Wikipedia

Fujimorist propaganda

Fujimorist propaganda encompasses the political and media strategies employed to shape public opinion in Peru during and after the presidency of Alberto Fujimori. This propaganda apparatus, orchestrated primarily by Fujimori’s intelligence advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, sought to control Peru's media landscape, suppress opposition, and cultivate a favorable public image of Fujimori’s regime. Rooted in the military plan known as Plan Verde, which outlined the establishment of an authoritarian and neoliberal state, these efforts intensified after Fujimori’s 1992 "self-coup" that dissolved Peru’s Congress and judiciary, consolidating power in the executive branch.

Sign of Alberto Fujimori and his son Kenji Fujimori together, promoting the candidacy of the latter for the 2011 Peruvian general election

Montesinos leveraged media influence to craft a narrative of stability and security amidst Peru’s internal conflicts, particularly against the Maoist Shining Path insurgency. State resources were directed toward promoting Fujimori’s policies while attacking political adversaries through smear campaigns, often labeling them as terrorists in a tactic known as terruqueo. Media outlets that complied received financial incentives, while those critical faced censorship or were targeted by state-controlled tabloids.

Following Fujimori’s fall from power in 2000, elements of this propaganda strategy persisted within Peruvian politics, notably through his daughter Keiko Fujimori's campaigns, where similar tactics were utilized to promote Fujimorist ideals.

Background

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Plan Verde

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In the late 1980s, the Peruvian Armed Forces drafted Plan Verde, which included objectives that involved the genocide of impoverished and Indigenous peoples of Peru, the control or censorship of media in the nation and the establishment of a neoliberal economy controlled by a military junta in Peru.[1][2][3] After winning the 1990 Peruvian general election, Alberto Fujimori would be approached by the armed forces and go on to adopt many of the policies outlined in Plan Verde.[4][5] According to Rospigliosi, Vladimiro Montesinos, a lawyer and friend of Fujimori, was not initially involved with Plan Verde, but his ability to resolve issues for the military resulted with the armed forces tasking Montesinos with implementing the plan with Fujimori,[1] while Schulte-Bockholt would say that both General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza and Montesinos were responsible for the relationship between the armed forces and Fujimori.[4] Fujimori and his military handlers had planned for a coup during his preceding two years in office.[6][4][7] The 1992 Peruvian self-coup removed political obstacles set by Congress against the Fujimori government, allowing the military to implement the objectives outlined in Plan Verde[4][6][7] while Fujimori served as a figurehead leader.[8] Montesinos, the head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), would subsequently become the most powerful leader in Peru, using the intelligence agency to control all state functions including the armed forces, Congress, the courts, election boards, banks and media organizations.[9][10] The smaller size of state bodies following sell-offs to foreign companies and the reduction of state employees would also more funding for populist programs.[11]

History

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Fujimori government

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Montesinos was able to take a Goebbels like grip on news and information that shaped Peruvian opinion.

—Tim Lester, ABC[9]

Propaganda was used by Montesinos to maintain nearly all functions within the government, with the government becoming the largest advertiser in Peru during the Fujimori government.[10][12] From 1992 to 2000, much of the information in Peru was controlled by Vladimiro Montesinos, with the government allowing a meager opposition media to exist only to deflect criticism from governments of the Western world and to warn of rising crises from opponents.[10][13][9]

According to Calderón Bentin, "Montesinos propelled the state toward a theatrical offensive, with more and more resources directed at image management rather than traditional public services", using funds from numerous ministries to pay for propaganda operations of the SIN's Fondo de Acciones Reservadas (Confidential Actions Fund).[10] Montesinos would pay media organizations for positive coverage and to assist with maintaining the presidency by attacking opponents.[9][10][13][14] Between 1997 and 1999, funding on state propaganda would increase 52 percent.[12]

Montesinos eventually controlled six of the seven main television channels in Peru.[13] News stories by the channels were reviewed daily by Montesinos and media executives at 12:30pm each day, with stories about politicians requiring Montesinos' explicit written permission to be approved.[12] Payoffs and promises of legal leniency were made to the newspaper Expreso and the television channels Global Television, Latina Televisión, América Televisión, and Panamericana Televisión.[14] Some television stations were given personal intelligence officers to discover stories in support of the government.[13][12] On occasion, Montesinos would promise exclusive stories to supporting channels, including an alleged payment of $3 million for the TV personality Laura Bozzo.[10][13] By 2000, Montesinos was paying $3 million monthly for positive coverage on television.[13]

