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A. G. Noorani and Nehru's plebiscite offer

@Owais Khursheed: I have deleted this A. G. Noorani claim once, saying that you should use WP:HISTRS. Now you have now re-added it with another source. Please note that Noorani is a lawyer and a civil rights activist. He is not a historian. WP:CONTEXTMATTERS, when you use sources. Hingorani is also a lawyer. Noorani's claims are contradicted by loads of evidence, and scholars gently point out that he is wrong.

Pretty much none of Noorani's writings on the history of Kashmir dispute have passed through peer reviews. They are essentially newspaper/magazine commentaries. They are not even published in Economic and Political Weekly, which we accept as a peer-reviewed journal. No great confidence can be placed on his writings on such historical matters. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:42, 5 February 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 (talk)

You are saying that he is not a historian but here is source that testifies him being a great historian [4]. You should watchout what you are saying about personalities without any evidence. We are not scholars here, but our POV should be backed with reliable sources. Noorani cited the following letter from Nehru to National Conference in November 1947.

it is not easy for us to back out of the stand we have taken before the world. That would create a very bad impression abroad and more specially in the UN circles...the question of referendum is rather an academic one at present...If we said to the UNO that we no longer stand by for a referendum in Kashmir, Pakistan would score a strong point and that would be harmful to our cause.

-- Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 12:40, 5 February 2017 (UTC)

No, WP:POV should be absent in what we write. And we should describe the POV of the authors only when they are significant viewpoints.

The quote you have reproduced from the Hingorani's book is clearly saying that Nehru says he cannot back out of the plebiscite, whereas Noorani is claiming that he wanted to back out of it. It seems to me that Hingorani is also saying that Noorani is wrong. You are misrepresenting the source in your content. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:11, 5 February 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 Hingorani is not disagreeing with Noorani, he is only quoting a letter which shows that Nehru wanted to go back on his promise of plebiscite...

In the light of recent revelations, it is appropriate to ask whether a plebiscite was at all seriously contemplated even in 1948. On May 14, Indira Gandhi wrote to prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru: They say that only Sheikh Saheb is confident of winning the plebiscite' '….On January 12, 1949 a week after the UNCIP's plebiscite of January 5, Nehru wrote reassuringly to Sheikh Abdullah: You know well that this business of plebiscite is still far away and there is a possibility of the plebiscite not taking place at all (I would suggest however that this should not be said in public as our bona fides will then be challenged). (S Gopal, ed. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru Memorial Fund, OUP. Second Series. Vol 9, p 198). On July 4, 1953 president Rajendra Prasad wrote to Nehru that according to the vice-president, S Radhakrishnan, who had been to Kashmir the previous year, even Sheikh Abdullah thought that we would lose a plebiscite as Sheikh Abdullah had told him that.

-- — Preceding unsigned comment added by Owais Khursheed (talk • contribs)

There is no doubt that Noorani believes that Nehru wanted to back out of the plebiscite in 1947-48. The question is whether his belief is significant enough for it to be included in an encyclopedia.

• He has not produced any solid evidence for it, only inferences based on what were written in the letters. (The letters themselves say nowhere that he wanted to back out of the plebiscite.)
• He has not convinced any other scholar about his theory. (If you think Hingorani believes the theory as well, please provide a reference to it.)

So you need to argue significance. In the absence of such significance, the ample evidence of Nehru supporting plebiscite should stand. Here, for example, is his writing, published in Noorani's own book on Article 370:

We are committed secondly to a plebiscite. If the people of Kashmir decide to remove or do away with their old Ruler, we must accept that decision, in view of our repeated assurances to that effect. If they want to leave India, that also we have to accept, because of our assurance. We could of course want this done in the proper way and having due regard to constitutional proprieties. The Maharaja’s wishes cannot come in the way. (emphasis added, from Nehru's letter to the President of India, 19 June 1952.)

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:36, 6 February 2017 (UTC)

@ Kautilya3 (talk) Here is the first quote from former high commissioner who knew Nehru well he basically said that Nehru was determined to escape the plebiscite, here is the quote........ According to one of the members of the first UN Commission sent out to Kashmir (1949-1951) Nehru was adamant already by 1950. This Commission consisted of five members, and one of the members happened thirteen years later to be a fellow ambassador of mine in a certain European capital and used to talk about his experiences on the Commission. He said that the Commission had come to the conclusion privately that the plebiscite ought to be held; that a plebiscite would result in a majority for Pakistan; and that Nehru, knowing this, was determined to get out of a plebiscite.

• Second quote which says that Nehru privately abandoned his commitment to plebiscite in 1948...

By late 1948, Nehru had abandoned the idea of a plebiscite, and had said so to Sheikh Abdullah in January 1949, but he never publicly abandoned the idea until 1954. The second quote comes from a text written by history professor Benjamin Zachariah who wrote Nehru's biography. -- — Preceding unsigned comment added by Owais Khursheed (talk • contribs)

Ok, I will check the sources. Meanwhile, can you please review the talk page guidelines at WP:TPHELP and follow it? You are still forgetting to sign your posts, missing indentation, and the latest issue: putting text in bold. Cheers, Kautilya3 (talk) 09:43, 7 February 2017 (UTC)

I haven't look at the sources in detail, but it occurs to me that Noorani as well as these authors cite are talking about the thinking in 1948, while the war was still going on, simultaneously with UN mediation. At that time, both Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru were concerned that a state-wide plebiscite would unleash "disruptive forces". (The "disruptive forces" weren't spelled out, but I can imagine that they had in mind potential fights between NC and MC, Hindu-Muslim conflicts and communalisation, not to mention the heartburn of the half-a-million Muslim refugees in Pakistan/AJK and the quarter-million Hindu/Sikh refugees in India/J&K.) Both of them proposed in talks with the UNCIP that, instead of a popular plebiscite, elections to a consituent assembly could be used to determine the people's will. This wasn't a conspiracy, but a legitimate concern, openly voiced in the negotiations. But Pakistan complained that India was backing off from the plebiscite and, so, the UNCIP developed detailed procedures for the plebiscite. These proposals were accepted by both India and Pakistan by the end of 1948, and that is how the war ended! See the UNCIP page/section.

You should note that the Srinath Raghavan book is also sort of a biography of Nehru (focusing on foreign policy and strategic matters), and it has had over dozen scholarly reviews in journals, almost all of which representing glowing accolades. Raghavan's book should take priority over all the others. It seems to me that your sources are misunderstanding and misrepresenting what happened. I didn't put that stuff on this page, because it was a temporary phase that got overtaken by other developments. Now that I see all these conspiracy theories, perhaps I should add a mention here. But it will be brief. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:05, 7 February 2017 (UTC)

My assessments of the sources:

• The Noorani view is burried in a book review, and book reviews are rarely peer-reviewed. So, we will have to treat this as an unverified "opinion".
• Walter Crocker is a diplomat and his book is a personal commentary on Nehru. It is valuable of course, but it is also a WP:PRIMARY source.
• Benjamin Zachariah's book is certainly a scholarly source, and Zachariah has published plenty of peer-reviewed papers. But the statement in question in his book is not backed by any evidence. There is however plenty of contrary evidence. In addition to the numerous public and private statements made by Nehru between 1948 and 1954, we must also note that he himself proposed to Dixon the idea of conducting a plebiscite limited to the Kashmir Valley and he himself proposed to Mohammad Ali Bogra a 'zonal plebiscite' in 1953. It is hard to sustain the argument that all this was just pretense.

I admit however that Nehru's slate is not entirely clean. If he did go through with a plebiscite, all this discussion would have been moot. Since he did not, suspicions will definitely persist as to how serious he might have been with his plebiscite offers. Srinath Raghavan also admits: It can be argued that these developments came handy to Nehru in stalling the move towards a plebiscite. (p.226) I suggest that this is the level at which we have to deal with the suspicions. Anything more than that would amount to givine WP:UNDUE prominence to fringe viewpoints. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:53, 8 February 2017 (UTC)

References

Kashmiri views

@Owais Khursheed: Thanks for adding the Kashmiri views section. It has been badly wanting. However, considerable clean-up is needed.

• The citations must be full. Please check how all the other citations are formatted. If you need help, please ask me on my talk pae.
• Opinions must be labelled as opinions, using WP:In-text attribution. This is especially the case for newspaper op-eds, which are not reviewed by anybody. Only notable authors should appear in such attributions.
• Do not repeat facts, as determined by scholars and already covered in the article, as if they are opinions or "views". See WP:NPOV.
• Avoid putting text in bold face, as per MOS:NOBOLD.
• Avoid WP:OR. You want to think of yourself as a Wikipedian, not as an advocate for any particular point of view. As WP:NPOV states, Wikipedia aims to describe disputes, but not engage in them. Editors, while naturally having their own points of view, should strive in good faith to provide complete information, and not to promote one particular point of view over another.. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:33, 10 February 2017 (UTC)

• Comment @Owais Khursheed and Kautilya3: Unfortunately I have had to revert Owais' latest edit. As mentioned above, we should adhere to WP:NPOV, and phrasing such as 'want their troubled and divided state to become an independent country' and 'Except for 1977 and 1983 elections, no state election has been fair' is, decisively, not a neutral portrayal of the facts. I also note that despite Kautilya's advice, Owais has made all the op-ed and scholarly suggestions to become statements of fact (removing mention of the people behind the suggestions made: A.G. Noorani , Zutshi, etc). O Fortuna!^{...Imperatrix mundi.} 12:49, 10 February 2017 (UTC)

@Fortuna Imperatrix Mundi: Owais's revised text said Kashmiris assert that ... no state election has been fair. I think it the attribution is enough, and it is not far from the truth. I would like to revert to Owais's revised version and work with it. The POV problems that exist in this section are no worse than those of the Indian/Pakistani views sections. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:15, 10 February 2017 (UTC)

Mate I agree with you, the whole article stinks of POV; WP:OTHERSTUFFEXISTS. But as long as we speak in the sources' voice, not Wikipedia's- say it's a poll, not a historical fact, for example. Cheers for the reply. O Fortuna!^{...Imperatrix mundi.} 19:35, 10 February 2017 (UTC)

I know. That is why I am not touching the debate sections until after the history is fully documented. The POVs can only be countered with facts. Otherwise, we will just end up with "my source is better than yours" arguments which will be never-ending. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:01, 11 February 2017 (UTC)

More significant factor

@Owais Khursheed: you are synthesizing again. The source (Snedden) says:

The Nehru-Bogra talks failed, chiefly because Bogra, an East Pakistani, was in a weak political position in Pakistan, but also because Nehru disliked Pakistan's entry into the Western-led Cold War alliances of SEATO and CENTO. These alliances made India feel insecure. More significantly, by the early 1950s (if not earlier), India believed that it almost certainly would 'lose' any plebiscite held in J&K.

and your text says:

From the 1950s, India became lukewarm to the idea of a plebiscite and instead adopted the view that the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, which was elected in 1951, had ratified the state's accession to India therefore it was unnecessary to further determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people. The more significant factor behind this decision was because by the 1950s, if not earlier than that, India understood that it would lose the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir.

and puts it even before discussing the Nehru-Bogra talks! Snedden is not saying explicitly that it was a factor in anything. He only said it was "significant".

