User:Kautilya3/sandbox/Stand Down Order (1947)

The Stand Down Order, also called Stand Down instructions, was a general order issued by Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander of the Indian and Pakistani military forces, in 1947. It directed that, in the event of a war between the newly independent dominions of India and Pakistan, all the British officers on both sides should immediately stand down. In principle, this precluded an inter-dominion war, which was an anathema to the British.

After the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, Auchinleck invoked the provision to dissuade the Pakistani Governor General, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, from ordering Pakistani Army to march into Kashmir. In subsequent months, the British government watered down the strength of the order, and General Douglas Gracey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army, defied it. Three brigades of the Pakistani Army were fighting in Kashmir in May 1948, as reported by Pakistan's foreign minister, Sir Zafrullah Khan, to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948 continued till the end of 1948 under the umbrella of the Stand Down Order.

Background

Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck declared that the British officers would continue in the new dominions only as 'volunteers'.

The British Indian Army began to be 'nationalised' beginning April 1946, i.e., native Indian officers were trained and promoted to take the positions previously held by British officers. By January 1947, the number of British officers had been reduced from 39,100 to 12,000. When the partition of India came up for discussion, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief said that it would take "five to ten years" to satisfactorily divide the army between the two dominions. However, the political leaders decided that the army should be divided before the partition and that the partition would take place by 15 August 1947, a year earlier than previously planned. This meant that the 'nationalisation' would be temporarily suspended and the British officers would stay on in their roles even after the partition. After independence, the newly formed 'India' and 'Pakistan' would continue as British Dominions until they made their final decisions, which made it legally and politically possible for the continuance of the British officers.

Auchinleck proposed that the British officers should stay on only as 'volunteers'. They could not be compelled by the dominion governments to take actions "repugnant" to their "code of behaviour" or to "their allegiance to the king [of Britain]". He also told the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten in July that, in case of hostilities breaking out between India and Pakistan, the British officers should not be allowed to take part. Each dominion would have its own Commander-in-Chief, who would be responsible for its army, but the administrative control (not the operational control) of both the armies would be exercised by a Joint Headquarters. Auchinleck was appointed to head the Joint Headquarters as the 'Supreme Commander', and all the dominion service chiefs were to report to him. The Joint Headquarters itself would report to a Joint Defence Council of India and Pakistan, with the governor generals and defence ministers of both the dominions as its members.

At the first Joint Defence Council meeting on 29 July 1947 (meeting on a 'provisional' basis) Lord Mountbatten raised the issue of inter-dominion conflict, stating that "under no circumstances could British officers be ranged on the opposite sides". However, due to Indian sensitivities regarding the halt to the 'nationalisation' of the army, he raised the matter in an allusive way, and the message was probably lost on Indian leaders, especially Vallabhbhai Patel, the Indian Home minister, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the would-be Governor-General of Pakistan.

Immediately after the Partition of India in August 1947, Auchinleck issued orders to the British service chiefs in both the dominions requiring them to 'Stand Down' in the event of a conflict between the dominions.

Junagadh affair and political discussions

Further information: Annexation of Junagadh

On receipt of the Code Word 'STAND DOWN', the following order will be immediately put into force:

Owing to the immediate risk/outbreak of open conflict between the armed forces of India and Pakistan, all British officers and other ranks, HOWEVER employed and of WHATEVER rank, shall cease forthwith to take any further part in the command or administration of the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan. You will take immediate action to this effect, and nothing is to be allowed to impede it.

-- Auchinleck to service chiefs of india and Pakistan, 30 September 1947, quoted in Noel-Baker's minute to Attlee, 20 August 1948.

The first case of a potential conflict between the two dominions arose in the matter of Junagadh, a Hindu-majority state in the Kathiawar peninsula. On 13 September, Pakistan accepted a proposal for accession from its ruler (made on 15 August), precipitating an India–Pakistan crisis. The Indian government asked its service chiefs to prepare an 'appreciation' for an operation designed to occupy Mangrol and Babariawad, two subsidiary states of Junagadh that acceded to India, and for a 'contingent armed action' against Junagadh. The chiefs responded by submitting a paper advising against such an operation. They feared that it might lead to a clash with Pakistan and stated that "it would be impossible for any of them to take part in a war between the dominions".

The Indian cabinet reacted sharply to the paper of the chiefs, stating that it impinged on the political domain by the military. Upon Mountbatten's urging, the chiefs withdrew the paper and apologised. Nevertheless, they stuck by their position that they could not participate in an inter-dominion war.

On 30 September, Field Marshal Auchinleck reiterated the Stand Down order in a secret message to all the service chiefs, with copies to the service chiefs of the United Kingdom and the British defence minister A. V. Alexander:

Following the Junagadh events, two sets of political discussions occurred in New Delhi and London, but apparently none in Pakistan. The Indian government formulated the 'plebiscite' principle to resolve conflicts on princely states. The British government attempted to water down the 'Stand Down' order.

Indian reaction

In Delhi, the Home minister Vallabhbhai Patel took the view that the British chiefs ultimately took their orders from Auchinleck rather than from the dominion governments. This eventually led to the termination of Auchinleck's office. The Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, on the other hand, recognized that the British Government would get involved in any conflict between the two dominions. It could withdraw the British officers from both the sides, or perhaps only one side if it was convinced that the other side was right.