Multiple chicha press tabloids were also paid for propaganda purposes, with Montesinos directly controlling the editorial oversight of nine newspapers.[10][14] SIN officers would use an encrypted fax machine to send article headlines, sometimes created by Montesinos himself, to newspapers, with editors then writing stories surrounding the headlines.[13] Opposition members were often targeted in the newspapers being described as "terrorists" or "communists", with attacks often appealing to the divide between the working class and the elites.[13] Diversionary tactics were also used in the press to distract from crises, with sensationalist headlines being published at such times and psychologists being employed by Montesinos to create stories that would be used for distraction.[9][13] Typical chicha press headlines cost $3,000 each[13] and between 1998 and 2000, Montesinos would pay $22 million for headline stories.[10]

Post-Fujimori government

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Due to the prevalence of Fujimorism throughout the political and social strata of Peru, a framework established by Fujimori and Montesinos would exist into the twenty-first century, allowing Fujimorist politicians to not have to hold a majority in government to have influence and granting the creation of a cult of personality in support of Alberto Fujimori.[15][16] This support for Alberto Fujimori and the idea that he "saved" Peru in the 1990s would project support down to his daughter Keiko Fujimori and son Kenji Fujimori, Alberto's political successors.[16] Despite being in prison, Alberto Fujimori was still active on social media and Fujimorists would begin to spread propaganda for promotion and for attacking opponents.[16] Propaganda has also been shared to support the pardon of Alberto Fujimori.[16]

Media organizations in Peru used fake news in an effort to support Keiko Fujimori, the political successor of her father Alberto Fujimori.[16][17] El Comercio, one of the largest media organizations in South America, has been described as supporting Keiko Fujimori, with Mario Vargas Llosa saying that the conservative newspaper "has become a propaganda machine to favour the candidacy of Keiko Fujimori" during the 2011 Peruvian general election[18] while Reuters wrote that during the 2021 Peruvian general election, El Comercio "generally backed Fujimori".[19]

Themes

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Enemies

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Leftists

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Main article: Terruqueo

The Fujimori government utilized terruqueos, a negative campaigning and often racist method of fearmongering that involves describing anti-Fujimorists, left-wing political opponents and those who are against the neoliberal status quo as terrorists or terrorist sympathizers, with the tactic being used to create a culture of fear.[15][20][21][22][23][24][25]

Using this technique with the help of the SIN The Fujimori government would discredit those who opposed it, including dissenters from the government, with political scientist Daniel Encinas saying that this would evolve into conservative politicians using the attack to target those opposed to Fujimori's neoliberal economic policies and that the right-wing used the terruqueo as a "strategy of manipulating the legacy of political violence".[23][24][26] Following the 1992 Peruvian self-coup, Fujimori would broaden the definition of terrorism in an effort to criminalize as many actions possible to persecute left-wing political opponents.[15] The Fujimori government threatened activists and critics of the Peruvian Armed Forces with life imprisonment, describing such groups as the "legal arm" of terrorist groups.[27] Ultimately, a culture of fear was created by Fujimori according to Jo-Marie Burt, with individuals fearing that they would be described as a terrorist.[25] Thus, using the terruqueo, Fujimori successfully made himself a "permanent hero" and made left-wing ideologies an eternal enemy within Peru.[15]

The terruqueo carried into the twenty-first century, with media organizations in Peru using the tactic beside fake news in an effort to support Keiko Fujimori.[28][17] Shortly before the second round of elections in 2021, propaganda in favor of Fujimori was distributed throughout Peru in paid advertisements, with some ads stating "Think about your future. No to communism".[29]

Values

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Anti-elitism

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  El RItmo del Chino music video featuring many aspects of Fujimori's propaganda campaign on YouTube

The Fujimori government used anti-elitism as a populist tactic according to Kay.[30] Much of Fujimori's image was directly linked to his appearance as a political outsider, which was specially crafted by the media in Peru.[31] Fujimori was presented by the government as being Japanese and not from the criollo white elite groups in Lima, identifying himself as being similar to the mestizos and indigenous Peruvians.[10] During events and speeches, Fujimori often wore Andean apparel – he could be seen wearing a poncho and chullo at gatherings – despite living most of his life in Lima.[10][30] Utilizing the Asian stereotype of being hardworking and pragmatic, Fujimori adopted the moniker El Chino for many of his campaigns.[10] The military were seen transporting Fujimori across the country for political events.[32] In a propaganda effort during the 2000 Peruvian general election, the Fujimori government described Alberto Andrade as a candidate for the "white business elite", saying that Andrade would only support the rich.[32]

