Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor/Archive 5

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Executive Order 9066

This is mistaken:

"notably by General John DeWitt, commanding Coast Defense on the Pacific Coast, apparently because of personal bias."

Heaven help me for citing this source, but Michelle Malkin, In Defense of Internment (DC: Regency, 2004), says DeWitt was used as a cover for Ultra. Trekphiler 11:54, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Malkin is mistaken. No one at DeWitt's level in the US was authorized for Ultra. In fact, most British commanders weren't. The British set up a very involved system for disseminating Ultra information without letting the users learn anything about Ultra's nature. ww 02:34, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

Actually, I do know that. What she said, as I understand, is he was a cover for it, not that he knew about it (might try reading more carefully): his claims were used to hide the fact Ultra had provided information about real spies (as it had, if Malkin is to be believed). Also, senior commanders cleared for Ultra usually said something like, "reliable info" or "source believed to be reliable" in ref Ultra, to hide its origin. See Winterbotham, Ultra Secret; Lewin, American Magic et al.; Kahn, Codebreakers; & Layton (I Was There?). Trekphiler 23:14, 11 February 2007 (UTC)

Sorry about this, just noticed your cmnt. Recall that Ultra was UK's most closely guarded secret, that it was disclosed to the US (after Dec 41) only very reluctantly, and over a considerable time, and that in the summer/fall of 41 the US was not at war with Hitler, UK chief preoccupation. Ultra data is unlikley on its face to have been available to the US or to Coastal Defense, whether being used as a cover or otherwise. In any case, there seem not to have been much to disclose from Ultra as (IIRC) the Abwehr variant of Enigma wasn't being generally read in the period. and there appear to have only been the Kuhn family as Abwehr agents in Hawaii. Ultra information on Japanese agents anywhere has never been established (Malkin to the contrary) and seems unlikely in the extreme. ww 19:46, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

No prob, I just saw your reply(s...). My bad. I'm using Ultra & MAGIC interchangably. Malkin suggests it was in PURPLE & reproduces documents on Japanese spies. Her argument's flimsy on most points, but she makes a case for DeWitt being a cover (or an excuse). BTW, I'm unaware of him being particularly bigoted, despite what the article says (& Malkin doesn't mention it, IIRC). Can anybody confirm? Trekphiler 15:01, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

Tell me, ww, why'd you pull the ref to Ultra? OK, Malkin's an idiot, but she reproduced intercepts suggesting DeWitt was a face. Put in a better source saying otherwise. Please. Don't leave me relying on Malkin. Trekphiler 02:44, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

Derelict?

Does anybody find it curious Kimmel & Short got hammered, but Kimmel's boss, Claude Bloch, got a walk? Trekphiler 12:00, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Should we list all the instances during the Pacific War in which a junior commander received the blame for an Allied defeat instead of the overall commander? Blame somehow often seems to "roll" downhill. Cla68 06:34, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

Kimmel's boss was Betty Stark in Washington, who was indeed relieved of his duties. Bloch commanded the local Hawaiian Naval District (13th?), not the Fleet which had been based out of San Diego forever until Roosevelt moved it to Hawaii as a 'forward deployment' to increase pressure on the japanese during the tension of the late 30s. It's former commander, Richardson, was so upset (wrong move in his view) that he went to Washingto to protext and was relieved. Kimmel was appointed to suceed him. Think of it as Block commanded the empty base and Kimmel commanded the ships if they came by. Bloch probably deserved soem blame for things as his intelligence people didn't spend enough time working on the Consulate and its various activities. Including pulling the wire tap on the Consulate when the the phone company found out about it just before the attack. But then the FBI dropped that one as well, since they didn't instazll a tap themselves.

As for Kimmel and Short, neither prepared for war, despite the explicit war warning the received in late Nov. Short didn't prepare for anything save sabotage, confused Washington by rearranging the meaning of his alert levels without bothering to pass the news, didn't bother to use his radar installation in any sensible fashion -- however limited and crude, or get the warning center up and running, kept air defense ammo in locked storage, and squabbled with Kimmel over long range recon flights. Likewise over who would be in charge of Wake Island. Kimmel on the other hand, didn't set up subamrine defenses, didn't keep his ships on alert status, didn't have ammunition for air defense where it could be gotten to readily, etc. Neither organized anything like a reasonable search fo the attack force in the few days after the attack -- they thought it came from the south and sent the aircraft carriers on a wild goose chase in that direction. The last wartime investigation, Clausen's, at the direction of Secretary Stimson by order of Congress, and the only one fully cleared for the crypto and wiretap background, concluded that the most culpable officer was Kimmel intelligence officer, Layton, who didn't notice enough to be suspicious. Despite Congress' edit recently, relieving Kimmel and Short was quite reasonable. There should have been a court martial, but with the secrecy (of PURPLE, and wiretaps and such) there was apparently a decision by someone not to take to that point. ww 02:58, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

Give me a break.

"neither prepared for war, despite the explicit war warning the received in late Nov."

Read the actual message (almost nobody actually does, notably conspiracy theorists). It warns of war in the Soviet Union, Thailand, Borneo, & DEI. It says nothing about Hawaii.

"Short didn't prepare for anything save sabotage"

This, from what I've read, is what most people expected to signal the start of a war: a campaign of sabotage by local agents.

"didn't bother to use his radar installation in any sensible fashion -- however limited and crude, or get the warning center up and running"

Recall how new & highly secret radar was then, & how few trained operators there were...

" kept air defense ammo in locked storage,"

Cf sabotage above.

"squabbled with Kimmel over long range recon flights."

Not really a surprise, since neither had adequate resources for the tastk. B-17s were being sent to MacArthur by the dozen, & Kimmel only had 54 PBYs (only 36 operational, IIRC).

"Kimmel on the other hand, didn't set up subamrine defenses, didn't keep his ships on alert status,"

Kimmel (& Short) had a training regimen to keep up, per demands from DC, recall. Most, especially conspiracy theorists, overlook this one.

"didn't have ammunition for air defense where it could be gotten to readily"

Cf sabotage above.

"Neither organized anything like a reasonable search fo the attack force in the few days after the attack -- they thought it came from the south and sent the aircraft carriers on a wild goose chase in that direction."

"Wild goose chase"? The Japanese had a major base in the Marshall Is, which was to the south, & where PacFleet believed the attack had come from (with reason); only with hindsight do we know it came from the northwest.

