The War of Jenkins' Ear[a] was fought by Britain and Spain between 1739 to 1748. The majority of the fighting took place in New Granada and the Caribbean Sea, with major operations largely ended by 1742. It is considered a related conflict of the 1740 to 1748 War of the Austrian Succession.

War of Jenkins' Ear
Part of War of the Austrian Succession

1741 map of the West Indies and North America
Date22 October 1739 – 18 October 1748
Location
Result Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle
Territorial
changes
Status quo ante bellum
Belligerents
 Great Britain  Spain
Commanders and leaders
Casualties and losses
c. 20,000 dead or wounded c. 10,000 dead or wounded [1]

The name derives from Robert Jenkins, a British sea captain whose ear[b] was allegedly severed in April 1731 by Spanish coast guards searching his ship for contraband. In 1738, opposition politicians in the British Parliament used the incident to incite support for a war against Spain.[2]

The most significant operation of the war was a failed British attack on Cartagena in 1741, which resulted in heavy casualties and was not repeated.[3] Apart from minor actions in Spanish Florida, Georgia, and Havana, after 1742 Britain and Spain focused their efforts on the War of the Austrian Succession in Europe.

Fighting formally ended with the 1748 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the terms of which meant Britain largely failed to achieve its original territorial and economic ambitions in the Americas. The war is significant in British naval history for Admiral George Anson's voyage around the world from 1740 to 1744.

Background

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Traditionally seen as a dispute over trade in Spanish America, modern historians argue economics was one of a number of issues, including Spanish concerns over British colonial expansion in North America. They suggest the decisive factor behind war was the campaign by the Tory opposition to remove the Whig government led by Robert Walpole, Prime Minister since 1721.[4]

The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht gave British merchants access to markets in Spanish America, including the Asiento de Negros, a monopoly to supply 5,000 slaves a year. Another was the Navio de Permiso, permitting two ships a year to sell 500 tons of goods each in Porto Bello in Panama, and Veracruz in Mexico.[5]

These rights were owned by the South Sea Company, acquired by the British government in 1720, [6] but their value was insignificant compared to the trade between Britain and mainland Spain.[7] The asiento itself has been described as a 'commercial illusion', with only eight ships in total sent from Britain between 1718 and 1733.[8] Even for these, their primary purpose was to transport consumer goods that evaded customs duties.[9]

Since high tariffs on imported goods and demand from Spanish colonists meant smuggling was too lucrative to be stopped, the Spanish tried to either manage it or use it as an instrument of policy. During the 1727 to 1729 Anglo-Spanish War, French ships carrying contraband were let through, while British ships were stopped and severe restrictions imposed on British merchants in Cadiz. This was reversed during the 1733 to 1735 War of the Polish Succession, when Britain supported Spain.[10]

 
The establishment of Georgia in 1733 raised tensions by threatening Spanish possessions in the Caribbean Basin

Under the 1729 Treaty of Seville, the Spanish were allowed to check British vessels trading with the Americas for contraband. In 1731, the brig Rebecca was found to be carrying an illegal cargo of sugar, and during the search, its captain Robert Jenkins later alleged his ear was partially amputated by coastguard officers. While deprecating such treatment, the Royal Naval commander in Port Royal argued those involved in "clandestine trade" could not complain if their cargoes were confiscated, and often used violence themselves.[11]

Tensions increased after the founding of the British colony of Georgia in 1732, seen as a threat to Spanish Florida, vital to protect shipping routes with mainland Spain.[12] For their part, the British viewed the 1733 Pacte de Famille between Louis XV of France and Philip V of Spain as the first step in being replaced by France as Spain's largest trading partner.[13] A second round of Spanish "depredations" in 1738 led to demands for compensation, with Tory-backed newsletters and pamphlets presenting them as being inspired by France.[14] In support of their campaign against Walpole, the Tories exhibited Jenkins in the House of Commons and it was at this point the incident became widely known.[15]

