Talk:Sino-Indian border dispute

Suggest to redirect to China-Indian border dispute

For historical reason of WWII , it is improper to use Sino to refer China as a country. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 222.65.173.79 (talk) 16:28, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

September 2014

http://naibaat.com.pk/Presentation/peshawar/Page13.aspx — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.96.157.117 (talk) 17:33, 12 September 2014 (UTC)

Removal of well-referenced text by Zanhe

Zanhe, I was surprised to see that you deleted well-referenced and completely objective text added by me, and you gave the edit summary as 'please write objectively'. Do you even understand the meaning of the word 'objectively'? The Discoverer (talk) 11:33, 2 October 2014 (UTC)

"Completely objective"? Let's see. The first source you cited says "Military officials in New Delhi and Kashmir said on Tuesday that Chinese troops set up a camp about 3 km (2 miles) into territory claimed by India", which is clearly a claim by an involved party. The text you added, "In September 2014, Chinese troops set up a camp 3km inside territory claimed by India", makes that claim appear to be undisputed fact. The second source you cited is an opinion piece written by an British-Indian academic with close ties to Indian media and think tanks. Again, you added his claim that "With every intrusion, China changes the ground realities at the border, gaining ever more territory in the process and redrawing the map in its favour" to the article as if it was undisputed fact, disregarding other Indian academics who "concede that India was largely to blame for this escalation". See New York Times article. My edit did not include anyone's opinion, but only undisputed facts. So who's the one who doesn't understand the meaning of the word 'objective'? -Zanhe (talk) 23:12, 2 October 2014 (UTC)

• If I had summarised the sentence "Military officials in New Delhi and Kashmir said on Tuesday that Chinese troops set up a camp about 3 km (2 miles) into territory claimed by India" as "In September 2014, Chinese troops set up a camp 3km inside undisputed Indian territory" then it would clearly have been an interpretation. But "In September 2014, Chinese troops set up a camp 3km inside territory claimed by India" clearly takes into account that the claimant is India or Indians. What part of this statement do you disagree with? Obviously, India protested because India claims the area.

• With regards to the second article, it does not say anywhere that it is an opinion piece. It has appeared in the BBC news website and in the news section, and the BBC is one of the most independent and respected news source in the world, if not the most. On the BBC website, analyses appear in the magazine section. The BBC also has stringent editorial guidelines, but since the sentence I have quoted is a statement of fact and not a conjecture, there is clearly no issue.

• The author of your source is also an Indian. How do you decide that certain Indian writers are reliable and some are not?

The Discoverer (talk) 19:06, 3 October 2014 (UTC)

• If you really think the original quote "Military officials in New Delhi and Kashmir said on Tuesday that Chinese troops set up a camp about 3 km into territory claimed by India", and your addition, "Chinese troops set up a camp 3km inside territory claimed by India", are equivalent, I have to seriously question if you have the competence required to edit Wikipedia.

• You must be delusional if you think Harsh Pant's statement "With every intrusion, China changes the ground realities at the border, gaining ever more territory in the process and redrawing the map in its favour" is a statement of fact, especially when he is contradicted by other Indian academics, as shown above.

• With regard to the writers' impartiality, it's not their ethnicity that matters, but their professional relationships. Everyone knows that a self-serving statement from someone linked to an involved party cannot be taken at face value. I never thought I'd ever have to explain such common sense.

-Zanhe (talk) 06:33, 6 October 2014 (UTC)

• Yes I think it's pretty much the same thing, since an Indian source would be a reliable source about Indian claims. But if you want, you can go ahead and add the entire sentence.
• There is no contradiction. The BBC source is stating what happens after an incursion, and the other sources are talking about the cause of the incursion. They are talking about two different things.
• Professional relationships have nothing to do with being a reliable source. In this case the BBC is a reliable source, and that is all we need to be concerned about.The Discoverer (talk) 18:01, 6 October 2014 (UTC)

I nothing to add to the main discussion. But it is not nice to say to a fellow editor, "you must be delusional ..." and "I have to seriously question if you have the competence required to edit Wikipedia." Same argument can be presented sweetly. 202.156.182.84 (talk) 19:15, 21 February 2018 (UTC)

That's because you don't know the history of this particular editor, who's been repeatedly caught misrepresenting sources, copyright infringement, POV pushing, etc. Two days after I wrote the message above, he was de facto topic-banned by an administrator [1]. -Zanhe (talk) 20:15, 21 February 2018 (UTC)

