Wikipedia

Populism in Latin America

Populism refers to a range of political stances that emphasise the idea of "the people" and often juxtapose this group against "the elite". This article focuses on populism in Latin America.

Latin America has been claimed to have the world's "most enduring and prevalent populist tradition".[1] This has been argued to be because it was a region with a long tradition of democratic governance and free elections, but with high rates of socio-economic inequality, generating widespread resentments that politicians can articulate through populism.[2]

History

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The first wave of Latin American populism began at the start of the Great Depression in 1929 and last until the end of the 1960s.[3] In various countries, politicians took power while emphasising "the people": these included Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Juan Perón in Argentina, and José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador.[4] These relied on the Americanismo ideology, presenting a common identity across Latin America and denouncing any interference from imperialist powers.[5]

The second wave took place in the early 1990s.[5] In the late 1980s, many Latin American states were experiencing economic crisis and several populist figures were elected by blaming the elites for this situation.[5] Examples include Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru.[5] Once in power, these individuals pursued neoliberal economic strategies recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stabilizing the economy and ending hyperinflation.[6] Unlike the first wave, the second did not include an emphasis on Americanismo or anti-imperialism.[7]

The third wave began in the final years of the 1990s and continued into the 21st century.[7] Like the first wave, the third made heavy use of Americanismo and anti-imperialism, although this time these themes presented alongside an explicitly socialist program that opposed the free market.[7] Prominent examples included Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.[7] These socialist populist governments have presented themselves as giving sovereignty "back to the people", in particular through the formation of constituent assemblies that would draw up new constitutions, which could then be ratified via referendums.[8]

Populism has been an important force in Latin American political history, where many charismatic leaders have emerged since the beginning of the 20th century, as the paramountcy of agrarian oligarchies had been dislocated by the onset of industrial capitalism, allowing for the emergence of an industrial bourgeoisie and the activation of an urban working class,[9] causing the emergence of reformist and multi-class nationalist politics, centered on a charismatic leadership,[10] such as Aprismo in Peru, the MNR in Bolivia, the Socialist Party of Chile, and the political movements gravitating around Perón (1946–1955, 1973–1974) the Justicialist Party in Argentina, Getúlio Vargas' Brazilian Labour Party in Brazil (1930–1945, 1951–1954), Jorge Eliécer Gaitán's National Leftist Revolutionary Union and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alliance (1953–1957) in Colombia, José Figueres Ferrer's National Liberation Party in Costa Rica (1948–1949, 1953–1958 and 1970–1974), Ramón Grau's Partido Auténtico in Cuba (1933–1934, 1944–1948), Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (1963), Assad Bucaram's Concentration of People's Forces and Velasco Ibarra's National Velascist Federation [es] in Ecuador (throughout the 1930s to 1960s), Revolutionary Action Party in Guatemala (1944–1954), the Institutional Revolutionary Party under Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico (1934–1940), Omar Torrijos's Democratic Revolutionary Party (1968–1981) in Panama and Rómulo Betancourt's Democratic Action (1945–1948, 1959–1964).[11] Ideologically, Latin American populism, with its emphasis on nation-building under an authoritarian leadership as a prerequisite for technological modernization, betrayed the earlier influence of Comtean positivism. Socially, for many authors—such as Brazil's Octavio Ianni—populism should be understood as the political alliance between an emerging industrial bourgeoisie and a newly organizing urban working class, in which the former accepts social reforming for the latter's sake as long as the working class remains politically subordinated to both a more or less authoritarian State and private enterprise,[12] in a process of controlled inclusion of the "masses" into the political system,[13] a co-opting process some Marxist authors like Brazil's Francisco Weffort ascertain was accepted by the newly urbanized working class given their lack of a previously developed class consciousness.[14]

