Talk:Ontological commitment

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This thought was incomplete in the article, as is. If someone can complete it, it should be put back, but its sloppy to have such things in the article space. —siroχo 10:36, Oct 15, 2004 (UTC)

Other examples are negative existential statements , such as "there is no such thing as Pegasus". This sentence appears to deny the existence of a certain object – Pegasus – but on closer analysis

What does the “[sic]” refer to?

Does anyone understand what the “[sic]” comment in the Quine quote refers to?

Formally it is precisely in allowing quantification over class variables α, β, &c., that we assume a range of values for these variables to refer [sic] to.

— Daniel Brockman 19:54, 10 December 2005 (UTC)

Problem?

The article says “Napoleon is one of my ancestors” can be rewritten as “any group of people that includes me and the parents of each person in the group must also include Napoleon.” However, what if the person saying this is Napoleon, himself? Clearly, Napoleon is not one of his own ancestors. 65.183.135.231 (talk) 01:45, 22 April 2009 (UTC)

Not expressible in First Order Logic?

I'm no expert of ontological commitment, but the statement "sentences of this kind cannot be interpreted in first-order logic" seems to me to be false. One may simply embed the desired representation in a first-order set theory. What would be wrong with this solution? (Marco Colombetti) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 131.175.121.192 (talk) 13:35, 3 March 2011 (UTC)

Incorrect definition

The article Ontological commitment begins with the remark:

" the ontological commitments of a theory (or sentence) are those things which must exist for the theory or sentence to be true."

It may be noted that this definition is not only wrong but unsourced.

I have tried to replace this incorrect statement with the definition from the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy:

In the philosophy of language and metaphysics, the ontological commitments of a theory are those things which occur in all the ontologies of that theory. In more detail, the ontology of a theory consists of the objects the theory makes use of. This dependence of the theory upon an object is indicated if the theory fails when the object is omitted. However, the ontology of a theory is not necessarily unique. A theory is ontologically committed to an object only if that object occurs in all the ontologies of that theory. A theory also can be ontologically committed to a class of objects if that class is populated (not necessarily by the same objects) in all its ontologies. [1]

[1] Robert Audi, ed. (1999). "Ontological commitment". The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Paperback 2nd ed.). p. 631. ISBN 0521637228.

It appears obvious to me that the present statement confuses the ontology of a theory with the commitment to that ontology which is the meaning of ontological commitment.

However, Snowded has refuse to see the point and has reverted back to the incorrect formulation twice now. [1] [2] Brews ohare (talk) 13:54, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

The lede is mean to summarise the article not just to take one definition Personally I don't think its incorrect, its a simple english summary of the second sentence of your quotation. Maybe elaborate in the main body, but lets keep the lede something that people can understand. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:05, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I don't think your unsupported opinion takes precedence over an authoritative source. In addition, your view is contrary to ordinary English construction: an ontological commitment by normal rules of English is a commitment to an ontology. What is more, the ontology of a theory is confused with commitment to it in this incorrect statement of the present lead. Brews ohare (talk) 14:09, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Check out wikipedia policy, we don't just quote in the lede. I'm open to changing this but not to a single quote from a single source which is obscurantist at best. You might want to find some more, list them and then we can see how to best express it is readable form ----Snowded ^TALK 14:14, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: It is an advance that you are now 'open' to a correct definition. I'll oblige. Brews ohare (talk) 14:23, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

I'm always open to improving any article, but not to you simply inserting the latest result of your google search. Discuss it here first please ----Snowded ^TALK 14:28, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Now here is another - from Stanford and it shows we have to be careful here as there are both uses in different contexts:

"We use common ontologies to describe ontological commitments for a set of agents so that they can communicate about a domain of discourse without necessarily operating on a globally shared theory. We say that an agent commits to an ontology if its observable actions are consistent with the definitions in the ontology. The idea of ontological commitments is based on the Knowledge-Level perspective (Newell, 1982) . So lets sort this out properly shall we and please try and listen to others. I am very clear that I am not open to you edit warring to insert your chosen quotation ----Snowded ^TALK 14:39, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Italics certainly helps us out, eh? Snowded, you are full of advice - let me offer you some in return: rather than making changes without justification, and when called simply reasserting them, try to do as you did (eventually) here, and provide some actual substance for your actions.

