Talk:Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki/Archive 7

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Strategic Bombing Survey

That oft-cited quote from the SBS's Summary Report, that "in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped" does not in any way prove that "Japan was ready to surrender" in August. And reading more of the report is worthwhile:

Chapter II The Effects of the Atomic Bombings
3. The Japanese decision to surrender--

As early as the spring of 1944, a group of former prime ministers and others close to the Emperor had been making efforts toward bringing the war to an end. This group, including such men as Admiral Okada, Admiral Yonai, Prince Knonye, and Marquis Kido, had been influential in effecting Tojo's resignation and in making Admiral Suzuki Prime Minister after Koiso's fall. Even in the Suzuki cabinet, however, agreement was far from unanimous. The Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai, was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General Anami, usually represented the fight-to-the-end policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guidance Council, a sort of inner cabinet, his adherence to that line was further assured by the participation of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff, so that on the peace issue this organization was evenly divided, with these three opposing the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister. At any time military (especially Army) dissatisfaction with the Cabinet might have eventuated at least in its fall and possibly in the "liquidation" of the antiwar members.
Thus the problem facing the peace leaders in the Government was to bring about a surrender despite the hesitation of the War Minister and the opposition of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff. This had to be done, moreover, without precipitating counter measures by the Army which would eliminate the entire peace group. This was done ultimately by bringing the Emperor actively into the decision to accept the Potsdam terms. So long as the Emperor openly supported such a policy and could be presented to the country as doing so, the military, which had fostered and lived on the idea of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not effectively rebel.
A preliminary step in this direction had been taken at the Imperial Conference on 26 June. At this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part despite his custom to the contrary, stated that he desired the development of a plan to end the war as well as one to defend the home islands. This was followed by a renewal of earlier efforts to get the Soviet Union to intercede with the United States, which were effectively answered by the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July and the Russian declaration of war on 9 August.
The atomic bombings considerably speeded up these political maneuverings within the government. This in itself was partly a morale effect, since there is ample evidence that members of the Cabinet were worried by the prospect of further atomic bombings, especially on the remains of Tokyo. The bombs did not convince the military that defense of the home islands was impossible, if their behavior in Government councils is adequate testimony. It did permit the Government to say, however, that no army without the weapon could possibly resist an enemy who had it, thus saving "face" for the Army leaders and not reflecting on the competence of Japanese industrialists or the valor of the Japanese soldier. In the Supreme War Guidance Council voting remained divided, with the war minister and the two chiefs of staff unwilling to accept surrender. There seems little doubt, however, that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weakened their inclination to oppose the peace group.
The peace effort culminated in an Imperial conference held on the night of 9 August and continued into the early hours of 10 August, for which the stage was set by the atomic bomb and the Russian war declaration. At this meeting the Emperor, again breaking his customary silence, stated specifically that he wanted acceptance of the Potsdam terms.
A quip was current in high Government circles at this time that the atomic bomb was the real Kamikaze, since it saved Japan from further useless slaughter and destruction. It is apparent that in the atomic bomb the Japanese found the opportunity which they had been seeking, to break the existing deadlock within the Government over acceptance of the Potsdam terms.

—wwoods 04:06, 1 March 2006 (UTC)

"Let 'em keep their emperor!"

"If the Americans had not insisted on unconditional surrender (that is, if they were willing to accept one condition to the surrender, that the Emperor, a holy figure to the Japanese, remain in place) the Japanese would have agreed to stop the war." -- Christiaan

Togo explicitly, specifically rejected that very deal. In his response to Sato's message,
"It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving [the Imperial House]."
Togo replied on July 21,
"With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia."
Who is this Togo character? The only Togo I can find in the wikipedia is Togo Heihachiro who died in 1934. 195.194.199.50 16:23, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
Shigenori Togo, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. KarlBunker 16:31, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

Even after the bombs, the Supreme Council was split 3-3 on whether

"To accept the Potsdam Declaration unconditionally, with the understanding that the Potsdam Proclamation did not include the requirement that the Emperor's legal position be altered."
or
"To accept the Potsdam Declaration with the following conditions: First, that the Allied forces would not occupy the home land, excepting the small Islands off the coast; second, that the Japanese military and naval forces abroad were to be withdrawn by the Japanese's own will and disarmed and demobilized; third, all war crimes should be prosecuted by the Japanese Government."

First-hand account from Sakomizu Hisatsume, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Suzuki cabinet. —wwoods 04:06, 1 March 2006 (UTC)

Minor question on why there were strong concrete buildings

Some of the reinforced concrete buildings in Hiroshima were very strongly constructed because of the earthquake danger in Japan, and their framework did not collapse even though they were fairly close to the center of damage in the city.

Historically, wood-frame buildings have survived earthquakes very well, which the Japanese certainly understand quite well. I don't think the buildings discussed in this line were so constructed because of the earthquake danger. Does anyone know enough about Hiroshima to tell whether this line should simply be deleted as uninformed speculation? Were the particular buildings "very strongly constructed" to survive air raids, perhaps? Are we talking about 2 buildings, or several dozen? Tempshill 19:41, 1 March 2006 (UTC)

Censoring historical fact !!!

Why was the following historical fact constantly deleted. It looks like censorhip of the worst kind - trying to conceal information solely because it contradicts the misconceptions and prejudices of the people that conceal it.

Japanese response to the bombings

It was claimed by the U.S Government that this resulted in the Japanese surrender. However, according to the minutes of the meetings of the Japanese War Cabinet, when the Japanese War Cabinet were notified of the bombings of both Nagasaki and Hiroshima, they explicitly stated their decision to continue the war. According to the details of their meetings, The Japanese War Cabinet decided at a subsequent meeting to surrender, only when they were notified of the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory.''
—The preceding unsigned comment was added by Parkinsons (talkcontribs) 15:03, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

As I said on your talk-page, the most obvious problem with your version of events is that the Soviet invasion began before the bombing of Nagasaki, not after.
You also said, I can not write "according to some document" because it was all said during the Japanese War Cabinet meetings rather than exchanged in official documents. I have not read the minds of the Japanese War Cabinet.
But now you're talking about minutes of meetings. Do you have a reference, preferably on-line?
—wwoods 22:30, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

I would suggest that "Parkinsons" read "Japan's Longest Day" which is a Japanese account of the events leading up to the surrender. This meticulous reconstruction will indeed enable him to read the minds of the war cabinet. As it happens, the cabinet agreed to surrender only after the emperor made an unprecedented intervention, which happened five days after the Russian invasion of Manchuria. That invasion and the Fat Man explosion took place roughly at the same time, though doubtless the war cabinet knew about Nagasaki before it knew about the invasion. To attribute the surrender to the Russian invasion is arguable, but it is far from demonstrable. --Cubdriver 23:02, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

...doubtless the war cabinet knew about Nagasaki before it knew about the invasion. Not according to Surrender of Japan#Hiroshima, Manchuria, and Nagasaki. Is that info wrong or misleading? EricR 23:41, 2 March 2006 (UTC)


The article has been amended in order to explain the points raised here. It is historical fact. It is not "Vandalism" as was ridiculously claimed. There is no reason whatsoever why such information should be completely censored, solely because the facts contradict so many people's false assumptions. Despite this, should the Americans have dropped the bombs. I still don't know. The only actual way we could find out is to go back in time and try not dropping the bombs. Then we could compare the two secenarios. Not much chance of that though !

I studied Japanese history at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies.I consequently had access to their massive Japanese library. As far as I know, what was said at the Japanese War Cabinet meeting is not available online. I have only ever seen the full details in books I used in the University of London's Japanese collection.

--Parkinsons 13:12, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Parkinsons -- I grant you that this isn't a case of vandalism, but a "content dispute." I've removed your edit again, but I invite you to put it back in a corrected form. Because this is a controversial issue, you should name a book where the War Cabinet's Minutes are transcribed. Also, saying that the Russian advances "were not considered" until after the bombs were dropped seems rather vague. Were they not mentioned at all? Saying that something was "falsely assumed by the U.S Government" is impossible to support. The government isn't a single person, and "assumed" isn't a verifiable fact. Lastly, additions like this belong in the "Debate over the decision to drop the bombs" section. KarlBunker 15:10, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

1. What is the purpose of me finding out exactly the name of the book I used, which is inaccessible in all but specialist reference libraries, giving a title in Japanese text, that I doubt anyone here will be able to read, and that I doubt I will be able to technically add, as I have no idea how Japanese text can be added to this site ? The vast bulk of what is added to this site is not referenced at all. So why have you not removed everything else.Is it because you simpy don't like the facts I have added ? That's what your actions are demonstrating because they are totally inconsistent ?

2. I have not debated the controversial issue of this subject or referred to it. It deals solely with historical fact rather than issues of morality. So it clearly should not go in the debates section. I have no certain opinion on that subject. So which section would it go in, because I don't think it decides it either way.

3. The Soviet invasion was not previously considered at the Japanese War cabinet meetings. At the time of the Nagasaki it might have only constituted an initial incursion. It may have been considered sperately by individuals of the War Cabinet. However, the War Cabinet were not continuously in session. The first opportunity for them all to discuss it was after they had discussed the Nagasaki bombings and decided to continue the war. There is no vagueness about it.

4. It is common belief that the bombings brought an end to the war. I assumed it myself before I studied Japanese history.It was widey assumed by the U.S. Government and just about everyone else. Probably more than 95% of people internationally including just about everyone in the U.S. Governemnet believe that to be true. However, the blunt historical fact is that it didn't.

--Parkinsons 16:03, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Don't you think it is rather presumptuous and logically absurd to assert that you are the only one, out of all the potential visitors of this site, who is able to read "Japanese text" and has access to "specialist reference libraries?" And, if you "have no idea how Japanese text can be added to this site", that ought to be a reason for you to look into the help section of this site or ask around, rather than an excuse to post unreferenced "facts". In fact, even just browsing to the Japanese Language page would show you that it is not only possible but quite straightforward to add Japanese text to a wikipedia page.
As for your "leave me alone if you can't catch'em all" argument, nobody can solve all the problems in the world, does that mean we should not try to solve some of them?
--ManifoldRonin 15:40, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
Please take a momment to read Wikipedia:Verifiability.
  1. Articles should contain only material that has been published by reputable sources.
  2. Editors adding new material to an article should cite a reputable source, or it may be removed by any editor.
  3. The obligation to provide a reputable source lies with the editors wishing to include the material, not on those seeking to remove it.
EricR 16:43, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

1. It contains a reputable source.

2. The whole of "Prelude to the bombings" provides no source whatsoever - not a reputable source - no source whatsovere. So why haven't you deleted it ???? You have very obvious double standards.

3. Unlike me, you are obviously motivated in the debate over the atomic bombs, which is why you try any reason, no matter how inconsistent with the facts, to conceal any historical facts that you don't like. What is your motivation ????? It certainly isn't an honest or honourable one. --Parkinsons 17:05, 3 March 2006 (UTC)


The source you cited does not seem to support your argument, there is a summary here: [1]

Asada shoots down definitively two of the anti-Truman lobby’s favorite claims: that Soviet entry, not the bomb, triggered the surrender, and that the surrender would have come as early as June if the United States had guaranteed the continuation of the emperor. The Soviet invasion, says Asada, “gave them an indirect shock, whereas the use of the atomic bomb on their homeland gave them the direct threat of the atomic extinction of the Japanese people.”

If there is other information within the article which you feel does not meet WP:V please point out specifically what needs to be cited and we can all take a look at it. EricR 17:13, 3 March 2006 (UTC)


You have not quoted Asada,you have quoted an outrightly pro bombers interpretation of Asada !

Parkinsons --
  1. More-controversial material obviously needs to be more thoroughly cited than less controversial material.
  2. Since the material you're trying to add bears on whether the bombings brought about the end of the war, it obviously bears upon the debate around the decision to drop the bombs, so it belongs in the debate section.
  3. It's rather bizarre that you believe your understanding of these minutes of the War Cabinet answer with finality the question of what caused the Japanese to surrender. That belief doesn't take into account the vast uncertainty around what goes into any human decision, the large number of factors that must have been on the minds of those who were involved in that decision, and the vast uncertainty around history in general.
  4. I agree that you have a point that there's a widespread assumption that the bombs ended the war. The way you mention that in your attempted edit needs to be reworded, however.
  5. It is unhelpful of you to take a belligerent attitude and declare that people who disagree with you have dishonest motivations. You will find that you make better progress in life if try to maintain a more mature tone and attitude. KarlBunker 17:34, 3 March 2006 (UTC)


Here's another author, Oliver Kamm, talking about Asada's article:
Sadao Asada, in a study entitled "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration", in Pacific Historical Review, November 1998, assessed newly-released documents about the surrender. He demonstrated that the dropping of the atomic bomb was crucial in giving leverage to those within the Japanese government who wished to sue for peace.
It really doesn't seem likely that two authors would be so willing to distort Asada'a conclusions as to portray them as being the exact opposite of what they "really" (according to Parkinsons) were. KarlBunker 17:48, 3 March 2006 (UTC)


Karl Bunker :

I don't think it does decide the debate as to whether the bombs should have been used. Unlike everyone else here, I have actually read the details of the Japanese War Cabinet meetings. That's where the decision was made. They were the people that decided it. I was very surprised by what I read as I had always assumed until then, like most other people that the bombings had ceased the war. I consequently know that they decided to continue the war after the bombings.They took a vote on it in favour of continuing. There was a definite decision to continue the war. It was immediately after discussing the Soviet invasion that they decided to end the war - directly in response to their discussion of the Soviet invasion. Even then not all of them were in complete agreement. Some of the Japanese military still wanted to continue.