Despite efforts to charter an ideological pedigree to Populism in Latin America, as has been attempted by some, working, e.g., with concepts taken from Perón's Third Position,[15] Latin American countries have not always had a clear and consistent political ideology under populism. Populist practitioners and movements in Latin America usually adapt politically to the prevailing mood of the nation, moving within the ideological spectrum from left to right many times during their political lives. If populist movements in 1930s and 1940s Latin America had apparent fascist overtones and based themselves on authoritarian politics, as was the case of Vargas' Estado Novo dictatorship in Brazil (1937–1945),[16] or of some of Peron's openly expressed sympathies,[17] in the 1950s populism adapted—not without considerable unease from its political leadership[18]—to heightened levels of working-class mobilization. Therefore, it is not surprising that 1960s populism was associated mainly with radical, left-leaning petty-bourgeois nationalism, which emptied the State of its function as a coercive class-rule apparatus and saw it instead as an organ of representation of the Nation as a whole.[19] Such was the case, for instance, of the Goulart government (1961–1964) in Brazil, Goulart being described as a fiery populist who identified—mainly rhetorically—with the dispossessed and tried to foster a reformist agenda through ties to the organized Left.[20] The fact that Goulart was eventually ousted by the military shows that, in the views of some authors, other populist leaders of the time faced a jeopardy: they were reformists who, in the pursuit of their agenda, had to encourage popular mobilization and class conflict they ultimately abhorred.[21] Consequently, populism was eventually identified by the 1970s military dictatorships as "demagogery" and as a risk to the stability of the existing social order.[22]

If "left", reformist and nationalist populism never died out altogether during the 1970s Latin American military dictatorships—as offered proof by the prompt and successful return of a populist like Brazil's Leonel Brizola to electoral politics in the early 1980s[23]—a different streak of populism appeared in the post-military dictatorship era. This 1990s populism, in the persons of leaders like Argentina's Carlos Menem or Brazil's Fernando Collor, adapted itself to prevailing neoliberal policies of economic adjustment, setting aside nationalistic reforms and retaining the need for charismatic leadership policies, mass support and a concern for the plight of the "common people".[24] In the 1990s and 2000s, with the emergence of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela—albeit Chavez refuses himself to be labelled as "populist"[25]—reformist and nationalism Latin American populism has resurfaced with new patterns, as what is called by some authors socialist populism[26][27] that appeals to masses of poor by promising redistributive policies[27] and state control of the nation's energy resources[28]—a blueprint that had already appeared, however—albeit with no openly "socialist" rhetoric, viz., in the nationalist policies—including the launch of the State-owned oil-company Petrobrás—that were the hallmark of Vargas' second term as Brazil's democratically elected president (1951–1954) and that led to his eventual suicide.[29]

In some countries, Populism has been fiscally supported in Latin America during periods of growth such as the 1950s and 1960s and during commodity price booms such as in oil and precious metals.[30] Political leaders could gather followers among the popular classes with broad redistributive programs during these boom times. Conversely, in others countries, Populism has been historically associated with countering the relative decline of export agriculture with deficit spending and import-substitution policies aimed at developing an internal market for industrial consumer goods.[31] Populism in Latin America has been sometimes criticized for the fiscal policies of many of its leaders, but has also been defended for having allowed historically weak states to alleviate disorder and achieve a tolerable degree of stability while initiating large-scale industrialization. Though populist fiscal and monetary policies, called macroeconomic populism, has been criticized by economists, who see in it the ultimately dysfunctional subordination of economic policy to political goals,[32] some authors acknowledge populism to have allowed non-radical leaders and parties to co-opt the radical ideas of the masses so as to redirect them in a non-revolutionary direction.[33] It's generally regarded that populists hope "to reform the system, not to overthrow it".[34]

Often adapting a nationalist vocabulary and rhetorically convincing manner, populism was used to appeal to broad masses while remaining ideologically ambivalent.[35] Notwithstanding, there have been notable exceptions. 21st-century Latin-American populist leaders have had a decidedly—even if mostly rhetorical[36]—socialist bent.[26][27]

When populists take strong positions on economic philosophies such as capitalism versus socialism, the position sparks strong emotional responses regarding how best to manage the nation's current and future social and economic position. Mexico's 2006 Presidential election was hotly debated among supporters and opponents of populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador.[37]

