your questions which relate to the elaboration are not being answered because the connection is to the elaboration itself. Oh and I am not talking about 'bare bones' restrictions but one of 'sufficiency to purpose' and that is very usual. Otherwise if I actually 'rant' you can use the word, but given that I am not its a personal attack. Also I suspect your confusion is genuine and it is what has caused the problem here and on other articles, plus the problems on Physics. It takes a lot for the community to turn a one year ban to an indef. You need to learn from that. ----Snowded ^TALK 21:49, 16 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your longer response contains only one on-topic sentence in all that stuff about my failure to listen and to learn. It is this: "An article on meta-ontology is one on meta-ontology, it is not the place for an extended elaboration of one debate used to illustrate that theme."

You haven't attempted to explain how this general remark applies to the proposed material on Quine. So I'll try to formulate its application below.

The precept says firstly: “An article on meta-ontology is one on meta-ontology”. Now I don't think anyone doubts that.

That brings us to the second part of the precept: “it [an article on meta-ontology] is not the place for an extended elaboration of one debate used to illustrate that theme [that is, the “theme” of 'meta-ontology'].”I'll argue there are (at least) two debates, and only one is being included:

Here are the two debates about Quine in the literature viz a viz his meta-ontological comments on Carnap:

1. The question of Inwagen's paper, which deals with how satisfactorily Quine's meta-ontology applies to the analytic-synthetic distinction.
2. The question about how satisfactory is the internal-external distinction, the feature characterizing Carnap's meta-ontology, which is not the analytic-synthetic distinction. Quine botched this point according to the literature.

So Snowded, we have a peculiarly one-sided approach: the first debate that most authors agree has the least to do with Carnap's meta-ontology, and which has been mistakenly confounded with the real issue, is given much space; while the the second debate, which is the more pertinent, you object to including at all.

Personally I think both debates should be present, and their differences pointed out. Both debates are discussed widely in the literature. Sources have been provided.

So, Snowded, what is the basis for including one debate and not the other? Can you answer this question by comment directed specifically at the proposed material on Quine, rather than easy generalities that seem to be simply an expression of personal preferences? Brews ohare (talk) 00:59, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

How many threads are you going to open? See response to section below ----Snowded ^TALK 04:55, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded's basis for refusal: Part 1

Snowded says he has refused the proposed material on Quine because:

You can report what the authors who use meta-ontology say about the debate in so far as it relates to an understanding of that word. you can not develop an article based on your own interpretation (selection of primary sources) of that debate. Nothing to do with easy generalities or personal preference, other than possibly your personal preference for stringing together quotes from primary sources in contravention of wikipedia policy (as recently clarified for you on the reliable sources notice board) ----Snowded ^TALK 01:20, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Assuming the reason for your rejection of the proposed material is actually what you say here, the issue is that this material is seen by you as Brews' interpretation, not my own creation, but my own interpretation by virtue of my having selected particular primary sources. So let's look at the first part of the rejected material, which states:

A major part of Quine's critique of Carnap is his work Two Dogmas of Empiricism, which attacks the analytic/synthetic division of statements raised by Carnap in his book on logic: Meaning and Necessity. In regard to Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Frank Ryan concludes his article on the analytic–synthetic distinction:

Quine's pragmatic challenge to the analytic-synthetic distinction has won many sympathizers, including Nelson Goodman, Morton White, and Hilary Putnam. Critics, however, maintain that some notion of analyticity is indispensable to any coherent account of either formal systems or our everyday use of language. H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, for example, contend that analyticity, necessity, and cognitive synonymy constitute an internally coherent family of terms, which Quine takes out of context in appealing to extensional criteria such as semantic reference. Others follow Wittgenstein in restricting analyticity to pure logical tautology, noting that Quine himself does not contest logical truths or stipulations. Even such counterproposals, however, concede a severe curtailment of the distinction, and in the wake of challenges from pragmatism it is hard to envision the analytic and the synthetic ever again enthroned in resplendent isolation.

— Frank X. Ryan, "Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic" in American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia

Now you left the long Ryan quote in place, but removed the prolegomena. Now it is easily verifiable that Quine's critique in Two Dogmas of Empiricism is a critique of Carnap's Meaning and Truth and is the basis of Inwagen's paper Meta-ontology. These works are already cited in the article, and links to them are provided. I can, of course, footnote them again here, if you wish.

I find it improbable that you are unaware of these facts and these works and their content, or that you really believe that these introductory words forming the prolegomena is in any way 'my interpretation'. Your reasons for rejection therefore do not apply here, to this part of the proposed insertion about Quine.