You don't seem to have looked at the Mahesh Shankar article that I have cited numerous times already. You cannot write anything about the 1950s without reading this article. With over a hundred citations to Nehru's public and private statements, this article does an in-depth analysis of what Nehru was thinking. In the present context, the Nehru-Bogra talks happened because Nehru realised that India would lose the plebiscite. He wanted to settle the issue before things got out of hand. But, he warned Pakistan that a military pact with the US would change the situation, and there would be no settlement afterwards. Pakistan chose to do it anyway. Please read the sources you have been provided, and stop making up your own theories. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:59, 7 February 2017 (UTC)

@ Kautilya3, I don’t agree with Shankar’s arguments. Scholar T. V. Sathyamurthy says in his book which was published by Oxford University Press that it is indeed argued that Pakistan and USA’s defence pact changed the situation but he adds that Nehru reiterated even after the USA-Pakistan pact that India would stand by its international commitments on the Kashmir issue. . When Nehru was taunted in 1957 for going against his pledge for plebiscite in Kashmir he said that India cannot stay in Kashmir for a moment without the consent of the Kashmiri people. see also here [5]. Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 12:17, 9 February 2017 (UTC)

Shankar never said that Nehru went back on any international commitments and my text doesn't say that either. Where did you get that impression? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:27, 9 February 2017 (UTC)

To be specific, what Nehru withdrew was the "plebiscite offer" that is described in the section titled Last attempt at resolution Nehru's plebiscite offer. This offer did not require Pakistan to withdraw from its controlled territories or to disband the local militias being directed by the Pakistani military (both of which were preconditions according to the UN Resolution 47 as elaborated by the UNCIP). The offer proposed that a plebiscite should be held in all areas of the state without any preconditions, and the state would be partitioned based on the results. It was made after Sheikh Abdullah was put in prison, and Pakistan had an almost certain chance of "winning" the Kashmir Valley. It was Nehru's grand strategy for peace in the subcontinent. But Pakistan was not interested in peace. Your efforts to undermine Nehru with Noorani's aid are completely off the mark. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:57, 11 February 2017 (UTC)

reformatted version below

@Kautilya3 I checked on Google Scholar for citations to Mahesh Shankar and AG Noorani. AG Noorani’s book The Kashmir Dispute: 1947-2012 has been cited by 3. [6] Mahesh Shankar’s article has not been cited by anyone. [7] AG Noorani is a leading constitutional expert and has written numerous papers and books on Kashmir dispute. He should be given more space than Mahesh Shankar. You should compare the number of citations to both their works and see if it is okay then to give more space on encyclopedia to Shankar than Noorani. [8] [9] I think Shankar has been given too much space. Noorani should be given more priority as he is more knowledgeable in Kashmir Dispute. Also Shankar says in his journal article on Page number 2 ‘It particularly addresses critics’ claims—in Pakistan and in the scholarly community—that the failure of the plebiscite option owed itself solely to Nehru’s intransigence. By this account, India’s first prime minister was never completely sincere in his commitment to a plebiscite, and had very early on determined that such a vote would not be held, a conviction that ostensibly strengthened as it became clear that India was losing the hearts and minds of a critical mass of the Kashmiri people and leadership, especially in the Kashmir valley.2’ This shows us that Shankar is admitting to talking from a minority POV. He says this article is to address the scholarly community’s claims about Nehru’’s intransigience. There is no scholarly consensus and this shows that Shankar's view is not widespread among scholars. Shankar’s views should therefore be included as a minority opinion in this article. Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 10:03, 13 February 2017 (UTC)

I checked on Google Scholar for citations to Mahesh Shankar and AG Noorani. AG Noorani’s book The Kashmir Dispute: 1947-2012 has been cited by 3. [10] Mahesh Shankar’s article has not been cited by anyone. [11] AG Noorani is a leading constitutional expert and has written numerous papers and books on Kashmir dispute. He should be given more space than Mahesh Shankar. You should compare the number of citations to both their works and see if it is okay then to give more space on encyclopedia to Shankar than Noorani. [12] [13] I think Shankar has been given too much space. Noorani should be given more priority as he is more knowledgeable in Kashmir Dispute. Also Shankar says in his journal article on Page number 2

‘It particularly addresses critics’ claims—in Pakistan and in the scholarly community—that the failure of the plebiscite option owed itself solely to Nehru’s intransigence. By this account, India’s first prime minister was never completely sincere in his commitment to a plebiscite, and had very early on determined that such a vote would not be held, a conviction that ostensibly strengthened as it became clear that India was losing the hearts and minds of a critical mass of the Kashmiri people and leadership, especially in the Kashmir valley.2’

This shows us that Shankar is admitting to talking from a minority POV. He says this article is to address the scholarly community’s claims about Nehru’’s intransigience. Shankar’s views should therefore be included as a minority opinion in this article. Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 10:03, 13 February 2017 (UTC)

Three quick points:

• Note that the publihser describes A.G. Noorani as an Advocate, Supreme Court of India, and a leading constitutional expert and political commentator. Nowhere does it say that he is a historian. He is a "commentator" and his book is a commentary. He is also a notable commentator, and his views can be stated as and when needed in order to document the views present in the wider public. But he is not a scholar historian. There is no contest between him and the scholarshistorical scholars.
• Secondly, books can be cited for any number of reasons. If any of the citations to Noorani's book support his theory that Nehru was being duplicitous in making the plebiscite offer, please mention them. Otherwise, the citations are irrelevant to the issue. Note also that his view has been explicitly contradicted by Raghavan (p.225) as well as Shankar. Noorani has not stated how he disagrees with their assessments, even though he writes practically every week in various media. His isolated views that don't engage with the wider scholarship have no validity.
• Scholarship in general proceeds, as far as possible, by examining evidence. In scholarly publications, the evidence needs to be presented (in footnotes and citations). If other scholars examine all the cited evidence and draw different conclusions, then we can note that there is disagreement among the scholars. Noorani has not stated whether he has examined all the cited evidence, and how he supports his theory in the face of such evidence. He has not published peer-reviewed papers on the topic. Until he does so, we take no cognisance of his view, except in a footnote somewhere.

I will respond about your minority-majority issue later in the day. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:21, 13 February 2017 (UTC)

@ Kautilya3 . Here is the review of the book by Noorani which mentions that he is a scholar [14]. Here is another source which mentions that he is historian. I had already mentioned it above. [15]

pinging the admin RegentsPark and Fowler&fowler......Sir, I want your opinions on the scholarly status of Noorani and his work in comparison to Mahesh Shankar. -- Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 14:29, 13 February 2017 (UTC)

Noorani is certainly a scholar in his field of expertise, which is constitutional law. His book on Article 370 has been published by OUP. I have cited it myself in the Article 370 page. But his views on history are not scholarly, even though some of them get cited by historical scholars. They are also often contradicted by historical scholars as it is in this case. See the p.225. Note that we have a more or less clear definition of what is historical scholarship on WP:HISTRS. What the Milli Gazette says makes no difference to this.

Here is a possible compromise. If you find any of his views endorsed in peer-reviewed scholarly sources, I will be happy to include them. If they are contradicted, then no. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:12, 13 February 2017 (UTC)

References

More sources

@Kautilya3 Stanley Wolpert:

Over the next decade, whenever the United Nations Security Council's Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) sent its three most distinguished chairmen to India to ask Nehru to agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir, supervised and monitored by the UN, he always adamantly refused. Nehru finally withdrew any pretense of supporting a UN-supervised plebiscite, arguing that India's “elections” in Kashmir were as “valid” as such a plebiscite. By then Nehru had ordered the imprisonment of his friend Sheikh Abdullah for denouncing India's growing martial presence in Kashmir and favoring a free and fair plebiscite throughout the state._

Howard Schaffer:

Bowles did not allow evidence of Nehru's intransigence on Kashmir to discourage him for long. The prime minister had registered his inflexible attitude most forcefully in mid-1952. The occasion was Bowles' involvement in what would latter be called shuttle diplomacy. En route from Washington to New Delhi, he had met in Karachi with Pakistan Prime Minister Nazimuddin at the suggestion of Avra Warren, the American ambassador there. Nazimuddin had unveiled to Bowles and Warren substantial concessions on the Pakistan military presence in Kashmir that his government was prepared to make, provided the Indians agreed to the appointment of a plebiscite administrator, a major element in Graham's approach. The Pakistanis asked Bowles to sound out Nehru informally on their offer, and the department instructed him to do in the capacity of a friendly messenger. Despite an emotional personal appeal from Bowles, Nehru had rejected the offer. Reporting to Washington, Bowles concluded that Nehru is acting in a wholly unreasonable manner and will probably continue to do so...[He] definitely hopes the whole situation can be made to go away.'