External links modified

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Dispute regarding reliability of Direct Democracy source

178.84.145.84, The direct democracy bases itself on 2 sources. One it does point to Wikipeida but it also points to an independent research publication here [2]. In this document, it is clearly stated on Page 9 (middle column towards the bottom) that over 97% of the voters approved the merger with India. Can you explain your rationale behind terming this an unreliable source. Please do not engage in an edit war and try to put forth your point here. Thanks Adamgerber80 (talk) 18:05, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

Pls review: I have significantly redesigned this article

I have significantly redesigned this article without deleting the content. I gave them more meanigful heading, divided the article into into 3 sectors that govt uses, identified names of locations on India and Chinese sides. Added more disputed sites. This needs further enhancements, you can help by undertaking the following:

1. . Add more details to the disputed sights that are light on content and/or sources.
2. . Condense some of the lengthy disputed sites e.g. Aksai Chin which has own separate article.
3. . Redo the lead.
4. . Dispute resolution section: I added this as new section. This is light on details, needs escalation process, resolution mechanism at each level of escalation and so on. Border meeting points are just local and lowest level resolution point (L-1 resolution), higher level resolution points at sector, secretary, minister and bilateral-treaties-forum level are missing. I will keep adding in future if I come across, which may take next few months or years owing to my lack of current expertise and research time on this. If you already know, then please add.
5. . If you find some of my sources are crap, please replace with better source but do not throw out the baby with bathwater i.e. please do not delete good content due to one bad source in (your eyes).
6. . I do not feel emotionally attached to my work, i.e. feel free to overwrite, enhance, use your articulation skills superior than mine to do your magic to this article to take it forward.
7. . If you are a Chinese, this article is lacking input from the experienced Chinese editors, specially the names of location, Chinese perception, etc or whatever else you wanna add, just go ahead. Pakis are welcome too but please do not make deliberate subtle-smart-POV disruptive-editing nuisance, keep it factual and constructive, no jealous edits please.
8. I already did what I could do, nothing more I could do to enhance except the point-5. Now, this article needs your skills to take it to the next level. Please help.

Thanks. 202.156.182.84 (talk) 21:39, 23 January 2018 (UTC)

I am sorry. I much prefer the old organisation. The new version has too many levels of sections, quite unnecessarily, and giving very high WP:WEIGHT to comparatively minor issues. It is definitely not an improvement. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:31, 24 January 2018 (UTC)

* About the high WP:WEIGHT to comparatively minor issues, let us randomly pick a red link from the article (disputed area that has no existing wikipedia article as of today).
Bara Hoti, for example, a large area of over 700 sq km, google gives 95,000 hits on "barahoti dispute" and 1,740 google books hits.
Kauirik/Kaurik, another example, of smaller but still large area of 200 sq km provides 23,000 google hits in English language alone (much more in other Indian languages, plus chinese languages).
Each one of these areas are deserving of their inclusion and creation of their own wiki article, as they are significant enough in terms of geographical area (each one is several hundred sq km) and the size of media coverage (google hits). I do not watch tv, not sure of tv coverage of these topics in India, people tend to remember more the recent noise on the tv, and events that are older than couple of years tend to fade away from the public memory with tv noise about the each new dispute. We can not use that as criteria. In fact, to add the due weight, more effort is needed to create articles on each on of these red link. 202.156.182.84 (talk) 19:42, 21 February 2018 (UTC)

About the number of sections, it can not be helped if India and China have too many disputed areas. But, if you can find a way to condense or merge, please go ahead, no problem. 202.156.182.84 (talk) 19:42, 21 February 2018 (UTC)

About the preference for the older version, I recall you left a message on my wall about your distaste for lengthy unnecessary history section in the older format. Other editors have put in good efforts before me and I have tried to overcome the gaps in the article by adding the missing disputed areas, this aids the growth of wikipedia. My version is no way complete, it needs further effort from other editors. Please have a go. 202.156.182.84 (talk) 19:42, 21 February 2018 (UTC)