Clausen's investigation falls into the traditional trap of blaming Kimmel & Short, who had been denied access to Ultra. DC had full access to it, & didn't expect an attack on Hawaii, either. (That makes Layton culpable?) And MacArthur, who also had full access, also got caught by surprise. "There should have been a court martial", true--& MacArthur should have been sent to prison (where, one suspects, he'd have tried to run for President). If there had been, Stark, King, Marshall, Wilkinson, Redmond, & others would have been ruined, too, quite aside exposing the secret. It just wasn't on. Trekphiler 23:43, 11 February 2007 (UTC) (BTW, it's 14h Naval District; Bloch was Com14.) 18:14, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

Just a few observations. War between US and Japan as warned explicitly in late Nov from Wash to both Navy and Army in Hawaii means war. Not patty cake. As Brecht commented, ... the war will come to you. If either Short or Kinmmel actualy thought Hawaii would be exempt, they shouldn't have kept their commands five minutes after it became known. As for not having access to MAGIC in Hawaii, this was perhaps unfortunate, and ruffled feathers, but irrelevant. The Foreign Office in Tokyo was largely in the dark too. Just reading local Honolulu papers should provided Kimmel and Short and Layton more information than was being read from Purple. The wild goose chase was to Hawaii's south, within carrier aircraft range, not to the SW in the Marshalls. The radar at Opana Point had been operational for a year or so, and use of its information has nothing to do with radars existence being secret. There were, as it actually happened enough trained operators to detect the incoming raid; what was done wrong was to ignore it, and more to Short's responsibiliyt fail to provide support for its use and intelligence analysis for whatever the radar came up with. A red herring, I think. I agree about MacArthur, though note that he was until Federalized, working for the Philippines, having retired from the US Army. ww 19:46, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

A few things.

"If either Short or Kinmmel actualy thought Hawaii would be exempt, they shouldn't have kept their commands five minutes after it became known."

You're forgetting, nobody thought Hawaii would be attacked, certainly not on the first day, let alone the opening act. Professionals thought Japan incapable of 2 similtaneous major naval ops. They were wrong. Being surprised is not reason to relieve someone. I don't think they were blameless, but I do think they've gotten a raw deal since.

"The wild goose chase was to Hawaii's south, within carrier aircraft range".

It wasn't exactly wild. As Holmes points out in Double-Edged Secrets, it was based on a DF bearing; at the time, the operators had difficulty identifying reciprocals, & gave Halsey the wrong one. (Fortunately for the USN...)

"and use of its information has nothing to do with radars existence being secret."

Noted. I've recently read December 7th 1941 (Prange et al.) that clarifies, & I wouldn't argue that position now.

"what was done wrong was to ignore it, and more to Short's responsibiliyt fail to provide support for its use and intelligence analysis for whatever the radar came up with."

Actually, as December 7th 1941 makes clear, there was no way to tell friendly civil from Japanese attacker (which seems really peculiar now, with ATC transponders so common). Not Short's fault, nor (as commonly believed, even by me) Tyler's. Trekphiler 15:15, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

"Result: Decisive Japanese Victory"

That's what it says in the box at the top right of the article.

I have to disagree. Sure, they sunk some ships, but at the cost of going to war with the US, which they could not hope to match in the long term?

In my book, that's not a victory. William Jockusch 05:16, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

• but in the short term, at Pearl Harbour, they butchered the Americans. Thats what I call a victory. - codu (^t/^c) 07:14, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

You can win battles but lose wars. Gelston 09:14, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

It ain't a decisive victory when you've missed crucial targets... Trekphiler 00:06, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

Victories can be decisive even if they're not a total as Cannae, and in this case, the IJN managed to destroy most of the fighting power present in Pearl, missing only administrative stuff, workshops, oil storage, and the sub base. And all that at the cost of a small number or planes and pilots and five mini-subs and crews (less one survivor). Pretty decisive victory; and it was seen to be so at the time in Japan, in the US, nad in the rest of the world. No one had any idea that carriers would be so important in WWII naval combat, nor that US subs would be as effective as they were, aided as they were by targeting information derived from cryptanalysis of Imperial Army Water codes/cyphers, some fortunate captures of crypto material (from I-1, beached at Guadalcanal and later buried and dug up at Sio on New Guinea), and despite the loopy (literally) torpedo design usde for the first couple of years.

By your apparent standard, Gettysburg wasn't really much of a victory for the North or a defeat for Lee. It was awful close, and ended pretty much a draw in many ways. Can't agree with your analysis here. ww 04:13, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

Nobody knew "US subs would be as effective as they were"? What planet are you from? U-boats had been sinking everything in sight for 2 years. What nobody knew was how ineffective US subs would be, thanks to the Mk14's failings, the flawed dispositions of Nimitz via King (basing in Oz, supplying MacArthur, close blockade of Japanese ports), the stubbornness of BuOrd, & the stupidity of a SanFran customs official who siezed the maru code, not knowing ONI had already broken it, leading Japan to change it--&, contrary to common belief, it was this, not the Mk14, or radar (also commonly credited), that was the major contributor to increased sinkings. (I doubt "some fortunate captures of crypto material from I-1" had anything to do with it; I-1 had keylists & such for JN-25, not the maru code.) See Blair, Silent Victory (the tables in the back & a little math will prove it). A "decisive" victory that leaves intact all the tools by which Japan is defeated scarcely fits the definition. Trekphiler 03:56, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

I'm from the Earth, is that close enough to the discussion for you? In fact, it was targeting information (largely from cryptanalysis, some of it assisted by material from I-1) that made US subs so effective despite their troubles with torpedoes and the rest. They were far better than they should have been at commerce destruction, and any reasonable estimate of the risk from US subs would not have included prior knowledge of routings and timings. German U-boats were in a similar advantageous situaion for some periods during WWII and this is one of the reasons they were as effective as they were. Again, more effective than a reaonable estiamte of the risk would have made them. In WWI, such subs as Germany got out tended not to hunt at sea, concentrating on voyage end points. For instance, Lusitania. So the situation isn't as clear as you suggest. You are, I think, letting your knowledge of what actually happened to affect your evaluation of decisions made at the time, with knowledge and estimates avaialble at that time. A perinneal temptation for all. ww 19:46, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

"They were far better than they should have been at commerce destruction".

Huh? "Far worse", you mean, without the maru code. I'd be interested in your source for "assisted by material from I-1"; I'm unaware of it, &, as I said, I-1 would've been carrying JN-25, not the maru code.

"In fact, it was targeting information (largely from cryptanalysis".