The January 1739 Convention of Pardo set up a Commission to resolve the Georgia-Florida boundary dispute and agreed Spain would pay damages of £95,000 for ships seized. In return, the South Sea Company would pay £68,000 to Philip V as his share of profits on the asiento. Despite being controlled by the government, the company refused and Walpole reluctantly accepted that war could not be avoided.[16] On 10 July 1739, the Admiralty was authorised to begin naval operations against Spain. On the 20th, a force under Admiral Vernon sailed for the West Indies.[17] Vernon reached Antigua in early October. On 22 October, British ships attacked La Guaira and Puerto Cabello, principal ports of the Province of Venezuela. Britain formally declared war on 23 October 1739.[18]

Conduct of the war

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First attack on La Guaira (22 October 1739)

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Vernon sent three ships commanded by Captain Thomas Waterhouse to intercept Spanish ships between La Guaira and Porto Bello. He decided to attack a number of vessels that he observed at La Guaira, which was controlled by the Royal Guipuzcoan Company of Caracas.[19] The governor of the Province of Venezuela, Brigadier Don Gabriel de Zuloaga had prepared the port defences, and Spanish troops were well-commanded by Captain Don Francisco Saucedo. On 22 October, Waterhouse entered the port of La Guaira flying the Spanish flag. Expecting attack, the port gunners were not deceived by his ruse; they waited until the British squadron was within range and then simultaneously opened fire. After three hours of heavy shelling, Waterhouse ordered a withdrawal. The battered British squadron sailed to Jamaica to undertake emergency repairs. Trying later to explain his actions, Waterhouse argued that the capture of a few small Spanish vessels would not have justified the loss of his men.

Capture of Portobelo (20–22 November 1739)

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Ruins of the fortress of San Jeronimo, Portobelo

Prior to 1739, trade between mainland Spain and its colonies was conducted only through specific ports; twice a year, outward bound ships assembled in Cadiz and the Flota escorted to Portobelo or Veracruz. One way to impact Spanish trade was by attacking or blockading these ports but as many ships carried cargoes financed by foreign merchants, the strategy also risked damaging British and neutral interests.[20]

During the 1727 to 1729 Anglo-Spanish War, the British attempted to take Portobelo but retreated after heavy losses from disease. On 22 November 1739, Vernon attacked the port with six ships of the line; it fell within twenty-four hours and the British occupied the town for three weeks before withdrawing, having first destroyed its fortifications, port and warehouses.[21]

The victory was widely celebrated in Britain; the famous song "Rule Britannia" was written in 1740 to mark the occasion and performed for the first time at a dinner in London honouring Vernon.[22] The suburb of Portobello in Edinburgh and Portobello Road in London are among the places in Britain named after this success, while more medals were awarded for its capture than any other event in the eighteenth century.[23]

Taking a port in Spain's American empire was considered a foregone conclusion by many Patriot Whigs and opposition Tories. They now pressed a reluctant Walpole to launch larger naval expeditions to the Gulf of Mexico. In the longer term, the Spanish replaced the twice yearly Flota with a larger number of smaller convoys, calling at more ports and Portobelo's economy did not recover until the building of the Panama Canal nearly two centuries later.[citation needed]

First attack on Cartagena de Indias (13–20 March 1740)

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Spanish Admiral Don Blas de Lezo 1741

Following the success of Portobelo, Vernon decided to focus his efforts on the capture of Cartagena de Indias in present-day Colombia. Both Vernon and Edward Trelawny, governor of Jamaica, considered the Spanish gold shipping port to be a prime objective. Since the outbreak of the war, and Vernon's arrival in the Caribbean, the British had made a concerted effort to gain intelligence on the defences of Cartagena. In October 1739, Vernon sent First Lieutenant Percival to deliver a letter to Blas de Lezo and Don Pedro Hidalgo, governor of Cartagena. Percival was to use the opportunity to make a detailed study of the Spanish defences. This effort was thwarted when Percival was denied entry to the port.