Next step, I have done my part for now, I learnt a lot while editing this article both about this dispute and wikiguidelines . If you want to revert everything, go ahead, mainly because you had previously left tips on my wall. Purely for that reason alone, anyone who tried to help me, deserves a lot of gratitude from me, I am okay if you undo/revert everything. This is only for you, out of my gratitude. For other editors, I would like to understand their specific sustainable objections if they do the mega revert of my edits. Article is by no means complete, it needs further refinement from other editors. 202.156.182.84 (talk) 19:42, 21 February 2018 (UTC)

Reference in further reading to a second reference second

The further reading The McMahon Line section has a reference which creates a second reference section Banak (talk) 19:09, 21 June 2020 (UTC)

 Done. Is it fixed now? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:08, 21 June 2020 (UTC)

Added new sections

Dear all,

I just added sections on "command structure" and "troops deployment" as well as noncontiguous disputed areas. These have been reguarly raised numerous times in media and tv debates over the last several years. These edits provide a good snapshot. First iteration. Next iteraton, I will also add Chinese Airbases (there are 5 large ones, 3 main and 2 backup), and AGL to the table once I have more time to find the souce I had read sometime ago. Please review, enhance as you deem fit, insert edit tags and leave message on my talkpage if you want me to change anything or find additiona soruces/text, etc or if you dispute. I do not recognise anyone above except Kautilya3. If there is a consensus, feel free to move it to LAC, mcmohan line, or wherever else, as long as these edits in tabular form are retained in some article. Thanks. 58.182.176.169 (talk) 11:24, 31 July 2020 (UTC)

Not all significant viewpoints

I came across this article today and while reading it, I noticed the tag, not all significant viewpoints may not be included. I think it is a bit slanted, or at least a bit incomplete: I have made note of several things:

1. Not once does the article make any real mention whatsoever of the Dalai Lama (his fleeing to India in the 1959 uprisings) or the annexation of Tibet itself, is there any valid reason for this? Surely it should at the very least be mentioned in brief passing - especially as it likely contributed to further deterioration of relations. Note this reaction from the PRC for example: http://www.archieve.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/590506_Nehru_Philosophy.pdf

2. What does international law, or at least major international law experts say about this dispute? Which do most of them say have a stronger claim, in regards to modern-day application of U.N. and international law? Is there any major consensus?

3. Even if you believe China rightfully owns the disputed territory, from a cultural viewpoint, you could argue that India (intentionally or not) actually helped to preserve a considerable amount of "Tibetan" culture by keeping Tawang from Chinese control, because Tibetan religious culture arguably suffered considerably, with many ancient monasteries apparently destroyed, according to some sources, in the years after Chinese rule - although it is true the culture was modernised considerably as well.

4. A possible argument from India's viewpoint in criticism of China's claim is this - why for example did China allow Mongolian independence, or resolve a much greater territorial dispute with Russia after their multiple border conflicts, but it is still so adamant on Pradesh. Comparing the land sizes, it does seem a bit strange from India's viewpoint at least, for China to adequately resolve things with its other neighbors (and most Chinese people today apparently view Russia very positively at that) but for China and India to be unable to come to a settlement over much smaller portions of territory.

I also believe I read somewhere that an Indian argument was that China allowed Myanmar and China's border to be "generously" settled via the McMahon Line, more or less, and so it is confusing why China was not willing to settle its boundary with India likewise. One could also point to the other territorial disputes China had with its western neighbors - why was it able to settle with them eventually, but not India, which had fairly close relations with even PRC China for years, being the first country to recognize its establishment?

5. Possible contradiction here, or at least a very vague and confusing statement following the Simla agreement: "Rejecting Tibet's 1913 declaration of independence, China argued that the Simla Convention and McMahon Line were illegal and that Tibetan government was merely a local government without treaty-making powers. In 1947, Tibet requested that India recognise Tibetan authority in the trading town of Tawang, south of the McMahon Line. Tibet did not object to any other portion of the McMahon line. In reply, the Indians asked Tibet to continue the relationship on the basis of the previous British Government.[10]

The British records show that the Tibetan government's acceptance of the new border in 1914 was conditional on China accepting the Simla Convention. Since the British were not able to get an acceptance from China, Tibetans considered the McMahon line invalid.[28] Tibetan officials continued to administer Tawang and refused to concede territory during negotiations in 1938."