That's exactly what I said. You may well be right I'm letting hindsight color things, but statistically, the effectiveness in 1943 went up dramatically with possession of the maru code, & Japan, as an island nation, should have been watching what the Germans were doing to Britain & acted accordingly. "German U-boats were in a similar advantageous situaion for some periods during WWII and this is one of the reasons they were as effective as they were." Yep, & RCN (betcha didn't know they covered half the Atlantic convoys, didja?) & RN, with USN help, still beat 'em. IJN doctrine was so screwed up, commerce protection was "shiftless", in the opinion of a Japanese admiral, who remarked (rightly), when the Japanese improved their ASW, the Americans responded by increasing their sinkings (Prange et al., Pearl Harbor Papers). And that ain't hindsight. (Or not mine, anyhow.)

"In WWI, such subs as Germany got out tended not to hunt at sea, concentrating on voyage end points."

You may be wrongly attributing causality there. Recall, WWI boats were quite small coastal boats; the Type7 wasn't much different. My criticism of Nimitz's dispositions follows Blair; Nimitz (& Dönitz, btw) scattered his boats across the ocean, rather than concentrating on the Yellow Sea, Tsushima Strait, Bungo Suido, & Luzon Strait. That, plus a #1 priority on tankers, with the maru code in Withers' hands 8/12 & a steady supply of Mk10 torpedoes (by no means guaranteed, where NTS & BuOrd were concerned) would have ended the war by 1944. (That, tho, is OR....) Trekphiler 15:25 & 17:59, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

Blinded by the "comparatively light"

--moved from "By the numbers" above, for convenience of discussion --

It seems you've changed the article back to comparatively light again. And again, I disagree. We can see, in hindsight, and knowing how important air power would turn out to be, that loses were not fatal to the US, but as noted just above, these were serious losses, both absolutely (US Fleet -- save sub and carriers, both regarded at the time as scouting elements, even if wrongly so -- was out of commission for quite a while and able only to fight periperally (eg, Fletcher near New Guinea early 42) or with great luck (eg, Midway) for quite a while. And, of course, compared to oppositon losses, US casualties were huge. This really should be reworded and recast. Comments from others? ww 23:10, 17 March 2007 (UTC)

I did change it back. I maintain you miss the point. Losses compared to the Japanese are irrelevant. Compared to what Japan might have achieved, they are light. Compared to loss of Enterprise & Lexington, destruction of the power station, the tank farms, the Sub Base, HYPO? The Pacific Fleet got off easy. And what the view was at the time is also irrelevant. We see now the battleships lost would have been of no value; they were incapable of operating with carriers. It is now we are writing from, not 8 Dec 1941, & hindsight changes the perspective, which changes the view of airpower; of course, Yamamoto's desire to sink American carriers was just a fluke, right? If you think the article ought to be written from an 8 Dec POV, all references to crypto ought to be removed, just as a for instance; that was Top Secret. So should the effects of the Sub War; that wasn't known until postwar. Shall I go on? As far as "fight periphally", English placed submarines off Japan's doorstep within about ten days of the attack; that's hardly "periphally". (You, like most, forget the commerce war was of paramount importance.) And Nimitz's ability to fight wasn't limited by the loss of battleships; it was limited by the number of aircraft carriers (& his justifiable reluctance to lose them) & their aircrews' inexperience. Should he have done as MacArthur suggested & thrown them into a premature invasion of Rabaul? He'd have been considered a fool, & rightly. Then HYPO, which only survived because the Japanese blew it, gave him the crucial advantage at Coral Sea & Midway. (It was less "great luck" than good leadership by Nimitz, & bad leadership & abysmal planning by Yamamoto.) And IJN incompetence made the Sub Force's job much easier; had BuOrd not effectively conspired with them to hamstring the Mk14 until September 1943, & had a stupid Customs man not cost them the maru code, the war would have been over much sooner, battleships sunk or not. You also say the Pacific Fleet was "crippled". "Crippled" fleets do not place significant units off the very enemy coast within weeks of being "crippled"; Joe Grenfell's Gudgeon was off Kyushu by Christmas. And "crippled" fleets do not engage in two major actions in less than six months; the Pacific Fleet did: tie at Coral Sea, win at Midway. This "crippled" fiction needs to be laid to rest. Trekphiler 01:01, 01:06, & 02:02, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

There are more fundamental issues involved in the different perspectives around this than I had thought. You ae suggesting the article should be written from a position of current (ie, hindsight) knowledge, not from understandings at the time.

Additionally, you are suggesting a kind of prospective hypothetical should be important for the article. For instance, had HYPO and the sub base, and the fuel storage, etc been hit, things would have been such and such, and since they weren't we are entitled to take into account such and such not having been that way in the way we write the article. Since we can't cite those hypotheticals (except as speculation by informed observes such as military historians...), there will be trouble with well-established WP policies.

I agree with you that torpedo design troubles were very significatant and were evidence that BuOrd was not doing its job competently, but I can't go so far as to suggest effective conspiracy with the Japanese w/o some evidence. Certainly not for inclusion in the article.

Some better approach has to be found, I think. Perhaps we'd best ask for observations from other editors? ww 02:40, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

First, I would suggest a compromise similar to the one I suggested in Talk:Barney_Frank#openly_gay. Move these parts that are not summary away from the opening paragraphs, to a section of their own. Then at least the first paragragh will be free of conflict. Remove "numerous", "trivial", "Comparatively light", and other adjectives from the initial paragraphs, and place them along with their justifications/references lower in the article, in their own section if needed.

Second, I wish to respond to User:Trekphiler piece by piece, to simplify where we agree and disagree.

"I was counting the materiel losses. It was comparative to the potential losses, not to the Japanese losses, which is the usual standard." Until this response, the only comparative available, and the ususal standard by your own words, was to the Japanese losses. Comparing to potential, hypothetical losses would have value, and should be included. However, to place comparatively light without this reference, and in the start of the article, where "potential" results are usually not noted, is where my complaint came into play.

"It "seems to weaken the results of the attack"? That's the idea." Wikipedia is about facts, not ideas. Giving a slant to weaken or strengthen objective results would fall under the weasel words rule, IMO.

"The Japanese missed the boat, destroying ships & planes that would play small or no part in the war even had they survived." I will leave the pun alone. That the Japanese would later regret their choice of targets is true. That their actions made sense based on the naval strategies of the time is also true. You are an expert on the topic. Nobody was questioning that. But, this article was meant to be read by non-experts like me. It is confusing to a layman when leaps of logic such as this one are made. If I started the article on Desert Storm saying the Iraqi losses were comparatively light, based on the potential additional losses had the US gone into Bagdad in 1992, I am sure it would get questioned as well, even though we can both see that the Iraqi's could have potentially lost more.