The changes you have made do provide a different viewpoint on ontological commitment, one at variance with that of Quine and a lot of philosophy. But if your goal is to be more comprehensive here, you have failed. As you may be aware there is a very wide usage of ontological commitment extending beyond your context and beyond philosophy, to computer science ( an agent commits to an ontology if its observable actions are consistent with the definitions in the ontology Ontological commitment for participative simulation), and other areas. Perhaps a more general article is a good idea, but then its organization has to broaden to reflect that change. Brews ohare (talk) 15:12, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Happy to revert to the previous stable version and discuss, but not happy with your original change which was (I felt) obscure and difficult for most readers to understand. A general article might be useful as the term is more used in my experience in IT than philosophy and we should at least disambiguate it. Oh and by the way I note that when you make a change and ignore WP:BRD its not "making changes without justification". I suggest you take a read of the Bible, in particular Matthew 7:3 ----Snowded ^TALK 15:38, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Your determination of what is difficult to understand is your personal view, of course. The Cambridge dictionary provides the definition consistent with Quine and many other philosophers. The main issue here, which you have avoided, is the broadening of the scope you have introduced without the necessary follow-up. Probably a more computer-science orientation would be useful to more readers. Brews ohare (talk) 15:45, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

All editors have personal views Brews, and in the case of the lede making the subject intelligible to readers without a Philosophy degree is important. As I say extending this article to IT which does dominate could well be more useful. ----Snowded ^TALK 23:29, 25 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, you have introduced a new definition that you think is easier to understand. Unfortunately, the source you quote in its support here is a verbatim quote from an old version of this article on Wikipedia. Can you find a less circular way to support your definition? Brews ohare (talk) 15:40, 26 March 2013 (UTC)

Well its not verbatum its a summary. The lede is meant to do that not just take a quote from one definition. I'll remove the reference and happy to restore the full older version pending agreement on a replacement. ----Snowded ^TALK 23:33, 26 March 2013 (UTC)

So now we are back to an unsupported assertion about what the topic is. Not satisfactory, especially when it is not suitable for a philosophical discussion based around what 'ontology' is, and not when Quine is widely attributed as the originator of the term and used a different definition. of his own. Brews ohare (talk) 01:29, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Lets try and work on this together shall we? I'm in Singapore at the moment so I don;t get access to my books until the weekend when I get home. If we between us research the various definitions exist and post them here, then we can agree a summary text? We also need to wider discussion on IT use as well as philosophical use. I'd much prefer a co-operative approach on this if we can ----Snowded ^TALK 01:37, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Definitions of "ontological commitment"

The idea of cooperation is novel, but a good one. So far, for sourced definitions, we have the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy:

In the philosophy of language and metaphysics, the ontological commitments of a theory are those things which occur in all the ontologies of that theory. In more detail, the ontology of a theory consists of the objects the theory makes use of. This dependence of the theory upon an object is indicated if the theory fails when the object is omitted. However, the ontology of a theory is not necessarily unique. A theory is ontologically committed to an object only if that object occurs in all the ontologies of that theory. A theory also can be ontologically committed to a class of objects if that class is populated (not necessarily by the same objects) in all its ontologies. [1]

[1] Robert Audi, ed. (1999). "Ontological commitment". The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Paperback 2nd ed.). p. 631. ISBN 0521637228.

As you have noted (i) this definition is complicated, and (ii) it is not broad enough to cover all the usages. Brews ohare (talk) 16:29, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Blackwell Reference Online

The famous criterion put forward by Quine concerns the ontological commitments of a theory: a theory is committed to those objects that must exist if it is true and is committed to the existence of entities of a certain kind if and only if they must be counted among the values of its bound variables of quantification in order for the theory to be true. This criterion is a development of Russell 's theory of descriptions , which shows that the occurrence of a singular term in a true statement does not automatically warrant an assertion that the term refers to something real or existent, but that the analysis of the statement into its correct logical form reveals the objects that must exist if the statement is true. “If what we want is a standard for our own guidance in appraising the ontological commitments of one or another of ...

Jamin Assay

According to the familiar Quinean understanding of ontological commitment, (1) one undertakes ontological commitments only via theoretical regimentations, and (2) ontological commitments are to be identified with the domain of a theory’s quantifiers.

Chihara

Quine holds that saying certain things can commit one to affirming or accepting certain ontological assertions, and that accepting a theory can also commit one to accepting a whole ontology - hardly a surprising thesis.