I am not anti-bombing. I am not pro-bombing. I still have no opinion as there is a lot more to consider than that. However, it is obvious that some of the pro bombers realy don't like this historical fact, as their objections are inconsistent and obsessive. If you want to read the original sources rather than a second hand version like Asada, or even worse, the obviously biased third hand versions like the ones quoted here, then do as I did and go to the original source in a major library such as The British Library, or the Washington DC Congress library and see the blunt facts for yourself. The pro bombers can carry on deluding themselves by trying to conceal historical facts or not checking the original sources. It makes no difference to me. However, it does make me wonder why they are so motivated to delude themselves. Most people believe what they want to believe. It's all over. No amount of debate is going to change what happened, or alter the historical facts.

--Parkinsons 18:14, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

I don't get this: "I consequently know that they decided to continue the war after the bombings.They took a vote on it in favour of continuing. There was a definite decision to continue the war."
Every account I've read says, as above, that on August 9 the Supreme Council split 3-3, but with neither faction in favor of continuing the war. For instance,
"According to Kido's diary, after the Big Six meeting broke up, at about 1:30, Suzuki came [to the Imperial Palace] to announce that the Big Six had agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration, but with four conditions." (Frank, p.291)
That afternoon, the full cabinet was likewise split. The decision to surrender was made about 03:00, August 10, less than 24 hours after the Soviet attack and the Nagasaki bombing.
—wwoods 19:32, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

There was no decision to surrender, until August 14. The cabinet operated on consensus; as long as one person dissented, there could be no decision, and there was no vote. The three principal military representatives would have agreed to peace with four conditions that the civilians (and probably the military men) knew to be impossible: No occupation of Japan; the Japanese to take their own surrender; Japan to try its own war criminals; and Japan to determine its postwar form of government. That was what they wrangled about for days. The decision was made late in the day on August 14, when the emperor told (ordered, really) the cabinet to accept the Potsdam declaration. (There was of course a wished-for condition, that the emperor remain, and of course the Americans signaled that they would agree to this. The Japanese got what they valued most, and the Americans got to maintain the fiction of unconditional surrender.) Where are you getting your information? --Cubdriver 22:27, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

I mostly used Frank's Downfall for the quotes in Surrender of Japan--it's the best single reference I know.
The emperor made his decision on the night of August 9–10: "...Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable.... I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister." That being the one-condition position, which the cabinet then accepted. But the Allies didn't, so there followed a couple of days of telegrams back and forth. The surrender wasn't a done deal until August 14, when the Japanese gave up on an explicit guarantee for the Emperor: "I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change."
I linked to it before, but here's an interesting first-hand account: [2]
—wwoods 00:38, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

Use of word "terrorism"

Obviously a controversial term -- but people use it, so Wiki must report it. Elimination of the word from the "con" side of the "decision" section would be censorship. Keep in mind, the use of the word is presented as one possible argument that can, and has been, made, along with the citation of a historian (Newman) who defended the use of the bomb in spite of accepting that it was an act of terrorism. The purpose of this article is not to care one way or the next on whether or not the bombings were in fact terrorism, it is only to report the facts about what people have argued along with their reasoning. Lucidish 03:02, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

A good, well written addition, IMO. KarlBunker 13:31, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

Footnotes

Any objections to migrating the footnotes from WP:FN3 to WP:FN? EricR 19:27, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

Surrender of Japan

I would like to see more of the chronology of events surrounding the bombings. However, the info that keeps getting added to this article is better presented in the Surrender of Japan article. EricR 17:46, 8 March 2006 (UTC)

The purpose of the bombings was to bring about the Japanese surrender. Therefore the decision to surrender and its relation to those bombings is highly relevant to the atomic bombings. It is not fully dealt with, in this respect, elsewhere on Wikipedia in Surrender of Japana.It is esppecially pertinent because it is very widely believed that the bombings resulted in the Japanese surrender.

--88.106.216.4 18:01, 8 March 2006 (UTC)

I agree with EricR, the info added should be in the Surrender of Japan article as it us mostly irrelavent, at the most a one paragraph mention and a link to the Surrender of Japan article. Thanks --Jaranda wat's sup 18:54, 8 March 2006 (UTC)

88.106.216.4 seems to be under the impression that the chronology he presents somehow demonstrates that the surrender was entirely or mainly brought about by the Russian declaration of war and their advances. But there's nothing in the chronology that supports that. It might be somewhat interesting if he could find a scholar to quote who holds the opinion that the surrender was entirely or mainly due to that reason, but it would still be a minority opinion, not the "historical fact" that 88.106.216.4 seems to think it is. KarlBunker 19:12, 8 March 2006 (UTC)

I'm sure that Kai Bird or another of the revisionist historians has made exactly that argument. But as you say, it would still be only an opinion. --Cubdriver 20:18, 8 March 2006 (UTC)

I have not claimed it proves anything. I have stated very relevant historical facts. It is obviously very relevant. People who appear to be American (like Aranda), pro American, or pr bombing obvioulsy consider it very reelavnt as they are obviously upset by its possible implications. If it was merely irrelevant as some are deceitfully claiming they would just not read it. However, instead they try to censor it solely because they don't like it. I will add it again tomorrow (outside the 3 revisions in a day rule) and when ever necessary after that. Instead of people wanting to establish historical fact, I see obvioulsy politically motivated people who try to pursue propganda rather than hsitory.
—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 88.106.216.4 (talkcontribs) 13:14, 8 March 2006 (UTC) (who is presumably User:Parkinsons)

With that attitude, you'll go far. One big problem with your timetable is that it leaves out the key event—the meeting on the night of 9–10 August, at which it was decided that Japan would surrender. I don't have a copy of Butow handy, but I know he covers it. By the way, is the Supreme Council minutes you've been citing the Daihon'ei Rikugun-Bu (10)? If so, you'll no doubt be pleased to learn that it hasn't been collecting dust for the last 60 years; Frank cites it extensively. The surprising thing about the Soviet attack is how little impression it seems to have made, except perhaps on Suzuki. Lots of people use the bomb to explain or justify the surrender (e.g. "the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb"), while Stalin's stab-in-the-back goes nearly unmentioned.
—wwoods 21:14, 8 March 2006 (UTC)

I can't remember the name of the book that I read that detailed accounts of the War Cabinet meetings, but it was Japanese,so it is probably the one you mentioned. At the time, it would have been reasonable for the Americans to assume that the bombings had caused the end of the war. That was their intention, and the war did end soon afterwards. They couldn't have know what was actually discussed in the Japanese War Cabinet meetings. When it did eventualy surface that the Soviet invasion had been the final straw there were too many people already believing that the bombings had stopped the war. And would the Americans have wanted it to be the dreaded Russians that brought about the Japanese surrender ? Elsewhere on Wikipedia it details that most Chinese and Russian historians have long belived that it was the Soviet invasion that caused the war to end. It was the Emperor who finally effectively decided it. In his surrender speech to the Japanese, he did not mention the Soviet invasion, but did refer to the bombings, therefore suggesting that his primary concern was the bombings rather than the Soviets. My personal view is that it was an accumulation of events. Hiroshima, then Nagasaki, then the Soviet inasion were just three in a long line of reasons. The Soviet invasion was just one too many. --88.106.216.4 22:51, 8 March 2006 (UTC)


Parkinsons -- It's true that many Americans will tend to downplay the role of the Russians in ending the war with Japan, just as it's true that Americans tend to downplay the role of the Russians in winning the war in Europe, and just as it's true that the Russians will overplay their role in both cases, and just as it's true that the Prussians and the British both believed that they were primarily responsible for defeating Napoleon. This sort of distortion is part of human nature and a part of the study of history.
The question is: why do you think that in your edit you have a handle on some great, previously unrecognized truth? Because the Japanese didn't surrender the instant that Hiroshima was bombed? Because they did surrender after there was some discussion of the Russian advances? Which event was discussed most recently before the final decision was made doesn't prove anything. Obviously, everything that was happening played a part in the decision. Exactly how much of a role each event played in the decision is something that is impossible to know, and rather pointless to guess at. Even the people who made the decision couldn't honestly answer that question.
Most Americans probably believe that a Japanese surrender was inevitable, and that the bombings made it happen sooner. And as far as that goes, it's probably true. KarlBunker 00:19, 9 March 2006 (UTC)

I didn't describe what I added as "some great, previously unrecognized truth". You did that. It is part of the sequence of events. It shows how it is not as simple as bombings = surrender as most people falsely believe. It is good in history as it is in all subjects to go to the original sources to find out the actual rather than assumed facts, and to present all facts rather than try to suppress facts solely because they contradict personal bias and previously held misconceptions.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 88.106.228.196 (talkcontribs) 02:58, 9 March 2006 (UTC)

You continue to state that most Americans assume that the bombings were the cause of the surrender, and that your edit somehow refutes this belief. I don't see either as being correct. Most Americans probably believe that it was the bombings combined with the impending massive American invasion of the Japanese home islands that forced the surrender. And the chronology you present adds very little beyond the well-known fact (already stated in the article) that the surrender didn't come until a week after Nagasaki. What it does add is the fact that the Russian advances were discussed by the Japanese as they debated surrendering, but that's hardly proof of anything. As I said above, I'm sure that most Americans downplay the importance of the Russian advances in the surrender. But that has little relevance to this article, unless you can quote some significant scholar(s) who argue that the sole or main reason for the surrender was the Russian advances, and that the bombings had little or no impact on that decision. KarlBunker 15:48, 9 March 2006 (UTC)

I greatly doubt that most Americans have considered a future attack as the reason for surrender. Few certainly knew that the Soviet invasion was the final straw. You certainly didn't. That's why iot's so troubling for you. Of course what I have added is new. Nowhere was it previously mentioned that a surrender was rejected after both Hiroshima and Nagasaki or that the Soviet invasion was such a factor. Most Americans don't downplay the importance of the Russian advances in the surrender. Most Americans do not know about it. I have quoted historical facts. I have not quoted reasons. --88.106.168.253 23:44, 9 March 2006 (UTC)


You certainly didn't. That's why it's so troubling for you. You keep telling people who disagree with you what they are thinking and why they disagree with you. In my case at least, you are quite incorrect. But your willingness to do this is in keeping with your general willingness to hold onto beliefs regardless of whether there are any facts to support them. KarlBunker 23:57, 9 March 2006 (UTC)
And you're still getting basic facts wrong. The Soviet attack preceded Nagasaki—obviously, there could not have been any rejection of surrender after the latter but before the former. And you've still provided no support for your claim that the Soviet invasion was "the final straw", separate from the bombings. Here, I can give you one quote:
"Is the Kwantung Army that weak?" sighed Suzuki. "Then the game is up." This exchange, often cited to establish the decisive importance of Soviet intervention, is based on Ikeda's recollection several years after the event. It conflicts with evidence from August 1945 demonstrating that Suzuki, far from resigning himself to a swift capitulation, vacillated sharply over the next critical days on the terms and timing of the war's end. (Frank, p.288)
And meanwhile Army leaders made preparations to quash "any initiative by those disposed to peace. ... In his memoirs, Admiral Toyoda reported that "a rather bullish atmosphere" dominated as the [Supreme Council] meeting began. "To be sure," he stated, "the damage of the atomic bomb was extremely heavy, but it is questionable whether the United States will be able to use more bombs in rapid succession." Then the news arrived of the atomic-bomb blast over Nagasaki. (Frank, p.289-290)
Ironically, initial reports understated the gravity of both the Soviet invasion and the Nagasaki bomb, though in each case the most important fact was clear: that the Soviet Union had become an active enemy, and that the Hiroshima bomb was not a one-off.
A timeline of relevant events may be helpful:
9 August:
0400: First word of Soviet attack reachs Tokyo
1030: Supreme Council meeting begins
~1200: News of Nagasaki reachs Tokyo
~1330: Supreme Council meeting ends, split, initially 2-4, finally 3-3, for surrendering on Potsdam+1 condition vs. Potsdam+4 conditions
1430: Full cabinet meets
2000: Cabinet meeting ends, split ~9-~4 (and 3 others with other opinions)
2350: Imperial conference begins; Emperor, Big Six, several others
10 August:
~0300: Emperor speaks, favoring surrender on Potsdam+1; concerns include prospective American invasion and atomic bomb
~0330: Cabinet meets, ratifies Imperial decision
~0700: Cables sent to Allies, acceding to Potsdam, "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives" of the Emperor
12 August:
~0100: Radio broadcast of Allied reponse picked up in Tokyo; the authority of Emperor will be "subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers"
14 August:
1100: Imperial conference; Emperor tells cabinet to accept Allied terms
1300: Cabinet meeting
2348: Message sent to Allies accepting terms
15 August:
early morning: coup attempt
1200: Imperial broadcast, announcing surrender
—wwoods 02:10, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