"And it's not "obsolete by today's standards"; they were obsolete at the time. (If you don't know that, maybe you shouldn't criticize comments by people who do.)" I never claimed to be an expert on the topic. However, I do claim a strong knowledge of English words and their meanings. I had a problem with the use of the word obsolete. According to http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/obsolete, these ships were not obsolete. These were not 100 years behind the times, replaced by better ships, or even decommissioned. My question was not a criticism, it was a request for a clarification. Obsolete without a clarifier was as incorrect as "comparatively light" without the clarifier.

"And how formidable to the Japanese they were isn't the issue, either. IJN was in the grip of a faulty doctrine, & we shouldn't be endorsing it; the idea is to present a historical view, not parrot the contemporary mistakes." I was not endorsing the Japanese sneak attack, and I hope that was not the impression I gave. The Japanese were under a faulty doctrine, and as part of that doctrine, they felt the ships of Pearl could hurt them. That is the historical view that I think we as a group can agree on.

"Furthermore, I wouldn't put too much emphasis on it; the attack on Pearl Harbor was as much a political statement, an attack on British-American unity, as on the Fleet." It was also the biggest loss of life to Americans in peacetime outside of natural disasters until 9-11. It get's emphasis due to it's #2 overall standing, not due to it's political statement.

I hope this clears things up a bit. Will the suggested compromise solve both side's desires? CodeCarpenter 19:35, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

I suspect that it would be best to break this discussion out into its own section, ideally at the end of the current talk. This would save interested editors from having to wander hither and yon attempting to find prior discussion. If there's no objection, I'll undertake to do so in the next day or so.

As for CodeC's comments, I agree with some -- the removal from the very beginning of controversial phrases, and inclusion of some speculation in the article, though I would think it best if it were in its own section separate from the rest of the article. But CodeC doesn't address the overall question of perspective from which the article shoudl be written. We are enjoined here by WP olicy to stick to the facts, Ma'am and further to cite sources for those facts. While I think that can be carried to ridiculous extremes, leading to a footnote forest with some annotation, extraordinary statements really should bear a higher sourcing burden. In this case, I think the comparitively light phrase is one such. ww 21:36, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

Since this seems to have sparked more controversy than I expected, let me respond in detail.

• "Move these parts that are not summary away from the opening paragraphs, to a section of their own." I'm disinclined. A brief overview at the start that includes a capsule assessment of losses strikes me as important. "However, to place comparatively light without this reference, and in the start of the article, where "potential" results are usually not noted, is where my complaint came into play." Maybe this is a stylistic issue, or a preference, but I see the intro as a quick pass over the issue to hit the highlights, & calling U.S. losses "light" & Japanese "trivial" seems appropriate, especially considering most laymen think just the opposite (for U.S., at least). Think of it as a teaser or trailer. "removal from the very beginning of controversial phrases"? Is the objective accuracy, or avoiding controversy?
• "Until this response, the only comparative available, and the ususal standard by your own words, was to the Japanese losses." I've never seen American losses measured against Japan's to define "light" or "heavy", except here. Blair & Willmott (IIRC), just for instance, both mention the other targets as illustrative, & Nimitz (in his memoirs?) & Safford (in Congressional testimony? It's mentioned in Stinnett, I think; cf the conspiracy page) have both commented on how much worse it might have been, which fits my definition of "comparative" (& "comparatively light"). "In this case, I think the comparitively light phrase is one such." Would you rather a shopping list of potential targets? Take a look at the footnote for total numbers (if it hasn't been reverted); they're from Nimitz & Safford (as mentioned), & Prange et. al., December 7th 1941.
• "You ae suggesting the article should be written from a position of current (ie, hindsight) knowledge, not from understandings at the time." Absolutely. It's standard historiography.
• "Additionally, you are suggesting a kind of prospective hypothetical should be important for the article." No, I'm not. That was to explain why the losses were "comparatively light". Mentioning other potential targets isn't a "prospective hypothetical", as I understand it, it's an illustration. It's also fairly common in better histories, when writers aren't limiting themselves to mere reportage; Blair & Willmott, for instance, both mention it (IIRC). "Iraqi losses were comparatively light", I think, mistakes the point. The objective was to cripple the Pacific Fleet; the targets hit didn't do that, & the common opinion of a smashing victory suggests otherwise. I'm trying to correct that. As I understand it, a hypothetical as you suggest, or "counterfactual" (it's alternate history, you just can't get historians to admit it...), would deal with the consequences of attacking the tank farm or Sub Base, & even there, something deserves to be said. Did ignoring the Sub Base affect the outcome? Crucially. Should it be mentioned? Absolutely. Why? For the same reason we'd mention the failure to KO 11 Group prevented Luftwaffe success in the Battle of Britain. I'm not saying a "counterfactual" is appropriate; not mentioning the effects strikes me as leaving the story half-told. (BTW, the pun was unintentional...)
• "Giving a slant to weaken or strengthen objective results would fall under the weasel words rule, IMO." I'm not trying to. I'm trying to change the perception of the results, as noted. This is part of the historical POV issue. Historians agree the results were insignificant to the conduct of the war, & suggesting otherwise (or omitting perspective) is a slant, too.
• "torpedo design troubles were very significatant and were evidence that BuOrd was not doing its job competently". That was the point. More than that was for the talk page only; I'm certainly not suggesting an actual conspiracy, just that BuOrd's stubbornness might as well have been collusion.
• "Obsolete without a clarifier was as incorrect as "comparatively light" without the clarifier." I'd disagree with that, too. The dictionary definition doesn't get it when dealing with military equipment. The heavies were obsolete because they couldn't operate with carriers; they were too slow. Even by your own definition, they were obsolete: replaced by carriers (as the main striking force) & cruisers (as escorts), so "not replaced" is factually wrong. The P-36s had been replaced by P-40s, which were shortly to be replaced by P-38s, a design already in the pipeline; ditto F4Fs. (That the F4U was delayed was irrelevant, & the F6F was soon operational anyhow.) For the layman, a clarifier is appropriate; if I could figure out how to put it in without spending half a page, I'd do it. (It seems to me "obsolete" in the intro is apt, with a clarifier in the "targets" or "plans" section, tied to the Mahan doctrine to explain why the heavies were targets at all.)
• "I was not endorsing the Japanese sneak attack, and I hope that was not the impression I gave." It wasn't, & that wasn't what I meant, either. I meant endorsing the doctrine.
• "The Japanese were under a faulty doctrine, and as part of that doctrine, they felt the ships of Pearl could hurt them. That is the historical view that I think we as a group can agree on." Agreed. My criticism is the apparent support of the doctrine, by suggesting the heavies were more important than they were, which comes back to the hindsight POV. At the time, battleships were seen as crucial; now we know they weren't. Treating the success of the attack as if the view then is still true is mistaken, IM(NS)HO.
• "It get's emphasis due to it's #2 overall standing, not due to it's political statement." Not my point again. I'd downgrade it from "monstrous losses" for the reasons stated above, & the commemoration note suggests its importance to American history. What I was getting at was its importance to Japan. Pearl was attacked in the belief the U.S. & Britain were inseperable, which may well have been an excuse by IJN to protect its turf from IJA; that, however, is OR territory...