Brews ohare (talk) 18:29, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Oliver

It should be noted at once that the criterion [of ontological commitment] is to be distinguished from others of Quine’s views related to ontology and language. The criterion is one thing; advocacy of paraphrasing as a method for eliminating commitment to unwanted entities is another; specific proposals for paraphrasing are a third; the advocacy of minimal ontologies is a fourth, and a pluralistic view of acceptable ontologies is still another. But the criterion may be discussed apart from these other issues.” (James Willard Oliver. “Ontic Content and Commitment”. Ontological Commitment. Ed. Richard H. Severens. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974. 91.) Brews ohare (talk) 16:59, 28 March 2013 (UTC)

Chateaubriand

There are three main themes (and several sub-themes) that Quine developed in his work.The first is ontological commitment: What are the existential com-mitments of a theory? The second is ontological reduction: How can an on-tology be reduced to (or substituted by) another? And what is the most eco-nomical ontology that can be obtained for certain given purposes? The third is criteria of identity: When are entities of some kind (sets,properties, mate-rial objects, propositions, meanings, etc.) the same or different?”(Oswaldo Chateaubriand. “Quine and Ontology”, Principia 7.1-2 (2003): 41-42)

Brews ohare (talk) 17:02, 28 March 2013 (UTC)

William P. Alston

This article considers the task of translating linguistic expressions, such as sentences of the form ‘there are p’s’, to sentences of some other form. The author is especially concerned with the view that such translations enable us to avoid “ontological commitments.” He takes an example from Morton White, which allegedly provides a case of a translation which avoids ontological commitments, and argues that if the translation is adequate, then it is used to make the same assertion as the original and so makes the same commitments. He concludes that those who take avoidance of ontological commitment as the point of linguistic translations are obstructing our view of the real point of such translations. “Ontological commitments” Philosophical Studies (1958) 9, 8-16 Brews ohare (talk) 17:36, 28 March 2013 (UTC)

Quine on 'ontological commitment' MP Hodges

Leslie Stevenson

Quine offers his famous criterion for the ontological commitment of a theory - paraphrase it into the first-order predicate calculus, and look to the range of values of the bound variables.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:08, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

Ontological Engineering: with examples from the areas of Knowledge Management, e-Commerce and the Semantic Web p. 36

Ontological commitments were defined by Gruber and Olsen (1994) as the agreements to use the shared vocabulary in a coherent and consistent manner. Guarino (1998) formalized the ontological commitment definition based on the connection between the ontology vocabulary and the meaning of the terms of such vocabulary. Thus, according to Guarino, an ontological commitment is a function that links terms of the ontology vocabulary with a conceptualization. Ontological commitments guarantee consistency, but not the completeness of an ontology...giving the parties committed freedom to specialize and instantiate the ontology as required.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:16, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

Ontologies for Software Engineering and Software Technology p. 89

Spyns et al. [86] used ontologies as an alternative to traditional data modeling for database design, in which conceptual relations are separated from domain rules: but in this case, through an ontological approach, by means of an "ontology base", which contains multiple intuitive conceptualizations of a domain, and "ontological commitments", where each commitment contains a set of domain rules.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:27, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

On using conceptual data modeling Jarrar, Demey Meersman

We decompose an ontology into an ontology base and a layer of ontological commitments. The ontology base hods conceptual relations...The commitment layer consists of ontological commitments, where each commitment holds ontology rules, which formally and explicitly provide an interpretation of an application or task in terms of domain knowledge, (see fig. 7)....Hence a conceptual schema can be seen as an ontological commitment defined in terms of the domain knowledge.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:52, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

There are a number of occurrences of 'ontological commitment' in Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Proceedings of the 1st International Conference June 6-8, 1998, Trento, Italy. IOS Press. 1998. ISBN 9051993994. Only one such occurrence is linked here.

An ontology is a logical theory accounting for the intended meaning of a formal vocabulary, i.e. its ontological commitment to a particular conceptualization of the world. The intended models of a logical language using such a vocabulary are constrained by its logical commitment. (p. 7)

Brews ohare (talk) 20:19, 29 March 2013 (UTC)

Thanks, will do some research over the weekend when I am home ----Snowded ^TALK 21:51, 27 March 2013 (UTC)

Discussion of philosophical meaning of ontological commitment needs work

There are a number of technical terms used like "existential quantifiers" and "first-order" and "second-order" and on and on that need a lot better introduction and sourcing. I moved the paragraph with these unidentified terms into their own sub-section where they sit as so much gobbledygook. Brews ohare (talk) 16:18, 30 March 2013 (UTC)