Iftikhar Malik

Nehru dithered not once but always on Kashmir, either for emotional reasons or out of a conviction that the decision for accession by the former ruler was irreversible. The British High Commissioners in the 1950s were usually baffled by Nehru's moralist exhortations on global affairs simultaneous with his flippant statements and conflicting policy postures on Kashmir. In 1950s, Sir Owen Dixon, the UN arbiter, was so frustrated that, in one of his letters, he alleged Nehru of 'downright lying'.

Malik Iftikhar’s this book has been given a lot of positive reviews by the scholars. Copland, Ian. “The Journal of Asian Studies.” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 52, no. 3, 1993, pp. 768–769. JSTOR 2058917 (2000) Book Reviews, Contemporary South Asia, 9:3, 387-389, DOI: 10.1080/713658754

Ellis and Khan:

India has not responded to this, or to the UN resolutions. The tactics employed were to first promise a plebiscite, but institute delaying moves, and then ignore the resolutions. No sanctions were applied by the UN. There is evidence, as quoted in Malik, amongst others, that the Indian government wished from the start to permanently acquire Kashmir, and that they had no intention of seeking out the Kashmiris' preferences. VP Menon. . raised his glass to Symon [British Deputy High Commissioner]. "Here it is", he said, "We have Kashmir. The bastard [the Maharajah) signed the Act of Accession. And now we've got it, we'll never let it go"..(quoted in Malik 1993: 6) [In 1965] the Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, when asked by a journalist why India had consistently refused to agree to carry out the promised plebiscite in Kashmir, replied: "Because we would lose it. Kashmir would vote to join Pakistan, and no government responsible for agreeing to the plebiscite would survive", (quoted in Malik 1993: 7)

Iftikhar Malik:

When both the USA and the UK, in pursuit of UN resolutions, sought a solution to Kashmir dispute, Nehru, due to his emotional attachment to Kashmir and not willing to appear weak to his rightist Indian opponents, always took a stubborn attitude towards Pakistan ... The British High Commissioner in India, in a secret report to the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office, reported: 'Dr John Mattai, Finance Minister, told me recently in a private conversation that in his view it was a mistake to say that India's problem No 1 was the question of food. He had no doubt that India's problem No 1 was really Kashmir ... He added that the Prime Minister was extremely difficult to deal with over this matter because he tended to become emotional and unreasonable whenever such a question was raised' ... In 1950, when Sir Owen Dixon tried to arbitrate on behalf of the UN, India gave a cold shoulder to his proposals to which Pakistan, under pressure from the USA and the UK, had reluctantly agreed ... India remained evasive leaving the Australian envoy 'wondering whether Nehru really wanted an early settlement of the Kashmir situation on a basis which might be acceptable to Pakistan, whether Nehru was playing a lone card or whether he was supported by his Cabinet and responsible Indian opinion generally'.25 Privately, Dixon admitted that Nehru was 'downright lying', as during the Dixon/Nehru/Liaquat meeting in New Delhi, Nehru spoke for 16 hours while allowing his Pakistani counterpart to speak merely for one hour. Liaquat, as it appears from the contemporary British official archives, had even agreed to consider the River Chenab as the border according to the Dixon formula, but Nehru backed out leaving both Pakistan and Dixon out on a limb

Iftikhar Malik:

Nehru was emotionally attached to Kashmir, both because of his ancestral relatives, and so as not to appear weak to the strong rightist parties in India, which had already claimed Gandhi's life as well as criticizing the Indian National Congress for accepting Pakistan as a sovereign state. Both the USA and the UK8 wanted to resolve the crises but were baffled by reports from their envoys in New Delhi who submitted telegrams on temperamental changes in Nehru's daily utterances on the relationship with Pakistan.9 Many members of the Nehru cabinet felt that Kashmir was proving disastrous to India both financially and politically. The British High Commissioner in India reported to the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office by stating: 'Dr John Mattai, Finance Minister, told me recently in a private conversation that in his view it was a mistake to say that India's problem No 1 was the question of food. He had no doubt that India's problem No 1 was really Kashmir .. . He added that the Prime Minister was extremely difficult to deal with over this matter because he tended to become emotional and unreasonable whenever such a question was raised.'10 The British prime minister requested both Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan to find a 'true Agreement on Kashmir'.11 Attlee's letter was delivered to Nehru at the same time as a similar request from the US president, while the former evaded the basic issues by raising 'procedural issues' and by blaming Pakistan for consolidating its position in Azad Kashmir. Pandit Nehru was deeply annoyed with the appointment of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and seemed to have second thoughts about any UN role in the resolution of the dispute. India, after taking the issue to the UN, felt that it had not been able to wrest a moral and diplomatic victory over Pakistan; rather it had itself blundered into acceptance of a plebiscite.12 Nehru turned more offensive. In his famous speech in Allahabad he seemed to have come full circle by denouncing Pakistan as a theocracy, and he announced that Kashmir was an integral part of India, thereby invalidating the two-nation theory. '. . . Pandit Nehru so often allows his emotions to carry him away when making public speeches. He may also have been worked upon by Sheikh Abdullah who accompanied him to Allahabad'.13 Soon after, the Indian press vehemently turned against both Attlee and Truman as well denouncing both plebiscite and arbitration.14 At this stage, the British High Commissioner told Sir Girja Bajpai, the Indian Foreign Secretary, that if India dithered on the UN resolutions on a plebiscite after accepting them, it would mean 'that India was not prepared to go to arbitration because she had not sufficient faith in her own cause to accept the award of an objective neutral'. Bajpai confidentially told the envoy that he had privately advised Nehru to seize the opportunity for arbitration, but this had been of no avail: 'It is equally clear', reported the High Commissioner back to London, 'that nobody else has been prepared to dispute with Nehru and my impression is Sardar Patel has offered no views on the merits of the case and left it to the Prime Minister to decide as he wishes'.15 A year later, when Dixon tried to arbitrate on behalf of the UN, India gave the cold shoulder to his proposals, to which Pakistan, under pressure from both the USA and the UK, had reluctantly agreed. The Dixon formula stipulated a partition-cum-plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to meet the sensitivities of both contending parties. But despite Dixon's shuttle diplomacy, India remained evasive, leaving the Australian envoy 'wondering whether Nehru really wanted an early settlement of the Kashmir situation on a basis which might be acceptable to Pakistan, whether Nehru was playing a lone card or whether he was supported by his Cabinet and responsible Indian opinion generally'.16 Privately, Dixon felt that Nehru was 'downright lying', as during the Dixon/Nehru/Liaquat meeting in New Delhi when Nehru spoke for 16 hours while allowing his Pakistani counterpart to speak for merely one hour. Liaquat, as appears from the recently declassified British official papers, had, at that stage, agreed to consider River Chenab as the border accord- ing to the Dixon formula, but Nehru backed out leaving both Pakistan and Dixon out in the cold.17 India had earlier raised objections to the appointment of Admiral Nimitz as the plebiscite administrator, thus thwarting all efforts for resolution of the problem. As the above brief resume on the early years of the dispute, based on British official reports, amply shows, numerous historic opportunities were lost to resolve the stalemate on Kashmir due to obstinacy on the part of the Indian leadership. The concessions from both sides under the UN auspices, as initially agreed by them, could have helped South Asia to avert a continuum of unnecessary tragedies that were to befall its peoples.

Iftikhar Malik:

Nehru's intransigence on Kashmir predated comsummation of the United States-Pakistan alliance, and even during the best phase of Indo-American cordiality, New Delhi simply refused to budge.

AG Noorani:

We now know that Nehru had privately decided in 1948 not to keep his promises as he admitted to Sheikh Abdullah on August 25, 1952 (vide the author's article, 'Why and How Nehru and Abdullah Fell Out, EPW, January 30,1999). Nehru reneged on his pledge, and this new line became a matter of national faith.

AG Noorani:

Soon thereafter, Nehru bared his thoughts in a confidential Note to Abdullah dated August 25, 1952 while camping at Sonmarg in Kashmir. He revealed his decision to reject a plebiscite as far back as 1948, his public statements not withstanding.

Syed Shaid Hussain Bukhari:

Although several guarantees were given to ensure the decision of Kashmir’s accession to either side through plebiscite in accordance with the will of the people living there but the matter was put into stalemate due to contending demands from both India and Pakistan. UN resolutions never saw accomplishment due to India’s delaying tactics; therefore both countries went into crises over Kashmir again in 1965, 1990 and 1999

Miraj-U-Din Mushi:

Dr. Joseph Korbel, wo served as chairman of UNCIP in 1948, writes in his book Danger in Kashmir, … and especially (for so it must appear after all the Commission's efforts) by a lack of good will on the part of India. India thus procrastinated with the implementation of UN resolutions, paying lip service to them until 1958 when it found a ready supporter of this position in the evil empire of the Soviet Union, which vetoed every attempt by the Security Council on Kashmir, a condition that has lasted from 1958 to this day.

Miraj-U-Din Mushi:

Subsequent events in history prove that Nehru never meant to honor the pledges of his so-called great nation. His pledges were nothing but a typical brahminic evasive tactic to buy time.

Owais Khursheed (Talk to me) 10:00, 16 February 2017 (UTC)

References

@Owais Khursheed: I am not sure what you are trying to do here, or, if you are asking me a question, what that question is. The scholars that I use never make opinionated statements of this kind, and even if they did, I would never include them in the article. I am interested in facts not opinions. But I am just one editor, and you are another. You are free to do as you please. Keep in mind however that including opinionated statements will just invite other editors to include their own favoured opinions, and the quality of this article will go down the tube. No matter how many opinions you produce, the solid evidence that is present in the documents of Nehru and other Indian government officials will be here for eternity and it can never be taken away.