What does this mean exactly? Maybe it should at least be written with greater clarity? Did the Tibetans accept the territory as Indian territory or not? Did they accept Simla as a legitimate treaty or did they reject it? What did the Dalai Lama at the time or in the present day say in regards to this problem? Does anyone have additional sources for clarification? Thanks. Cadrescans27 (talk) 05:02, 17 August 2020 (UTC)

Cadrescans27, thanks for opening a discussion. I had put the banner at the top of the page on "viewpoints" but it had more to do with the narrow collection of sources used for the page. If you click on "discuss" link, you can get to the section at Talk:Sino-Indian War page. This page indeed seems to be an outgrowth of the Sino-Indian War page. Its editors moved some of the overflow discussion to here, but there is no comprehensive discussion of the border dispute as such.

Your suggestions are of course welcome. Yes, the Tibet issue needs to be discussed as well as the legality of McMahon Line, which is inherently tied to the question of the independent status of Tibet between 1912–1950. I will look for sources on these. On your point 5, which is more historical than legal, I will open a subsection to discuss it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:01, 18 August 2020 (UTC)

@Cadrescans27: Re Mongolia in point 4: China (both the ROC and PRC) and the Soviet Union were allies in WWII and its immediate aftermath, so they formally agreed on the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1945 and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950. The PRC and the Soviet Union were particularly close until the Sino-Soviet split. In comparison, both Chinas' relations with India were not nearly as close. The military situations in Mongolia and Tibet were also quite different. — MarkH₂₁^talk 12:34, 18 August 2020 (UTC)

I think a "generous settlement" was also offered to India in 1960, when Zhou En-lai is supposed to have proposed an "east-west swap", i.e., a Chinese accpetance of the status quo in Arunachal Pradesh in return for an Indian acceptance of the status quo in Aksai Chin. It was India that rejected the idea of a swap. The offer seems to have been on the table till 1985, when China raised the stakes for some reason or other. The present escalation is entirely new. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:26, 18 August 2020 (UTC)

References

The first funny paragraph

The first funny paragraph indeed seems wrong:

In 1947, Tibet requested that India recognise Tibetan authority in the trading town of Tawang, south of the McMahon Line. Tibet did not object to any other portion of the McMahon line. In reply, the Indians asked Tibet to continue the relationship on the basis of the previous British Government.[10]

Tibet actually asked for a whole bunch of territories, which they claimed that the British India snatched away from them, "... such as Sayul and Walong and in direction of Pemakoe, Lonag, Lopa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of river Ganges, and Lowo, Ladakh etc. up to boundary of Yarkhim. (I have no idea where most of these places are but "Mon" is Tawang.) The Indian government requested that they be dealt with in the same way as the British Indian government. After several months of consideration (!), the Tibetan government agreed. The Dalai Lama was very young and so Tibet was leaderless at that time. Whoever was running the affairs had temporarily lost their grip on reality. Maxwell also covers the affair in much less detail on page 69, but doesn't validate the specifics being claimed about Tawang. So, I think this paragraph can be safely deleted. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:23, 18 August 2020 (UTC)

References

McMahon Line "invalid"

The British records show that the Tibetan government's acceptance of the new border in 1914 was conditional on China accepting the Simla Convention. Since the British were not able to get an acceptance from China, Tibetans considered the McMahon line invalid.[28] Tibetan officials continued to administer Tawang and refused to concede territory during negotiations in 1938.

The source being cited is Shakya, Dragon in the Land of Snows (2012). He writes:

Lochen Shatra’s acceptance of the new border alignment in 1914 was not without conditions. The British records show that the Tibetans would concede to the new border on the condition that the British would secure Chinese acceptance of the Simla Convention, which would have in turn secured for Tibet a clearly defined border with China.[13] More importantly, it would have obtained an acknowledgment of Tibet’s separateness from China. Since the British were not able to obtain such an acceptance, the Tibetans considered the line proposed by MacMahon invalid.[14: Alastair Lamb, 1989. p. 469]

Cadrescans27 asks "what does this mean?" I think the plain meaning of Shakya is that the Tibetans had repudiated the 1914 agreement, but there are plenty of subtleties which Lamb discusses at length.