Inequality

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Populism in Latin American countries has both an economic and an ideological edge. Populism in Latin America has mostly addressed the problem, not of capitalist economic development as such but rather the problems caused by its lack of inclusiveness,[38] in the backdrop of highly unequal societies in which people are divided between very small groups of wealthy individuals and masses of poor, even in the case of societies such as Argentina, where strong and educated middle classes are a significant segment of the population.[39] Therefore, the key role of the State in Latin American populism, as an institution, is to mediate between traditional elites and the "people" in general.[40] In appealing to the masses of poor people prior to gaining power, populists may promise widely demanded food, housing, employment, basic social services, and income redistribution. Once in political power, they may not always be financially or politically able to fulfill all these promises. However, they are very often successful in providing many broad and basic services in the short term.[41][42]

Populist socialism

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Hugo Chávez, founder of the PSUV and former President of Venezuela

Populism has remained a significant force in Latin America. Populism has recently been reappearing on the left with promises of far-reaching socialist changes as seen in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, in Bolivia under Evo Morales, and Mexico under Andrés Manuel López Obrador—a process, however, seen by some as contradictory as it tries to meld the populist traditional celebration of folk wisdom and charismatic leadership with doctrinaire socialism.[43] The Venezuelan government often spars verbally with the United States and accuses it of attempting to overthrow Chávez after supporting a failed coup against him. Chávez had been one of the most outspoken and blunt critics of US foreign policy. Nevertheless, a large commodity trade continues between Venezuela and the US because of the economic constraints of oil delivery and the proximity of the two countries.[44]

When Hugo Chávez took power in Venezuela nearly 20 years ago, the leftist populism he championed was supposed to save democracy. Instead, it has led to democracy's implosion in the country...

Because populist tradition ascertains the paramountcy of the "people" (instead of class) as a political subject,[46] it suffices to say that, in the 21st century, the large numbers of voters living in extreme poverty in Latin America has remained a bastion of support for new populist candidates. By early 2008 governments with varying forms of populism and with some form of left leaning (albeit vague) social democratic or democratic socialist platform had come to dominate virtually all Latin American nations with the exceptions of Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico.[47] This political shift includes both more developed nations such as Argentina's Front for Victory and Chile's Socialist Party, and smaller income countries like Bolívia with its Movement towards Socialism and Paraguay with the Patriotic Alliance for Change. Even in middle-income Mexico, a populist candidate like López Obrador, albeit defeated, nevertheless appeared as part of a strong neopopulist reaction.[48] Nevertheless, populist candidates have been more successful in poorer Latin American countries such as Bolivia (under Morales), Ecuador (under Rafael Correa) and Nicaragua (under Daniel Ortega). By the use of broad grassroots movements populist groups have managed to gain power from better organized, funded and entrenched groups such as the Bolivian Nationalist Democratic Action and the Paraguayan Colorado Party.[47] Some people see also parallels with the Workers' Party in Brazil, with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his successor Dilma Rousseff, that used the state controlled oil company Petrobras to illegally fund their party, big companies, and politicians, while at the same time used populism strategies to get good results on the polls and elections.[49]

Former President Jair Bolsonaro, considered a far-right leader, also has populist tendencies. While there are varying interpretations of Bolsonaro’s political motives, one key explanation is the attitude of the people themselves. Brazilians, especially those in lower classes, tend to lean more conservative. Tolerance of social injustice, limited demands, and resistance to ‘political mobilization’ result in the tolerance of these populist tendencies and tones.[50]