The more striking evidence of the Indian government’s commitment to a plebiscite, however, lies in Nehru’s serious revival of the option in late 1953, when both Abdullah and public opinion in Kashmir had turned decidedly anti-India.[33] By June 1953, Nehru had conceded that were a plebiscite to be held in the state, India was sure to lose, and that Delhi could not seek to hold on to Kashmir “at the point of a bayonet.”[34] President Rajendra Prasad shared the assessment,[35] and concluded that while a solution along the status quo was ideal for India, Delhi could suggest to Karachi either zonal plebiscites, or a plebiscite restricted to the valley, which would likely mean losing the Kashmir valley, but at least leave Jammu with India.[36]

You might also keep in mind the quality of the sources. Regarding Iftikhar Malik's chapter on Kashmir, Katherine Adeney says:

The fourth [theme] is unfortunately an anti-Indian/pro-Pakistani bias, revealed most notably in the chapter on Kashmir, but also in 'Nationalism in contestation'.

I haven't seen any of his writings, but I will be glad to look at them. At least one of his quotes above (cited indirectly via Ellis and Khan) is quite substandard. The words attributed to V. P. Menon ("We have Kashmir. The bastard signed the Act of Accession. And now we've got it, we'll never let it go") are taken from Collins and La Pierre's fictionalised Freedom at Midnight. No reputable scholar believes that the words were ever uttered, or even that the said meeting ever took place. This represents highly dubious scholarship. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:20, 17 February 2017 (UTC)

References

Mudslinging upon the Indian Army.

'Indian forces have committed many human rights abuses and acts of terror against Kashmiri civilian population including extrajudicial killing, rape, torture and enforced disappearances'.

Whosoever is thus aligned with utter falsity, needs to correct it lest their personal vandalism overrule truth. It is duly asked of relevant authorities to 'unprotect' this page since it conforms to a personal and narrow agendum. NavyaRana (talk) 11:24, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

@NavyaRana: Unfortunately, scholarly consensus is against your claim. You need to find WP:RS to claim that content as 'utter falsity'. It is sourced to Seema Kazi. She is a women & human rights activist who has a PhD from London School of Economics and Political Science, and her works are published by Oxford University Press. You can look up for more sources from the references in this article. Cheers! — Vamsee614 (talk) 13:39, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

@Vamsee614 It indeed is a claim and I haven't the reference for it. Oft seen, scholarly claims fail to live upto reality. And also, because honourable cheer-folk must be reminded so, I have never 'edited Seema Kazi' or anybody as a 'Pakistani source'. Since the credentials have been duly elaborated to me for the benefit of nobody, I suppose I must congralute Ms. Kazi on her achievements and Oxford for having had the distinction. Suffice to say, anybody's having had a degree doesn't convert all their words into ground reality, nor do mine. — Preceding unsigned comment added by NavyaRana (talk • contribs) 13:55, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

@NavyaRana: Yeah, I mistook it. Some other user edited, saying she's a Pakistani source, not you. I apologize for that.

And I'm not sure how your reality is framed, but unfortunately/fortunately in Wikipedia we don't document content based on that reality. We are supposed to do it based on WP:RS. It is one of the core policies and principles of Wikipedia. — Vamsee614 (talk) 14:16, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

@Vamsee614 Again and again, a delusion that you extend to me is that I somehow perpetuate my own 'reality'. Of the two facts that 'WP:RS is one of core policies and principles of Wikipedia' and that 'we don't document based on that reality', I fully comprehend myself to have disregarded neither. 'It indeed is a claim and I haven't the reference for it'. There, I admitted it for the third time in three times. I want the acknowledgement to be made about the Army. I wanted it to be put out there that mere sentences can't be the absolute gospel because somebody said it, inclusive of myself. Evidence for the aforesaid can't be 'Ms. Kazmi's book' on Kashmir like horror stories even by R.L. Stine aren't for the existence of ghosts. People's admittance of their own faults is a yet another art. A source shall be put up regarding my original statement if I happen to come across it. I will not elaborate myself further for you. — Preceding unsigned comment added by NavyaRana (talk • contribs) 14:58, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

Come to think of it, perhaps I must write a book, like Ms. Kazmi did, have it published by any elite publisher and then Wikipedia and the madam would WP-RS it. -NavyaRana — Preceding unsigned comment added by NavyaRana (talk • contribs) 15:56, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

I am not contesting Seema Kazi (yet), but it seems to me that the entire section on Human rights abuses suffers from WP:Main article fixation and there is definitely an overdose of Seema Kazi in it. Are there no other sources that discuss these issues? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:16, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: I think, apparently, the violence & POV from one side is dominating the ones from the other side in the present content. I agree that needs to be balanced. I also feel that the content has to be briefed up a bit (since there are separate articles for the topic for elaboration), giving more prominence to reasonable facts than assessments (including comparisions), opinions and claims. However, in my opinion, complete neutrality cannot be achieved for a sensitive and contentious subject like this. — Vamsee614 (talk) 18:27, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

Poonch-Rajouri in the 1965 war

@Faizan: this edit summary: "This is part of 1965 war. If you still disagree I will have to take it to dispute resolution edit summary", is quite inadequate to the issue raised. It may be part of the 1965 war, but this article is not about the 1965 war. I said in my revert that it is not part of the India-Pakistan conflict (in the context of Kashmir). It could be part of the Internal Conflict, for which there is another section. But, then again, you would need to show how it is part of the overall conflict. You cannot just stick random bits of information in an already very long article just because you believe it is important. You need to show the RS that highlight its importance, or you have to argue here as to how it is important.

You are free to take it to WP:DRN if you wish, but you need to first articulate what your argument is. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:37, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

I have created a new sub-section on the page on 1965 war where refugees will be mentioned. That will deal with Kashmir refugees as well as refugees in other parts of the subcontinent. On this page there is no suitable section to talk about refugees from the 1965 war except the section about the 1965 war. I do not agree that such a thing can go under internal conflict. There is nothing about the 1965 war in internal conflict. This is a war event and the best place to write about it is under the war. Faizan (talk) 10:52, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

You still haven't answered the question: how is this part of India-Pakistan conflict? Yes, wars do hurt people, and the Indian army might have done a poor job in this instance. But did it impact the India-Pakistan conflict? If so, how?

Everything that happened during the 1965 war cannot go here. You need to address the WP:WEIGHT issue. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:05, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

I have not found a rule saying that everything under India-Pakistan conflict must discuss effect of each event on relations. For instance, I have also added Mirpur Massacre of 1947 even as I cannot find any WP:RS indicating that event's effect on relations between India and Pakistan. I inserted it because it is an offshoot to the main events. Faizan (talk) 11:13, April 7, 2017‎

Yes, the Mirpur edit was also bad. In fact, it was even worse because it violates the timelines. The discussion of the Jammu massacres in that section is also overweight, added by another POV pusher that is now gone. I will need to trim it eventually. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:55, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

• As I mentioned in my last edit summary, I too have a similar objection about the content's weight in that place. As Faizan said, it has to be certainly documented in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 article. But in this much broader article that deals with the Kashmir conflict and under the section of India - Pakistan conflict, I don't think, a whole para, explicitly about internal refugees of a war, has be inserted. Regarding Mirpur massacre in the article, it also has no effect on the conflict. But it is mentioned only in one line, so I don't object to its weight. — TylerDurden10 (talk) 11:37, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

Perhaps a brief line on refugees from Poonch-Rajouri and Chamb fleeing harassment can suffice? Faizan (talk) 11:47, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

First we would need a source that discusses it in the context of the 1965 war to know how it impacted the war. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:58, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

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Iftikhar Malik quotation

The following text was inserted in the Dixon Plan section quoting Iftikhar Malik, a pro-Pakistan scholar.

According to the pro-Pakistan & anti-Indian scholar Iftikhar Malik, Dixon privately felt that Nehru was ‘downright lying’ because of India remaining evasive despite Dixon's shuttle diplomacy.

References

The point of this appears to be merely to throw mud at Nehru, because no "lie" is mentioned. Dixon apparently doubted whether Nehru was representing the Cabinet and the public opinion or fighting his own lone battle. It hasn't been explained what was the basis of this. While I don't mind somebody properly analysing Nehru's intentions, I don't think this scholar has any credentials to do it.

His assertion that Liaquat Ali Khan was willing to concede the Chenab formula during the summit is false, as evidenced by many sources. Liaquat was pushing for a plebiscite in all of J&K without an attendant Pakistani withdrawal while also asking for the removal of Shekh Abdullah. After the failure of the summit, Nehru proposed partition-cum-plebiscite, and Dixon tried to persuade Liaquat in a separate visit to Karachi in August 1950. It was at the point that Dixon proposed the Chenab formula (for Jammu province only). Liaquat apparently accepted it then, but with the condition that Sheikh Abdullah should be removed. Noorani states that Abdullah's removal would not have been acceptable to anybody in India, whether the Cabinet or the public opinion. Iftikhar Malik's analysis is entirely substandard. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:11, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Analysis

I did some detailed reading over this. It does appear that Nehru's stance was inconsistent, going by the criticism in various reputable sources. Some particularly relevant extracts:

This one from Francis Pike while mentioning Dixon supports the contention that Nehru was deliberately stalling so as to avoid the plebiscite, and wanted to strengthen hold over the territory:

The reason for Nehru's failure to implement a plebiscite for Kashmir are worth analysing. Nehru's insistence that the popular will should be exercised in Junagadh and Hyderabad, and his failure to implement this solution in Jammu and Kashmir, was obviously grossly hypocritical. Quite simply, his fear of losing a plebiscite, and with it Kashmir, was not something he was prepared to concede...This position was reinforced by Nehru's refusal to sanction a United Nations Commission under Admiral Nimitz, to arbitrate a staged withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides. A further attempt to mediate a Kashmir solution saw the United Nations appoint an Australian lawyer, Sir Owen Dixon, to report on the problem. He also concluded that a fair plebiscite could not be held as long as Indian troops occupied Kashmir. By now it was clear to most observers that Nehru was filibustering for time, in the knowledge that the longer India occupied Kashmir, the more unlikely it was that the status quo would ever be changed. Nehru himself observed in August 1952 that 'Our general outlook should be such as to make people think that the association of Kashmir state with India is an accomplished fact and nothing is going to undo it.