The 1914 agreement on McMahon Line remained completely unimplemented for more than two decades for various reasons. The British government made up its mind to implement it only around 1937 and then WW II intervened. Finally, in 1944, progress was made. South of the McMahon Line, there were three areas (district or substrict-sized units) that were under Tibetan administration: Tawang (Tawang district), Dirang (West Kameng district, south of Tawang) and Walong (on the eastern periphery). In 1944, the British took control of Dirang and Walong (or at least set up posts there), and decided that they should return Tawang to Tibet in order to get an overall acceptance from the Tibetans. But the Tibetans were unimpressed by the offer, and they wanted Dirang and Walong returned as well. In fact, they passed a resolution in the National Assembly, whose operative line was:

If the officers and troops that are posted at KALAKTANG and WALONG are not withdrawn immediately, it will appear like a big insect eating up a small one, and the bad name of the British Government will spread like the wind.

(I suppose the "insect" stuff represents high censure in the Tibetan way of things.) Let us remember that the Dalai Lama was even younger in 1944 (nine years old) and the National Assembly would have been controlled by monastic orders. And these monasteries were like little fiefdoms. For example, Tawang and Dirang were under the control of Tsona Dzong. So losing them would imply loss of status and prestige to Tsona Dzong.

But the 1914 agreement was studded with various ifs and buts. The British plan was to get the McMahon Line agreed as the legal boundary and give the Tibetans as much as control as they wanted over the territories they previously held. But without an adult Dalai Lama, their ability to accomplish anything was quite limited. Steven Hoffmann writes:

Up to 1944, American support for the Kuomintang's sensitivities about Tibet, the demands of World War II on British resources, and British support for Tibetan autonomy prevented the British from pressuring the Tibetans via diplomacy and on the ground.[26] But substantial pressure was exerted in 1944—1945, even though the British Indian government offered to drop its claim to the northern Tawang tract. The Tibetans were not responsive. In 1945 they reafrmed their claims, and in 1947 the Tibetan government sent a list of territorial demands to the new government of independent India.

But whether any of this means that the Tibetans had repudiated the McMahon Line is a bit of an interpretation. If we say that each of these monasteries controlled perhaps 5% of the land area of Arunachal Pradesh, then the remaing 85% was uncontested. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:43, 18 August 2020 (UTC)

References

Sources

• Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990), India and the China Crisis, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-06537-6
• Lamb, Alastair (1989), Tibet, China & India, 1914-1950: a history of imperial diplomacy, Roxford Books
• Shakya, Tsering (2012), Dragon in the Land of Snows: The History of Modern Tibet since 1947, Random House, ISBN 978-1-4481-1429-0
• Woodman, Dorothy (1969), Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries, Praeger – via archive.org

New academic paper on the border conflict

Notifying interested editors that a new academic paper has been published in Asian Affairs, with an analysis of the pre-1962 border (including Aksai Chin, Galwan, etc.), the 2017 clashes, the June 2020 skirmishes, the border management system, and proposals from both sides.

This is a reliable source providing more on the recent conflicts, so we should definitely integrate it. It's not freely accessible without academic access, so if nobody else does it now, I might get around to it eventually. — MarkH₂₁^talk 03:39, 2 October 2020 (UTC)

Ignorance?

1875 Survey of India map of Upper Chang Chenmo

According to Kyle Gardner,

It would become clear after independence in 1947 that “Survey of India maps issued in 1865, 1903, 1917, 1929, 1936, and 1938 [did] not show any boundary at all in the western (i.e. Ladakh) sector.”[78] These borderless maps, supposedly precise, included the formal representation of territorial ignorance (e.g., Maps 2.7 and 2.8).

The first sentence is a fact. The second an opinion.

I think the author is squarely wrong in his opinion. Either he doesn't know or he hasn't bothered to find out that the Survey of India doesn't decide borders. The political bosses do. The reason the borders weren't defined was that the political bosses didn't make the decisions. It was not until 1954 that the decisions got made.

We know from all the previous works, Alastair Lamb, Parshotam Mehra, Noorani etc., that there was plenty of knowledge in the British Empire, but the politics was all screwed-up. I have no idea how CUP ended up publishing this book. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:04, 17 February 2021 (UTC)

His Map 2.7 is supposedly a Survey of India map of 1915, which showed nothing in Ladakh except for Leh. So Survey of India was "ignorant". Then how did it draw this map of Upper Chang Chenmo in 1875? The cherry-picking in this book is atrocious. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:16, 17 February 2021 (UTC)

References

1954 map

• 
  1946 Nat. Geog.
• 
  1947 Survey of India
• 
  1954 Survey of India

On China-India relations page, I found a citation to a book review by Noorani which says:

Nehru's unilateral alteration of India's maps in 1954 to show the Aksai Chin as Indian territory did not inhibit him from questioning China's maps.