I may be handicapped by judging based on better than average info, here. While I have a hunch this won't settle much, maybe it's a step forward? Trekphiler 23:21, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

(BTW, for the unititated, since I see there's no page, a teaser is the short setup piece before the titles & theme of a TV episode, usually with a cliffhanger to hold viewers through the first commercial. It's not commonly used anymore.)

Four Points in response. You notice noone has reverted your change while we discuss this. It is good to be civil and work together for a common solution.

1. I will use another attack as an example of why I at least am "blinded" by the "comparatively light". If I went onto the 9-11 page, and said the losses from the World Trade Center were comparatively light, it would quickly get removed. Compared to what Atta and his crew COULD have done, (hitting the 20th floor, trapping another 70 floors worth of people in the process), it was comparatively light. However, unless I mention the method of comparison, it will make no sense to an outside reader. You have mentioned yourself that the explanation for the comparison could get lengthy. Therefore, I figure it could be given it's proper notice in the Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#Logistical_and_Strategic_Analysis section, including detailed comparisons to what might instead have been the losses.

2. Picture the fifth grade student coming here for his history report on Pearl Harbor. He adds the mention of comparatively light losses, without any qualifiers. Will the teacher give him a red 'X' on that part of the report? Will the teacher know it was compared to what could have happened, instead of compared to the Japanese losses?

3. You mentioned Alternate History, you might be interested in Harry Turtledove's Days of Infamy, in which Japan actually invades Hawaii instead of just attacks it. A word of warning in advance though, he does drag on his series and turns them into 10 book sagas. This one already has a second book added to it, and I am sure more might be on the way.

4. I always wondered what a Dooshun was, but your comment about "blinded by the light" made me finally seek out the actual words. "wrapped up like a deuce, another...." Another mystery solved by the miracle of the Internet. CodeCarpenter 16:47, 22 March 2007 (UTC)

Trek's long post just above makes more clear. And the fact that his purpose could be so comprehensively misunderstood by CodeC and me should make also clear that the unclarity of purpose here should be addressed. We ought not to have se easily misconstrued stuff here, it's just bad writing if the intent/meaning is so obscure. Much of what Trek is aimed at (other erroneous perceptions by various folks that he wishes to repari) is a post event long view hindsight sort of thing and belongs in the Strategic analysis section, properly sourced. WP policy does not allow us to use our own opinions, however firmly grounded, here -- we must source them, especially if there is disagreement about htem. So we should point to Blair, Nimitz, etc as the sources of the evaluation that it would have been worse and that losses were comparatively light in comparision to how things might have been in that case.

The only of this material that should reamain in the header is the not easily misconsturable sort. Just good writing not to have confusing/obscure stuff in your heading. ww 19:36, 22 March 2007 (UTC)

I disagree on the Atta & Co. remark, but I take the point. It's evident un/clarity of purpose is at play, & since it's clear the change is "easily misconsturable", if everyone is satisfied the footnote addresses the issue (& if I could just remember the name of Nimitz & Potter's book...), I'd have no problem taking out any reference to the scale of losses in the header; a footnote providing specifics (or a broad sense) puts it in perspective, which satisfies me. I'll have a look at strategic analysis; maybe I can add something useful (without generating another 10000 words here...).

BTW, I've read Days of Infamy. Thanks for the heads up on the sequel. (What he's up to with his alternate of the South winning the Civil War isn't clear to me...) They don't always go 10. Have a look at Agent of Byzantium or Guns of the South (unrelated to the above saga, all the period characters are real people). Trekphiler 03:45, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

Don't shoot, I'm only the piano player

Kido Butai had orders to attack if they encountered enemy ships? Prove it. Prange et al. in Pearl Harbor Papers say they had orders to turn back. Trekphiler 01:14, 20 March 2007 (UTC)

Strategic controversy?

I added this:

"or the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center.

"Genda's plan, and Nagumo's desultory execution, left every major target in the harbor except battleships virtually untouched. Cruisers, essential to escort carrier task forces, suffered almost no damage, and destroyers, another critical element, took only three losses: Shaw, Cassin, and Downes. (Both the latter two had their machinery salvaged and installed in new hulls under the same names.) The tank farms, contining 530 million liters of fuel oil, were unscathed. The Navy Yard, which made important repairs to all ships, especially submarines, and famously to Yorktown prior to Midway, was undamaged. The engineering and repair shops were intact. The torpedo store was, as well. (Many submariners may have wished the Japanese had destroyed it.) The power station, without which the base could not function, continued to operate. The Submarine Base, which was the core of the major (and mostly unrecognized) contribution to the war, was unaffected. And the cryptanalysis unit, HYPO, located in the basement of the old Administration Building, actually benefitted, being provided with bandmen from sunken battlewagons who proved surprisngly adept crypto men.

"The Army Air Force loss of P-40s and (obsolete) P-36s must be balanced against the P-40's obsolesence (it was no match for the Me-109) and short range (a major handicap in the Pacific), as well as the advent of the Lockheed P-38, which was far superior as well as adding a margin of safety with the second engine, and the Republic Aircraft P-47, mythical for its ruggedness. (The long-distance champ, NAA's P-51, did not appear until late in the war, a function of the "Europe First" policy.).

"In addition, Yamamoto's targeting priorities, placing obsolete battleships first in importance, reflect a faulty Mahanian doctrine as well as a poor grasp of history, considering the damage German submarines did to British trade in two World Wars. In the end, Japan achieved surprisingly little for all her daring.