On 7 March 1740, in a more direct approach, Vernon undertook a reconnaissance-in-force of the Spanish city. Vernon left Port Royal in command of a squadron including ships of the line, two fire ships, three bomb vessels, and transport ships. Reaching Cartagena on 13 March, Vernon immediately landed several men to map the topography and to reconnoitre the Spanish squadron anchored in Playa Grande, west of Cartagena. Having not seen any reaction from the Spanish, on 18 March Vernon ordered the three bomb vessels to open fire on the city. Vernon intended to provoke a response that might give him a better idea of the defensive capabilities of the Spanish. Understanding Vernon's motives, Lezo did not immediately respond. Instead, Lezo ordered the removal of guns from some of his ships, in order to form a temporary shore battery for the purpose of suppressive fire. Vernon next initiated an amphibious assault, but in the face of strong resistance, the attempt to land 400 soldiers was unsuccessful. The British then undertook a three-day naval bombardment of the city. In total, the campaign lasted 21 days. Vernon then withdrew his forces, leaving HMS Windsor Castle and HMS Greenwich in the vicinity, with a mission to intercept any Spanish ship that might approach.

Destruction of the fortress of San Lorenzo el Real Chagres (22–24 March 1740)

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Fortress of San Lorenzo el Real Chagres

After the destruction of Portobelo the previous November, Vernon proceeded to remove the last Spanish stronghold in the area. He attacked the fortress of San Lorenzo el Real Chagres, in present-day Panama on the banks of the Chagres River, near Portobelo. The fort was defended by Spanish patrol boats, and was armed with four guns and about thirty soldiers under Captain of Infantry Don Juan Carlos Gutiérrez Cevallos.

At 3 pm on 22 March 1740, the British squadron, composed of the ships Stafford, Norwich, Falmouth and Princess Louisa, the frigate Diamond, the bomb vessels Alderney, Terrible, and Cumberland, the fireships Success and Eleanor, and transports Goodly and Pompey, under command of Vernon, began to bombard the Spanish fortress. Given the overwhelming superiority of the British forces, Captain Cevallos surrendered the fort on 24 March, after resisting for two days.

Following the strategy previously applied at Porto Bello, the British destroyed the fort and seized the guns along with two Spanish patrol boats.

During this time of British victories along the Caribbean coast, events taking place in Spain would prove to have a significant effect on the outcome of the largest engagement of the war. Spain had decided to replace Don Pedro Hidalgo as governor of Cartagena de Indias. But, the new governor-designate, Lieutenant General of the Royal Armies Sebastián de Eslava y Lazaga had first to dodge the Royal Navy in order to get to his new post. Starting from the Galician port of Ferrol, the vessels Galicia and San Carlos set out on the journey. Hearing the news, Vernon immediately sent four ships to intercept the Spanish. They were unsuccessful in their mission. The Spanish managed to circumvent the British interceptors and entered the port of Cartagena on 21 April 1740, landing there with the new governor and several hundred veteran soldiers.[24]

Second attack on Cartagena de Indias (3 May 1740)

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In May, Vernon returned to Cartagena de Indias aboard the flagship HMS Princess Caroline in charge of 13 warships, with the intention of bombarding the city. Lezo reacted by deploying his six ships of the line so that the British fleet was forced into ranges where they could only make short or long shots that were of little value. Vernon withdrew, asserting that the attack was merely a manoeuver. The main consequence of this action was to help the Spanish test their defences.[25]

Third attack on Cartagena de Indias (13 March – 20 May 1741)

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Castillo San Felipe de Barajas (Cartagena). This fortress, though incomplete during the war, was integral to Spain's effort to maintain the link with its colonies via the Atlantic sea lanes.
 
British operations in the Caribbean Sea during the War of Jenkins' Ear

The largest action of the war was a major amphibious attack launched by the British under Admiral Edward Vernon in March 1741 against Cartagena de Indias, one of Spain's principal gold-trading ports in their colony of New Granada (today Colombia). Vernon's expedition was hampered by inefficient organisation, his rivalry with the commander of his land forces, and the logistical problems of mounting and maintaining a major trans-Atlantic expedition. The strong fortifications in Cartagena and the able strategy of Spanish Commander Blas de Lezo were decisive in repelling the attack. Heavy losses on the British side were due in large part to virulent tropical diseases, primarily an outbreak of yellow fever, which took more lives than were lost in battle.[3]