Robert J. McMahon corroborates that position, concerning the use of a plebiscite promise as a delaying mechanism:

Increasingly, American officials blamed India for the impasse. They believed that India, in rejecting the UNCIP's various truce proposals on dubious legal technicalities, was simply trying to avoid a plebiscite. They were right. Since India was already in possession of the most desirable portion of Kashmir, and since the overwhelming Muslim majority in the state made a vote to join Pakistan the most likely outcome of a fair referendum, a postponement of the plebiscite clearly served India's interests. Some Indian officials admitted candidly to their American counterparts that they would find a partition of Kashmir preferable to a plebiscite. If a plebiscite is postponed to the indefinite future, Nimitz observed astutely, India will have the opportunity of so consolidating her position on the contested area that the conditions of a 'fair' plebiscite may never exist.

Furthermore, academic Hassan Abbas writes that Nehru repeatedly changed his words on the plebiscite well into the 1960s:

On May 10, 1954, Nehru, while addressing the Indian Council of States, had said: India, honestly and sincerely, does not want to tarnish its image in the world, and it is high time that the tyranny and brutalisation in the valley must cease. Kashmir is neither an inseparable nor an integral part of India...[India] must accept the facts and start making arrangements for allowing the people of the disputed territory to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination. It was astonishing, however, that Nehru tried to wriggle out of the promised plebiscite in 1961 by saying, There is no question of any plebiscite in Kashmir, now or later. I am sick of the talk about plebiscite, which does not interest anybody. That was not all. In August 1963 he changed his stance yet again, when he met Pakistan's foreign minister in New Delhi, and the resulting communique of their talks clearly stated that the Kashmir dispute would be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir...by a fair and impartial plebiscite. Nothing came of this as well...India had taken a very long and tortuous route to shift from a position of hypocrisy to one of truth...Countless attempts at a solution of the Kashmir problem had foundered on the rock of Indian transigence even while officially it held to the pledge of plebiscite...

So from a reliable perspective, it is a scholarly view that cannot be disregarded. Mar4d (talk) 14:44, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

I am not sure where we are going with this. I have admitted a long time ago that the doubts about whether Nehru was ever sincere about the plebiscite in Kashmir will persist. The footnote 101 documents some such doubts. You are welcome to add more if you wish. But the main body of the article is based on Mahesh Shankar's thorugh analysis based on published statements of Nehru. He documents exactly when Nehru changed his mind and why. Some people might suspect that he changed his mind much earlier. The British and American diplomats could have leaned on Pakistan to demilitarise Azad Kashmir and called Nehru's bluff. But nobody did. So we will never know the truth of these speculations.

As far as the subject matter at hand is concerned, Nehru gave written submission to Owen Dixon proposing plebiscite in the Valley and the rest of the state partitioned through negotiation. The combined response from Dixon and Liaquat Ali Khan was, "yes, but only if Sheikh Abdullah is made to step down". There ended the Dixon initiative. If there is some lie in any of this, it needs to be stated and documented. We are not going to put up with vague innuendo. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:39, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

References

Nehru quote from Taya Zinkin

Content from the Dixon Plan section for discussion

Here it would be pertinent to quote Pandit Nehru as reported by Taya Zinkin, the representative of "Manchester Guardian" of London, presently, The Guardian, on June 30, 1950, in answer to her question whether he would accept the "status quo" with plebiscite confined to the Valley of Kashmir, that, "I would not agree to a plebiscite so long as Pakistan held a part of the State because the people of Kashmir were 'timorous'. Of course if the Kashmiris want a plebiscite to be fought on economic and not mind you, religious grounds they can have it. But I shall never allow so long as I live a plebiscite over cow's urine and all that. It would undo the whole of communal harmony."

References

@Mamta Jagdish Dhody: can you please explain your rationale for including this quote in the Dixon Plan section? Please note that Balraj Madhok does not qualify as a WP:HISTRS. Our section says that Nehru had proposed a partition-cum-plebiscite plan, sourced to proper historians, whereby a plebiscite would be held only in the Kashmir Valley. What is this quote saying with regard to that? Was it said before the proposal or after? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:51, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

The basis to all my edits is resolving the heinous crime situation in India, wherein comes the dirty "STONE AGE WAR", in Kashmir! Anyone who has contributed significantly to absolve it comes in my focus, including Balraj Madhok and, how I can add my knowledge to it with reference. If you are a serious editor you must have noted the steady build up of all wikipedia articles as per the relevant present from past history. Blogs are not acceptable to wikipedia, in spite of the fact that they present an independent analysis of the present times.

Please see:- http://insightskashmir.blogspot.in/2015/02/scanning-dixon-plan.html

What all has been done for Kashmir cannot be put down on this talk page! Only if we focus on what is creating the trouble there, can we zero down on the main contributors to the peace of this heaven on earth, which in ancient times used to be a place where old people and the sick liked to retire to, for convalescing, spiritual healing. Religion is not an issue in Kashmir which earns from tourism. Crime is, as well as Strategic defence. Nehruji and Taya Zinkin, come in here. Please do not however make it an issue of his political inheritors, unless they are ready to focus on these two issues! Mamta Jagdish Dhody (talk) 13:46, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

This ending makes one laugh :- https://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/Stone_Age#/media/File:Dolmenmontebubbonia.jpg Mamta Jagdish Dhody (talk) 14:00, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Well, Nehru did agree to a plebiscite in the Kashmir valley, leaving the Pakistan-held areas untouched. So, whatever may the truth of the statement he made to Taya Zinkin, it has been superseded. So, this statement doesn't belong here.

Your blogger by the way is plagiarising from A. G. Noorani. The original is here. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:55, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Its ok. I make edits to increase your knowledge base, even if it is not original - at least it will lead to the original, and one can always refer to it. See the article on —war torn Kashmir— whose legacy nestles from the Hindu Kush started from here and Canada :- https://en.wiki.x.io/w/index.php?title=Kashmir_conflict&oldid=26826963 . In my perspective, which will not align with yours maybe, it is related to these articles.

1. https://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/2005_Delhi_bombings . 2. https://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/Air_India_Flight_182 . 3. https://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/Pashupati_seal

The entire Kashmir conflict is India's past and future, that one has to live with and can never leave as it is in the roots of an ancient civilization. Mamta Jagdish Dhody (talk) 18:56, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

• Woah woah woah! What's happening here? I don't think this discussion is being any objective. Mamta Jagdish Dhody, you have to seriously consider refraining from engaging in WP:OR. Regards, Tyler Durden (talk) 19:04, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

One sided / Biased article

This article is composed with very biased and one sided articles. It is not good for reference or education purpose. It only shows Pakistan's hard line views. For example, every where it keeps saying India is a fault and Pakistan is not.

Examples: "Nehru was lying....." - Not a fact. "Human rights violations are more in Indian Administered Kashmir than POK" - No reporting every comes out from POK due to hard dictatorship of Pak Govt. "Rapes etc by Indian military forces..." - not an actual fact or any evidence.

We should have normal narrative where both sides should be represented. I request this article to be updated accordingly or removed from Wikipedia. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Sonalrajeev (talk • contribs) 18:22, 26 June 2017 (UTC)

Similarly, in the introduction, it takes a quote from a book about the alleged human rights violations of the Indian army versus those of the terrorist organizations, and asserts that the army's violations are far worse (stated as fact rather than the opinion of one author). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2606:A000:C689:4A00:F0CD:C6C:2F28:47DC (talk) 00:18, 10 July 2017 (UTC)

UN Mediation

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

---

The 'terms' of the UNSC Resolutions in Kashmir require an agreement between India, Pakistan and UNSC appointed mediators on demilitarization. There is no requirement for a unilateral and unconditional withdrawal upon Pakistan. The demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir was to take place in a "synchronized manner" on both sides of the ceasefire line

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.​ [16]

- — Preceding unsigned comment added by Samm19 (talk • contribs)

Please remember to sign your posts, avoid white space, and indent appropriately. See HELP:TALK.

The source you quoted (not an UNSC resolution, but a UNCIP resolution) is called a WP:PRIMARY source. Wikipedians are not allowed to interpret PRIMARY sources. Calling it a "synchronized manner" is your interpretation, which is fit for a blog site, but not Wikipedia.

The content in the article is cited to reliable sources. Please check them. If there is a problem with a source, please bring it up. If you have another source that says something different, please mention it. You cannot randomly "dispute" a sourced statement. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:09, 22 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: No, it's not "my" interpretation. It is the official position maintained by Pakistan. For your education:

Pakistan's official response to ICJ(International Commission of Jurists):

The Response of the Government of Pakistan

(a) The demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir was to take place in a synchronized manner on both sides of the ceasefire line. It was India which refused to implement the process of demilitarization.

(b) The proof of Indian refusal to demilitarize is to be found in the report of Sir Owen Dixon (an eminent Australian Jurist and United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan) to the Security Council, contained in Document S-1971, in which he concluded as follows:-

"In the end, I became convinced that India’s agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any form or to provisions governing the period of plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion, permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled."(Para 52 of Document S/1971).