I also deleted lines implying the attack was connected to the defeat of Germany & a causal link between it & Germany & Italy declaring war. This belongs in the conspiracy section. Also, I'd propose merging "Strategic analysis" & "Long-term effects", since they seem to be covering the same ground. (Moreover, I'd question where the "logistical" comes in; I see none.) Trekphiler 05:31 & 05:59, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

I can't agree with much of these edits. They include personal asides in judgemental words which have an unencyclopedic tone. I'd be glad to suggest improvements in the wording. And many points have already been discussed above. As for the connection with Germany and Italy entering the war as a result of the attack, Hitler is reported as having told the Japanese amb that Germany would enter if war broke out (over an above its obligations under the Axis treaty) . And, in any case, the declarations by the rest of the Axis came only a few days past 7.12.41. ww 07:07, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

Hitler's promise isn't a causal link, & the fact it came "only a few days past" isn't, either, no matter what you, or conspiracy nuts, think. As for "Japan's daring", maybe that's too strong; I wanted something suggesting a daring plan but lousy execution. As for Nagumo's work, it defied Yamamoto's orders, & infuriated junior officers who wanted him to do more; call that desultory. I would have said "negligent" or "cowardly", but... As for "mostly unrecognized", it gets short shrift in damn near every history of the war I've seen, including the Pacific War article, with historiographers & documentary makers obsessing over carrier battles & invasions, but I wouldn't object to that phrase coming out. The rest is factually accurate. Trekphiler 11:25, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

I wouldn't have done what Nagumo did (or rather failed to do), but then I've the benefit of quite a lot of hindsight. And I certainly wouldn't have done as Macarthur did (wrongly and failed to do) from his taking command in the PI. But both of those are my own speculative opinions and don't belong here. I'm entitled to point out the effects of those decisions and how they were less than optimal, but not to condemn them or use loaded words in describing them. However satisfying that might be.

We are certainly entitled to point out that Nagumo didn't agree with some of his juniors and disappointed Ymamoto, perhaps violating the letter of his orders, and left significant things whole, but more than that I think not. There are in any case two sides to the question and the article covers reasons why his actions might have made sense. We just can't choose one and slant accordingly. And that subject has been pretty much covered here in earlier talk (archived now, I think), illuminated with considerable knowledge of IJN carrier practice at the time, leaving what we currently have.

As for the factual nature of your suggested changes, I've not had much trouble with that, but rather with the tone in which they're stated and with the not quite forthright interpretation added to them 'in passing', as it were. Neither is proper form here, and most certainly not for a Featured Article.

I have very strong opinions about Pearl and about the various theories about it, perhaps even stronger ones than yours -- reading a bit between the lines of your comments, but they don't belong here. Neither do yours, nor anyone's. That wouldn't be 'neutral' which is a WP requirement of edits and editors. And mine aren't particularly conspiratorial either, nutty or otherwise. Please remember "assume good faith", and "no personal attacks". ww 01:09, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

I didn't mean to imply I thought you nutty. For that, I apologize. I meant to say this is a central theme in the conspiracy theory: the attack was causal of Hitler's declaration of war, & FDR knew it would happen, which is nutty.

As for the rest, I'm not seeing your problem. I'm looking at this from the POV of a historian (&, as far as I'm able as a layman, a professional navy officer). Nagumo begged off a 3d strike claiming to fear U.S. air attack, when he'd destroyed U.S. airpower in Hawaii, outnumbered USN in decks 2:1, had aircrews with vastly superior experience (in flight time &, more important, combat), & had express orders to find & destroy the U.S. carriers. "Disappointed Yamamoto"? He deserved court martial. Except the Japanese system didn't permit criticism of senior officers' decisions. Compare Fletcher. Nimitz ultimately relieved him, for (at minimum) lack of aggressiveness. Nagumo deserved no less. And Yamamoto's plan, via Genda, let him get away with a negligent action. That is POV, & I wouldn't say it in the article. More than that, Nagumo had no faith in the plan as issued. I think that affected his aggressiveness, tho judging by Midway, maybe not. I think, between these things, "desultory" is justified. Maybe what I need to do is mention the other factors--if I could recall the sources.... That's part of the problem; I've read a lot on the war, but not intended for attribution at the time, so I didn't necessarily note titles & authors. I think the footnoted sources cover most of it; I'd add Prange et al., December 7th 1941 & Pearl Harbor Papers, if I haven't already.

I think we're agreed, the aim is the best article we can get. I've always prided myself on being a pretty damn good writer, & for damn sure I won't settle for less than the best I can do. I don't seem to be there yet. Throw it back, & I'll see if I can knock it over the wall. Trekphiler 03:13, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

With that in mind, I added mention of his orders, lack of faith, & background as a "gun line" sailor; if somebody can source more specifically, I want to know (even if nobody else cares). Trekphiler 13:51, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

More controversy?

I added:

"The lessons of intelligence analysis and sharing had not been learned."

based in part on news reports and on Hughes-Wilson Military Intelligence Blunders & Cover-Ups (Harper Collins, 2001). I also added:

"Postwar, Japan's overthrow of colonial powers gave credence and encouragement to resistance movements in India, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam."

This really isn't in dispute, but see Maclear 10000 Day War, Karnow Vietnam, & Dower War Without Mercy. I also deleted:

"Opening a second front against the Soviet Union, which never came to fruition, would have been of considerable value to the combined Axis' war effort."

per above, & IJA doctrine & training belonged in the 18h Century. See Hayashi & Coox, KaigunKōbun (oops; that's Peattie & Evans... 01:12, 30 March 2007 (UTC)) I also deleted a note "worst in U.S. history" as biased in favor of badness, & factually wrong; compare Sharpsburg, still the worst one-day loss in U.S. history (IIRC). Trekphiler 13:51, 14:12 & 18:49, 25 March 2007 (UTC) (Yep; 23000. Don't mess with me. ;D 14:16, 25 March 2007 (UTC))

I deleted:

"Side note. Japanese planes were aided in their navigation to Pearl by peacetime broadcasting of radio stations on the island of Oahu."