The extreme ease with which the British destroyed Porto Bello led to a change in British plans. Instead of Vernon concentrating his next attack on Havana as expected, in order to conquer Cuba, he planned to attack Cartagena de Indias. Located in Colombia, it was the main port of the Viceroyalty and main point of the West Indian fleet for sailing to the Iberian Peninsula. In preparation the British gathered in Jamaica one of the largest fleets ever assembled. It consisted of 186 ships (60 more than the famous Spanish Armada of Philip II), bearing 2,620 artillery pieces and more than 27,000 men. Of that number, 10,000 were soldiers responsible for initiating the assault. There were also 12,600 sailors, 1,000 Jamaican slaves and macheteros, and 4,000 recruits from Virginia. The latter were led by Lawrence Washington, the older half-brother of George Washington, future President of the United States.[26]

Colonial officials assigned Admiral Blas de Lezo to defend the fortified city. He was a marine veteran hardened by numerous naval battles in Europe, beginning with the War of the Spanish Succession, and by confrontations with European pirates in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, and Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean Sea. Assisting in that effort were Melchor de Navarrete and Carlos Desnaux, with a squadron of six ships of the line (the flagship vessel Galicia together with the San Felipe, San Carlos, África, Dragón, and Conquistador) and a force of 3,000 soldiers, 600 militia and a group of native Indian archers.

Vernon ordered his forces to clear the port of all scuttled ships. On 13 March 1741, he landed a contingent of troops under command of Major General Thomas Wentworth and artillery to take Fort de San Luis de Bocachica. In support of that action, the British ships simultaneously opened with cannon fire, at a rate of 62 shots per hour. In turn, Lezo ordered four of the Spanish ships to aid 500 of his troops defending Desnaux's position, but the Spanish eventually had to retire to the city. Civilians were already evacuating it. After leaving Fort Bocagrande, the Spanish regrouped at Fort San Felipe de Barajas, while Washington's Virginians took up positions in the nearby hill of La Popa. Vernon, believing the victory at hand, sent a message to Jamaica stating that he had taken the city. The report was subsequently forwarded to London, where there was much celebration. Commemorative medals were minted, depicting the defeated Spanish defenders kneeling before Vernon.[27] The robust image of the enemy depicted in the British medals bore little resemblance to Admiral Lezo. Maimed by years of battle, he was one-eyed and lame, with limited use of one hand.

On the evening of 19 April, the British mounted an assault in force upon Castillo San Felipe de Barajas. Three columns of grenadiers, supported by Jamaicans and several British companies, moved under cover of darkness, with the aid of an intense naval bombardment. The British fought their way to the base of the fort's ramparts where they discovered that the Spanish had dug deep trenches. This effectively rendered the British scaling equipment too short for the task. The British advance was stymied since the fort's walls had not been breached, and the ramparts could not be topped. Neither could the British easily withdraw in the face of intense Spanish fire and under the weight of their own equipment. The Spanish seized on this opportunity, with devastating effect.

Reversing the tide of battle, the Spanish initiated a fixed bayonet charge at first light, inflicting heavy casualties on the British.[citation needed] The surviving British forces retreated to the safety of their ships. The British maintained a naval bombardment, sinking what remained of the small Spanish squadron (after Lezo's decision to scuttle some of his ships in an effort to block the harbour entrance). The Spanish thwarted any British attempt to land another ground assault force. The British troops were forced to remain aboard ship for a month, without sufficient reserves. With supplies running low, and with the outbreak of disease (primarily yellow fever), which took the lives of many on the crowded ships,[28] Vernon was forced to raise the siege on 9 May and return to Jamaica. Six thousand British died while only one thousand Spanish perished.[citation needed]

Vernon carried on, successfully attacking the Spanish at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. On 5 March 1742, with the help of reinforcements from Europe, he launched an assault on Panama City, Panama. In 1742, Vernon was replaced by Rear-Admiral Chaloner Ogle and returned to England, where he gave an accounting to the Admiralty. He learned that he had been elected MP for Ipswich. Vernon maintained his naval career for another four years before retiring in 1746. In an active Parliamentary career, Vernon advocated for improvements in naval procedures. He continued to hold an interest in naval affairs until his death in 1757.