Perhaps, like the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, you will switch now to some other objection. Failing some reasonable argument, I suggest this prolegomena be returned to the article. Brews ohare (talk) 04:21, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

My original reason, as stated my me, stands Brews ----Snowded ^TALK 04:54, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I guess you applied the WP:TLDR approach to my serious effort to allow a simple non-answer that required no thought. Your original reason not only does not stand, you are applying it in a situation where it is simply absurd. Read the discussion, and respond to the discussion. Make an effort, eh? Brews ohare (talk) 05:08, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

No Brews, I have responded before and you are not happy with the response Live with it. Just as on the RfC on Philosophy you seem to think that if anyone disagrees with you the solution is lengthly statements and restatements of your original argument. I've had enough of dealing with the same arguments time and time and time again. You have had reasonable arguments in response. The material should not be placed in the article unless you can get a consensus of other editors . At the moment you don't have that, this or most other places for that matter. Futher repitition will simply receive a See previous response note ----Snowded ^TALK 05:16, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

No, Snowded, it is not disagreement that makes me unhappy - disagreement is an opportunity to improve a contribution. It is deliberate obstructionism in the form of non-specific vague general objections that are not tied to the text under criticism and include nothing specific for improvement. And of course, sermons about my being deaf, dumb, and blind. Brews ohare (talk) 17:12, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

See comment in section below Brews and I see you are into personal attacks again ----Snowded ^TALK 19:58, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

I gather that pointing out your comments about myself is a personal attack upon you, Snowded. Hey. Why not? Brews ohare (talk) 21:36, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded's basis for refusal: Part 2

Snowded says he has refused the proposed material on Quine because:

You can report what the authors who use meta-ontology say about the debate in so far as it relates to an understanding of that word. you can not develop an article based on your own interpretation (selection of primary sources) of that debate. Nothing to do with easy generalities or personal preference, other than possibly your personal preference for stringing together quotes from primary sources in contravention of wikipedia policy (as recently clarified for you on the reliable sources notice board) ----Snowded ^TALK 01:20, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Assuming the reason for your rejection of the proposed material is actually what you say here, the issue is that this material is seen by you as Brews' interpretation, not my own creation, but my own interpretation by virtue of my having selected particular primary sources. So let's look at the second part of the rejected material, which states:

---

However, the analytic/synthetic distinction and the internal/external distinction are separate matters. As pointed out by Bird: "Now it is one thing to claim that the analytic/synthetic distinction can be used to support the external/internal distinction, and another to claim that the contrasts are effectively identical. Yet it is the stronger claim which Quine also indicates..." Accordingly, Quine's analysis of the analytic/synthetic distinction is not directly concerned with that part of Carnap's meta-ontology that rests on the internal/external distinction.

---

In this material, there is nothing originated by myself, as I think you would allow, but I don't think that is what you mean by my presenting 'my personal interpretation'. I think you are saying that these statements, while accurately portraying these three authors' views of the matter, may be a parochial view.

I can, of course, add to the list of authors holding the same view, namely that the analytic/synthetic division is distinct from the internal/external division, for example, Thomasson, Hirsch, Eklund. I'll point out that you have accepted already Thomasson as an adequate source all by herself for the Carnap paragraph preceding this one on Quine.

However, if your problem with this material is that it may be parochial, the obvious way to avoid this problem is (i) to state the obvious, that it is the view of some, but not necessarily all, and (ii) to present whatever arguments can be found that state the opposite view, and cite them. Quine himself does not fall under this heading, because his error was to dismiss the internal/external distinction as a trivial matter, leaving only the analytic/synthetic distinction to worry about.

Snowded: How would such an additional disclaimer suit you as a solution to allowing this material?

I refer you to my statement above. As ever you quote it then misinterpret or restate it in incomplete form You are seeking to use this article as a coatrack for material that is not directly relevant ----Snowded ^TALK 05:12, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Very conciliatory - I offer a solution to your objection, and you change the objection. It is a pattern with you. The objective is exclude new material with one objection after another, so this article remains a stub instead of a full article, all with the dying aim of shoring up your merge proposal. Brews ohare (talk) 15:14, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Possibly one source of the general contention on this page might be from a disagreement about whether the material should be presented as a dispute between philosophers, or just presented. In that regard, it might be better to present the material without philosopher's names in the section headings (e.g. "Carnap and Quine" and "Quine's approach"), but with just topics in the section headings (e.g. "Linguistic frameworks" and "Deflationism"). (Just a brief interjection from me and I'll leave it at that.)--Bob K31416 (talk) 16:06, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Thanks. Any concrete proposal is better than vague assaults. We'll see if Snowded endorses your approach. Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