Ths article also reproduces the supposed 1947 map that occurs on the cover of Kyle Gardner's book. We don't have a copy of this map online. But I have copied it here so you can look at it. Noorani calls this the "independence day map". His implication is that between then and 1954, Nehru "unilaterally" added Aksai Chin to the terrritory of India and thereby brought upon himself the Chinese invasion!

A few points are worth noting:

• The map was printed on the independence day, but it dates back to 1938. It is what the Survey of India calls the "first edition map". That was when Olaf Caroe asked the Survey of India to show the McMahon Line as the border in the northeast. Nobody asked it to put any border for Kashmir at that time.
• Kashmir was neither part of India nor Pakistan on the independence day. So I suppose nobody paid any attention to its border.
• The 1947 map shown above ("second edition") was made after the accession of Kashmir to India (note the green border on the west). It extends the white color wash to what was assumed at that time, but the rest of the map was the same as that of 1938.
• In particular, the border line in the north stops at 76 degrees east. It does not even cover the Karakoram Pass (77.8 E). Apparently the 1938 map did not even include Baltistan, Shyok River, Nubra River and possibly even the Pangong Lake. By Noorani's argument, Nehru added all these areas to the territory of India as well, "unilaterally" to boot. Poor China was suffering under Nehru's cartographic aggression!

The 1954 map was made soon after signing the Panch Sheel agreement. Nehru apparently got the sense that China was trying to claim Indian territory. So he mandated that defined borders should be shown on the maps. That is all that happend in 1954. In fact, some of the white colour wash had been subtracted from the 1947 map. How they decided what to include and what to exclude, I have no idea. But the MEA had a historical division by this time, and I suppose they had been studying the historical documents to decide where the border should go. The legend on the map says it was "second edition" (of independent India map). There was apparently a "provisional" first edition map made in 1950, but I have not seen it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:54, 3 March 2021 (UTC)

References

Statement in document by Taylor Fravel

The document says that "China offered to hold 26% of the disputed land" as a compromise for a solution to the border question with India,... 26%? DTM (talk) 12:56, 4 March 2021 (UTC)

References

Clarification

Kautilya3: With regard to your edit and edit summary "Not clear which meeting is being referred to; the officials talks certainly have reports", the source is referring to the talks between Zhou and Nehru in April 1960; this happened before the Official's talks started, before Nehru and Zhou delegated the talks to the Official's.

The two Prime Ministers...had seven tête-à-têtes, with Paranjpe and Chieh acting as interpreters for Nehru and Zhou Enlai respectively. In order to keep the proceedings highly confidential and away from the public gaze, the venue chosen was Teen Murti House... Neither the foreign secretary, M.J. Desai, nor Jagat S. Mehta and Sarvepalli Gopal, although present throughout the week-long confabulations, were ever called into the meetings to provide any inputs. [...] Since there were no formal minutes made of the meetings, there were discrepancies in the records maintained by the two sides. These have been highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs. (via The McMahon Line: A Century of Discord by General (Retd.) J. J. Singh)

Claude Arpi's site hosts a document via "Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru" series related to the same. DTM (talk) 05:36, 5 March 2021 (UTC)

Zhou's six points

In 1960, "Zhou offered a six-point proposal", Nehru rejected the six point proposal, but agreed to delegating the talks.

1. There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides.
2. There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.
3. In determining the boundary between the two countries certain geographical principles, such as watersheds, river valleys and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary.
4. A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram Mountain.
5. Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as preconditions, but individual adjustments may be made.
6. In order to ensure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate the discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.

Quote source: document via "Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru"; OR The Pragmatic Dragon: China’s Grand Strategy and Boundary Settlements By Eric Hyer (page 52)

A summary of this or a point or two should be introduced into the boundary discussions section. DTM (talk) 05:36, 5 March 2021 (UTC)

Well, we have "Sinologists" who attempt to explain China's point of view ("pragmatic" or whatever) and we have "Indologists" who attempt to explain India's point of view ("finders keepers" proposals). We have to state both. For example, Hoffmann states:

Clearly, the April 1960 prime ministers' meetings were a failure. Any real chance for acceptance of what Premier Chou was offering had been forfeited months before, as a result of the Kongka Pass incident. Prime Minister Nehru's rejection of the Chinese position during the April talks brought to a final decision the Indian process of considering alternatives, which had started the previous August. This was perhaps the most important Indian decision of the pre-crisis period, and it was fully supported by Pandit Pant and by the ofcials who advised both Pant and Nehru. One may assume, too, that there was support from the rest of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the cabinet, with the exception of Krishna Menon, who was still seeking a political settlement.