Fujimorists would continue to promote anti-elitist arguments despite controlling many of Peru's institutions.[16]

Law and order

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  Fujimori campaign ad featuring explosions and violence related to the internal conflict on YouTube

Following the 1992 self-coup, the Fujimori government promoted law and order due to the internal conflict in Peru with the Shining Path.[10] Fujimori justified his government's actions, saying that he would use a "direct" democracy to protect Peruvians.[10] The public would often ignore democratic and human rights shortcomings in exchange for socioeconomic stability.[10] The Fujimori government also attempted foreign propaganda to attack groups in Europe and the United States that supported Shining Path.[33] During campaigning for the 2000 Peruvian general election, the Fujimori government disseminated through a negative campaigning effort in the chicha press that his opponent, Alejandro Toledo, was involved in a prostitution mafia and would bring more crime to Peru.[32]

During the 2021 presidential campaign of Keiko Fujimori, she advocated for the use of a "heavy hand", stating: "Democracy cannot be weak. It must be supported by a solid principle of authority."[34][35]

Neoliberalism

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See also: Lima Consensus

In order to support crony capitalism occurring within Peru, Fujimorism used the media to promote neoliberalism in an effort to create "an illusionistic state apparatus".[10] According to scholar Rocio Silva Santisteban, Fujimorists utilized the media in a neo-populist manner "to manage symbolically the cruelty of the neoliberal project while its plans continue to be implemented".[10] Domestic and foreign media repeated the propaganda of Fujimorists that a stable free market had been established in Peru.[36]