(c) It should also be noted that after a thorough examination of the matter the Security Council in its Resolution No. 98(1952), adopted on 23rd December 1952, allowed both India and Pakistan to maintain a limited number of their forces on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization in order to maintain law and order. This number was to be between 3000-6000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistani side and 12000-18000 remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. Pakistan agreed to this proposal; India did not.

(d) To claim, in the face of this clear and irrefutable evidence, that the plebiscite could not be held because Pakistan refused to withdraw its forces, is patently an attempt to deceive the world. The simple truth is that India did not allow the creation of conditions necessary for the holding of a free and fair plebiscite under UN auspices.

Please don't remove the "disputed" tag unless you are able to address the issue regards Samm19 (talk) 00:18, 22 July 2017 (UTC)

References

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Geelani

@Owais Khursheed: by the statistics that you yourself included, 87% of the Srinagar population want independence, and 3% want to join Pakistan. Syed Ali Shah Geelani is in this 3%. By what measure do you claim that he represents "Kashmiri views" [17]?

Mountbatten & Gurdaspur

@NadirAli:, I am reverting your addition to the Partition and invasion section, which reads as follows:

According to Yaqoob Khan Bangash it was certain that Lord Mountbatten did not want Kashmir to remain independent and he was possibly trying to get the state to accede to India. Nehru had made it clear in a letter on 17 June 1947 that ‘[i]f any attempt is made to push Kashmir into Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there is likely to be much trouble...[the] obvious course appears to be for Kashmir to join the Constituent Assembly of India’. Evidence for Mountbatten’s attempting the state to accede to India can be gleaned from the fact that on 4 August 1947 Mountbatten remarked that Kashmir could join either Dominion provided that the Radcliffe Boundary Commission awarded Gurdaspur District to India. This was despite the fact that it was generally accepted at the time that Gurdaspur District, due to its Muslim majority, would be awarded to Pakistan. When its three sub-districts were instead awarded to India, Liaquat Ali Khan complained to Lord Ismay, Mountbatten’s chief of staff, that the award was a political instead of judicial decision and an injustice and breach of faith by the British.

References

It is out of order and completely undue. The passage preceding it states that the Maharaja had decided to be independent and this was communicated by the prime minister Ram Chandra Kak to Mountbatten, and Indian and Pakistani leaders in unequivocal terms on 23 July. So, what happened earlier is of no consequence, and what Mountbatten thought is entirely inconsequential because it wasn't his decision.

The Gurdaspur District issue is a red herring. What matters is the Pathankot tehsil, which contained India's land route to Kashmir and it happened to be Hindu majority. Had the Pathankot tehsil been awarded to Pakistan, all hell would have broken loose. But it wasn't. What happened to the other two tehsils has no bearing on the Kashmir conflict. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:50, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Many historians such as Alistair lamb say Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe commission on Nehru’s urging so that India could access Kashmir through Gurdaspur which should have gone to Pakistan. If its in the sources and repeated by a number of historians its relevant. Even if Pathankot was the only tehsil not given to Pakistan India still would not have gained access to Kashmir because Muslim majority tehsils Batala and Gurdaspur would block India’s access. These tehsils were given to India. Shireen Ilahi does not counter this.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 06:38, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

There are two issues that should be separated:

• Whether the awarding of Batala and Gurdaspur tehsils to India affected the Kashmir conflict.
• Whether Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe award in this instance.

For the second issue (Mountbatten), yes, there have been many speculations about it, but no conclusive evidence. Until there is such, that discussion does not belong in this article. It can go in the Radcliffe Line article though.

As to the first issue, the railway line to Pathankot went through Batala and Gurdaspur tehsils, but there were separate road connections to Pathankot that did not go through these tehsils. So, to argue that these tehsils were pertinent to Kashmir, it should be shown that the railway lines were crucial. Do you have such a source? Since there was no railway between Pathankot and Kashmir and the road that existed was an abysmal one, India was able to manage a poor communication line from Pathankot to Kashmir. So, how is it possible that a good roadway to Pathankot wasn't good enough? This seems to be a highly dubious argument. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:59, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

You say, Shireen Ilahi does not counter this. Quite disingenuous. Here it is in black and white:

Both Lamb and Ziegler, and the historians that side with either one or the other, seem to forget the crucial point that the consensus records have already illuminated - only Pathankot tehsil was of consequence to Indian access to Kashmir (by road) and its non-Muslim majority placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line.

Her entire article is devoted to refuting the non-arguments of Lamb and co. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:35, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Many historians such as Alistair lamb say Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe commission on Nehru’s urging so that India could access Kashmir through Gurdaspur which should have gone to Pakistan. If its in the sources and repeated by a number of historians its relevant. Even if Pathankot was the only tehsil not given to Pakistan India still would not have gained access to Kashmir because Muslim majority tehsils Batala and Gurdaspur would block India’s access. These tehsils were given to India. Shireen Ilahi does not counter this.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 06:45, 9 June 2017 (UTC)

@NadirAli: why are you repeating the same post all over again? Did you read my response? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:44, 9 June 2017 (UTC)

For reference: A map of the Pathankot tehsil] with respect to Jammu and Kashmir. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:40, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Yes, there were other roads connecting Pathankot that didn't pass through Batala and Gurdaspur Tehsils, for example the Pathankot-Dunera and Pathankot-Palampur cart roads, but it was (and still is) Pathankot that was the major Rail-head in Punjab that provided main access to the hilly areas of (now) Himachal Pradesh from Punjab, and not the other way around. Had Gurdaspur and Batala not been given to India along with Pathankot, it would have taken years, if not decades, for India to construct a reliable all weather rail/road infrastructure in its northern hilly areas to connect to Pathankot, and then onwards to Jammu. Shereen Ilahi, whoever she is, has completely missed the point. Lamb and co (sic) didn't argue that it was 'impossible' for India to annex Kashmir had Gurdaspur district been transferred to Pakistan, they argued that the controversial award of Muslim majority Gurdaspur district to India made the (otherwise non-viable) accession of Kashmir to India 'feasible' . Also, Shereen Ilahi is 'assuming' that the Pathankot tehsil was to be transferred to India anyway as its non-Muslim majority placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line. She has ignored the fact that in the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act, all of Gurdaspur District was marked as Pakistan, and later, several Muslim majority tehsils were handed over to India. So Ms. Ilahi is making a baseless "assumption" here. Samm19 (talk) 21:20, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

The 'Gurdaspur district' was not awarded to India. Three tehsils out of four were awarded to India. If I recall correctly, Wavell's line gave all of the Gurdaspur district to India. (You say it was "rejected", but by whom?) However, whether it was "rejected" or not is not the point. Whatever reasons made Wavell give Gurdaspur district to India, didn't disappear by the time Radcliffe came on the scene? So, the theory that Mountbatten was conspiring with India to influence the award is very weak. Unlike Radcliffe, Wavell did explain the reasons for his award. You can go and read them.

If I were Radcliffe, I would say that the district is roughly 50-50 Muslim vs. non-Muslim. I know that population exchange is taking place. So, perhaps I would want to give half of it to India and half to Pakistan. But, unfortunately, the Gurdaspur's tehsils were stacked on top of each other along the north-south axis rather than east-west axis. So, there was no clean way to divide them 50-50. Giving three tehsils to India would preserve the railway line and canals. That seems visibly unfair to Pakistan. Perhaps I could make it up by giving some other territory to Pakistan in exchange.

That could have been the reasoning that went on with Radcliffe. There is no Kashmir here and no Mountbatten either. Whoever wants to make theories needs to address all such issues. Shereen Ilahi is doing that. Bangash is just repeating the standard Pakistani gripes without rhyme or reason. That is not scholarly at all. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:04, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

The 'notional' award is precisely what the name says. It was notional. It was a rough and ready line drawn for the purpose of illustration to the British Parliament, as part of passing the Indian Independence Act. If the notional award was to be the final one, there would have been no need for a Boundary Commission at all. So there is no point discussing the notional award. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:23, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

Also, interestingly, an explicit denial has been given:

Lord Radcliffe has denied that access to Kashmir and Jammu was at any time of the 'other factors' affecting the award.

So, I am afraid idle speculations won't do. Some solid evidence is necessary to make any headway. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:08, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Wavell's plan was rejected by HMG; The British Cabinet in Jan 1947. Wavell was a strong proponent of united India and his whole idea of 'breakdown' was meant to make Pakistan small, weak and unattractive for Jinnah. Wavell in his breakdown plan did mention that his 'proposal' of giving Gurdaspur to India was, of course, negotiable. There is a reason for which Wavell never acknowledged that Punjab was partitioned according to his breakdown plan. But that is another debate.

The point is, you are rejecting the opinion of Mr. Bangash, an Oxonian currently serving as Assistant Professor of history at one of the most prestigious universities in Pakistan, and deriding him as "not scholarly" and trying to present Ms. Shereen Ilahi (whoever she is) as a true scholar, just because the views held by the former are opposed to your own and the latter agrees with you. You, of course, are entitled to your opinion but removing/deleting properly referenced content from wikipedia just because you don't agree with it, or personally find it 'not scholarly', is not very 'neutral', and if I am not mistaken, wikipedia is supposed to be neutral. As already pointed out by @NadirAli:, If an opinion is held by a number of historians, and has been repeated many times, it is relevant (and therefore should not be deleted).

As for Lord Radcliffe, he himself is "the accused", whatever he says holds little, if any, credibility. Samm19 (talk) 23:24, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

• Wavell's 'Breakdown Plan' had nothing to do with the partition line, and is irrelevant to the discussion. (And, I should note, there is way too much WP:OR in your commentary.)
• Bangash may be an Oxonian, but all that it means here is that he is a reliable source. So is Shereen Ilahi. Other than that, it is the evidence and the analysis that matters. Bangash too is conceding Ilahi's point in his footnote 22:

[22] Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 215-20. Only Pathankot tehsil had a Hindu majority, but, without Gurdaspur and Batala tehsils which had Muslim majorities, India could still not have unfettered access to Kashmir.