This is a persistent myth, & implies Japanese aviators were incompetent. Also, I added the "oil effect" based on Toland (Eagle & the Rising Sun?) among others, & the fn on the 3" AA (Friedman, Naval Weapons, I think). Trekphiler 17:19, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

BTW, why change the OOB? I'd disagree it should include NGHQ & Combined Fleet, & it should include, but doesn't, the members of the subordinate units; compare Willmott's Barrier & the Javelin & Morison's 14 volume history of the Navy in WW2. Trekphiler 14:23, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

• First of all, per deleting content, it would be better to put a few words in the edit summary when you're deleting another editor's contribution and a partial revert of a good faith edit should be avoided just because you disagree (see also when not to revert). Secondly, I think that including the factual statement that Pearl Harbor was "one of the worst losses in U.S. history" makes for a stronger Article lead. Note it said "one of the worst losses", not "the worst" as you misstated, above. It is simply a fact that the toll at Pearl Harbor (2,388 killed) is indeed one of the worst one-day losses in U.S. history (viz., 1,435 killed on D-Day) and the loss of life on Arizona is the worst single-ship loss in the history of the U.S. Navy. JGHowes ^talk - 02:19, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Y'know, I really don't care if it's "worst" or "one of". As far as "a few words in the edit summary", & why I disagree with including such a reference, see the many words above on the subject. I'd also point out you might read the comments before reverting. (Judging by your comments below, I'd advise read carefully.) Trekphiler 04:48 & 04:55, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Dear Trekphiler, your second revert is inappropriate unless, and only unless, you provide firm, substantive, and objective proof to the contrary. Your disagreement and "I don't care" aside are not such proof. I have provided valid information, if you have a constructive edit that would improve this text, it should simply be edited and improved accordingly. Otherwise, please do not revert a third time as that would bring WP:3RR into play, you know. JGHowes ^talk - 13:17, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Did you read none of the controversy above? Or do you just not care? I'm after an objective assessment of the attack, not one that serves a U.S. POV (or yours), & (as you'd know, if you bothered to read the commentary) I spent several hundred words explaining why. So you've brought in WP:NPOV, no? If this was solely an American project, or solely from an American source, "one of the worst in U.S. history" might be apt. It's neither. Is it one of the worst in world history? Not a chance. Is it more than a small fraction of the total number of Americans on the island? No. And that, as I pointed out (& explained extensively above...), is why I changed it. As for "firm, substantive, and objective proof to the contrary", care to explain how eliminating POV needs that? Trekphiler 13:50 & 14:40, 27 March 2007 (UTC) (BTW, you aren't 75.16.159.179, by any chance? You're using the same {wrong} casualty #... 14:00, 27 March 2007 (UTC))

We've got coverage of the Japanese attitude before, during, and after the attack, and from several decades later, together with some motivation analysis and claimed causal analysis. I think we've done not badly from that side. On the US side, we've got coverage of the reaction at the time, the political reaction in the US, the reaction elsewhere (eg, famously, Churchill's and the Axis declarations), and some hint here of the conspiracy theoretical side (including a pointer to a full and extensive article on alternative theories of what actually happened). What more do we need to avoid a US POV? What we've got is hardly perfect, as the backing and forthing here has been showing for a considerable time, but structurally we've done pretty well. At least well enough to have earned a Featured article listing, which we've managed to hang onto so far. ww 15:41, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Nasty remarks and preposterous accusations of sockpuppetry do no credit to anyone. OTOH, I'm a firm believer in Wiki consensus, so if the general opinion is that my edit "one of the worst in U.S. history" should be removed from the lead paragraph, in the spirit of compromise I'm not going to be obstinate about it.

In order to clarify the issue, first let me offer this: the preceding sentence in the Article before my disputed addition states that the attack spurred the U.S. into entering WWII, which then raises the question in the reader's mind – why? That is, why was the U.S. so suddenly jarred out of isolationism and immediately catapulted into war? My edit seeks to put the attack in context, that is, the reason for the U.S. reaction and entry into WWII being the one-day loss of life to U.S. armed forces. In absolute numbers, it was the worst since Antietam (and, indeed, even to the present time, Dec. 7, 1941 remains the greatest peacetime loss of life ever by U.S. armed forces).

This quite obvious fact of the scale of casualties explains why the reaction was so different than, say, the muted reaction following the sinking of the Panay in 1937 or the attacks on the Greer, Kearny, and Reuben James some weeks before in 1941.

Of course, it is true that the Pearl Harbor fatalities were but a fraction of the total military population on Oahu, and certainly the casualty rate pales in comparison to battles on the Eastern Front or the AAF/RAF firebombings of Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, etc., but, again, if we can agree that the main significance of Pearl Harbor was to dispel U.S. isolationism at one stroke and result in the immediate entry of the U.S. into WWII, I don't see how or why we should avoid stating the obvious. JGHowes ^talk - 17:53, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

I would like to see both segments removed. I am not asking to avoid stating the obvious, it is just that the juxtaposition of "on of the worst in US history, but also light compared to how bad a more thorough attack could have been, is just too runon and painful for a simple mind like mine. The issue had been resolved, and we had reached an agreement. I know that JGHowes was not involved in the discussion, but I would hope the consensus reached would carry over to others, barring a RfC on the issue. It is just an easier read to avoid the comments in the middle of the numbers. The topics are not being avoided, just moved down to the "meat" of the article. I won't revert, but I ask that both sides revert their pieces and move them to a spot where they feel it fits within the article. CodeCarpenter 22:35, 28 March 2007 (UTC)

My "accusations of sockpuppetry" was not one of my better days; I thought the issue was settled, only to see it changed again. I'd agree with removing both, per before JGHowes' changes. Comment on its badness seems to me better left for analysis or cultural impact.

"if we can agree that the main significance of Pearl Harbor was to dispel U.S. isolationism at one stroke and result in the immediate entry of the U.S. into WWII"? I don't see any disagreement (& I certainly have none). It just belongs in an "effects" section, not the lead.

"the attack spurred the U.S. into entering WWII, which then raises the question in the reader's mind – why?" So read the article. As I said above, I see the lead as a teaser; if it makes you ask "why?", it's doing exactly what it should–making you read the article (or want to, better yet).

"This quite obvious fact of the scale of casualties explains why the reaction was so different". I wouldn't put too much enphasis on it. "Treachery" & racism played a role, too. (See Dower, War Without Mercy.) If you've got evidence it contributed, I'd like to see it. (I'm working on a book...) I won't exclude it, but my sense has always been it wasn't the scale of losses that tipped the balance. This explicitly contradicts Stinnett, btw, who claims FDR needed to engineer a holocaust; my feeling is the mere fact of a Japanese attack did it (& we are back to "comparatively"...).

Finally, talking bout "analysis", let me reiterate. I think the strategic analysis & effects sections should be merged, with mention of Mahanian doctrine, the London Naval Conference & the 60% & 70% ratios, War Plan Orange, & guerre de course. I'd do it, but I'm already having trouble keeping opinion & fact separate; I've read too much to be sure what's been written & what I've concluded. If somebody'll take it on, I'll try to keep you honest... ;D Trekphiler 22:51, 29 March 2007 (UTC) (As an aside, JG, where did you get that 2388? I've always seen 2403, AFAIK.)