Hoffmann is extremely clear that what happened in 1960 and afterwards cannot be treated without reference to the Kongka Pass incident, where China unilaterally advanced its claims and enforced it militarily. So the six points only represent a demand on India to submit to military occupation in the garb of reasonableness. It is a game that China has consistently played, even till today.

Given the situation, Nehru proposed the next best thing, to examine in detail the historical basis of Chinese claims. That happened during the officials' talks. China didn't really produce any real evidence, except to claim that they had secret military maps of 20th century, where Aksai China was claimed without telling anybody else about it.

The 26% claim should be tempered with the understanding that it was 26% of China's imagined territory both in Aksai Chin and Assam Himalaya:

the professed sovereignties claimed by both Republican China and British India over the Assam-Tibetan tribal territory were largely imaginary, existing merely on official maps and political propagandas.

The fact that the Sinologists are independent scholars/commentators doesn't mean that those are THIRDPARTY views. To me, it seems just as if China speaking through sympathetic foreign voices. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:10, 5 March 2021 (UTC)

References

Recognition

I am just wondering what countries recognize the disputed territories as part of China Patriciogetsongettingridofhiswiki (talk) 19:54, 26 November 2022 (UTC)

Indian foreign policy

Foreign policy 112.79.114.243 (talk) 16:24, 13 June 2023 (UTC)

Removing sourced content as, "redundant"

MrOllie, Kautilya3 suggested I can add that here, so please explain why you removed this text I had added, considering my additions as, "redundant"? -Haani40 (talk) 18:39, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

The sentence about the Sino-Indian War was redundant with the following paragraph. The 'As of March 25' bit at the end of the lead I removed per WP:NOTNEWS, and because it did not agree with the WP:NPOV policy. MrOllie (talk) 19:29, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

I have not added back the bit about the statements (what I added as, "Latest news") but the rest I believe are fine. Please see the discussion here.-Haani40 (talk) 19:40, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

It's still redundant. The lead should not discuss the war twice. MrOllie (talk) 19:44, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

This border dispute started with the conflicts starting in 1959 and I have cited sources for the same.-Haani40 (talk) 19:44, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

This is already discussed in the lead section, Aksai Chin in the first paragraph and the war in the second. The lead is supposed to be a short summary, it should not be repeating itself. MrOllie (talk) 19:47, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

OK, I have removed the repetition. Is it acceptable (to you at least) now?-Haani40 (talk) 20:00, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

The information you added is still redundant and I continue to think the article was better before these additions. MrOllie (talk) 20:06, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

There is no repetition (of text) in the lead now.-Haani40 (talk) 20:38, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

I agree with MrOllie. Haani40, please note that all revisions to the lead are subject to WP:CONSENSUS. Please be sure to read MOS:LEAD. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:15, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: MrOllie had not reverted what I had added last, so I feel he had agreed to accept what I had added. I therefore request you both to comment.-Haani40 (talk) 05:31, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

That is not correct. MrOllie (talk) 11:00, 1 April 2024 (UTC)

Proposed change to Zhou Enlai text in section 1947-1962

Should "The Chinese minister, Zhou Enlai proves that" be "The Chinese premier (or Prime Minister?), Zhou Enlai, asserted that"? Jlaramee (talk) 16:56, 23 April 2024 (UTC)

 Done. Thanks. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:41, 24 April 2024 (UTC)

Weapons used

I propose a section be added regarding the weapons used in the border conflicts, which appear to favor use of sticks and stones. Proposed text:

In the 1996 agreement, both sides agreed to not open fire within two kilometers from the line of actual control. [3] In consequence, the conflicts between the armies have involved hand-to-hand combat, at times using sticks and stones.[4][5]

Inspired by this post on Twitter. Mateussf (talk) 12:17, 16 May 2024 (UTC)