So it is not the Pathankot tehsil that is being contested, but the Gurdaspur and Batala tehsils. Supposedly it provided "unfettered access", which was important enough for Nehru, Mountbatten as well Radcliffe to bend the rules and cheat in favaour of India. It is a pretty far-fetched theory that might have currency in Pakistan, but note here. Victoria Schoefield, who is sensible about these matters says this:

In the final award the three tehsils... went to India. A memorandum prepared by the minister of state, which included Radcliffe's observations after he returned to England, reported that the reason for changing the 'notional' award regarding Gurdaspur was because 'the headwaters of the canals which irrigate the Amritsar District lie in the Gurdaspur District and it is important to keep as much as possible of these canals under one [i.e. Indian] administration'.[35: Hugh Tinker, 'Pressure, Persuasion, Decision...', The Journal of Asian Studies, August 1977, p.702] Wavell, however, had made a more significant political judgement in his plan, submitted to the secretary of state, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, in February 1946: 'Gurdaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being sacred city of Sikhs must stay out of Pakistan... Fact that much of Lahore district is irrigated from upper Bari Doab canal with headworks in Gurdaspur district is awkward but there is no solution that avoids all such difficulties.' Wavell had also noted the problem this would create by leaving Qadian, the holy city of the Ahmadiyyas, in India, but the interests of the Sikhs were considered to be paramount. 'The greatest difficulty is position of Sikhs with their homelands and sacred places on both sides of the border. This problem is one which no version of Pakistan can solve'.[36: Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 7 February 1946, Transfer, vol.6, doc. 406, p.912]

There the matter rests, unless somebody can dig up some evidence to the contrary.

• Please don't speak of "accusing" people. That is not the job of Wikipedia. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:15, 18 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3:

• Let me remind you my friend that Wavell's 'Break Down' plan was brought into discussion by you and I have only replied/responded. As for WP:OR, I am new to wikipedia editing and am trying to learn about 'how to add references', but rest assured I know what I am talking about, and I can back up everything I write/say with authentic sources.
• No, Mr. Bangash is not conceding Ilahi's point. As already shown, she doesn't even have 'a point' to begin with.
• If one goes through the section 'Partition and Invasion', he may find out that the entire section is dedicated to Indian POV only and contains different kinds of unsubstantiated allegations leveled against Pakistan by Indian authors and scholars. I am surprised that you have no problem with that but are unwilling to let anyone post Pakistan's point of view in that section. So, let's leave aside other things and concentrate on this. What makes you believe that posting/presenting the official position maintained by Pakistan in this regard (that is corroborated by multiple local and international sources) should not be allowed ? Samm19 (talk) 16:48, 18 July 2017 (UTC)

• As I said right in the beginning it would be "completely UNDUE" to go into the issues of partition or the British role in the whole affair. The British role was of course not limited to the allocation of Gurdaspur. It started sometime around 1939 in promising the creation of Pakistan and it went all the way until Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Treaty with the US in 1954. There is long story to be told, and there are plenty of books about it.
• This article is on Kashmir conflict and it focuses on India, Pakistan and the people of the state, who are the main people that are "conflicted". The maximum that can be put in this article is the mention that the award of Gurdaspur to India made Kashmir contiguous to India, and Pakistanis allege British manipulation of the award. I will add that in the next couple of days.
• Regarding Wavell, you are confusing the 'breakdown plan' (January 1947) with his partition line (February 1946). The Radcliffe line essentially followed Wavell's, except for a few details. So, Wavell's line is quite important, even though it is hard to find sources about it.
• As for Radcliffe, most people don't seem to know the process. Radcliffe didn't lock himself up in a room and work in vacuum. He was the head of Commission (in fact, two Commissions), which held public hearings with copious presentations and argumentations made by both the sides. Radcliffe didn't attend all the sessions, but the proceedings were flown in to him on a daily basis. So he knew what the issues were. It is quite ridiculous to claim that some letter from Nehru to Mountbatten was evidence of "cheating". All kinds of people were trying to talk to all kinds of people, trying to influence the award. You yourself quoted Liaquat Ali Khan trying to pressure Ismay. That was equally evidence of "cheating".
• Christopher Beaumont, Radcliffe's secretary, has revealed that the only time Radcliffe met Mountbaten without an aide was on 11 August for a lunch. The Gurdaspur decision had been made before that date, and the Pakistan government has in its possession (through another instance of "cheating") a copy of the older map which shows that fact. So, sorry to burst your bubble. It is quite easy to prove that the Gurdaspur decision was Radcliffe's own decision.

This is my last post on this topic here. The rest to be continued at the Radcliffe Line article. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 03:44, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: My friend, I know what I am talking about and I am not confusing anything. However, I am unable to understand that why are you so much against allowing Pakistani View to be presented/posted? Pakistan, after all, is a party to the Dispute. You have every right to disagree with the Pakistani position, but why censor it ? Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer of the Muslim majority Gurdaspur District to India in order to give it a land access to Kashmir, and it considers this controversial transfer to be the 'origin' of the dispute. I fail to see how is this 'not related' to the topic. We all have our prejudices and biases but we shall not let our prejudice cloud our judgement. So, I would say that Pakistani View definitely deserves more than just 'two lines'. Samm19 (talk) 05:06, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

And... respected sir, I request you not to use phrases like "burst your bubble" etc., trust me, you haven't even come close to 'proving' anything. We can always agree to disagree however Samm19 (talk) 05:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

You have asked multiple times why I am "against" Pakistani View to be presented. So, here is the answer. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia (click that and read it), which focuses on presenting factual information. Views come into the picture only to the extent that facts may not be known, and multiple sources provide conflicting views. However, Wikipedia is not a forum to present "views". That would be a WP:SOAPBOX, which Wikipedia is not.

Now you assert Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer. That is complete WP:OR as far as I can see. You need to provide reliable third party sources that attest to that. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Yes, you are right, sir. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia that is supposed to be neutral and present 'facts'. But the problem here is that you are presenting unsubstantiated Indian allegations as factual information, and are parading the opinions of Indian authors as 'facts'. India and Pakistan see Kashmir issue through different prisms and what is considered 'fact' by one is rejected as 'fiction' and 'fabrication' by the other. The international opinion on this matter is divided. Some scholars accept the Indian position while many others reject it. Same holds true for the Pakistani position. I believe that the proper approach in such matters is to allow both sides to present their views and leave it to the readers to decide who is right and who is not, and what the actual 'facts' of the matter are. Why double standards ?? Why allow Indian view but censor Pakistani? You are ignoring Wikipedia's basic principle and core content policy of NPOV:

All encyclopedic content on Wikipedia must be written from a neutral point of view (NPOV), which means representing fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all of the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic.

About what I have posted, I have backed it up with proper and reliable sources/references, Pakistani as well as neutral. Please read it through. So, I will ask you once again to stop deleting/disallowing properly referenced content that goes against your pre-conceived notions, and that challenges the Indian position. I believe we can sort out this 'dispute' mutually. Otherwise, we can ask for 'neutral' opinion on this. Regards Samm19 (talk) 15:06, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

I am afraid you are being evasive. You have started this entire discussion of the Gurdaspur Award and wrote reams of posts, claiming Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer. I have asked for reliable sources that state this. You haven't provided any. Can you do that please? If there are problems with other issues in the article, you are welcome to raise them separately. But as far as this discussion is concerned, you need to demonstrate the claimed centrality of the Gurdaspur Award to the Kashmir conflict. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:05, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: You, my friend, seem to have some serious comprehension issues. Read "Pakistani PoV" through, carefully, and then please tell us what makes you believe that it is not related to the (history/origin of the) Kashmir Dispute ???. And please tell us that why do you think that the 'provided sources' are not reliable ? or why should it not be included in the section "Partition and invasion" ? Also, please tell us that why are you OK with the unsubstantiated allegations leveled against Pakistan by Indian authors in the aforementioned section but NOT ok with Pakistani view ? Samm19 (talk) 18:52, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

References

Notional award

About Notional Award, of course it wasn't 'final'. The point is, the notional award, in accordance with 'The terms of reference to the Boundary Commission'; of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, did 'suggest' that the entire Gurdaspur District, including the Hindu majority tehsil of Pathankot, would be included in Pakistan as it was 51.14% Muslim majority. All of the 5 Muslim majority tehsils of Non-Muslim majority districts of Punjab that were to be included in India as per the notional award were handed over to India. But the only non-Muslim majority Tehsil (i.e. Pathankot) that was to be included in Pakistan, was not given to Pakistan, and then to add insult to injury, two more Muslim majority tehsils (Gurdaspur and Batala) were given away to India along with Pathankot. Therefore, Ms. Shereen Ilahi's assertion/claim that 'the non-Muslim majority of Pathankot tehsil placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line' cannot be accepted, and the assumption that Pathankot, owing to its Hindu majority, was to be included in India anyway, is ill-founded. Samm19 (talk) 00:19, 18 July 2017 (UTC)

References

Arbitrary break

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To editor Kautilya3: I have a question for you. What was the the basic sub-unit to divide Punjab, district or tehsil ? If it was Tehsil, then why were Muslim majority Tehsils of Ferozepur, Zira, Ajnala, Nakodar and Jullundur given to India ? If it was district, then what is the basis of your claim that the only Non-Muslim majority Tehsil (i.e. Pathankot) of Muslim Majority district of Gurdaspur was to be included in India anyways giving it a road-access to Kashmir ?? 7-8 Muslim majority Tehsils of Punjab were given to India, no Non-Muslim majority Tehsil was given to Pakistan. Pathankot could easily have been the one (if those drawing lines were not pro-India) Samm19 (talk) 01:14, 16 July 2017 (UTC)

The terms of reference to the Boundary Commission had no requirements about any levels. But it was widely assumed that it would be at the tehsil level at least, with the possibility that it could go down to even finer levels when necessary. If it was at the district level, the entire Gurdaspur district (incuding the Shakargarh tehsil) might have gone to India as per Wavell's decision earlier. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:42, 16 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: So, it was neither Tehsil nor District that was the basic sub-unit to divide Punjab but whatever suited the agenda of those drawing the line?. "Other Factors" too came into play. This gives rise to a very important question that why, without any exception, India 'gained territory' and Pakistan 'lost territory' whenever and where ever those ambiguous "Other Factors" came into play?. While a Muslims majority district of Punjab and several Muslim majority tehsils were handed over to India, ironically or perhaps strategically no non-Muslim majority tehsil or district was given to Pakistan.