"And you're still getting basic facts wrong. The Soviet attack preceded Nagasaki—obviously, there could not have been any rejection of surrender after the latter but before the former." WWoods

The Soviet invasion preceded Nagasaki, but the discussion of the Soviet attack by the Japanese War Cabinet took place AFTER the discussion of the Nagasaki bombing. I have already stated this. So you've stated a fact that is correct, and then made a false asumption because you have failed to read what was actually said (from original sources - not the second or third hand versions that you have been using) --88.106.254.115 17:00, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

It would be easier to talk your argument seriously if you came out from behind the cloak of anonymity and established an identity (which could still be anonymous) that was consistent from visit to visit. I have therefore flagged your contribution for POV. --Cubdriver 19:04, 11 March 2006 (UTC)


...And I've removed it as over-long, of little relevance, and in the wrong section. 88.106.254.115, several people have raised various objections to this edit, and for the most part you have simply ignored those objections rather than responding to them. If this edit has genuine value, it should be possible for you to explain what that value is. (And by "explain" I don't mean telling me that I object to it because I am biased.) If you can't explain what that value is, and can't respond in a meaningful way to the objections that have been raised to it, then you are admitting that it has no such importance, and your sole purpose here is to be an annoyance. KarlBunker 20:14, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

Cubdrivers claim that I should come out of anonymity is one of the most ridiculous things I have seen written here. Would it really help if I called myself Mickey Mouse on every occasion. You'd take it seriously then !!!! You really make me laugh. It is obvious I am the same person each time Cubdriver. Is that your real name by the way. I reckon you should come out of the anonymity of "Cubdriver" then maybe I'd take you seriously LOL !!!

Don't you read what is written KarlDunker ? I have already answered all of that. The purpose of the bombings was to bring about the Japanese surrender. Therefore, the Japanese decision to surrender and its relation to the bombings is highly relevant. This is even more so because just about everybody - you included - falsely believed that the atomic bombings resulted in the surrender. Its now obvious to me that some of the people here are no different from Holocaust deniers, attempting to cover up the facts they don't like, with any possible excuse,and with excuses that keep on changing when they are proven to have no basis. They read an Amazon paperback rather than the original sources - assume themselves to be instant experts - and then desperately try to cover up any fact that contradicts their nationalistic biases and prejudices. This is nothing to do with history. It is delusion and denial. I am the ony person here who has formally studied Japanese history. I am the only person here who has studied the original sources. I am the only person here who does not suffer from very obvious nationalistic bias.

Mickey Mouse--88.106.254.115 20:43, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

Yes, Mickey, you have repeatedly asserted that your edit demonstrates that the bombings did not bring about the surrender. You have not, however, explained to anyone's satisfaction how it demonstrates that fact; when asked to do so, you ignore the request and call people names instead. I hope you will forgive me if I don't consider name-calling to be a compelling logical argument. If, as you say, you are the only rational person in the room, it should be possible for you to present a rational argument.KarlBunker 21:58, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

WWoods on this same page has detailed how the atomic bombings did not result in a surrender. His summary lacks the actual details of what occurred in the War Cabinet meetings. According to the details of the Japanese War cabinet meetings that I read, they were not in favour of surrender after discussing Hiroshima, and not then after the discussion of Nagasaki, but they were after the discussion of the Soviet Invasion. In the conversations that took place whilst discussing Nagasaki they considered surrender. However, after discussing the Soviet Invasion it was spoken of as if it was inevitable. The importance of the Soviet invasion as a factor has been realised by Chinese and Russian historians for a long time. This is detailed in Wikipedia's August Storm which concerns the Soviet invasion.

Donald Duck --88.106.254.115 22:25, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

Donald -- Much Better! You may yet get the hang of this. You make a good point that, if properly worded and cited, would make a good addition to the article. What's needed is some scholar to cite who argues that the primary reason for the surrender was (or at least, may have been) the Soviet advances rather than the bombings. With such a source, I would expect it to be acceptable to the other editors here if you were to add something like the following to the "Opposition to use of atomic bombs" section": Although the stated purpose in dropping the bombs was to force the immediate surrender of Japan, it has been argued by XXX that they did not have this effect. The order of topics discussed by the Japanese War Cabinet immediately prior to the decision to surrender suggests that the Soviet Union's aggressive entry into the war in Manchuria may have had equal or greater weight in that decision. KarlBunker 23:21, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

I don't believe that the Soviet invasion was THE reason. It was part of the reason for the surrender. If the order of the discussions of the Japanese War Cabinet was the Soviet invasion then Nagasaki then Hiroshima, then Hiroshima rather than the Soviet invasion would probably have been the final straw. Even these three reasons were not the whole explanation. A lot preceded those three events that would have contributed to the eventual decision to surrender, such as the defeats in the Pacific and the conventional bombing of Tokyo. It wasn't solely due to Hiroshima and Nagasaki as is commonly assumed. Judging by their actions and what was said, the reasons for surrendering were also different from person to person within the Japanese War Cabinet, and the Emperor himself. Judging from his surrender speech it was probably the possibility of an atomic bombing of Tokyo that was the Emperor's primary reason for surrender.

Daffy Duck --88.106.196.163 12:09, 12 March 2006 (UTC)


Daffy -- If that's the extent of the point you're trying to make, then the point is already covered in the article. From the "Opposition to the use of atomic bombs" section: Other Japanese sources have stated that the atomic bombings themselves were not the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, they contend, it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories on the mainland in the week following Stalin's August 8 declaration of war that forced the Japanese message of surrender on August 15, 1945. KarlBunker 12:32, 12 March 2006 (UTC)

I have presented detailed, referenced and very relevant historical facts concerning the Surrender. I have not given any opinion based on those facts. The arguments you refer to in the "Opposition to the use of atomic bombs" section do the exact opposite. They do not provide detailed and referenced historical facts, and has instead given an opinion (that I do not share) that is in opposition to the bombings. Daffy Duck --88.106.129.55 22:48, 12 March 2006 (UTC)

I don't think any one has "run out of reasons" for opposing this particular edit. All the reasons are still here on the talk page, and i for one haven't been convinced otherwise by your arguments. If you require another one, then please look at this url: [3]. It appears that most of the information you have been adding may be a copyright violation. The preceding unsigned comment was added by EricR (talk • contribs) 16:13, 12 March 200 (UTC)

Copyright violation now !!! You try one thing after another. Also owning a publishing company, I always keep a copy of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Conventions. I have previously studied them thorougly. Check Article 10 of the Berne Convention, then consider the countries that are not a party to that Convention. As usual you fail to check the facts before coming to conclusions.

Your spurious reason for trying to censor historical facts don't stand up to any scrutiny. I have nullified them without being contradicted. Yet your very obvious nationalistic bias makes you intolerant of historical facts. This site should be left to the professional historians rather than schoolboys and Amazon paperback amateurs.

Former Professor of History at Oxford and Cambridge Universities. --88.106.218.23 12:45, 13 March 2006 (UTC)

  • BTW, I checked up on article 10. I saw nothing there that said you could take long sections from other's people's works without attribution and pass it off as your own. Please don't make spurious excuses for copyright violations. The page was written by Doug Long, and his copyright would be recognized in the United States and most everywhere else in this instance. --Fastfission 14:20, 13 March 2006 (UTC)

It looks like you have no knowledge at all of copyright law - another instant web site expert - you look up something on a web site - think you know it all, and then start trying to tell evryone else what to do. The relevant section on Wikipedia is "Using copyrighted work from others". Limited use of copyright work from others (called "fair use") is legally allowed within Section 10 of the Berne Convention. Somebody within a member country can legally quote, word for word, sections of copyrighted material without permission first being obtained. I am not in a member country of the Berne Convention, and so I am consequently not obliged to attribute the source of the quotation. Check the facts first !

  • You have quoted copiously and not cited it. It isn't fair use, which would cover something like a quotation, a brief excerpt from a song, plot summaries, and things of that nature. And because Wikipedia is hosted within the United States it must first meet the standards of U.S. copyright law (Berne Convention, if I recall, is just a set of minimum standards any member country must comply by). And you'll get a lot further if you don't talk down to people -- you don't have the slightest idea what people's qualifications are on here, and nobody respects someone who dishes out disrespect to others. --Fastfission 00:14, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

What you consider copious use is not copious use according to Copyright law. Somebody who contributes to Wikipedia is only bound by the copyright laws where they are. You really are deceitful. If you sincerely cared about stating the original authors name you would put it. You are just another one of these pro bombing self deluders. You can not challenge what I write, so you come up with some spurious crap about Copyright. Even then you make yourself look a fool by proving that you haven't even studied the legislation you are misquoting and misinterpreting. It's justified to be heavily critical of people, when (1) they are Amazon paperback amateurs who never read original sources yet delude themselves that they are hsitorians, and (2) who come up with any reason they can think of for trying to conceal facts solely because they don't like them. THis site isn't historical fact, it's US propaganda. Anything that doesn't make the US look good is obsessively eliminated. Not much different from Neo Nazi Holocaust deniers. What makes me wonder is why some of you spend so much of your time hanging around a supposedly information site so obsessively. Haven't you got anything useful to do with your lives ????

Daffy Duck 14:23, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

Listen, if you want to avoid the entire copyright issue, just rewrite the text using that as a source. We have a fairly straightforward policy about copying text from other webpages without attribution, and it is don't do it. Read Wikipedia:Fair use if you want the full policy: "Brief, attributed quotations of copyrighted text used to illustrate a point, establish context, or attribute a point of view or idea may be used under fair use. Text must be used verbatim: any alterations must be clearly marked as an elipsis ([...]) or insertion ([added text]) or change of emphasis (emphasis added). All copyrighted text must be attributed." This is about Wikipedia rules, and none of your own back-of-the-envelope interpretations of copyright law have anything to do with that. And no, Wikipedia content is first bound by the copyright laws of the US, which is why our policies are set up in that way. If you have a problem with the policies, take it up on the policy pages, not here.
Now, if you want to re-write the text in your own words and then try to put it in, then we can talk about whether there is some sort of massive conspiracy against the truth, but until then the copyright issue will suffice.--Fastfission 16:27, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

Yet again your claims are based on misinterpretation and misquotation. The Wikipedia Fair use page according to itself "is not policy." Yet another failure to check the facts !!! Just because you are in the U.S. and are bound by U.S. copyright law doesn't mean that I am. I am not in the U.S. ! If you were genuinely concerned about copyright you would amend what I had written taking in to account your misconceptions about copyright law. However, you are obviously just making up a really spurious reason because your excessively nationalistic pride is really hurt by the blunt fact that the bombings did not as you had falsely believed and wanted to believe bring about an immediate surrender by the Japanese. Isn't it odd that it is only the pro American pro bombers that are bothered by what I have written. The excuses for trying to censor it have gone from one to another. Your excuse is the most spurious of all. Just accept historical facts. You won't change them by deluding yourself.It's all over. There's nothing we can do about it. Your country just dropped atomic bombs on thousands of civilians without achieving what was intended. We all make mistakes. --Emperor Hirohito 18:34, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

  • Are you so lazy that you will not simply re-write the text yourself? You cannot just paste in other people's text here. It is against our policies and considered a copyright violation. If you re-write it yourself, then we can talk about its factual merits. Until then simply inserting it, despite being asked not to, will not only result in a quick revert but probably result in your getting blocked from editing. It's up to you! I've grown tired to discussing this with you, because you clearly have no clue how things work on here and I have outlined very clearly what you could do to get around this problem. "Nationalist pride" has nothing to do with the fact that you can't just paste other people's content verbatim; and I am not a "pro American pro bomber" in the slighest. --Fastfission 18:55, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