Countries in Latin America with high rates of poverty, whose governments maintain and support unpopular privatizations and more orthodox economic policies that do not deliver general societal gains, are under pressure from populist politicians and movements[51] accusing them of benefiting the upper and upper-middle classes[52][53] and of being allied to foreign and business interests.[54][55]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 27.
  2. ^ Michael L. Conniff, "A historiography of populism and neopopulism in Latin America" History Compass (2020) e12621 https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12621
  3. ^ Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 28.
  4. ^ Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, pp. 28–29.
  5. ^ a b c d Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 29.
  6. ^ Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, pp. 29–30.
  7. ^ a b c d Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 31.
  8. ^ Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 32.
  9. ^ Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Bureaucratic authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973, in comparative perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, ISBN 0-520-04260-3, pp. 9–10
  10. ^ John D. French, The Brazilian workers' ABC: class conflict and alliances in modern São Paulo. University of North Carolina Press, 1992, ISBN 0-8078-4368-7, p. 4.
  11. ^ Walter Laqueur, ed. Fascism: A Readers' Guide : Analysis, Interpretations, Bibliography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, ISBN 0-520-03642-5, p. 255
  12. ^ Rafael Torres Quintero & Rafael Quintero López, El mito del populismo: análisis de los fundamentos del Estado ecuatoriano.Quito: Universidad Central del Ecuador, 1980, p. 27
  13. ^ Mehmet Uğur & Nergis Canefe, eds., Turkey and European integration: accession prospects and issues. London, Routledge, 2005, ISBN 0-415-32656-7, p. 51
  14. ^ Alberto Aggio, Agnaldo de Sousa Barbosa, Hercídia Mara Facuri Coelho Lambert, Política e sociedade no Brasil, 1930–1964. São Paulo: Anna Blume, 2002, ISBN 85-7419-242-2, p. 74
  15. ^ Gil, Federico G.; Smith, O. Edmund (1 January 1953). "Review of Perón's Argentina., ; Yankee Diplomacy: U. S. Intervention in Argentina., O. Edmund Smith, Jr". The Journal of Politics. 15 (4): 582–85. doi:10.2307/2126552. JSTOR 2126552.
  16. ^ Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, Derechas y ultraderechas en el mundo. Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2004, ISBN 968-23-2519-6, p. 140
  17. ^ Íñigo Bolinaga, Breve historia del fascismo. Madrid: Nowtilus, 2008, ISBN 978-84-9763-452-6, p. 242
  18. ^ In 1952, viz., Vargas' Labor Minister in Brazil saw his tasks in fervently anticommunist terms: to battle ideologies opposed to "traditions" of social peace—John D. French, Drowning in laws: labor law and Brazilian political culture. University of North Carolina Press, 2004, ISBN 0-8078-5527-8, p. 81
  19. ^ Francisco Weffort, O populismo na política brasileira. Rio de Janeiro:Paz e Terra, 1978, p. 43.
  20. ^ Stephen G. Rabe, The most dangerous area in the world: John F. Kennedy confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999, ISBN 0-8078-4764-X, p. 66
  21. ^ John D. French, The Brazilian workers' ABC: class conflict and alliances in modern São Paulo, p. 262
  22. ^ Mary P. Lassiter, ed., Economics, politics and social issues in Latin America. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007, ISBN 978-1-60021-182-9, p. 25
  23. ^ Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985. New York: Oxford University Press US, 1989, ISBN 0-19-506316-3, p. 265
  24. ^ Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernández Jilberto, Barbara Hogenboom, eds. Miraculous metamorphoses: the neoliberalization of Latin American populism. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001, ISBN 1-85649-887-5, p. 11
  25. ^ Kirk Andrew Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-76503-9, p. 51
  26. ^ a b Héctor E. Schamis – Populism, socialism and democratic institutions Archived 17 February 2013 at archive.today
  27. ^ a b c "Search". Retrieved 25 April 2015.
  28. ^ Anonymous. "Populist Left in South America". Archived from the original on 2008-11-20. Retrieved 2018-06-19.
  29. ^ Thomas F. O'Brien, The century of U.S. capitalism in Latin America. University of New Mexico Press, 2002, ISBN 0-8263-1996-3, p. 101
  30. ^ Grigera, Juan. "Populism in Latin America: Old and new populisms in Argentina and Brazil" International Political Science Review (2020) https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117701510
  31. ^ Luiz Renato Vieira, Consagrados e malditos: os intelectuais e a Editora Civilização Brasileira. Brasília: Thsaurus, 1998, ISBN 85-7062-139-6, p. 41