Social projects

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Social projects, especially in the Andes, were common during the Fujimori government; despite promoting a liberalized economy without government interference, the executive would provide social spending only because it could gain support through tangible resources and increased reliance on the relationship with the president.[30][32] Ribbon-cutting ceremonies featuring Fujmori in Andean apparel and a crowd of peasants were disseminated through television broadcasts as Fujimori would promote his "direct democracy, without parties".[30] Fujimorists would also provide items such as books, construction supplies and food to individuals in poor communities in an effort to build support.[32]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b Rospigliosi, Fernando (1996). Las Fuerzas Armadas y el 5 de abril: la percepción de la amenaza subversiva como una motivación golpista. Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. pp. 46–47.
  2. ^ Gaussens, Pierre (2020). "The forced serilization of indigenous population in Mexico in the 1990s". Canadian Journal of Bioethics. 3 (3): 180+. doi:10.7202/1073797ar. S2CID 234586692. a government plan, developed by the Peruvian army between 1989 and 1990s to deal with the Shining Path insurrection, later known as the 'Green Plan', whose (unpublished) text expresses in explicit terms a genocidal intention
  3. ^ Burt, Jo-Marie (September–October 1998). "Unsettled accounts: militarization and memory in postwar Peru". NACLA Report on the Americas. 32 (2). Taylor & Francis: 35–41. doi:10.1080/10714839.1998.11725657. the military's growing frustration over the limitations placed upon its counterinsurgency operations by democratic institutions, coupled with the growing inability of civilian politicians to deal with the spiraling economic crisis and the expansion of the Shining Path, prompted a group of military officers to devise a coup plan in the late 1980s. The plan called for the dissolution of Peru's civilian government, military control over the state, and total elimination of armed opposition groups. The plan, developed in a series of documents known as the "Plan Verde," outlined a strategy for carrying out a military coup in which the armed forces would govern for 15 to 20 years and radically restructure state-society relations along neoliberal lines.
  4. ^ a b c d Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt (2006). "Chapter 5: Elites, Cocaine, and Power in Colombia and Peru". The politics of organized crime and the organized crime of politics: a study in criminal power. Lexington Books. pp. 114–118. ISBN 978-0-7391-1358-5. important members of the officer corps, particularly within the army, had been contemplating a military coup and the establishment of an authoritarian regime, or a so-called directed democracy. The project was known as 'Plan Verde', the Green Plan. ... Fujimori essentially adopted the Green Plan and the military became a partner in the regime. ... The self-coup, of April 5, 1992, dissolved the Congress and the country's constitution and allowed for the implementation of the most important components of the Green Plan
  5. ^ Avilés, William (Spring 2009). "Despite Insurgency: Reducing Military Prerogatives in Colombia and Peru". Latin American Politics and Society. 51 (1). Cambridge University Press: 57–85. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2009.00040.x. S2CID 154153310.
  6. ^ a b Cameron, Maxwell A. (June 1998). "Latin American Autogolpes: Dangerous Undertows in the Third Wave of Democratisation". Third World Quarterly. 19 (2). Taylor & Francis: 228. doi:10.1080/01436599814433. the outlines for Peru's presidential coup were first developed within the armed forces before the 1990 election. This Green Plan was shown to President Fujimori after the 1990 election before his inauguration. Thus, the president was able to prepare for an eventual self-coup during the first two years of his administration
  7. ^ a b "El "Plan Verde" Historia de una traición". Oiga. 647. 12 July 1993.
  8. ^  • Llosa, Mario Vargas (1994-03-27). "Ideas & Trends: In His Words; Unmasking the Killers in Peru Won't Bring Democracy Back to Life". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2023-03-24. The coup of April 5, 1992, carried out by high-ranking military felons who used the President of the Republic himself as their figurehead, had as one of its stated objectives a guaranteed free hand for the armed forces in the anti-subversion campaign, the same armed forces for whom the democratic system – a critical Congress, an independent judiciary, a free press – constituted an intolerable obstacle.
    • "Spymaster". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. August 2002. Retrieved 29 March 2023. Lester: Though few questioned it, Montesinos was a novel choice. Peru's army had banished him for selling secrets to America's CIA, but he'd prospered as a defence lawyer – for accused drug traffickers. ... Lester: Did Fujmori control Montesinos or did Montesinos control Fujimori? ... Shifter: As information comes out, it seems increasingly clear that Montesinos was the power in Peru.
    • Keller, Paul (26 October 2000). "Fujimori in OAS talks PERU CRISIS UNCERTAINTY DEEPENS AFTER RETURN OF EX-SPY CHIEF". Financial Times. Mr Montesinos ... and his military faction, ... for the moment, has chosen to keep Mr Fujimori as its civilian figurehead
    • "THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE ANDES" (PDF). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 2001. Retrieved 25 March 2023. Alberto Fujimori,... as later events would seem to confirm—merely the figurehead of a regime governed for all practical purposes by the Intelligence Service and the leadership of the armed forces
    • "Questions And Answers: Mario Vargas Llosa". Newsweek. 9 January 2001. Retrieved 25 March 2023. Fujimori became a kind of, well, a figurehead
  9. ^ a b c d e "Spymaster". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. August 2002. Retrieved 29 March 2023. Lester: Though few questioned it, Montesinos was a novel choice. Peru's army had banished him for selling secrets to America's CIA, but he'd prospered as a defence lawyer – for accused drug traffickers. ... Lester: Did Fujmori control Montesinos or did Montesinos control Fujimori? ... Shifter: As information comes out, it seems increasingly clear that Montesinos was the power in Peru.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Calderón Bentin, Sebastián (January 2018). "The Politics of Illusion: The Collapse of the Fujimori Regime in Peru". Theatre Survey. 59 (1): 84–107. doi:10.1017/S0040557417000503.