U.S. and international copyright law applies. Violating the law could mean that the winner of the copyright infringement lawsuit could then own and shut down Wikipedia. Win or lose, defense of such a lawsuit is prohibitive and would shut down Wikipedia anyway. There is no persuasive argument in favor of doing it. None. skywriter 19:11, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Citations

Zinn, Howard. "Machiavellian Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Means and Ends", in The Zinn Reader (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1997), p. 351

the essay cited here is available online, but i can find no assertion that the total number of casualties predicted, even according to the highest estimates, was substantially lower than the expected deaths from dropping the bomb. Is this the correct essay? EricR 04:15, 10 March 2006 (UTC)
Wow, never a dull moment. Probably Paul put the Zinn cite in the wrong place. His other edit was about the casualties of the invasion of Japan, and Zinn does refer to "a military estimate that an invasion of the southernmost island of Japan would cause 30,000 American dead and wounded." Which is, um, wrong. Estimates for the invasion of Kyushu started at ~70k and went up over ~400k, plus far higher Japanese casualties. Zinn probably misunderstood one of the estimates with a month-by-month breakdown, and took the estimate for the first 30 days for the total.
As for Paul's apparent claim that the SBS predicted lower casualties from (A) another three months of conventional bombing than from (B) the atomic bombing, I don't think either of those numbers even exist. Was the SBS in business soon enough to make such predictions? I haven't read all of the SBS, though. It's available online at the Truman Library, and other places.
—wwoods 07:08, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

The Us-Bus for Japan was a distinct effort, and not as thorough as the one for Germany. It's been a while since I read it. I'm reasonably sure the group was formed after the Japanese surrender. As I recall, it concluded that Japan would have surrendered shortly (months if not weeks) due to conventional bombing, but of course that's exactly what Hap Arnold wanted it to conclude. The Us-Bus's main goal was to ensure the creation of an independent U.S. Air Force, not to write a history of WWII bombing. (That's not to say there isn't good stuff in there.) It couldn't attribute the surrender to the atomic bomb, because that would have put the nascent USAF on life support. --Cubdriver 11:08, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

I've seen the opposite claim quite a bit, that the atom bombs actually saved Japanese civillian lives. Parts of the SBS could probably be used to argue either way, but there's not enough there IMHO to come to any conclusions. I've only seen a version of the SBS titled "Summary Report" though, maybe there is a "Full Report" version or additional documents somewhere which make some kind of claim. EricR 16:33, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

I don't agree, and evidently neither does anyone else. The Us-Bus report is biased toward a given conclusion and reflects knowledge only of the 1940s. Read "Japan's Longest Day" for a more intelligent discussion of these events. --Cubdriver 23:45, 12 March 2006 (UTC)

OK, i'm confused here. The claim that the total number of casualties predicted, even according to the highest estimates, was substantially lower than the expected deaths from dropping the bomb. was removed because it used an inappropriate citation. We thought possibly that the editor was claiming the SBS came to this conclusion or somehow supported it. I thought everybody was agreeing that the SBS could not be used as a source for that claim? EricR 04:48, 13 March 2006 (UTC)
It seems safe to say that cutting the war short cut civilian casualties by more than were killed in the bombings. "What is clear beyond dispute is that the minimum plausible range for deaths of Asian [non-Japanese] noncombatants each month in 1945 was over 100,000 and more probably reached or even exceeded 250,000." (Frank, p.163) Most of these were Chinese—i.e. Allied—civilians. Japanese casualties from a longer war are more speculative, but the destruction of Japan's railway system, which was on the agenda for late August, "would have caused far more loss of life by starvation than the atomic bombs exacted. Simply stated, Japan in 1945 was facing mass famine brought on by the destruction of her transportation system. While three out of four Japanese resided on Honshu—and half of them in the southwestern part of the island—Japan harvested the great bulk of its food on Hokkaido, parts of Kyushu, and in northern Honshu. ... Had the war continued for even only a few more weeks, the destruction of Japan's rail network would have quickly caused a food-supply crisis in late 1945. And once this catastrophe began, it would have required massive repair and replacement of rail infrastructure to remedy, far beyond the capacity of Japan's resources, even after hostilities ceased." (Frank, p.350–354)
—wwoods 08:34, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

"RERF Frequently Asked Questions". Retrieved August 6, 2005.

This citation is a bit confusing and i'm not quite sure what claims it applies to.
  • illness and death after the bombing in about 1% -- no mention of this on the FAQ page.
  • thousands more people died due to radiation poisoning -- page metions that total estimates include later deaths from burns and radion exposure, no numbers and not strictly due to radiation
  • about 90,000 -- estimate on the page is 90-140 thousand. Most likely the low estimate is from Medical Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan (1956) and the high estimate is from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings (1981).
  • Since then about a thousand more people -- the page gives a figure of 428 for cancer deaths 1950-1990. A better cite would be [4], 690 deaths due to radiation for 1950-1997.
I would like to try and clean this up a bit, change the citation to the lifespan study report rather than the FAQ page, but not sure which claims the FAQ page was meant to be supporting. EricR 18:15, 15 March 2006 (UTC)
Well, after looking again, the 428 and 690 numbers are for both cities--i have no idea where the about a thousand more people claim comes from. EricR 18:32, 15 March 2006 (UTC)
Down in Question 5, it says, "the total number of estimated radiation related excess noncancer deaths is about 50-100% the number of estimated radiation related cancer deaths", so I figured the sum of cancer and non-cancer deaths is ~2 × 428 = 1000, to one significant figure.
—wwoods 08:34, 16 March 2006 (UTC)
But doesn't the life span study report apply to all atomic bomb survivors, not just Hiroshima survivors? Not trying to argue either way here, for all i know the true number could be much larger than 1000--the study does not include all the survivors and doesn't count deaths from 1945-1950 or since 1997.
Do you know if the 1% and 90 thousand figures come from RERF? Most of the wiki versions and mirrors seem to be using the 140 thousand number. Shouldn't the article be particularly careful about letting the reader know where these numbers come from?
Not trying to make any arguments here, just going through the list of citations and making sure they match the article text. EricR 17:24, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Associated Press which estimated that the nuclear bombs killed 140,000 people instantly or within months in Hiroshima, 80,000 instantly or within months in Nagasaki, and 237,062 due to after-effects, including radiation poisoning and cancer, for a total of 457,062. [5]

Did the AP make these estimates or are they reporting on someone elses estimates? The given URL doesn't provide much information. EricR 00:29, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Casualties revisited

If you want to insist on using Frank as sole source, then make it clear the Wiki account is close to the offical U.S. version and ignores detailed studies by Japanese scientists who studied the casualties in detail over three decades, including accounting for the genetic effects. To ignore Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings is to accept the U.S. account that, for obvious reasons, prefers the lower count. The above discussion of casualties did not take up this book which was published in 1981 and is the definitive account of the casualties. It has not been challenged or disproven. skywriter 00:29, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Actually, Frank did indeed use this 1979 study in his research. (It was the English translation that was published 1981.) See below. --Cubdriver 11:26, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

The AP numbers reported on NPR are a summary of the death count found in Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. There are still a few copies of this book around at used book stores. I recently bought it. Part II (chapters 7-9) explain in detail the various damges to the human body caused by atomic bombs: external wounds, burns, and radiation injuries. These chapters cover both the immediate effects of the bombings and long-term aftereffects that continue through the generations. The multiple scientist/authors show in many tables and graphs how the casualty numbers are derived including effects on humans at different distances from where the bombs dropped. skywriter 00:42, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

  • I agree that Frank is probably not the best source, at least for the intro. His low-end figures are considerably lower than most of the literature on the subject. But in any event we should just come up with a small blurb for the intro -- the question of casulties can be taken up in the article itself. The intro should just give an idea of the order of magnitude, frankly. --Fastfission 00:45, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I concur. That's why the AP summary is handy. It boils down a 706-page book, including 40-page bibliography detailing all of the various casualty studies, without going into physical damage to property or to genetic damage to later generations. I removed two direct quotes by Frank from the lede because they did not say much except to downplay the casualties, and claim nobody can know what they are, which ignores 25-year old Japanese publication. Frank is good at reporting what's new in what U.S. radio intell knew and when they knew it, but not on casualties. skywriter 00:59, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

  • A suggestion: let's make the intro note something like "The number of exact casualties is not known exactly, but most reliable estimates put them between (low)-(high) deaths immediately after the bombing." Then, a footnote, which gives a few sources on the casualties, explains the general range, and notes that there are further estimates about the number of people who died fairly soon afterwards too, which will be discussed in the rest of the article. That way we can keep the intro un-cluttered while not necessarily deferring to one source. --Fastfission 00:49, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

So, here's one relevant passage:

In the report (Hiroshimashi-Nagasakishi, p. 31) sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by both cities in the autumn of 1976, the total deaths following exposure to the bomb by the end of 1945 totaled 140,000 (± 10,000) in Hiroshima and 70,000 (± 10,000) in Nagasaki.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings, trans. Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swain (New York: Basic Books, 1981) pg. 113.

I can't find any reference to the 237,062 number. Do you have a page # Skywriter? EricR 01:31, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Not certain how the AP reached that number. However, the book of scientific evidence commissioned by the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki uses charts from Beebe, Kato and Land. One is here: http://www.rerf.or.jp/eigo/lssrepor/tr01-77.htm G. W. Beebe, H. Kato, and C. E. Land, "Mortality Experience of Atomic Bomb Survivors 1950-1974," Radiation Effects Research Foundation Technical Report RERF TR 1-77 (1977). The data for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is broadly discussed here: http://www.rerf.or.jp/eigo/faqs/faqse.htm#faq1 Other discussion is here: http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309064023/html/311.html The RERF site is a joint U.S.-Japan project over decades, and appears to have the most credible scholarship on acute casualties, meaning up to 90 days after bombs dropped, as well as the longterm studies that followed on pickup in cancer, leukemia and genetic defects among the affected. Ninety percent of deaths occurred during the acute phase, which lasted 90 days, the book says. skywriter 03:40, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Not certain how the AP reached that number. A good reason to cite (Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1981) instead of the AP in my opinion.EricR 04:04, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I'm going to revert this edit in the opening paragraph. It doesn't seem right to state that the AP made these estimates. It's not even clear that the AP is using (Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1981) as a source--the 237,062 figure probably is from Hiroshima city[6] and apparently is a tally of everyone who reported exposure to the bombs and has since died, of whatever cause. I also don't think there is any reason to prefer (Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1981) in this case. The authors don't derive any numbers, they are restating the numbers reported to the U.N. It should probably be referenced somewhere in the article tho. EricR 03:50, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Don't get too attached to Richard Frank's guess because he did not study casualties. That CBS link takes me to today's CBS home page. Ergo, I have no idea what you are referencing. You do know the basis for two of the three AP numbers and can cite the original if you shy from aping AP. I suspect AP added the accelerated deaths over the years from cancer and leukemia, using the numbers presented by Beebe, Kato and Land, which is also cited in the National Academies Press, official publishing arm of the U.S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) and its adjuncts among science and engineering scholars. RERF.or.jp, the combined U.S.-Japan scientific website appears to contain much of the material in the 1981 book albeit truncated. The 1981 book presents the backup showing how the combined numbers are arrived at. Beebe, Kato and Land use the data in the 1981 book to create the charts which you see on RERF.or.jp and also in the book, although I haven't compared them to ascertain whether they are the same charts. The point is, the official U.S. scientific community accepts Beebe, Kato, and Land numbers and the two affected cities do too. That's consensus. Spend a little time looking at the charts at RERF.or.jp as it seems to be neutral, credible, and on point ground. I will also look at it more closely sometime this weekend when I next get a break. skywriter 04:43, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

The AP article i was refering to is: "Hiroshima Mayor Criticizes U.S." (August 6, 2004) AP. You can probably google for the title or "237,062 bomb" and find it. I'm not attached to any numbers in the article, but if there is a number there i would like to know where it came from. You added the text "...237,062 from related cancer and leukemia deaths..." to the article. The RERF site you have been pointing to reports 440 cancer deaths and 250 noncancer deaths for 1950-1997[7], the numbers we were discussing above in the Citations section. Quite a large difference don't you think? EricR 05:23, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

You're looking for one compact number that rids itself of complexity. Good luck. The RERF study is not looking at everybody, just a sampling. Look at Question 8. How many atomic-bomb survivors are included in the group being studied by RERF and how were they chosen for this study? http://www.rerf.or.jp/eigo/faqs/faqse.htm#faq8 skywriter 05:59, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