  32. ^ Rüdiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, eds. The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, ISBN 0-226-15844-6, p. 16
  33. ^ Mejía, Daniel; Posada, Carlos Esteban (2 February 2005). "Populist Policies in the Transition To Democracy". Borradores de Economia. Archived from the original on 17 October 2015.
  34. ^ Rüdiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, eds. The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America, 47.
  35. ^ Stropparo, P. E. (2023). Pueblo desnudo y público movilizado por el poder: Vacancia del Defensor del Pueblo: algunas transformaciones en la democracia y en la opinión pública en Argentina . Revista Mexicana De Opinión Pública, (35). https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.24484911e.2023.35.85516
  36. ^ Jeffery R Webber,"Venezuela under Chávez: The Prospects and Limitations of Twenty-First Century Socialism, 1999–2009", Études socialistes, Vol 6, No 1 (2010)
  37. ^ 24 January 2007: Mexican Political Polarization Limited to Elites Despite Contested Election Archived 27 November 2008 at the Wayback Machine, APSA Press Release
  38. ^ Dornbusch & Edwards, The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America, p. 1
  39. ^ Current Economic Issues in Argentina[permanent dead link‍], Z. Edward O'Relley, November 2001
  40. ^ Elizabeth Montes Garcés, ed., Relocating identities in Latin American cultures. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007, ISBN 978-1-55238-209-7, p. 74
  41. ^ Dealing with Political Ferment in Latin America: The Populist Revival, the Emergence of the Center, and Implications for U.S. Policy Archived 11 April 2010 at the Wayback Machine
  42. ^ The Impact of "Populism" on Social, Political, and Economic Development in the Hemisphere, Vladimir Torres Archived 9 July 2007 at the Wayback Machine
  43. ^ Kirk Andrew Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-76503-9, p. 84
  44. ^ "Business – Venezuela-US trade under the microscope". BBC News. 29 December 2006. Archived from the original on 12 May 2011.
  45. ^ Fisher, Max; Taub, Amanda (1 April 2017). "How Does Populism Turn Authoritarian? Venezuela Is a Case in Point". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2 April 2017. Retrieved 2 April 2017.
  46. ^ Carlos De La Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America, 2nd. Edition. Ohio University, 2010, ISBN 978-0-89680-279-7, p. xii
  47. ^ a b "More leftist leaders in Latin America – World news – Americas". NBC News. 21 April 2008.
  48. ^ Scott Mainwaring &Timothy Scully, eds., Democratic Governance in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-8047-6084-3, p. 254
  49. ^ "Brazil's ruling party wonders how it lost its populist touch". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 19 October 2017.
  50. ^ Bethell, Leslie (2018), "Populism in Brazil", Brazil: Essays on History and Politics, University of London Press, pp. 175–194, ISBN 978-1-908857-54-5, JSTOR j.ctv51309x.10, retrieved 2020-11-01
  51. ^ Patricio Navia and Ignacio Walker, Chapter 8, Political Institutions, Populism, and Democracy in Latin America, in Scott and Timothy R. Scully (ed), Democratic Governance in Latin America, Stanford University Press, 2008 Archived 11 May 2011 at the Wayback Machine, pp. 2–3
  52. ^ "En 16 años, los gobiernos neoliberales democratizaron el hambre. Discurso de Daniel Ortega en Estelí". Archived from the original on 2009-06-13. Retrieved 2018-06-19.
  53. ^ Pemex y los Gobiernos Neoliberales, Alberta Torrentera Archived 11 May 2011 at the Wayback Machine
  54. ^ Upside Down World. "Bolivia y el mandato progresista en Latinoamérica". Archived from the original on 5 January 2015. Retrieved 25 April 2015.
  55. ^ Roberto (3 April 2008). "¡A babor!". Archived from the original on 8 July 2011.

Sources and further reading

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  • Conniff, Michael L. "A historiography of populism and neopopulism in Latin America" History Compass (2020) e12621 https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12621
  • Conniff, Michael L., ed. Populism in Latin America (1999) essays by experts
  • Demmers, Jolle, et al eds. Miraculous Metamorphoses: The Neoliberalization of Latin American Populism (2001)
  • Grigera, Juan. "Populism in Latin America: Old and new populisms in Argentina and Brazil" International Political Science Review (2020) https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117701510
  • Knight, Alan. "Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico." Journal of Latin American Studies 30.2 (1998): 223-248.
  • Leaman, David. "Review: Changing Faces of Populism in Latin America: Masks, Makeovers, and Enduring Features" Latin American Research Review 39#3 (2004), pp. 312-326 online
  • Mudde, Cas; Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190234874.
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