My objection hasn't changed Brews it has been very consistent. Material here has to explain the term meta-ontology, it should not be an extended discussion of one dispute around which some people use the term. From that perspective it doesn't matter if the names are used or not, the material needs to relate to the subject of the article. ----Snowded ^TALK 19:56, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Bob, I think Snowded's answer to your suggestion is not complicated: "NO!!" Brews ohare (talk) 21:34, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Inconsistency is the last adjective I'd apply to you. Unresponsive? Unhelpful? Unfocussed? Very consistent. Brews ohare (talk) 21:39, 17 June 2013 (UTC)

I have modified the discussion of the Quine-Carnap differences to clarify that there are two major differences: the debate over the internal-external distinction and the debate over the analytic-synthetic distinction. The literature is very clear about this distinction, and sources have been provided. Of course, the matter could be explained more carefully, as suggested here, but Snowded is adamant in his opposition, although his reasons are vague. Brews ohare (talk) 16:35, 21 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowden's reasons are precise - this article is already over extended. You are also putting the "two major differences" again which was previous rejected. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:54, 21 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Wake up! The separate matters of the analytic-synthetic distinction and the internal-external distinction are made clear in separate WP articles, in the original sources by Quine and Carnap, and in later discussions by Thomasson, Price, Eklund, Hirsch, Bird and who knows how many other sources linked on this Talk page and in various reverted material. To oppose a correct statement of the issues in favor of a completely wrong description on the basis of brevity is nuts, as you would agree, so I conclude only that you have not fully absorbed what is going on here. Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 21 June 2013 (UTC)

As I remember it Brews you had the same argument with Bob and its not sourced per se. in the meta-ontology references Nor is it remotely clear that it is needed here. You are constantly seeking to expand articles beyond their natural limits and adding material that belongs on other articles. I will check it later but if I can't see anything new from when you last attempted to insert similar material it will be reverted. I will also try and find the time to cut the material back from an extended discussion of what is only an example of the article's subject. Try and stop the constant comments on editors by the way, it really has little effect ----Snowded ^TALK 17:33, 21 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: You mis-remember. It is obvious that these changes are needed here. Why not look at the issue and the sources presented instead of relying on vague recollections about hazily recalled events? Brews ohare (talk) 18:28, 21 June 2013 (UTC)

Brews, in my experience many things are obvious to you that represent failure to follow policy for others. As I say above I will double check but you have acquired another bad habit recently of reverting anyone who disagrees you on the grounds they have not understood you. Regrettably, most of the time they have. ----Snowded ^TALK 18:36, 21 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your generalizations as to my actions and motivations are your own and stem from problems that attribute to you as well as myself. They are irrelevant here. I look forward to your 'double' check. Look at the sources particularly with a view to establishing that there are two issues here. Brews ohare (talk) 18:52, 21 June 2013 (UTC)

OK I reviewed it and per my previous comment this is needless expansion of the material with stuff that is not relevant to explaining the article subject - it belongs on other articles if anything. I also removed more material which simply elaborated the Q-C debate which again belongs elsewhere unless it is used to specifically illustrate the subject's topic ----Snowded ^TALK 05:17, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: All you have provided here is your own unsubstantiated opinion that this material is needless. I have pointed out that it corrects an erroneous version of the Carnap-Quine differences and supported that remark with half a dozen sources. You are simply being obstructive and have not responded in any way to reasonable commentary. Brews ohare (talk) 07:22, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

And you are just continuing to argue your perspective and not listening Brews. I disagree with the extensions get your mind around it. Given you are not agreeable I have reverted to the last stable version. I have added two tags which illustrate my concerns which are further described above. When you are ready to discuss them rather than just assert that your content is right let me know ----Snowded ^TALK 07:33, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: There are two aspects being discussed by published philosophers regarding Carnap's views: they are the internal-external distinction proposed in Carnap's Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (which does not mention the analytic-synthetic distinction) and the analytic-synthetic distinction proposed in Carnap's Meaning and Necessity: A study in semantics and modal logic (which does not mention the internal-external distinction). Do you agree that there are in fact these two issues?

Assuming you agree, as indeed there is no choice about this and the question is largely rhetorical, do you agree that these two matters are discussed as separate issues in on-going philosophical publications? I refer to Thomasson, Eklund , Price, Bird, Hirsch, ...?