The sample size is 120,000 people, including 50% of those who were "significantly exposed" to radiation. The study does not track 1945-1950, but do you really think you are justified in going from 440 to nearly a quarter million? EricR
237,062 was the 2004 total of hibakusha who have died since 8/6/45. The 2005 number was 242,437; the 2006 number will be ~248k. These are not good numbers for the fatalities due to the bombs.
For Hiroshima, 140k is often cited as the high-end estimate, but what's the original source?
Life Span Study Report 8 concludes, "Under the linear hypothesis, ... the estimated absolute risk for all forms of cancer, including leukemia, would suggest that the A-bomb survivor population of 285,000 registrants at the time of the 1950 census may have experienced 400 or 500 deaths from cancer induced by radiation ... in the interval 1950-1974." Obviously there have been more since then, but how many?
—wwoods 07:49, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
140 thousand for Hiroshima might be originally from:
  • Hiroshimashi-Nagasakishi [City of Hiroshima—City of Nagasaki]. 1976. To the United Nations. Expert Committee for Compilation of Data to Appeal to the United Nations, ed.
and also the 80 thousand for Nagasaki (70±10 becomes 80)?
There doesn't seem to be a fair way to present the number of deaths due to radiation since 1945 without going into a fairly long explanation. Maybe in a "Medical effects" or "Bombing victims" section? EricR 16:35, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

If the average a-bomb survivor in August 1945 was thirty years old, he or she would be 90 today, and a newborn would be 65. Surely more than half the hibakusha would have died by now whether they had been exposed to radiation or not. To attribute their deaths to the bomb is worse than unscientific; it is dishonest. --Cubdriver 10:49, 17 March 2006 (UTC)--Cubdriver 10:49, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Frank (p.286) notes that "While the very earliest low numbers of casualties should be approached with skepticism, these extremely high revised figures are at least equally subject to challenge." The notes to this page attributes those "Massive postwar casualty numbers" to the 1979 study referenced above. While there is a place for the extremes in the course of the article, that place isn't in the introduction. --Cubdriver 11:26, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Frank's estimate seems to be low, compared to the various estimates out there. The lowest low-end estimate I found in a web search was 130,000 (both cities combined). I don't think Frank should be presented in the introduction as if his were the "final word." I don't care for Skywriter's version either ("Hiroshima city officials..."). Giving an exact-number "estimate" for deaths caused by the bombing "as of 2005" simply defies common sense. In the introduction at least, I think the number should be for immediate deaths only, or deaths as of the end of 1945, since estimating delayed deaths gets very fuzzy very quickly. Something like "estimates for the immediate death toll range from 100,000 to XX0,000" would be more appropriate, IMO. KarlBunker 15:32, 17 March 2006 (UTC)


What is the basis of Frank's numbers? Does he say? Did he study casualties? Are you accepting his casualty claims on faith alone? What is the basis for that faith?

Franks says between 100,000 and 200,00 died. Who besides Frank says 100,00? Who aside from Frank goes no higher than 200,000? Where do these numbers derive?

For example, do his numbers derive from the The Manhattan Engineer District of the United States Army under the direction of Major General Leslie R. Groves dated June 29, 1946? If so, please say that in the lead.

What time period does the claim 100,000 and 200,000 cover? How is it that every reputable source gets to at least 240,000?

If Frank does not source his casualty claims, please state that.

What period is Frank covering with his casualty claim? It is indisputable that fatalities due to radioactivity do not end 90 days after the dropping of nuclear bombs. Failure to state a time period is grossly incomplete and misleading, if the purpose is something other than propaganda.

You don't get much more conservative than textbook publishers because they have to appeal to the most conservative school districts. Pearson Education, publishing as Fact Monster: Altogether, the two bombings killed an estimated 110,000 Japanese citizens and injured another 130,000. By 1950, another 230,000 Japanese had died from injuries or radiation. Though the two cities were nominally military targets, the overwhelming majority of the casualties were civilian. [8]

Notice that Pearson Education numbers are very close to the numbers disseminated to every news outlet by the Associated Press.

Notice you are staking your claim on the basis of a few lines in a book by one journalist who has written two books. Frank does not claim to be a historian. Why do you claim he is?

The point that Frank DOES NOT HIMSELF claim to be a journalist was made earlier. Why do you insist he is?

Steve Coll and Seymour Hersh have written many books on miitary/intelligence historical issues. No one calls them historians. Stop overstating the credentials of your expert and stop using the quote "The best approximation is that the number is huge and falls between 100,000 and 200,000 because it flat out is not true AND it understates most other sources on the matter, OR it refers to the report of the 1946 findings of the U.S. Army's Manhattan Engineer District.

One more thing, Cubdriver, your comments are overheated. Name-calling is not persuasive. Perhaps you will consider not calling people who disagree with you dishonest. skywriter 16:16, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

The Pearson/Fact Monster numbers seem more in line with the consensus, and it's a straightforward set of numbers that can be linked as well as cited. I'd be agreeable to using those figures in the introduction.
Let's not get distracted by name-calling or by focusing on what someone's credentials are. Whether Frank is a historian or an auto mechanic is less relevant than how well supported his numbers are and how well they represent a consensus opinion. KarlBunker 16:39, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
I disagree w/ linking to the Fact Monster site. Those may be the consensus numbers, but if so we ought to be able to find them in a reliable publication (one which cites it's own sources.) I don't think there is any reason to prefer an online textbook because they appeal to the most conservative school boards. Also linking to a site which is mostly a substitute for the wikipedia content, especially in the first paragraph, is probabaly not a good idea. EricR 17:11, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

March 17, 2006

Frank did make contributions to the atomic bomb story but not in the area of accurately reporting or estimating the casualties. It is sad that his real contributions are ignored in this article in favor of highlighting in the lead what he did not investigate. Frank did not investigate casualties and he does understate the valid source he did use on this point.

Richard Frank is not a historian and what he claims is "The best approximation" is not. So there are two provably false facts in the opening paragraph.

Not previously identified as a Japanese language speaker, Frank sources to the Japanese language version (1979) account, as stated, here by --Cubdriver 11:26, 17 March 2006 (UTC)-- rather than the English translation published in 1981 as ISBN 046502985X.

Here's a quote from the primary source Frank quotes, and in the process, mis-states (by low-balling): page xliii: Preface to the English Edition: In the extremely brief span of 0.2-3 seconds, hundreds of thousands of people were obliterated along with their homes and places of work; many thousands more of the survivors suffered serious physical and psychological injuries which are not all healed even today, over thirty-five years later; and the genetic damages may well last for several generations, if not indefinitely. ...Indeed, if the future of the human race is to be safeguarded, the destructive dimensions of those "small" bombs and the depths of misery they caused must be clearly recognized. For our part, as human beings and as scientists, we believe that it is our inescapable duty to report accurately and objectively the full spectrum of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences while the memories and records of that fateful August and subsequent years are still accessible. This duty is all the more compelling when the aftereffects of the first atomic bombs have yet to come to an end."

In a detailed manner, the book lays out all the problems of assessing casualties, and explores and sources to all known documentation on the topic. It is an exhaustive survey of what is assessable, the most credible to date, and it is discarded in the writing of this Wikipedia article.

From the Introduction, p. 4, the author/scientists write: Immediately after the atomic bombings, Japanese medical scholars and natural scientists, while extending all possible care to the A-bomb injured, exerted strenuous efforts to determine the details of the atomic disasters. During the early postwar months their labors yielded a considerable volume of solid research and surveys, the most important of which were later compiled by the Science Council of Japan (SRIABC 1951: CRIABC 1953).* Allied Occupation policies, however, imposed strict controls on all Japanese research into A-bomb affairs: under directives issued in late November 1945 by the General Headquarters (GHQ), Japanese scientists could neither undertake studies of the A-bomb damages without permission nor could they publish their findings. Given these restrictions, their work was seriously curtailed until the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Despite these limitations, many scientists managed to sustain their efforts; and their findings, particularly those revealing the marked increase in radiation aftereffects in 1946, contributed greatly to the medical treatment of exposed victims.

The purpose and slant of this Wikipedia article is in defense of the victor's viewpoint, and in so doing, it low-ball the casualties. The precise figures offered by scientists from the affected population is disregarded, out of hand, along with the conventional wisdom as evidenced by the Associated Press and the textbook publisher, both of which match the report of the affected population. Both AP and the textbook publisher are widely acknowledged to be conservative in their presentation of disputed matters.

Frank is neither disinterested nor a historian. He is author of two books. I do understand there is propaganda value in calling him historian. And, there is propaganda value in leading with his low-ball figures that mis-state his source. This is a tipoff to the U.S.-centric opinions of the gatekeepers of this article who bar extensive studies by Japanese/U.S. scientists from weighing in on this topic.

The official U.S. explanation is fully vented on the article page, and profusely by its defenders on the talk page. Contrary views are suppressed as the article history and talk page reveal. Undercounting (by low-balling) the atomic casualties understates the effects of the use of nuclear weaponry. The lead of this article dispenses with radiation effects by not mentioning it at all.

Everyone has a viewpoint, including Frank. Victors write history. That has always been the way, and it is true in the writing of this Wikipedia article, which projects the tone of explaining the victor viewpoint. There is no evidence in the opening of this article that any but the victor's viewpoint exists. The majority of the article puts forward the U.S. government viewpoint and barely acknowledges other viewpoints.

There is a lot of evidence that gatekeepers of this article have behaved in a fashion that wears down and eventually runs off those who digress from the official U.S. political viewpoint of the atomic bombings, in even the smallest way. Perhaps it is not surprising that the propaganda is kept up. The United States holds more nuclear weapons than any other nation, and threatens to use them even now. Guardians of this Wikipedia article sugar coat the effects and cost in human lives by low-balling the casualties, not giving an inch, even when plenty of documentation shows otherwise. Revising U.S.-centric opinion distracts from the propaganda line. There is no discussion here of the record of official U.S. government censorship of Japanese and U.S. reporters and film crews and of scientists who tried early on to document what happened. Why is that?

This article will be tagged as factually disputed for all of the foregoing reasons. skywriter 19:36, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I note that Sky thinks that the Associated Press (!) is a better source than a historian. How extraordinary. Frank's lowball figure of 100,000 is a bit higher than the Manhattan District findings (60,000 in Hiroshima and I think 35,000 in Nagasaki). The highball figure of 200,000 is the highest defensible estimate of deaths (that is, without attributing 21st century deaths to the bomb).

I have deleted the two sections following this, since nobody seems interested in improving the article, only to move overheated figures into the opening. Those overheated figures are already in the article. There is no reason to put them in the lead, any more than there is reason to use the Manhattan District findings there instead. People look to Wiki for facts, not gross exaggerations from journalist typing in a hurry in quest of an eye-popping story.

For example, we could check what the Brittanica says on the subject and use that as a baseline. Otherwise, let's stick with Frank, who is disinterested, who has studied the subject, and who has reviewed all the findings up to about 1998. --Cubdriver 16:55, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Brittanica puts Hiroshima deaths as at least 70,000 and Nagasaki "between 60,000 and 80,000 people killed." I'm getting a little confused at what the various numbers are -- perhaps we can make a table? I'll start one below, feel free to add the other values as you see fit. It might also be worth clarifying whether by "casualties" people mean it in the strict sense (dead + injured) or specifically to mean "dead" --Fastfission 17:44, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Well, so much for Brittanica! The Hiroshima death toll seems too low and that for Nagasaki too high, though I would not be averse to taking the average of 140,000 as a consensus total that could be in the opening section. Certainly we should always speak of deaths and injuries, never casualties unless it's clearly the sum of the two. Meanwhile, I'm delighted to see the Totally Disputed flag on the article. I'd thought of putting it there myself. --Cubdriver 19:45, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Casualties tables

Here is a little table, just to organize the competing claims. Add to it as you see fit. I've made it a sub-section so it is easy to edit and can stay out of the main discussion above it. --Fastfission 17:44, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Good idea, added a few, all out of (Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1981) EricR 18:04, 17 March 2006 (UTC)
Source Hiroshima casualties Nagasaki casualties Total casualties
Encyclopedia Brittanica Online at least 70k dead 60k-80k dead 130k-150k dead
RERF[9] 90k-140k 60k-80k 150k-220k
Richard Frank's Downfall (1999), p. 285–7
Manhattan Engineering District 1946[10] 66k dead, 135k total 39k dead, 64k total 105k dead, 199k total
USSBS, March 1947 78,150 dead 23,753 dead 101,903 dead
Japan Economic Stabilization Board, April 1949 80k dead 45k dead 125k dead
OSW (Japan) and USNR , April 1966 70k dead 36k dead 106k dead
Frank's summary: 100k-200k dead
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1979/1981), p. 113–4
Special Committee of the Science Council of Japan, 1951 ~100k dead (in 1945)
Joint Commission
(Does not include military: 15-20k dead in H.?)
58,580-68,670 dead (1945) 29,398-37,507 dead (1946) 87,978-106,177 dead
Hiroshima City Survey Section (August 1946) 118,661 dead, 82,807 injured and missing
Nagasaki City A-bomb Records Preservation Committee (December 1945) 73,884 dead, 74,909 injured
Hiroshima and Nagasaki report to Secretary-General (1976) 140k ± 10k 70k ± 10k 210 ± 20k