News of the defeat at Cartagena was a significant factor in the downfall of the British Prime Minister Robert Walpole.[29] Walpole's anti-war views were considered by the Opposition to have contributed to his poor prosecution of the war effort.

The new government under Lord Wilmington wanted to shift the focus of Britain's war effort away from the Americas and into the Mediterranean. Spanish policy, dictated by the queen Elisabeth Farnese of Parma, also shifted to a European focus, to recover lost Spanish possessions in Italy from the Austrians. In 1742, a large British fleet under Nicholas Haddock was sent to try and intercept a Spanish army being transported from Barcelona to Italy, which he failed to do having only 10 ships.[30] With the arrival of additional ships from Britain in February 1742, Haddock successfully blockaded the Spanish coast[31] failing to force the Spanish fleet into an action.

Lawrence Washington survived the yellow fever outbreak, and eventually retired to Virginia. He named his estate Mount Vernon, in honour of his former commander.

Anson expedition

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George Anson's capture of the Manila galleon, painted by Samuel Scott before 1772

The success of the Porto Bello operation led the British, in September 1740, to send a squadron under Commodore George Anson to attack Spain's possessions in the Pacific. Before they reached the Pacific, numerous men were killed by disease, they had to outrun pursuing Spanish naval vessels, and ultimately the fleet found itself in no shape to launch any sort of attack.[18] Anson reassembled his force in the Juan Fernández Islands, allowing them to recuperate before he moved up the Chilean coast, raiding the small town of Paita. He reached Acapulco too late to intercept the yearly Manila galleon, which had been one of the principal objectives of the expedition. He retreated across the Pacific, running into a storm that forced him to dock for repairs in Canton. After this he tried again the following year to intercept the Manila galleon. He accomplished this on 20 June 1743 off Cape Espiritu Santo, capturing more than a million gold coins.[30]

Anson sailed home, arriving in London more than three and a half years after he had set out, having circumnavigated the globe in the process. Less than a tenth of his forces had survived the expedition. Anson's achievements helped establish his name and wealth in Britain, leading to his appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty. One of his ships, HMS Wager, was presumed lost in the storms round Cape Horn the survivors would later take part in a sensational public inquiry concerning allegations of mutiny, cannibalism, and murder among the Wager's crew.

Florida

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In 1740, the inhabitants of Georgia launched an overland attack on the fortified city of St. Augustine in Florida, supported by a British naval blockade, but were repelled. The British forces led by James Oglethorpe, the Governor of Georgia, besieged St. Augustine for over a month before retreating, and abandoned their artillery in the process. The failure of the Royal Navy blockade to prevent supplies reaching the settlement was a crucial factor in the collapse of the siege. Oglethorpe began preparing Georgia for an expected Spanish assault. The Battle of Bloody Mose, where the Spanish and free black forces repelled Oglethorpe's forces at Fort Mose, was also a part of the War of Jenkins' Ear.[32]

French neutrality

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When war broke out in 1739, both Britain and Spain expected that France would join the war on the Spanish side. This played a large role in the tactical calculations of the British. If the Spanish and French were to operate together, they would have a superiority of ninety ships of the line.[33] In 1740, there was an invasion scare when it was believed that a French fleet at Brest and a Spanish fleet at Ferrol were about to combine and launch an invasion of England.[34] Although this proved not to be the case, the British kept the bulk of their naval and land forces in or near southern England to act as a deterrent.

Many in the British government were afraid to launch a major offensive against the Spanish, for fear that a major British victory would draw France into the war to protect the balance of power.[35]

Invasion of Georgia

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In 1742, the Spanish launched an attempt to seize the British colony of Georgia. Manuel de Montiano commanded 2,000 troops, who were landed on St Simons Island off the coast. General Oglethorpe rallied the local forces and defeated the Spanish regulars at Bloody Marsh and Gully Hole Creek, forcing them to withdraw. Border clashes between the colonies of Florida and Georgia continued for the next few years, but neither Spain nor Britain undertook offensive operations on the North American mainland.