  11. ^ Kay, Bruce H. (Winter 1996). ""Fujipopulism" and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990-1995". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 38 (4): 60. doi:10.2307/166259. JSTOR 166259.
  12. ^ a b c d McMillan, John; Zoido, Pablo (Autumn 2004). "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru". The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 18 (4): 69–92. doi:10.1257/0895330042632690. hdl:10419/76612.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Guriev, Sergei (2023). Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century. Princeton University Press. pp. 92–104. ISBN 9780691224473.
  14. ^ a b c Conaghan, Catherine M. (2002). "Cashing in on Authoritarianism: Media Collusion in Fujimori's Peru". The International Journal of Press/Politics. 7 (1): 115–125.
  15. ^ a b c d Villalba, Fernando Velásquez (2022). "A TOTALIDADE NEOLIBERAL-FUJIMORISTA: ESTIGMATIZAÇÃO E COLONIALIDADE NO PERU CONTEMPORÂNEO". Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais. 37 (109): e3710906. doi:10.1590/3710906/2022. S2CID 251877338. terruqueo, ou seja, a construção artificial, racista e conveniente de um inimigo sociopolítico para deslegitimar formas de protesto social
  16. ^ a b c d e f Díaz Meléndez, Sara Mariella (2015). "Fujimorismo: propaganda política y herencia populista". Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla. University of Seville. hdl:11441/29718.
  17. ^ a b Mitrovic, Mijail (30 December 2021). "At the fabric of history: Peru's political struggle under (and against) the pandemic". Dialectical Anthropology. 45 (4): 431–446. doi:10.1007/s10624-021-09634-5. PMC 8716181. PMID 34980936.
  18. ^ Carroll, Rory (2011-06-02). "Mario Vargas Llosa attacks Peru newspaper over election 'propaganda'". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 2023-04-16.
  19. ^ "Peru's Fujimori loses allies as bid to flip election result falters". Reuters. 28 June 2021. Archived from the original on 1 July 2021. Retrieved 1 July 2021.
  20. ^ Tegel, Simeon (2023-03-21). "Peru's far right is reviving decades-old terrorism narratives to undermine protests". Coda Media. Retrieved 2023-04-02.
  21. ^ Tegel, Simeon (12 January 2023). "Discontent, death toll rise as Peru's poor demand change". The Washington Post. That alleged racism has taken the form of terruqueo, a uniquely Peruvian term that describes the smearing of critics by falsely accusing them of terrorism. ... It's still used routinely by the Peruvian far right.
  22. ^ "From Peru, its terruqueo and saqueo: a continuum of (racist) violence". Justice Visions. 29 March 2023. Retrieved 2023-04-02.
  23. ^ a b Feline Freier, Luisa; Castillo Jara, Soledad (13 January 2021). ""Terruqueo" and Peru's Fear of the Left". Americas Quarterly. Retrieved 2021-11-18. It was in this context that Martha Chávez, ... accused demonstrators of being linked to the terrorist left ... As absurd as it may seem, this kind of attack is common in Peru, and recently there is even a name for it: terruqueo, the mostly groundless accusation of being connected to once powerful communist terrorist organizations. ... After the end of the conflict, the term came to be used carelessly and often as a racially charged political insult, targeting progressive or left-wing politicians or activists, organizations committed to the defense of human rights, and, at least historically, people of indigenous origin.
  24. ^ a b Mendoza, Marina (1 March 2022). "The political use of terrorism in the 2021 Peruvian presidential campaign". Revista Universitas (36). Universidad Politécnica Salesiana: 243–268. doi:10.17163/uni.n36.2022.10. ISSN 1390-8634.[permanent dead link‍]
  25. ^ a b Burt, Jo-Marie (2006). ""Quien habla es terrorista": The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru". Latin American Research Review. 41 (3): 32–62. doi:10.1353/lar.2006.0036.
  26. ^ "Qué es el "terruqueo" en Perú y cómo influye en la disputa presidencial entre Fujimori y Castillo". BBC News (in Spanish). Retrieved 2021-11-18.
  27. ^ Guriev, Sergei (2023). Spin dictators : the changing face of tyranny in the 21st century. Princeton University Press. pp. 92–104. ISBN 9780691224473.
  28. ^ Mendoza, Marina (1 March 2022). "The political use of terrorism in the 2021 Peruvian presidential campaign". Revista Universitas (36). Universidad Politécnica Salesiana: 243–268. doi:10.17163/uni.n36.2022.10. ISSN 1390-8634.[permanent dead link‍]
  29. ^ "Propaganda a favor de Keiko Fujimori fuera de la ley: paneles, mensajes anónimos y pronunciamientos públicos". Wayka (in Spanish). 2021-05-20. Retrieved 2023-04-16.
  30. ^ a b c d Kay, Bruce H. (Winter 1996). ""Fujipopulism" and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990-1995". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 38 (4): 55–56. doi:10.2307/166259. JSTOR 166259. Fujipopulism is remarkably similar to its forerunners. It is anti-elitist...
  31. ^ Kay, Bruce H. (Winter 1996). ""Fujipopulism" and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990-1995". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 38 (4): 91. doi:10.2307/166259. JSTOR 166259.
  32. ^ a b c d e Taylor, Lewis (April 2001). "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Reelección' to Regime Collapse". European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. 70: 3–24.
  33. ^ Long, William R. (1992-09-18). "Peru Orders Anti-Sendero Effort in U.S." Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2023-04-16.
  34. ^ "'Mano dura', el plan de gobierno de Keiko Fujimori para Perú". The Chicago Tribune. 25 January 2021. Archived from the original on 12 February 2021. Retrieved 10 February 2021.
  35. ^ "Mi visión del país, por Keiko Fujimori". El Comercio (in Spanish). 6 February 2021. Archived from the original on 10 February 2021. Retrieved 12 February 2021.
  36. ^ "Taking Note". NACLA. 25 September 2007. Retrieved 2023-04-16.
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