Ontological parsimony deleted by Snowded

The following section was deleted by Snowded as "original research". This discussion closely parallels Baker's article as cited and uses his reference to Quine for the definition of ontological commitment. As Baker's article is an entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, I am taken aback at this chutzpah claiming (in essence) WP's standards are superior to theirs. Here is a Google books search showing 1470 discussions using this term in published books. Here is a Google scholar search showing 772 technical journal articles referring to ontological parsimony. Here are 56 articles referring to Baker's article in the Stanford Encyclopedia. Snowded: What is your problem here? Brews ohare (talk) 23:49, 4 April 2013 (UTC)

Ontological parsimony

Ontological parsimony can be defined in terms of Quine's concept of ontological commitment. A theory, T, is ontologically committed to items F if and only if T entails that F′s exist. If two theories, T₁ and T₂, have the same ontological commitments except that T₂ is ontologically committed to F′s while T₁ is not, then T₁ is more parsimonious than T₂. More generally, a sufficient condition for T₁ being more parsimonious than T₂ is for the ontological commitments of T₁ to be a proper subset of those of T₂. These ideas lead to a formulation of Occam's razor:

Other things being equal, if T₁ is more ontologically parsimonious than T₂ then it is rational to prefer T₁ to T₂.

While a common formulation stipulates only that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity, this version by contrast, states that entities should not be multiplied other things being equal, and this is compatible with parsimony being a comparatively weak theoretical virtue.

Comments

• Deletion of this sub-section on the basis that it is "original research" is nonsense. If Baker's Stanford Encyclopedia article is thought to be incorrect or parochial in its treatment of this term, the correct approach it so introduce another reputable source and present both views. Brews ohare (talk) 00:16, 5 April 2013 (UTC)
• Snowded having taken time to comment to the thread below, but having no comment here, I have reinstated this section. Brews ohare (talk) 14:57, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded's disagreement with Brews revised introduction

Why have I reverted Snowded's replacement of the introduction to Ontological commitment? Because it has several flaws that are fixed in the newer version. Here are the sentences of the older version and the problems with them.

1. "An ontological commitment refers to a relation between a language and certain objects postulated to be extant by that language."

The problem with this statement is simple: it appears to define ontological commitment as a relation between a language and the objects it implies exist. Unfortunately, that restricted definition only applies to 'languages' and not more generally. The replacement avoids this problem:

"In the philosophy of language, an ontological commitment refers to a relation between a language and certain objects postulated to be extant by that language."

2. "In philosophy it indicates a dependency on an object where the "the theory fails when the object is omitted"[3]

The problem with this statement is that it confuses the definition of ontology with that of ontological commitment. The replacement avoids this problem:

" In philosophy, an ontology of a philosophical domain basically is a taxonomy of entities – objects, attributes, processes and relations – complete with formal rules that govern that taxonomy. There may be more than one ontology possible for a domain, so a general statement of an ontological commitment is then a commitment to entities that appear in all possible ontologies of that domain. "

Snowded has objected to the word 'taxonomy' in this description. (It is employed by Katherine Munn, Barry Smith, ed. (2008). Applied ontology: an introduction. Ontos Verlag. ISBN 3938793988.) Perhaps there is a better word: Snowded has not offered one.

Unless Snowded actively engages with these problems on this Talk page, and changes his version to meet the objections, the newer version should stand. Brews ohare (talk) 00:10, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

Once again we see the problems associated with an editor dependent on out of context google searches for their content. I'll look at it later to see if I can come up with an alternative but will otherwise revert. You never seem to understand the need to make proposals and reach agreement on the talk page. It was one of the behaviours that earns you a topic ban elsewhere and you seem not to have learnt from that----Snowded ^TALK 04:39, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

OK your first problem - have you got a source to back that up or is it your opinion? On the second it comes straight from the source and matches other material so again that looks like your opinion. I have issues with Taxonomy if you make it generic to ontology as it only really applies in Biology and a degree information science. Your source is in that camp so it can't be used to make a general statement. Otherwise you need to start engaging in the talk page before making edits based on original research, selective often out of context references and your own opinion. Winging here that you have been reverted when you fail to use the talk page is not good enough. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:51, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: As for item 1 about this introduction, the sentence using the definition in itself refers to language for its meaning, while 'ontological commitment' is well understood to be a much wider concept. So this definition has to be identified as a limited and restricted version of the term. If you don't like the restriction being to the 'philosophy of language', then some circumlocution is necessary to establish that there is a restriction involved here.