As for Wavell's breakdown plan, it had been already rejected, and in the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act, all of Gurdaspur District was marked as Pakistan. Gurdaspur district along with four to five Muslim majority tehsils were given to India despite Mountbatten’s assurance that ‘there can be no question of coercing any large areas in which one community has a majority to live against their will under a Government in which another community has majority.’

Radcliffe Award was altered by Mountbatten; Gurdaspur was handed over to India and thus was manipulated the accession of Kashmir to India. Despite all protestations ‘to the effect that if it was proved true that the Gurdaspur district in the north Punjab area or even a large part of ithad been given to East Punjab by the Boundary Commission, this would be regarded as a most serious fact by Jinnah and the Pakistan Government’ amounting to ‘so grave a breach of faith as to imperil the future friendly relations between Pakistan and the British’, no attempt was made to redress the Muslim grievances.(Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 17, 16 August 1947, IOR/L/P/6/123.) Samm19 (talk) 17:44, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

References

@Kautilya3: @NadirAli:, guys, need feedback

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Pakistani POV

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Pakistan maintains that the Radcliffe Award was altered by Mountbatten; Gurdaspur was handed over to India and thus was manipulated the accession of Kashmir to India. District Gurdaspur was a Muslim majority district, three of its four sub-districts (or tehsils) were Muslim majority. In the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act that had already been put into effect for purposes of administration ad interim, all of Gurdaspur district was marked as Pakistan with 51.14% Muslim majority. Mountbatten, well aware of what was impending, delayed the announcement of the Radcliffe Award until 36 hours after India and Pakistan had received their independence and in the final award, the major part of Gurdaspur district, i.e. three of the four tehsils (including two Muslim majority tehsils) and also a small part of the fourth, was handed over to India, giving India practical land access to Kashmir, thus making the Indian intervention in Kashmir possible. It came as a great blow to Pakistan. Jinnah, other leaders of Pakistan, and particularly its officials, criticized the Award as ‘extremely unjust and unfair’.

Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, who represented the Muslim League in July 1947 before the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, stated that the Boundary Commission was a farce. A secret deal between Mountbatten and Congress leaders had already been struck. Mehr Chand Mahajan, who represented Congress before the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, in his autobiography, has acknowledged that when he was selected for the boundary commission, he was not inclined to accept the invitation as he believed that the commission was just a farce and that decisions were actually to be taken by Mountbatten himself. It was only under British pressure that the charges against Mountbatten of last minute alterations in the Radcliffe Award were not officially brought forward by Pakistani Government in the UN Security Council while presenting its case on Kashmir.

Stanley Wolpert writes that Radcliffe in his initial maps awarded Gurdaspur district to Pakistan but one of Nehru’s and Mountbatten’s greatest concerns over the new Punjab border line was to make sure that Gurdaspur should not go to Pakistan, since that would have deprived India of direct road access to Kashmir. As per “The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture”, a part of UNESCO’s Histories flagship project, recently disclosed documents of the history of the partition reveal British complicity with the top Indian leadership to wrest Kashmir from Pakistan. Alastair Lamb, based on the study of recently declassified documents, has convincingly proved that Mountbatten, in league with Nehru, was instrumental in pressurizing Radcliff to award the Muslim-majority district of Gurdaspur in East Punjab to India which could provide India with the only possible access to Kashmir. Andrew Roberts believes that Mountbatten cheated over India-Pak frontier and states that If gerrymandering took place in case of Ferozepur, it is not too hard to believe that Mountbatten also pressurised Radcliffe to ensure that Gurdaspur wound up in India giving India a road access to Kashmir. Perry Anderson states that Mountbatten, officially supposed neither to exercise any influence on Radcliffe, nor to have any knowledge of his findings, intervened behind the scenes – probably at Nehru’s behest – to alter the award. He had little difficulty getting Radcliffe change his boundaries to allot the Muslim-majority district of Gurdaspur to India rather than to Pakistan thus giving India the only access road from Delhi to Kashmir Professor Lawrence Ziring, considered an authority on Pakistan's political development writes that the Gurdaspur district of the Punjab, a Muslim-dominant area, had been demarcated for India not Pakistan in order to provide New Delhi with direct land access to Kashmir. Jinnah’s effort to prevent this geopolitical strategizing provide futile, and indeed the granting of Gurdaspur to India by Britain signaled India’s intention to occupy the mountain kingdom with British acquiescence.

However some British works suggest contrary to that 'Kashmir State was not in anybody's mind' when the Award was being drawn and that even the Pakistanis themselves had not realized the importance of Gurdaspur to Kashmir until the Indian forces actually entered Kashmir. Both Mountbatten and Radcliffe, of course, have strongly denied these charges. It is impossible to accurately quantify the personal responsibility for the tragedy of Kashmir as the Mountbatten papers relating to the issue at the India Office Library and records are closed to scholars for an indefinite period. Samm19 (talk) 23:56, 19 July 2017 (UTC)

References

To editor Kautilya3: Why do you want to move this discussion to another page, my friend ? I believe It belongs here Samm19 (talk) 05:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

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Indo-Pak war of 1947

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To editor Kautilya3: Here it is:

With this summit between Jinnah and Mountbatten at Lahore on 1 November, we enter a decisive phase of negotiations on Kashmir between India and Pakistan... A full account is available in a “Note of Discussion” by Mountbatten of his talks with Jinnah in the presence of Lord Ismay his Chief of Staff at Government House, Lahore.[21] The talks spread over three and a half hours, covered Kashmir (“most of the time”), Hyderabad and Junagadh.

Mountbatten offered a six para “proposals to form the basis of discussion.” It proposed plebiscite in Kashmir under the United Nations’ supervision and “a joint India-Pakistan force should hold the ring while the plebiscite is being held.” This was to form part of a wider accord on “procedure for accession of those States in which this matter is in dispute.” That was formulated in a draft which is quoted in extenso: “The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State’s, the question of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people.”

It was a fair offer. The “communal factor” was untied by India. It was ignored by Pakistan only to rely on it later. It clearly had Nehru’s endorsement since he repeated this offer to Liaquat a week later. Mountbatten claimed that Jinnah considered plebiscite to be “redundant and undesirable” and proposed an outright exchange of Junagadh for Kashmir. “Mr. Jinnah then went on to say that he could not accept a formula if it was so drafted as to include Hyderabad, since he pointed out that Hyderabad did not wish to accede to either Dominion and he could not be a party to coercing them to accession.” Jinnah said that “there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan.” He had accepted it reluctantly. He explained that he was opposed to a plebiscite in Kashmir because of the presence of Indian troops there and with Sheikh Abdullah in power.

Samm19 (talk) 09:46, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

References

To editor Lopki90: before making edits, please discuss it here. Samm19 (talk) 11:01, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: I have added a 'more balanced' narrative. Jinnah was not against plebiscite, he believed that a plebiscite under the supervision of the Indian Army would be sabotaged. And he didn't trust Sheikh Abdullah. He alone is not to be blamed for the failure of Jinnah-Mountbatten talks. And Please read paragraph 2 and 3 (about Jinnah-Mountbatten talks), if needed, remove the redundant lines/parts as the same thing is being repeated in both paras. Regards Samm19 (talk) 13:07, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: Thanks for the advice. Now A G Noorani is not a reliable source ?? Why am I not surprised ?? anyway, if you insist on pushing Indian PoV and deleting everything that goes against your view, this section too has to be marked "Not Neutral"

Tell us why you believe that only Jinnah is to be blamed for failure of Jinnah-Mountbatten talks ? just because he was a Pakistani ? Samm19 (talk) 01:02, 22 July 2017 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Chester Bowles comment

This paragraph was stuck into the Dixon Plan section. Ostensibly it had nothing to do with Dixon Plan:

In mid-1952 Pakistani Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin unveiled to Bowles "substantial" concessions that Pakistan was prepared to make on its military presence in Kashmir if India agreed to the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. The Pakistanis asked Bowles to convey this message informally and Bowles was also instructed to do this in the "capacity of a friendly messenger". Nehru rejected this offer. Bowles concluded that "Nehru is acting in a wholly unreasonable manner and will probably continue to do so... [He] definitely hopes the whole situation can be made to go away."

References

First of all, what were the "concessions"? How did they meet the requirements of the UN Resolutions?

Secondly, the matter was in the UN, and a UN-appointed mediator Frank Graham came and went. If anything, that mediation is probably what should be covered, not some informal negotiation by the American Ambassador, who was trying to do what he could to help.

Coming to Chester Bowles himself, he was quite in favour of the Dixon Plan, and he tried to pursue it while he was in Delhi. But Washington told him to stop it. So, within the limitations he did what he could. The same page that has been cited here also gives Bowles's assessment that the Indians believe that the American policy has hindered rather than helped, and that the Americans didn't really understand the Indian position. I think what has been included is UNDUE, given all the context, and also given how little information this passage really contains. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 03:53, 8 November 2017 (UTC)