Here's what Frank has to say (p.285-6):

Two sets of problems confront any effort to quantify the deaths due to the atomic bombs. The first stems from the general deterioration of Japanese civil administration in 1845, the second from the stupendous power of the weapons. ... According to Japanese sources, for example, the number of individuals registered to receive a rice ration in Hiroshima as of June 30, 1945 was 245,423. ... Making these allowances [for, e.g., commuters and soldiers] one Japanese estimate placed 370,000 persons in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, though this number is very probably high.
Perhaps the best contemporaneous report is that of from the police department of the Hiroshima prefecture, which calculated that by the end of November 1945 Little Boy had inflicted the following casualties:
Deaths              78,150    60.3 percent
Seriously injured    9,428     7.3 percent
Slightly injured    29,997    21.6 percent
Missing             13,983    10.8 percent

Total              129,558   100.0 percent

The official Japanese history of Imperial General Headquarters, from which this narrative draws heavily, states the number of deaths is "difficult to ascertain," and gives a range for Hiroshima between 70,000 and 120,000. The following table provides some indication of the ranges of the more noteworthy estimates made over the years:
       Dead                  Injured
Hiroshima  Nagasaki    Hiroshima  Nagasaki   
255,000   195,000 -- populations, 1945

 66,000    39,000       69,000     25,000  Manhattan Engineering District, June  1946
 80,000    45,000   80-100,000  50-60,000  USSBS, March 1947
 78,150    23,753      151,000     55,000  Japan Economic Stabilization Board, April 1949   
 70,000    36,000       70,000     40,000  OSW (Japan) and USNR , April 1966
Decades afterward, revised estimates were put forward of much higher numbers for total deaths attributed to the bombs. These estimates worked backward from two dubious premises. First, they assumed the accuracy of a count of atomic-bomb survivors in 1950 numbering 158,597 for Hiroshima and 124,901 for Nagasaki (plus ten individuals present for both bombs[!!!]). These numbers were then subtracted from a conjectured population of each city on the dates of the bombings. This process yielded a count of deaths by 1950 that totaled 200,000 for Hiroshima and over 140,000 for Nagasaki. While the very earliest low estimates of casualties should be approached with scepticism, these extremely high revised figures are at least equally subject to challenge.
(Footnote: For example, the 1950 total of survivors was 283,498 ... [Over time more survivors identified themselves, so that] In March 1995, no fewer than 328,629 living Japanese qualified by this definition. ...)

Here's RERF's table of
Estimated population size and number of acute (within two to four months) deaths in Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the atomic bombings

    ________________________________________________________________
                Estimated city population      Estimated number of
     City       at the time of the bombings       acute deaths
    ________________________________________________________________
     Hiroshima       310,000 persons              90,000-140,000
     Nagasaki        250,000 persons              60,000- 80,000
    ________________________________________________________________

—wwoods 19:34, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I integrated the RERF data into the above -- feel free to add the others as you see fit. Putting it all into one big table should help us sort out things (and might later be useful for an article itself). --Fastfission 19:56, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Neutrality/accuracy tag

Skywriter, the casualty estimates obviously cover a huge range, so there's no question of the article being factually inaccurate, as long as estimates quoted are called estimates rather than factual figures.

As for neutrality, this issue is under very active discussion, so it's premature to tag the article as non-neutral. KarlBunker 19:52, 17 March 2006 (UTC)


The lead of the article is factually inaccurate.

Take this quote out of the lead because it is unsupportable: "The actual total of deaths due to the atomic bombs will never be known," concluded the American historian Richard Frank. "The best approximation is that the number is huge and falls between 100,000 and 200,000."

The minor point is "actual total" is horrible English.

"best approximation" is not true. "falls between 100,000" is not true. "and 200,000" is not true as scientific sources-- who made careful assessments-- reveal.

No credible source alleges the deaths were as low as 100,000, not even United States government scientists, at least false and this article propaganda.

Source instead to AP or the book publisher which are plainly written and readers can judge for themselves what to think of them as sources. Use of Frank is misleading, again, because he did not study the death toll and mis-stated the source he cited.

A google search for - 237,062 hiroshima - shows that news editors across the news spectrum including the Washington Times accepted that specific number 237,062 for just one of these cities. What does that say about Wikipedia that the prevailing view of those editing this article supports the false claim that deaths from the dropping of two nuclear bombs tolled as low as 100,000 and as high as 200,000? Why should anyone believe it? Where is the underlying evidence? Certainly not in the 1970/1981 book Frank cites. "Factual Dispute" should tag this article until at least this is resolved. skywriter 20:45, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

The article would be factually inaccurate if Frank did not make that statement in his book. I assume that's not what you're asserting. It's presented as an estimate that was written in a book. The prevailing view among WP editors at the moment is that the Frank figures are too low, and the article will be updated in due course. In the meantime, let's try to stay calm and try to make constructive contributions. KarlBunker 20:56, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

The article is factually inaccurate because it quotes someone who misstates the source he cites. The article was updated with new information to reflect credible source. You managed to revert the article three times today, calmly?, constructively?, to what is clearly factual and/or POV error. Either factual challenge tag goes up, or AP source. skywriter 21:36, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

C'mon Skywriter -- You can put up the NPOV tag if you want to, but the "factually inaccurate" tag would be, you know, factually inaccurate. As for my reverts today, they've been mainly due to a one-against-many edit war that a user has been waging against all the other editors here for the bast 2 weeks.

Although I am not certain, the above comment appears to have been written by KarlBunker. skywriter 05:19, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Radiation Illness Should be in the Lead

Grossly misstating by underestimating the number of deaths attributed to nuclear bombing is not a viewpoint issue. It is a serious issue of fact. Today's edit wars were directed against early deletion of the Frank estimates that are not supportable. Lots of discussion preceded the inclusion of the AP numbers. In the comment directly after this one, Cubdriver attributes the 100,000 low number to either the Manhattan Engineer District (M.E.D.) or Oughterson Commission, saying "That is no doubt what Frank had in mind." Sorry, that works only for mind readers. Earlier, Cubdriver said Frank cited the work of the 1979/81 Committee. So which is it? If Cubdriver was correct the first time, without the mind reading, he has identified exactly where Frank misstated his source's figures. Here's why. The Committee includes the M.E.D. numbers in its compilations of all known studies and compares it with the research of Japanese scientists who compiled data despite orders of censorship by the Occupation, noting the censorship. So, if you want to use the lowball 100,000 number, fairness demands explanation that Japanese scientists were actively prevented from publishing their data for years, right up until the SF accord. As to Cubdriver's phrase: "which were believed to be just about all deaths save for "several hundred" expected to die over the next 30 years" --- do cite your source if there is a factual basis for that comment. skywriter 03:30, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

Quoting: "No credible source alleges the deaths were as low as 100,000, not even United States government scientists, at least false and this article propaganda." Actually, yes. The Manhattan Engineer District or Oughterson Commission figures total about 100,000: 66,000 for Hiroshima and (as I recall) 35,000 for Nagasaki. That is no doubt what Frank had in mind. Those are the closest figures to the moment and include deaths to the end of 1945, which were believed to be just about all deaths save for "several hundred" expected to die over the next 30 years. --Cubdriver 22:23, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Skywriter can you please take a look at the text you've been trying to insert:

Hiroshima city officials estimate that 140,000 people died instantly, a number that rose to 237,062 from related cancer and leukemia deaths by August 2005. [11] The plutonium bombing of Nagasaki instantly killed about 82,000 people.

There are no sources which make any of those claims. Does your text fairly and honestly represent the article you have provided as a citation? EricR 00:21, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

EricR, which part of that sentence are you questioning? if the cancer and leukemia, then that is in the 1979/81 book of scientific studies. While there were other diseases and there were genetic defects also traceable, the cancer and leukemia spiked the most after the atomic bombings. All of the rest of that summary derives from the linked AP article.

For clarity, the wording could be:

Hiroshima city officials estimate that 140,000 people died instantly, and that by August 2005 the number of deaths traced to the atomic bombing rose to 237,062. Many of the later deaths were from cancer and leukemia, according to The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings.

Does that address your question? skywriter 03:06, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

I think that's getting closer. If you are using (HN 1981) as a source for Hiroshima, it's probably better to say "aproximately 140,000 died by the end of 1945" rather than died instantly. I think everyone agrees that this should be in the article somewhere.
The AP did report the number of deaths since 1945,but as wwoods pointed out 237,062 was the 2004 total of hibakusha who have died since 8/6/45. Different sources are reporting this exact same number--but as either deaths due to the bombings or deaths from all causes, and either from Hiroshima or from both cities. That number is not from (HN 1981) and is not deaths from cancer and leukemia.
EricR 04:47, 18 March 2006 (UTC)


Eric, do you mean 237,062 was the 2005 total?

Google "hiroshima 237,062" without the quote marks, and it becomes clear 237,062 is the expanded number for Hiroshima only, as the mayor of that city is quoted directly as to that number, and that is what was reported as of August 2005.

No, 237,062 is the 2004 total. The corresponding number for 2005 is 242,437--incremented by the 5,375 who'd died in the preceding year. That number is already in the article, but it doesn't belong in the introduction, since it's not an estimate of the number of people killed by the bombs.
—wwoods 08:25, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

As distinct from radiation illness which is a direct and lasting effect of the bombs? Is there not a fundamental difference between what this article reports and the real world? These were no ordinary bombs without lifetime and inter-generational effects. Nuclear weapons have consequences beyond the momentary flash of light and immediate disintegration of whatever lies in its path. Anyone "lucky" enough to survive a nuclear bombing is likely to feel the physical and neurological consequences long afterward. I notice in the history of this article that an advocate of sanitizing successfully deleted photographs of people affected by the bombings. Sanitizing to the point of removing pictures of people to cause this this topic to seem impersonal does not remove consequences to humans of the matter that is addressed. I am sorry the person who advocated sanitizing-- and the editors who allowed these photos to be removed-- has such a weak stomach that he can not look at reality. Perhaps looking at these now omitted photographs and feeling what they represent will have an impact many times greater than the hundreds of words written here. Could that be the reason they were removed? Nuclear bombing has very real effects on humans and that is part of the completeness of what is true. When discussing number of people killed by the bombs, it is incomplete to omit the factor of radiation illness and it is incomplete to omit the photos. Government censorship is not operative on this Wiki article. It is strongly held beliefs that prevent the presentation of the full range of views on this controversial subject. skywriter 05:54, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

One of us would have to dig more deeply through the tables and charts in (HN 1981) to determine at least what the expanded number for Nagasaki is to 1979 (or earlier (1974 or 1977?) when those studies ended.) The book does take up the point that there has to be an ending point in data collection, for the purpose of making certain everyone is, colloquially speaking, "on the same page." There are additional problems in calculating deaths (outside the two cities) from the atomic bombings due to meteorological conditions on the day of the bombing, fallout, and residual radioactivity in the air, water, dirt and crops.

p. 237 "Acceleration of the aging process and elevation of the mortality rate are important subjects in the study of the aftereffects of the atomic bomb. Animal experiments have shown that leukemia and other malignancies are induced by radiation; and increased frequencies of specific disorders associated with radiation are accompanied by a rise in mortality rate, a shortening of life, and also indications of increased aging. A large-scale survey by the National Institute of Health, Japan, and the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (RERF* Radiation Effects Research Foundation ((referred to earlier as the RERF website))on approximately 109,000 people has been in progress since 1950. This survey is called the Life Span Study."

p. 237

"Life Span Study and Methods"

In this study, a fixed population including controls was established for long-term observation. The main group consists of 28,000 persons (exposed within 2 kilometers of the hypocenter) selected from 280,000 survivors who had been exposed to the atomic bomb, according to the national census held in 1950. As a control group, people of a similar age and the same sex were selected at random from those who either had been exposed at some distance (over 2.5 kilometers of the hypocenter) or had not been exposed. Other groups include about 16,000 survivors who had been exposed 2 to 2.5 kilometers from the hypocenter, and another 9,000 who had been exposed near the hypocenter but whose family registers ("Koseki") were not in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The estimated dose of radiation exposure has been calculated for each person. Table 9.20 shows the number of persons studied and th exposure dose."

p. 238 (skipping over the table, for now, and hoping to find it online at RERF)

"Death certificates were checked to determine whether members belonging to this fixed population were alive or dead. Vital statistics were examined periodically, and records of autopsies and biopsies were sometimes referred to in order to determine accurately the cause of death."