As for item 2, you have only to read the footnote from the Cambridge Dictionary to see the new statement is accurate and is correctly stated by the new intro.

Also as for item 2, the idea of a 'taxonomy' is that we have not just an 'inventory' but some kind of structure, which I'd hazard is usually the case with the ontology of a philosophical domain, one striking example being Spinoza. However, if 'inventory' suits you better, just say so.

Your claims of original research and so forth are simply unsubstantiated rant, and your council to use the Talk page should be adopted by yourself as well. Brews ohare (talk) 14:55, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

It would be helpful if in your reply you stuck to particular objections using specific language directly addressed at points raised, aimed toward being helpful in revising content rather than chastisement. Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

You need to get a grip on the language you are using in headings and edit summaries as my patience is running out. I have changed the title of this section to give you an example of how to behave properly in this respect. As to 1, no restriction of circumlocution is given in the referenced definition so that is your option only. In respect of item 2 I think the selection I made from the definition is clearer that your more convoluted one but I am happy to revert to an earlier version if you will not accept that. Inventory has the same problems as taxonomy and again is not in your directly philosophical references ----Snowded ^TALK 15:38, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

Change in header is appropriate, thanks. Let us take up your two main points in detail.

Item 1. "no restriction of circumlocution is given in the referenced definition so that is your opinion only."

The source is here It is a technical paper presented at a conference. It explicitly restricts itself to the legal domain, which is not, of course, a broad context. The source has no need to explicitly state that its definition is peculiar to its subject area, as that restriction is a given in view of the paper's explicit statement of a legal context. Moreover, let's look at an everyday parsing of the WP article sentence:

"An ontological commitment refers to a relation between a language and certain objects postulated to be extant by that language."

and focus upon the words: a relation between a language and... These words, to me at least, indicate a restriction to the domain of language, call that 'legal discourse' as does the author of the cited source, or call it the 'philosophy of language' as a somewhat broader context. I understand your desire to keep matters simple, but 'not too simple' as Einstein is said to say. As a general idea of philosophy, 'ontological commitment' is not restricted in this way.

Item 2. "I think the selection I made from the definition is clearer"

It is clear, but it also is mistaken. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy says "The ontology of a theory consists of the objects the theory makes use of. A dependence of a theory upon an object is indicated if the theory fails when the object is omitted." If I compare that with your 'selection' In philosophy it indicates a dependency on an object where the "the theory fails when the object is omitted" it is clear that your 'selection' from the Cambridge Dictionary is the selection of its definition of ontology, and is not its definition of 'ontological commitment'. In short, the citing of the dictionary as the source for the quoted phrase is an error, leaving unfounded any contention that this WP assertion is supported by this source. It's simply an error in interpreting this source, but it should be fixed. Brews ohare (talk) 16:40, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded has so far no comment on these obvious shortcomings of the present introduction. Brews ohare (talk) 14:35, 6 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded continues to have no comment on these obvious shortcomings of the present introduction. Brews ohare (talk) 15:39, 7 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Is your continued silence about these problems with the introduction an indication of your acceptance that change is necessary? Brews ohare (talk) 15:24, 8 April 2013 (UTC)

Some of us have real work to do and you never ever stop repeating the same arguments and I have other articles to dealwith as well. I'll look at it in the morning UK time ----Snowded ^TALK 18:24, 8 April 2013 (UTC)

OK ITEM ONE - by your own admission a highly restricted source from which you cannot make a general conclusion. You go onto to impute a conclision from that. So its not in the source and its too specific to use. ITEM TWO, I think my selection form the source is closer to the philosophical nature of the term. Yours I think is over complex. The solution here maybe to look for another source then form a conclusion. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:37, 9 April 2013‎ (UTC)

Snowded: Item 1: This paper is indeed a "highly restricted" source, as I have pointed out, and that is exactly why its use for a general definition of 'ontological commitment' is not acceptable without adding explicit qualifications, as I have suggested. I have no understanding of your remark "So its not in the source and its too specific to use." It's not too specific to use - it just has to be clarified that it is not general.

Item 2: Your 'selection' from the definition by the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy is their choice for definition of ontology that they consider to be appropriate to understanding the term 'ontological commitment'. But it is not a definition of 'ontological commitment' itself.