Second attack on La Guaira (2 March 1743)

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Commodore Charles Knowles in armour, one hand gestures to fortifications and a burning ship

The British attacked several locations in the Caribbean with little consequence to the geopolitical situation in the Atlantic. The weakened British forces under Vernon launched an attack against Cuba, landing in Guantánamo Bay with a plan to march the 45 miles to Santiago de Cuba and capture the city.[36] Vernon clashed with the army commander, and the expedition withdrew when faced with heavier Spanish opposition than expected. Vernon remained in the Caribbean until October 1742, before heading back to Britain; he was replaced by admiral Chaloner Ogle, who took command of a sickly fleet. Fewer than half the sailors were fit for duty. The following year, a smaller Royal Navy squadron led by commodore Charles Knowles raided the Venezuelan coast, on 2 March 1743 attacking newly La Guaira controlled by Royal Guipuzcoan Company of Caracas whose ships had rendered assistance to the Spanish navy during War in carrying troops, arms, stores and ammunition from Spain to her colonies, and its destruction could have been a severe blow both to the Company and the Spanish Crown.

After a fierce defence by Governor Gabriel José de Zuloaga's troops, Commodore Knowles, having suffered 97 killed and 308 wounded over three days, decided to retire west before sunrise on 6 March. He decided to attack nearby Puerto Cabello. However, despite his orders to rendezvous at Borburata Keys—4 miles (6.4 km) east of Puerto Cabello, the captains of the detached Burford, Norwich, Assistance, and Otter proceeded to Curaçao. The commodore angrily followed them in. On 28 March, he sent his smaller ships to cruise off Puerto Cabello, and once his main body had been refitted, went to sea again on 31 March. He struggled against contrary winds and currents for two weeks before finally diverting to the eastern tip of Santo Domingo by 19 April.[18]

Merger with wider war

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By mid-1742, the War of the Austrian Succession had broken out in Europe. Principally fought by Prussia and Austria over possession of Silesia, the war soon engulfed most of the major powers of Europe, who joined two competing alliances. The scale of this new war dwarfed any of the fighting in the Americas, and drew Britain and Spain's attention back to operations on the European continent. The return of Vernon's fleet in 1742 marked the end of major offensive operations in the War of Jenkins' Ear. France entered the war in 1744, emphasizing the European theatre and planning an ambitious invasion of Britain. While it ultimately failed, the threat persuaded British policymakers of the dangers of sending significant forces to the Americas which might be needed at home.

Britain did not attempt any additional attacks on Spanish possessions. In 1745, William Pepperrell of New England led a colonial expedition, supported by a British fleet under Commodore Peter Warren, against the French fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island off Canada. Pepperrell was knighted for his achievement, but Britain returned Louisbourg to the French by the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle in 1748. A decade later, during the Seven Years' War (known as the French and Indian War in the North American theatre), British forces under Lord Jeffrey Amherst and General Wolfe recaptured it.[37][pages needed]

Privateering

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The war involved privateering by both sides. Anson captured a valuable Manila galleon, but this was more than offset by the numerous Spanish privateering attacks on British shipping along the transatlantic triangular trade route. They seized hundreds of British ships, looting their goods and slaves, and operated with virtual impunity in the West Indies; they were also active in European waters. The Spanish convoys proved almost unstoppable. During the Austrian phase of the war, the British fleet attacked poorly protected French merchantmen instead.

Lisbon negotiations

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From August 1746, negotiations began in the city of Lisbon, in neutral Portugal, to try to arrange a peace settlement. The death of Philip V of Spain had brought his son Ferdinand VI to the throne, and he was more willing to be conciliatory over the issues of trade. Because of their commitments to their Austrian allies, the British were unable to agree to Spanish demands for territory in Italy and talks broke down.[38]

Aftermath

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A monument in Georgia commemorating the Battle of Bloody Marsh

The eventual diplomatic resolution formed part of the wider settlement of the War of the Austrian Succession by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle which restored the status quo ante.[39] British territorial and economic ambitions on the Caribbean had been repelled,[40][41][42] while Spain, although unprepared at the start of the war, proved successful in defending its American possessions.[43] Moreover, the war put an end to the British smuggling, and the Spanish fleet was able to dispatch three treasure convoys to Europe during the war and off-balance the British squadron at Jamaica.[44] The issue of the asiento was not mentioned in the treaty, as its importance had lessened for both nations. The issue was finally settled by the 1750 Treaty of Madrid in which Britain agreed to renounce its claim to the asiento in exchange for a payment of £100,000. The South Sea Company ceased its activity, although the treaty also allowed favourable conditions for British trade with Spanish America.[45]