"Mortality Rate"

"Of these approximately 109,000 persons, 25,924 have died during the twenty-four years between October 1950 and September 1974 (Beebe, Kato, and Land, 1977). The mortality rate rose with increased doses of radiation exposure. Figure 9.5 shows the relative risk of those exposed to high doses (over 200 rads) and those not exposed according to mortality rate and cause of death. Since errors are included in calculating the relative risk, a confidence-interval limit of 80 percent was estimated statistically. When compared with the group that had never been exposed to radiation, the mortality rates for all diseases, leukemia, and malignancies other than leukemia in the high-dose group (over 200 rads) were 1.16, 17.6, and 1.43 time higher. There was, however, no increase in mortality from trauma, tuberculosis, cerebrovascular accidents, or disorders of the circulatory system (mainly heart disease.)"

p. 238 continued

"Leukemia"

"Death from leukemia among the exposed survivors has been increasing since 1947. Figure 9.6 shows the yearly change of mortality rate for leukemia in the group exposed to 100 rads or more. The peak of the mortality in this group occurred between 1950 and 1954 and then gradually declined each year. A significantly higher rate than in the control group (0-9 rads) was , however, still maintained in the year 1974. Although the mortality from leukemia rises with increased doses of radiation exposure, the shapes of the dose-response curves differ between Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with leukemia-mortality-per-radiation dose being higher in Hiroshima. On the assumption that the difference between the cities was caused by the different types of radiation,"

(skipping Beebe, Kato, and Land 1977 Figure 9.5 showing major group causes of death, mostly cancer, that is p. 239)

and skipping p. 240 that is Figure 9.6, (Beebe, Kato, and Land 1977) showing the mortality rates (1950-74) for all neoplasms, leukemia, all cancers except leukemia etc. in the study group. (It shows rates of leukemia mortality decreased while all cancers except leukemia rose sharply although breast cancer rose sharply 1963-71 then dropped sharply.)

p. 241 continued from p. 238

"the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) would be nearly 5. As shown by the dose-response curve, mortality from leukemia is proportional to neutron dose and to the square dose of gamma rays, but the RBE differs by radiation dose. RBE is larger than 5 when the radiation dose is low, while RBE is smaller than 5 when the dose is high. ...

"Even when the exposure dose of radiation is the same, the risk of carcinogenesis is the highest in those exposed between birth and nine years. Figure 9.7 shows the relative risk of cancer mortality in the group exposed to more than 100 rads (standardized to 0-9-rad group) by age at time of exposure (Beebe, Kato and Land 1977) ...

"As for malignancies in general, the difference of dose-response curves in Hiroshima and Nagasaki indicates that the effect was more prominent in Hiroshima, although not so clearly as for leukemia."

"Other causes of death" (still p. 241

"If malignancies are excluded as a cause of death, the mortality of the high-dose group receiving more than 100 rads was not increased, as compared with that of the control group, either by age at exposure or by period of time )figure 9.8)....

p. 244 discusses the tendency of the ABCC (the US Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission) to show no interest in the psychoneurologic effects of the atomic bombings. "At one time this institution was even inclined to underestimate the aftereffects of the atomic bomb...."

(Following several pages of charts and tables and discussion of studies of the relationship between radiation and leukemia and other cancers)..."It was thus anticipated that leukemia might occur more readily in A-bomb survivors exposed to large doses of radiation. This, unfortunately, proved true; and leukemia is now considered to be a characteristic disease following exposure to the atomic bomb....

p. 260

...The incidence of leukemia was especially high in people exposed to more than 100 rads. Although the incidence in this population somewhat declined during the 1960s compared with the 1950s, the incidence between the years 1965 and 1971 was still high, at 25-35 per 100,000 population. Since the death rate of leukemia at the same time period in Japan was approximately 3.3 per 100,000 population, the incidence of leukemia among those exposed to large doses of radiation is about seven times higher."

That's all I can do tonight. Gives an idea of what sort of casualties they looked at and duration. skywriter 07:37, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

The effects of radiation fallout on human illness and mortality should be in the lead of this article. To ignore it is to side 100 percent with the U.S. view immediately after the bombing that censored journalistic descriptions of radiation illness, beginning with, but not limited to George Waller's stories that were not revealed for 60 years [12] and would not have come to light had he not saved carbon copies that his son found after Waller died.

Excerpts from the censored stories slated to be published in a book later this year: 'Disease X is still snatching away lives'

Here's a recent story demonstrating that the ongoing atomic studies continue to give up a lot of information about the longterm effects of even a one second dose of a large (more than 100 rad) dose of radiation. A-bomb survivors face greater risk of thyroid cancers by Alok Jha, science correspondent, Wednesday March 1, 2006

This Wikipedia article marches in lockstep with the official U.S. narrative of the atomic bombings in that it downplays civilian casualties and dismisses reports of the lingering effects of radiation. That should change. This article should be open to the full spectrum of knowledge on this topic. skywriter 05:19, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

From an op ed piece in the LA Times: "When a government substitutes an officially sanctioned view for publicly debated history, democracy is diminished." skywriter 05:29, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

When a 40-year-old survivor of the Hiroshima blast dies 60 years later, do you always attribute his demise to Little Boy? After all, mortality among centenarians is fairly high at the best of times. Even 60-year-olds have been known to die from time to time. --Cubdriver 10:47, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Cubdriver: Your comment seems to suggest 'we don't need no stinkin' science.' Is your conclusion based on original research, or is there a link to a documented basis for your comment? skywriter 15:55, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

It doesn't appear that leukemia increases the estimates by very much. Even if 25 to 35 per 100000 is maintained over 40 years that still amounts to less than 10000 additional deaths, so attributing the other cancers to the bombs is even more questionable. The politicians and scientists can't say which deaths are the incremental ones, so anyone that wants to be labeled a victim is allowed to be one.--Silverback 12:25, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Silverback: Is your personal opinion based on unsourced or original research? The links provided earlier are quite specific in connecting dosage and proximity to ionized radiation and the frequency of occurrences of cancer and leukemia. skywriter 15:55, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Skywriter, it is based on the figures you provided. Was I wrong to rely upon those?--Silverback 03:56, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

The comment was directed toward the conclusions drawn. The charts show steep and direct linkages between (radiation dosage and proximity) and the likelihood of getting cancer or leukemia, except in the case of children who were generally at higher risk for leukemia. The farther people were from the blast center, the less chance they had of coming down with any of the cancers, leukemias or other radiation diseases specifically traced to the uranium 235 (H) and plutonium 238 (N) attacks. That is assuming they survived the blast. The charts break down each of the radiation diseases, including each of the cancers (on the various body organs) to show what the people who got it had in common with respect to dosage, proximity, age, and sex. The data even shows a different kind of leukemia occurring in survivors of the Nagasaki blast from those who survived Hiroshima.

Cubdriver condemns me for bringing up this parallel: the radiation disease claims of the U.S. Atomic Veterans were validated based on the findings of the Japanese data: proximity, dosage, age and sex. The VA link said that precisely. Since 1988 and 1990, the U.S. government stopped challenging the causal link that has been established between radiation exposure and radiation disease, based on the findings of Japanese scientists in collaboration with U.S. scientists.
You stated "scientists can't say which deaths are incremental "so anybody that wants to be labeled a victim is allowed to be one." The opposite is true. The data is good, they've figured a lot of it out. I don't think they're certain exactly how radiation causes disease but they know, depending on the dosage, it does. skywriter 04:57, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

What about the conclusion do you have problems with? The leukemia is by far the most pomininent delayed onset radiation illness, and even in the 1960s the death rate was down to the figures you cited, so if anything the estimate of additional 10,000 deaths over the next 40 years is a generous allowance. Note by your own figures, some of that 25 to 35 death rate (3.3 to be exact) should not be attributed to the bombs. These rates would likely decline with more time since the bombing. If scientists can say which leukemia deaths are due to the 3.3 background rate, and which are incremental due to the bomb, please provide a citation, don't just say "the opposite is true".--Silverback 05:49, 20 March 2006 (UTC)
Skywriter had a typo in his quote; the leukemia rate is 25.35 (/100k/yr), not 2535. Eyeballing Figures 9.9 and 9.10, from 1955 to 1975 there were about 7 new cases/year among people who received >=1 rad exposure, and about 5 among people with >=100 rad (100 rad == 1 gray). That seems consistent with RERF's figure of 89 radiation-related leukemia cases in the LSS cohort in 1950–1990.
—wwoods 20:30, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Karl, here's an authoritative source that sets the number at 250,000. This is preferable to the unsourced guess now in the lede. The bombs claimed the lives of about 250,000 people. They also provided scientists with unique data on how radiation causes cancer.

Leaving out the human effects of radiation fallout defies science. To ignore the science derived from the studies of atomic bomb survivors is also shortsighted. In the plainest of terms, the atomic bomb data is the basis for studying one of the most important ways in which human cells and genes become corrupted with the result that people get cancer or leukemia. These studies are important on a practical level in determining how much or how little radiation can be applied to cancer patients before heightening the risk of radiation-induced second cancers. The atomic bomb survivors are the control group that sets worldwide standards for exposure to ionizing radiation and radiological protection. Radiation link to cancer explained It is the possible risks arising from low dose and low dose-rate exposure to ionizing radiation that are central to the setting of standards for radiological protection. 1997: Recently released data on cancer incidence in Japanese atomic bomb survivors are analyzed using a variety of relative risk models that take account of errors in estimates of dose to assess the radiation dose response at low doses.

This Wikipedia article takes 90 words to say what this article says in 36: "Today, many Japanese believe the atomic bombings of the two cities were unjustified, despite their country's war of aggression. US wartime leaders defended the bombings as the only alternative to a bloody invasion of mainland Japan." There is tremendous resistance to editing and content changes to this article. As it stands, this article does not reflect divergent viewpoints but rather is an unbalanced championing of the US outlook. Even so, this article ignores those parts of the US outlook that are unacceptable to the page editors who hold this page closely and zealously against all comers. For example, the ways in which primary research by U.S. historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa in the last few years compares directly with and differs from Frank, this page's most favored author, are ignored. There is no point in exploring that because it is of lesser importance than the central and most glaring omission in this article, and that is the failure to reference and explore radiation sickness and its effects. That defies and suppresses science. skywriter 15:55, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Skywriter, you said: There is tremendous resistance to editing and content changes to this article. I view that as a good thing. Edits to this article should be well sourced and NPOV. At issue are your edits: [13] and [14]. I believe those edits cite a low quality source (AP) when you have much better sources (RERF or HN 1981) at hand. The text you added is contradicted by the source you do provide ( killed instantly as opposed to by the end of 1945 ) and they contradict each other. Certainly those are sufficient grounds for reverting those edits.
I have only been editing this article (and WP) for a very short time, but have been watching for quite awhile. Editors here seem to have incredible patience and restraint in the face of all the drive-by POV edits and vandalism. Accusations of resisting good faith edits are not warranted. We have explained the reasons for reverting your edits, recognized that you bring up an issue that may need work in the article and took steps to begin working on the problem (FastFission's table). What more evidence would you like to show that we are editing in good faith?
You have raised a number of issues on the talk page, some of which i agree with. The current chronology mostly ends w/ the dropping of the bombs. Nowhere does the article describe what came after. Adding the experiences of the survivors, the medical effects including long term effects of radiation would be an improvement to the article.
EricR 18:09, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

I concur with all that you said, and have no problem with reversing those edits. The larger point is the discussion of radiation illness, which will lead to a defensible and more accurate count of fatalities associated with the explosion of comparatively "small" nuclear weapons in the only two instances they were dropped on civilian populations. The mention of the nicknames fat man and little boy in the lead detract from the seriousness of the article: too cute by half. The nicknames do not belong in the lead. skywriter 21:38, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

NPOV

Although the verifiablity may be disputed, the neutrality of this article holds. The use of the NPOV tag is so incredibly childish, predictable, and indicative of an anti-US agenda. Just come out and say you are an anti-US liberal, don't defile a perfectly good article with milquetoast tags. Haizum 05:10, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

Yep, that ridiculous NPOV tag is still there. Wait, I thought the facts were being disputed, not the POV of the article...apparently not. Haizum 01:40, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
Actually Haizum, until recently this article had an NPOV tag at the insistence of an editor who thought the article was too anti-American in tone, and the balance of the article hasn't changed significantly since then. Just goes to show that it's risky to make assumptions about people's political motivations. Anyway, I don't think it belongs there either. If no one objects here in the next day or so, let's remove it. KarlBunker 12:06, 22 March 2006 (UTC)
Since it's Wikipedia, it's fair that I assume otherwise. Let's face it. Haizum 01:23, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

POWs

As a matter of general editing re: this sentence:

Another account stresses that after General Spaatz reported that Hiroshima was the only targeted city without POW-camps, Washington decided to assign it highest priority.