Again assuming you agree, as again there is no choice about this and the question is largely rhetorical, do you think the article Meta-ontology adequately presents both aspects? Brews ohare (talk) 16:37, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

Assuming your answer is "Yes! It does indeed discuss these matters adequately." how do you support that opinion of yours? I'll offer a few possible answers, none of which I find reasonable: (i) Yes the two aspects exist, but only one of them, the analytic-synthetic distinction, is meta-ontology. (ii) Yes the two aspects exist, but only one of them, the analytic-synthetic distinction, is important enough to warrant inclusion. (iii) Yes the two aspects exist, but the 'See-also' link to the internal-external distinction is a sufficient indication to the reader. I provide you with a check-list to make it easy for you to articulate your reasons, which so far has been rendered unavailable to you, possibly because you are easily distracted by generalities and a penchant for assessing my behavior instead of content. Brews ohare (talk) 16:51, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

This is an article about meta-ontology not about the two distinctions you mention. Those are already covered elsewhere in wikipedia and material from contemporary debates should be part of the articles on internal-external distinction and analytic-synthetic distinction. The Carnap sections in this article are already a coat rack and there is no justification in making that problem worse. Your final sentence contradicts itself; if you want to focus on content stop making trivial statements about the behaviour of other editors----Snowded ^TALK 17:45, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: You say that for Meta-ontology, in its role as an article strictly about 'meta-ontology', a discussion of the two different aspects of Carnap's meta-ontology is irrelevant and is covered elsewhere. But one of these aspects, the analytic-synthetic distinction is discussed at length in Meta-ontology, while the other, the internal-external distinction is neglected. Why do you apply your argument only to exclude one of the two aspects? Why is one aspect of 'meta-ontology' to be distinguished as interesting, and the other aspect not? Brews ohare (talk) 18:18, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

See multiple previous replies ----Snowded ^TALK 18:23, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

I take this non-answer as evasive, especially as no indication is given where you have already responded. In fact you have not, and your position is unsupported and unsupportable. Brews ohare (talk) 18:31, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

Your unsupported and unsupportable failure to understand positions that disagree with you, and the requirement for constant repetition is evasive and intransigent . ----Snowded ^TALK 18:46, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

I understand your situation exactly, Snowded. You have chosen awkwardly to include one aspect of Carnap's meta-ontology, the analytic-synthetic distinction, but not another, the internal-external distinction. Don't worry about it - things like this happen. Just fix it. Brews ohare (talk) 20:41, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

I did Brews, but then you reverted ----Snowded ^TALK 21:39, 22 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your revisions attempted only to avoid the appearance of including only the analytic-synthetic distinction but not the internal-external distinction, but made no effort to present both equally. For example, referring to "Iwagen's critique of Quine's analysis of Carnap", rather than the more precise "Inwagen's critique of Quine's analysis of Carnap's analytic-synthetic distinction". These little word games don't improve the article, and simply burying this matter doesn't 'fix' the problem.

It appears that your aim is to keep Meta-ontology a stub by forcing all discussion of meta-ontology to a minimum, regardless of any disservice to the reader and to WP. Brews ohare (talk) 15:40, 23 June 2013 (UTC)

I'm happy for the article to include all and any material that explains the use of the term. However that does not mean extended discussion of subjects covered elsewhere, especially when not all of those involved of those discussions would use or recognise the validity of the term. The article is too much of a coat rack and needs to be made relevant. Please stop making statements about other editors motivation, you inevitably get it wrong. Now when you are prepared to discuss the legitimate range of this article we might make progress. If you continue to insist on reinserting material rejected and adding whole wardrobes of coatracks then we are just going to end up with a stalemate. ----Snowded ^TALK 19:12, 23 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: There is no WP requirement that an article on meta-ontology should be restricted to material that "explains the use of the term". Where does that idea come from? The article is about the subject of meta-ontology, not about the use of the term. That includes examples of meta-ontology, and in particular, careful discussion of the most famous of all meta-ontological arguments — the Quine-Carnap debates.

Not policy. Brews ohare (talk) 22:39, 23 June 2013 (UTC)

I disagree, given your definition here you could simply replicate and extend the ontology article. Come to think of it, given the rejection of your particular take on Philosophy that may even be your intention. Sorry Brews my next set of edits will be to make another attempt to reduce the content to relevant material. As long as you revert those and/or attempt to extend the article it will simply be stalemate. You should have tried to work with Bob a little harder. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:08, 24 June 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: If the problem is duplication to excess, point out the overlap and let's work on it. I think the problem is not that - it is an erroneous presentation of Carnap's meta-ontology. The material in analytic-synthetic distinction and internal-external distinction can be relied upon to keep the presentation here brief, but it should not be ignored or distorted in Meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 14:06, 24 June 2013 (UTC)

The point is that the article has too much on that already Brews, my edit avoided any possible error but reduced the content a bit (ie going in the right direction). I do not agree with adding extended discussion at this level of detail so I will revert any expansion. Please STOP EDIT WARRING, and gain agreement here for any future edit. I am working on a proposal as to how this page can move forward but you will have to wait a day or so for that as I am teaching most of this week. There is a way forward but you are going to have to accept the coat rack point, if you can't do that then its going to be stalemate at best ----Snowded ^TALK 14:19, 24 June 2013 (UTC)