George Anson's expedition to the Southeast Pacific led the Spanish authorities in Lima and Santiago to advance the position of the Spanish Empire in the area. Forts were thus built in the Juan Fernández Islands and the Chonos Archipelago in 1749 and 1750.[46]

Relations between Britain and Spain improved temporarily, in subsequent years, due to a concerted effort by the Duke of Newcastle to cultivate Spain as an ally. A succession of Anglophile ministers were appointed in Spain, including José de Carvajal and Ricardo Wall, all of whom were on good terms with British Ambassador Benjamin Keene, in an effort to avoid a repeat of hostilities. As a result, during the early part of the Seven Years' War between Britain and France, Spain remained neutral. However, it later joined the French side and lost Havana and Manila to the British in 1762; although both were returned as part of the peace settlement, in exchange the Spanish ceded Florida to the British.

The War of Jenkins' Ear is commemorated annually on the last Saturday in May at Wormsloe Plantation in Savannah, Georgia.

Footnotes

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  1. ^ Spanish: Guerra del Asiento, lit.'War of the Agreement'
  2. ^ It is uncertain based on attestations whether the whole of the ear or "a piece" of it was cut off.

References

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  1. ^ Clodfelter 2017, p. 78.
  2. ^ Graboyes & Hullar 2013, pp. 368–372.
  3. ^ a b Webb 2013, pp. 396–398.
  4. ^ James 2001, p. 61.
  5. ^ Browning 1993, p. 21.
  6. ^ Ibañez 2008, p. 16.
  7. ^ McLachlan 1940, p. 6.
  8. ^ Anderson 1976, p. 293.
  9. ^ Richmond 1920, p. 2.
  10. ^ McLachlan 1940, pp. 91–93.
  11. ^ Laughton 1889, pp. 742–743.
  12. ^ Ibañez 2008, p. 18.
  13. ^ McKay 1983, pp. 138–140.
  14. ^ McLachlan 1940, pp. 94.
  15. ^ Morison 1965, p. 155.
  16. ^ Woodfine 1998, p. 204.
  17. ^ Davies 1994, pp. 215, 215i.
  18. ^ a b c Rodger 2005, p. 238.
  19. ^ "Historical Chronicle" Archived 23 September 2015 at the Wayback Machine, The Gentleman's Magazine, Saturday 23 October 1739, Vol. 9, October 1739, p. 551; accessed 13 May 2010.
  20. ^ Lodge 1933, p. 12.
  21. ^ Rodger 2005, p. 236.
  22. ^ Rodger 2005, p. 23.
  23. ^ Simms 2009, p. 276.
  24. ^ Sáez Abad 2015, p. 57.
  25. ^ Sáez Abad 2015, p. 58.
  26. ^ "Commission of Lawrence Washington as captain in provincial forces serving under Admiral Vernon in the Cartegena Campaign". The Fred W. Smith National Library for the Study of George Washington at Mount Vernon (Lyrasis). 9 June 1740.
  27. ^ "ImageShack". Archived from the original on 18 August 2011.
  28. ^ Chartrand, René (25 April 2002). Chartrand, Rene. Colonial American Troops, 1610–1774, Vol. 1, pp. 18–19 Osprey Men-at-Arms #366, Osprey Publishing 2002. Bloomsbury USA. ISBN 9781841763248.
  29. ^ Browning 1993, pp. 109–113.
  30. ^ a b Rodger 2005, p. 239.
  31. ^ Browning 1975, p. 97.
  32. ^ branmarc60 (13 June 2018). "Bloody Battle of Fort Mose". Fort Mose Historical Society. Archived from the original on 24 June 2019. Retrieved 24 June 2019.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  33. ^ Browning 1993, p. 98.
  34. ^ Longmate 1990, p. 146.
  35. ^ Simms 2009, p. 278.
  36. ^ Gott 2005, p. 39.
  37. ^ Francis Parkman, A Half Century of Conflict II and Montcalm and Wolfe II
  38. ^ Lodge 1930, pp. 202–207.
  39. ^ Bemis 1965, p. 8.
  40. ^ "Spain's fortifications, fleet and merchant marine were able to repel Great Britain's offensive. England's design to detach the Americas from the Spanish monarchy failed, for the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which ended the war in 1748, left the Spanish empire intact while cancelling British trading privileges in Spanish territory". Chavez, Thomas E.: Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004, p. 4. ISBN 9780826327949
  41. ^ "Naval and continental campaigns had not shattered the Spanish empire nor modified their pretensions to protect their colonies from interlopers. The war had opened with massive expectations of quick victory based on naval power. It ended with failures and disappointments". Harding, Richard: The Emergence of Britain's Global Naval Supremacy: The War of 1739–1748. Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2010, p. 6. ISBN 9781843835806
  42. ^ "The Franco/Spanish alliance still owned most of the Caribbean in terms of geographical area and produced more sugar, the golden crop, than the Anglo/Dutch alliance. The Protestant powers had failed to seize hegemony in the Caribbean from the Catholic powers by the end of the first half of the eighteenth century". Mirza, Rocky M.: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire: A Re-Interpretation of History, Economics and Philosophy: 1492–2006. Oxford: Trafford Publishing, 2007, p. 139. ISBN 9781425113834
  43. ^ "The Spanish archives reveal that Spain was not prepared for war but willing to take measures to defend her colonies in America. Her men fought well, and for the most part successfully, when the chips were down. That they were aided, in part, by English errors and indecision, should not detract from their victories". Ogelsby 1970
  44. ^ Ogelsby 1970, pp. 156–157.
  45. ^ Simms 2009, p. 381.
  46. ^ Urbina Carrasco, María Ximena (2014). "El frustrado fuerte de Tenquehuen en el archipiélago de los Chonos, 1750: Dimensión chilota de un conflicto hispano-británico". Historia. 47 (I). Retrieved 28 January 2016.