This sentence is not sourced and according to (H/N 1979/81), it is not true: (General Spaatz's bad intel notwithstanding-- does he have a first name?) POWs were present in both cities.
(H/N 1979/81) reports POWs present on p. 478-81, casualties among 479-80; and fatalities, 367; in Hiroshima, 480-81; location of camps for, 478, 479-80; in Nagasaki, 346, 353, 478, 480; and New York Times. The report, in target cities, 461.

The Spaatz sentence should be deleted. skywriter 19:24, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. There were no POW-camps in Hiroshima, but there were a dozen or so recently-captured POWs.
—wwoods 20:09, 19 March 2006 (UTC)


Leaving the Spaatz sentence hanging there leaves unsaid that there were POW camps in Nagasaki, with significant loss of life, and POWs in Hiroshima, although yes technically, no "camps," there were still POWs killed by the atom bomb in Hiroshima. After a couple of pages of description of which POWs were in Hiroshima and how they got there and where they were held, H/N 79/81 concludes: "Various observations and stories concerning American servicemen who were A-bomb victims are also recorded in Hiroshima Genbaku Sensaishi [Record of the Hiroshima A-bomb War Disaster (RHAWD)]. Whatever the truth or falsehood of these stories, it is certain that the lives of more than ten American servicemen were lost in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima." p. 481.

The Spaatz sentence opens an area of incomplete inquiry. Without amplification, the Spaatz sentence leaves unsaid that there were POW camps in Nagasaki, with significant loss of life, and POWs in Hiroshima. Although yes technically, no "camps," there were still Allied POWs killed by the atom bomb in Hiroshima. After a couple of pages of description of which POWs were in Hiroshima and how they got there and where they were held, H/N 79/81 concludes: "Various observations and stories concerning American servicemen who were A-bomb victims are also recorded in Hiroshima Genbaku Sensaishi [Record of the Hiroshima A-bomb War Disaster (RHAWD)]. Whatever the truth or falsehood of these stories, it is certain that the lives of more than ten American servicemen were lost in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima." p. 481.

Getting the facts of the short- and longterm effects of ionizing radiation right in this article better informs readers of what's at stake after the fiery smoke clears. And, it clears it up for articles spawned from this one. The suppression of what was known about the effects of ionizing radiation meant that 195,000 veterans returned from WWII with the fight for their lives continuing, this time with bureaucrats and politicians. They weren't alone. Between 1945 and 1962, there was another group of "210,000 mostly military members" who were later "confirmed to be participants in U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons tests between 1945 and 1962, in the United States and the Pacific and Atlantic oceans prior to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. Largely as a result of epidemiological studies of Japanese atomic bomb survivors, exposure to radiation has been associated with a number of disorders including leukemia, various cancers and cataracts. VA (now) (finally?) provides special priority enrollment for health-care services to "atomic veterans" for radiation-related conditions."[15]
Eventually Washington listened, but only after atomic veterans battled long and hard to be compensated for health effects associated with being atomic veterans, and then only after medical and epidemiological studies began pouring in from Japan. skywriter 21:33, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Sky, you evidently have an agenda which has little or nothing to do with the atomic bombings, of which you seem to know very little. (Little Boy and Fat Man were indeed the code names of the bombs, and they are discussed at length in Wiki under those titles.) Perhaps you should write a book arguing about Hiroshima and Nagasaki as control groups for the effects of radiation, and then us serious folk could cite it here for further reading. (In the meantime, in the space below, you can vomit up another three or four pages of polemics.) --Cubdriver 22:17, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Salience of Soviet invasion vis-a-vis the atomic bomb

Since Parkinsons (et al.) is up to his usual tricks, here's what one of his sources, Robert Butow's Japan's Decision to Surrender (1954) has to say (pp.158–182):

[Meeting of the Supreme Council on 9 August]
To Japan, the Soviet Union's entry into the war at this time was decidedly iniquitous but not entirely unexpected. The feeling within the government and the Supreme Command was generally expressed with these words: "What had to come has come." This fatalism, however, was but a poor antidote for the shock with which Japan's war leaders viewed the situation as a whole. The blow dealt them by the Kremlin ... was all the more staggering since it followed the atomic obliteration of a vital nerve center in the very heart of the homeland itself. It was at this moment of unparalleled crisis that the end-the-war advocates crowded upon the stage of national policy previously denied them by the machinations of the fanatics. ... In short, they recognized in the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war not just an imperative need to give in but actually a supreme opportunity to turn the tide against the die-hards...
[footnote] A claim to the effect that Japan had already decided to accept the Potsdam Proclamation prior to the Soviet Union's entry into the war can be validly applied only to the thinking of a very few individuals. The over-all impression created by the mass of evidence is simply this: When the final news of the Hiroshima disaster reached Tokyo, the members of the end-the-war party realized that they must bring the war to an end at once. By that time—or immediately thereafter—Nagasaki had been bombed and the Soviet Union had come into the war. The feeling then was as follows: "Now, indeed we cannot go on with this war any longer."
In this atmosphere of immediacy made more terrible by the uncertainty of where and when the next attack would occur (rumor had it that Tokyo would be A-bombed on August 12), the Big Six ... met ...
[footnote] There is no precise or detailed record of what occurred at this meeting or the meetings which immediately followed. The text, therefore, is a reconstruction based on material contained in the following [list of sources].
Suzuki, as Premier, opened the session by briefly declaring that the developments of the preceding three days had made it impossible to continue the war. ... Navy Minister Yonai, ... then went on to outline the problem as he saw it. Either Japan could accept the Potsdam Proclamation as it stood, with the sole reservation that the imperial house would be maintained, or she could try to negotiate ... on the questions of disarmament, punishment of war criminals, and an Allied occupation of Japan.
These points, as Yonai well knew, were the only issues at stake, for no one present—not even the War Minister or the chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs—was any longer opposed, in principle, to an acceptance of the Allied terms. The main argument, as soon became apparent, was simply how far to go in drawing the line.
The Supreme Council meeting, ... had now consumed nearly two hours. ... The Council was deadlocked, with Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai on the one side and Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda on the other. Although the atomic attack upon Hiroshima had made it impossible for anyone present to continue to deny the urgency of Japan's situation, it apparently had not made a deep enough impression upon the chiefs of staff and the War Minister to make them willing to cast their lot outright for a termination of the war.
While the two sides were still debating the issue, however, the news that Nagasaki had suffered the fate of Hiroshima was carried into the council chamber. ... Certainly the fact that a second A-bomb had been dropped did not offer much consolation to those who were wistfully speculating about the total number the United States might have on hand. It was similarly quite useless to suggest that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was nothing more than an unfounded supposition.
[Imperial conference on 10 August]
[footnote] Since apparently no minutes were taken at the imperial conference, it has been necessary to reconstruct what occurred from the material found in various sources. Although the material is either from persons who attended the conference or from those who heard the details immediately after the adjournment, there is naturally a certain amount of variation in their recollections ...
... Suzuki quickly recapitulated the major points on which the two opposing factions stood firm and reported that there was a 6-3-5 split within the cabinet—six supporting the sole reservation ...; three demanding the inclusion of [three] additional conditions ...; and five remaining neutral but favoring an over-all reduction in the number of terms.
[Togo and Anami speak to their positions] ... Umezu arose and continued in much the same vein—taking special care to point up the military's confidence in their ability to deal a smashing blow to the enemy. Although Umezu admitted that the Soviet entry into the war had rendered the situation unfavorable, he declared that he could see no need to abandon the plan to fight a decisive battle in the homeland simply because of the new turn of events. ...
[Baron Hiranuma, president of the Privy Council questions Togo about diplomatic situation and the proposed terms of surrender.] Satisfied in this quarter, Hiranuma now turned to the military men present. In the course of his remarks, he briefly covered all of the sore points: the daily air raids, ..., the scarcity of food, and , finally, the atomic bomb and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. In short, Hiranuma wanted to know if the army and navy authorities really had any confidence in their ability to continue the war.
... Umezu said that he believed the enemy's use of the atomic bomb might be checked if proper antiaircraft measures were taken, ...
[Toyoda sides with Anami. Suzuki summarizes the deadlock.] Turning toward the Emperor, Suzuki respectfully announced: "Your Imperial Majesty's decision is requested as to which proposal should be adopted—the one stated by the Foreign Minister or the one containing the four conditions."
... "I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be placed in fortified positions at Kujukuri-hama [east of Tokyo, where the Allied invasion was expected] so that they would be ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. [Richard Frank says Hirohito "also made specific reference to the greatly increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb", but Butow doesn't have it.] ... I ... give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister."
As those who had been present at the imperial conference began to depart, word was passed that a cabinet meeting would be held immediately ... the assembled ministers ... unanimously approved the "imperial decision." thus legalizing the action taken by the Emperor ... With the state thus committed to a positive policy, the ministers turned their attention to drafting identical notes to be dispatched to the Allied powers.
The real significance of the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and of the Soviet dash into Manchuria was that these events produced a shock great enough to crack the walls of the prison. Even this shock did not result in an escape but it did force everyone, the guards and guarded alike, to face the full and glaring light of day ... It was not that the military men had suddenly become reasonable in the hours following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters; ... They were also at a loss for words which could make any lasting impression upon the end-the-war faction. Prior to the dropping of the two A-bombs they had been able to pledge their belief in their ability to meet effectively any action taken by the enemy, but now whatever they said made them look foolish and insincere.
[On 11 August, a statement was issued to prepare people for the surrender.] Containing the usual platitudes about the spirit of the fighting forces and their unflinching destruction of enemy efforts everywhere, the statement warned the people that the Allies were preparing to invade Japan. To this was added a bitter castigation of the Empire's "diabolical enemies" for their use of a "new-type bomb" with which they were ravaging the innocent, the young and the old, and Japan's fair womanhood—spreading death and destruction "unprecedented, in the history of the human race, in ruthlessness and barbarity." Only the concluding sentences had a completely different cast. Referring to the over-all picture—the coming Allied invasion, the introduction of the new-type bomb, and the Soviet entry into the war—the government statement declared: ...

Really, it's surprising how little emphasis there is on the Soviet invasion.
—wwoods 02:28, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

Interesting. Thank you. As a rule it's a good idea anyhow to stay away from, or at least to view with a skeptical eye, 50-year-old histories. New information does indeed surface from time to time. --Cubdriver 20:21, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

Removal of Nanking massacre

The article says that because of the dropping of the bombs, "Japanese atrocities against millions of Chinese, such as the Nanking Massacre, were ended." This wrongly implies that the Nanking Massacre was ongoing at the time of the bombings, when in fact it ended in 1938.

I suggest replacing that sentence with the following one:

"Furthermore, the Japanese had commited atrocities against millions of Chinese and the early end to the war prevented further bloodshed.

--Jonovision 06:58, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

I see the need for the clarification, but still think a Wikilink to Nanking is a useful illustration of those atrocities; perhaps something like this would work:
"Furthermore, the Japanese had committed atrocities against millions of civilians and the early end to the war prevented further bloodshed, such as the Nanking massacre, which occurred from 1937 to 1938."
Note that I also changed "Chinese" to "civilians" to include other nations, like Korea and the Philippines.
StuRat 08:47, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
I like StuRat's version, mentioning Nanking but giving the date. KarlBunker 11:55, 23 March 2006 (UTC)
I don't know that we need a mention of Nanking specifically, but we do need the costs of the ongoing war, for context. We've got a mention two paragraphs up, but it could be rewritten for greater emphasis. "[In Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (1995), Robert] Newman concluded that each month that the war continued in 1945 would have produced the deaths of "upwards of 250,000 people, mostly Asian but some Westerners." What is clear beyond dispute is that the minimum plausible range for deaths of Asian [non-Japanese] noncombatants each month in 1945 was over 100,000 and more probably reached or even exceeded 250,000." (Frank, p.163)
—wwoods 00:35, 24 March 2006 (UTC)
I'd go for something along those lines too (I'm easy to please :-) KarlBunker 01:10, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

I think the year should be given as 1937 (only). The "Rape" is usually considered the wholesale butchery and literal rape that followed the city's fall in December, and as I recall the worst of it was over in a couple of weeks, i.e. before 1 Jan 1938, by which time the army had the situation in better control. To give a two-year range implies that it lasted two years. --Cubdriver 10:45, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

I think ending in 1938 is correct, based on the following from our Nanking massacre article:
"Those who define the Nanking Massacre as having started from the time the Japanese army entered Jiangsu province push the beginning of the massacre to around mid-November to early December (Suzhou fell on November 19), and stretch the end of the massacre to late March 1938."
StuRat 17:39, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

I think the operative word there is stretch! Is stretching what Wiki ought to be doing? --Cubdriver 18:11, 24 March 2006 (UTC).