Absent objection to the above proposal, I'm deleting both "worst" & "comparatively light". I also deleted

"The Battle of the Philippines (1941-42), the Japanese invasion of what was then a U.S. colony, began nine hours later."

as not on point. If somebody wants to make a case for the attack on Pearl as the first event in the Pacific War, feel free; I'd suggest, at minimum, the Philippine reference be moved. Trekphiler 03:05 & 03:13, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

My Name is Kurasawa Akira

I deleted this:

"Rev. E. Stanley Jones an American was in Tokyo where he had negotiated a treaty with the Japanese. This was radioed in the form of a cypher document to The Japanese Embassy in Washington on Saturday Night but only the Ambassador himself could decode it. The Ambassador however had taken the weekend off to play Golf, so the message was not decoded till after the attack which took place on the morning of Sunday December 7th."

It's fiction. Jones had no authority to "negotiate a treaty with the Japanese." Moreover, he was never taken seriously, AFAIK. That he became involved at all is a reflection how desperate FDR was to keep the peace in the Pacific (contrary to what Stinnett & his conspiracy cabal would have you believe). It might be nice if people actually had a clue before adding this junk. Trekphiler 14:55, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

• Once again (although the above cited edit about E. Stanley Jones is not mine), I would remind you to be WP:Civil. Characterizing another editor's good faith contribution as "junk" because it's poorly worded is no reason for calumny or partial reverts. Rather, if there's a reliable source for the involvement of E. Stanley Jones, it would be better to improve it to say something along the lines of "Rev. E. Stanley Jones, an American who was in Tokyo at the time, talked to the Japanese... [etc.]". JGHowes ^talk - 04:09, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Pay attention. It's got nothing to do with how badly worded it is. If it was, there'd be a lot more "junk" on WP. It's about being factually inaccurate. Trekphiler 04:41, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Forced to fight America?

"Many Japanese today still feel they were "pushed", or compelled, to fight because of threats to their national security and national interests by the U.S. and certain European powers, and because of embargoes and lack of cooperation, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands." I am gonna ask for a citation on this, because it seems odd that they were attacking and invading other countries, expanding beyond their borders, and coming up to the edge of US territories (i.e. the Phillipines), and they felt that us asking them to stop their expansion was a lack of cooperation and a threat to their national security? Sounds like a poll or something substantial must exist to make the claim that they were forced to fight us when all we wanted (isolationist viewpoint) was to be left alone. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by CodeCarpenter (talk • contribs) 12:49, 27 March 2007 (UTC).

That's actually a pretty accurate assessment of the Japanese view at the time. Of course, the Japanese attitude of "co-operation" was, "Give us whatever we want & shut up", & anything else was "hostility". (Sound familiar?) The embargo, especially on oil, was the next thing to a declaration of oil war (oops 13:12, 27 March 2007 (UTC)), since Japan imported something like 90% of her supply (most, oddly enough, from the U.S., which I betcha didn't know, didja? I didn't...), & a total embargo wasn't what FDR had in mind... Trekphiler 13:11, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

There's an odd psychological business here. The problem seems to be to discover a reason to do something offensive (many possible meanings there!), in the absence of an actual reason. Hitler did a lot of this to gin up support for his 'projects'; Bismark did some; Hearst (and eventually McKinley) did quite a lot (contrast Mark Twain's comments on); Bush 2 and Co has been doing a lot to justify various things (eg, Iraq war, warrantless wire taps, warrantless arrests, imprisonment without habeus corpus, kidnappings in Italy and Germany, rendition, defense of an official torture policy, ...); the French and the Germans were doing it for several hundred years until they finally decided (more or less) to bury the hatchets within the EU; etc. The Japanese problem was to explain all that offensive activity without appearing to be merely thugs, and they did it (more or less) by overreacting to protests against what they were doing in Korea, China, etc. Eg, huuffing and puffing out of the League of Nations in outrage, ... And so resentment at the protests became justification for further unreasonable behavior including Pearl. Or something like that, over more than a decade. You can refer to Thuycidides for more examples from the dawn of history. It's an old and not very admirable trait of humans in society. I don't think there's a real explanation of the effect, but someone can probably cite a reference from an historian or two or a social pyshologist so we can get it in that way. For the nonce, the recent Japanese newspaper accounts, Nomura's account, etc will have to do I suppose. ww 15:33, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

I was unable to get into the Japan Times article, which I thought was a reference to the next line, not to the whole paragraph. BTW, I did not know Japan was 90% exporting oil from the US. I guess Venezuela wasn't an option for them back then. Is there a wiki rule on needing to register for access to a reference? I am asking out of ignorance, as usual. I am guessing the link provides a current poll or something showing the "Many Japanese feel" comment in context. Thanks again, CodeCarpenter 16:16, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Maybe I'm misreading it, but it seem to me the focus is narrower, just the embargoes, which can legitimately be seen as provocative. I won't say Japan was right in "huffing out", but neither was China blameless. I've an impression the "treachery" of P.H. makes it easier for many (let me hasten to say, lest I give further offense, I mean none here present!) to see Japan as a bully & China a victim; by the time of P.H., China was far less a collection of fiefdoms than in 1931.

Can't speak to any rule on registering; I'm more ignorant there than u.

If you're interested in oil, embargoes, & such as provocative, have a look at Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War. There's also a book that mentions FDR's POV on it I can't find the name of...

And, recalling alternate history, if you haven't already, grab a copy of Bova's Triumph. It's one of the most interesting I've seen. (The best part may be speculating what follows the ending...). And try Spinrad's Iron Dream; it's (appropriately) turgid & awful... Trekphiler 23:52, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

Re: The comment above questioning that Japan felt her interests were threatened by the old colonial powers & the U.S. This is a true statement according to historian John Toland's book "Rising Sun" which I used to add some comments awhile back. The Japanese had seen other colonial powers invade countries overtly or covertly: Britain expanded its empire into India (but one example!), Netherlands and U.S. in SE Asia. As a proud country with an 1,000 year history the Japanese felt they had every right to do the same thing, and also needed to in order to survive, considering their tiny islands are fairly devoid of natural resources like oil, tin, rubber that were available in SE Asia. Can't add the reference though, I returned it to the library... P. Moore 03:00, 6 April 2007 (UTC)