Sources

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  • Anderson, M.S. (1976). Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713–1783 (A General History of Europe). Longman. ISBN 978-0582486720.
  • Browning, Reed (1975). The Duke of Newcastle. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300017465.
  • Browning, Reed (1993). The War of the Austrian Succession. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-0312094836.
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  • Ibañez, Ignacio Rivas (2008). Mobilizing Resources for War: The Intelligence Systems during the War of Jenkins' Ear (PHD). UCL.
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Further reading

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  • Finucane, Adrian. The Temptations of Trade: Britain, Spain, and the Struggle for Empire (2016)
  • Gaudi, Robert (2021). The War of Jenkins' Ear: The Forgotten Struggle for North and South America, 1739–1742. New York: Pegasus Books, Ltd., distributed by Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-1-64313-819-0. OCLC 1272907990.
  • Norris, David A. "The War of Jenkins' Ear". History Magazine (Aug/Sep 2015) 16#3 pp. 31–35.
  • Shepard, Odell & Shepard, Willard. Jenkins' Ear: A Narrative Attributed to Horace Walpole, Esq. (1951). Historical fiction.
  • Rivas, Ignacio. Mobilizing Resources for War: The British and Spanish Intelligence Systems in the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739–1744) (2010).

Other resources

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  • Tobias Smollett. "Authentic papers related to the expedition against Carthagena", by Jorge Orlando Melo in Reportaje de la historia de Colombia, Bogotá: Planeta, 1989.
  • Gary B. Nash and Julie Roy Jeffrey. The American People: Creating a Nation and Society (8th ed., 2016).
  • Quintero Saravia, Gonzalo M. (2002). Don Blas de Lezo: defensor de Cartagena de Indias. Editorial Planeta Colombiana, Bogotá, Colombia. ISBN 958-42-0326-6. In Spanish.
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  • "Proposals relating to the War in Georgia and Florida". vault.georgiaarchives.org. Military strategies to defeat the Spanish. Georgia Archives, University System of Georgia. 1740. Retrieved 20 January 2023. – a document suggesting strategies by which General James Oglethorpe might defeat the Spanish during the War of Jenkins' Ear