Your goal to find a more transparent definition is fine. However, until that is accomplished, it is time to change the errors in the introduction. A correct alternative has been provided. Brews ohare (talk) 15:49, 9 April 2013 (UTC)

Ontological Parsimony

The only reference in this section has ontological commitment as used by one author as an illustration of one issue with parsimony as a subject. That is simply not enough to justify inclusion of this material, and a lot of it uses primary sources as well. I'll give it a day or so to see if there is a source, if not it gets reverted again ----Snowded ^TALK 17:11, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

• Apparently Snowded is unaware of an extensive presentation for this section that already appears on this Talk page here. The characterization of Baker's treatment of Ontological parsimony as "an illustration of one issue" is nonsense. Apparently Snowded has the view that he is a better authority than published authors in distinguished sources and refuses to consider the extensive sourcing presented in the original discussion on this talk page. Brews ohare (talk) 17:19, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

You previously provided evidence that Ontological Parsimony is a valid term - no dispute on that but you miss the point. The source given in the section does not establish it is a part of Ontological Commitment. You continue to edit wikipedia as if you were writing under-graduate essays which would I am sure gain high marks. However here we are writing an encyclopaedia, so you need a third party source which shows the term deserves a section on THIS article. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:27, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: The section Ontological_commitment#Ontological_parsimony follows Baker's treatment in showing that 'ontological parsimony' is defined in terms of 'ontological commitment'. So the two are very tightly connected. You now shift gears from your first opposition that this section is WP:OR, to take up a new position that ontological parsimony is not 'a part' of 'ontological commitment. I'd say to your new opposition that 'ontological parsimony' is a particular application of 'ontological commitment' so, as with many WP articles, a subsection is warranted, as where hearing might have a subsection on hearing aids. Brews ohare (talk) 21:16, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

not shifting at all just trying to explain OR to you. Sorry you need a clear reference not a conclusion you have chosen to make. It's like meta ontology where you just wanted to seize on any connection to allow you to write another essay. ----Snowded ^TALK 21:33, 5 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Well, no thanks for your commentary on my editing. As for your own editing, you have yet to explain how you arrive at the conclusion that Baker's treatment of 'ontological parsimony' is WP:OR. It isn't, of course, being in a published reliable source, as a review article by a professional philosopher. You say I am writing an essay: I am not - I closely paraphrased Baker's article and added nothing of my own. You say that 'ontological parsimony' is not part of 'ontological commitment' and refuse to back up that assertion when challenged, but switch back to your already discredited arguments that you cannot and do not try to support.

You have no sustainable objections to adding Baker's treatment of 'ontological parsimony' to this article. You simply don't like it. Brews ohare (talk) 14:33, 6 April 2013 (UTC)

I've been very clear, in the Baker reference ontological commitment in Quinne is used as an illustration of a problem in ontological parsimony. You are just choosing to add some material based on a loose association of words on a (I suspect) a google search. Something which is a consistent pattern. If there is a valid reason for inclusion you should have been able to find a direct source that makes the link as more than an aside (which is the case for Baker). Well done on reverting your personal attack by the way ----Snowded ^TALK 06:06, 7 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I simply do not understand these remarks of yours at all. "choosing to add some material based on a loose association of words" - how do these remarks at all apply to Baker's inclusion of of a subsection titled Ontological parsimony in his review? I've already listed a host of other references to 'Ontological parsimony'; I'll repeat them below:

Here is a Google books search showing 1470 discussions using this term in published books. Here is a Google scholar search showing 772 technical journal articles referring to ontological parsimony. Here are 56 articles referring to Baker's article in the Stanford Encyclopedia.

What do you mean by finding a "direct source" that links 'ontological parsimony' to 'ontological commitment'? Baker's article explicitly defines ontological parsimony in terms of ontological commitment. I can't figure out what you are saying. Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 7 April 2013 (UTC)

On thinking about this further, I wonder if this is what you mean: 'ontological parsimony' can be defined in words instead of using Quine's formal formulation based upon 'ontological commitment'. Hence, the description of Baker is an example of how 'ontological commitment' can be used to define a version of the term 'ontological parsimony'. I'd agree with such a remark, but I do not agree that the existence of other formulations is a reason to omit mention of the use of 'ontological commitment' to provide a particular definition of 'ontological parsimony'. Rather, the wording might be changed to indicate that there are other formulations as well as this one.

Accordingly, I have reworded this section, made it a sub-subsection, added a source, and reinserted it. Brews ohare (talk) 16:47, 7 April 2013 (UTC)

The new reference provides some credibility that the subject should be in this article (which has been the point). I'm still not convinced but have reformulated it to something I can live with ----Snowded ^TALK 17:39, 7 April 2013 (UTC)