Nehru searched for ways of peaceful resolution of conflicts over princely states. He formulated a policy stating that,

Wherever there is a dispute in regard to any territory, the mater should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the poeple concerned. India would abide by the wishes of the people concerned.

The policy was approved by the Indian cabinet and communicated to the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on 30 September, during his visit for a Joint Defence Council meeting. Khan, however, made no response to the proposal.

British cabinet reaction

In London, the 'Stand Down' order was discussed in the Cabinet's Commonwealth Affairs Committee on 13 October. The Defence minister A. V. Alexander supported the order and thought Auchinleck should have the authority to issue it. On the other hand, the Commonwealth Relations minister Philip Noel-Baker took the view that it should be decided by the British ministers, on the grounds that the decision would be of "great political and military importance". It was agreed however that in the event of an emergency if there was no time to consult the ministers, the Supreme Commander could authorise it. But it was considered "most desirable" that the British Government should be consulted before issuing it.

Following the discussion, Clement Attlee sent his approval of the 'Stand Down' instructions to Auchinleck on 15 October. The complex supplementary instructions for obtaining the Cabinet approval were sent out later in November. Fortuitously, Kashmir conflict broke out in between these two communications, during which time Auchinleck still had the sole auhtority to issue 'Stand Down'.

Kashmir invasion and Jinnah's order

Further information: Kashmir conflict and Indo-Pakistani War of 1947

Lord Mountbatten, Governor-General of India, insisted on Kashmir's accession as a condition for Indian military support.

The role of the British commanding officers in the Pakistani tribal invasion of Kashmir remains largely unanlysed. There are indications that the Commander-in-Chief Frank Messervy was privy to a plan, code named Operation Gulmarg, which was formulated within a week of Pakistan's independence and designed to employ Pashtun tribes from the northwest frontier to invade Kashmir. Native Pakistani officers would provide command and control, but the British officers would remain in the background, which would have circumvented the Stand Down Order.

On 12 September 1947, the Pakistani prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan authorised a two-part invasion of Kashmir: one invasion in the north targeting Srinagar, led by an ex-Major Khurshid Anwar, and another in the south targeting Jammu and the Kathua road, led by ex-Major General Zaman Kiani of the Indian National Army. Throughout September and October 1947, Kiani's armed bands raided the border of Kashmir, causing the State Forces to be dispersed along the border and expending their ammunition. The state's arms stores were depleted and there was no possibility of obtaining fresh supplies from Pakistan, which had already imposed an effective blockade. On 19 September, the Maharaja of Kashmir sent a request to the Indian government, proposing to accede to the Indian dominion and requesting arms supplies. The Indian government demanded that the jailed political leader Sheikh Abdullah be released and involved in the State government before accession could be proposed. It did, however, agree to send arms supplies and orders were issued to this effect.

However, Auchinleck's office (Supreme Headquarters) blocked the effort to send arms. It regarded Kashmir as 'neutral territory' and believed that the Joint Defence Council had laid down that no arms were to be provided to states that did not accede to either dominion. Thus no arms were sent until 22 October, when the Pakistani invasion was launched. General Palit remarks that the State's battalions and companies were reduced to fighting rear-guard actions, in some cases with "just ten rounds of ammunition left in each man's pocket".

Paistani invasion of Kashmir, position on 26 October 1947

After the news of invasion was received in Delhi, the Indian Cabniet's Defence Committee met on 25 October Even though it was agreed on that day that arms should be sent to Kashmir immediately, the question of sending troops was not agreed. Lord Mountbatten, acting as India's Governor General, raised the objection that India could not send troops to a state that had not acceeded. Once again, the possibility of an inter-dominion war stood in the way. Instead the States Department's secretary V. P. Menon was sent to negotiate the terms of accession with the Maharaja. Having received the Maharaja's agreement, the decision to send troops was taken the next day (26 October) and the troops were air-lifted on the morning of 27 October.

Bibliography

• Ankit, Rakesh (January 2010), "The Defiant Douglas", Epilogue, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 46–47
• Ankit, Rakesh (2014), "To Issue 'Stand Down' or not...: Britain and Kashmir, 1947–49", Britain and the World, 7 (2): 238–260, doi:10.3366/brw.2014.0150
• Ankit, Rakesh (2016), The Kashmir Conflict: From Empire to the Cold War, 1945-66, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-317-22525-6

• Ankit, Rakesh (2014), Kashmir, 1945–66: From Empire to the Cold War, University of Southampton

• Bajwa, Kuldip Singh (2003), Jammu and Kashmir War, 1947–1948: Political and Military Perspective, Har-Anand Publications, ISBN 978-81-241-0923-6
• Dasgupta, C. (2014) [first published 2002], War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48, SAGE Publications, ISBN 978-81-321-1795-7
• Jha, Prem Shankar (2003), The Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-566486-7
  • Jha, Prem Shankar (1996), Kashmir, 1947: Rival Versions of History, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-563766-3
• Hodson, H. V. (1969), The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan, London: Hutchinson, ISBN 9780090971503
• Marston, Daniel (24 April 2014), The Indian Army and the End of the Raj, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-89975-8
• Moore, Robin James (1987), Making the new Commonwealth, Clarendon Press, ISBN 978-0-19-820112-0
• Palit, D. K. (1972), Jammu and Kashmir Arms: History of the J & K Rifles, Palit & Dutt
• Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7

Category:General orders Category:Military history of British India Category:Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 Category:History of the Indian Army