User:Rjensen/Britain-entry wwI

draft from Sept 3 2018 mostly used

European diplomatic alignments shortly before the war.

Background

Copy ex"Allies of WWI" Sept 10 2018

British leaders increasingly had a sense of commitment to defending France against Germany – first if Germany again conquered France, it would become a major threat to British economic, political and cultural interests. Secondly, partisanship was involved. The Liberal Party was identified with internationalism and free trade, and opposition to jingoism and warfare. By contrast the Conservative Party was identified as the party of nationalism and patriotism; Britons expected it "to show capacity in running a war." ^[1] Liberal voters demanded peace, but they also were outraged when the Germans treated Belgian neutrality as a worthless "scrap of paper" (in the words of the German chancellor ridiculing the Treaty of London (1839)). Germany invaded Belgium en route to a massive attack on France early on the morning of 4 August. The victims called upon Britain for military rescue under the 1839 treaty and in response, Britain declared war on Germany that same evening.^[2] As late as August 1, 1914, the great majority of Liberal--both voters and cabinet members--strongly opposed going to war.^[3] The German invasion of Belgium was such an outrageous violation of international rights that they voted for war on August 4. Unless the Liberal government acted decisively against the German invasion, its top leaders Including Prime Minister H.H. Asquith, Foreign Minister Edward Grey, navy minister Winston Churchill and others would resign, leading to control of the British government by the much more pro-war Conservative Party. Mistreatment of Belgium itself was not a main cause British entry, but it was a main justification used extensively in wartime propaganda to motivate the British people. ^[4]

The German high command was aware that entering Belgium would trigger British intervention but decided the risk was acceptable; they expected it to be a short war while their ambassador in London claimed civil war in Ireland would prevent Britain from assisting France.^[5]

The declaration of war automatically involved all dominions and colonies and protectorates of the British Empire, many of whom made significant contributions to the Allied war effort, both in the provision of troops and civilian labourers.

Propaganda

On 4 August, the King declared war on Germany and Austria, following the advice of Prime Minister H. H. Asquith of the Liberal Party. The rest of the Empire automatically followed. The cabinet's basic reasons for declaring war focused on a deep commitment to France and avoidance of splitting the Liberal Party. Top Liberals led by Asquith and Foreign Minister Edward Grey threatened to resign if the cabinet refused to support France. That would deeply split the party and mean loss of control of the government to a coalition or to the Unionist (ie Conservative) opposition. However, the large antiwar element among Liberals, with David Lloyd George as spokesperson, would support the war to honour the 1839 treaty that guaranteed Belgian neutrality. So Belgium rather than France was the public reason given.^[6]^[7]^[8]

"The Scrap of Paper - Enlist Today", 1914 British propaganda poster emphasizes German contempt for the 1839 treaty that guaranteed Belgian neutrality as merely a "scrap of paper" that Germany would ignore.

Therefore the public reason given out by the government. and used in posters, was that Britain was required to safeguard Belgium's neutrality under the 1839 Treaty of London.

Entry

British Empire in 1914

King Edward VII's visit to Paris in 1903 stilled anti-British feeling in France, and prepared the way for the Entente Cordiale. Initially however, a colonial agreement against the Kaiser's aggressive foreign policy deepened rather than destroyed the bond between the two countries. The Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 encouraged both countries to embark on a series of secret military negotiations in the case of war with Germany. However, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey realized the risk that small conflicts between Paris and Berlin could escalate out of control. Grey insisted that world peace was in the best interests of Britain and the British Empire.^[9] Working with little supervision from the British Prime Minister or Cabinet, Grey deliberately played a mediating role, trying to calm both sides and thereby maintain a peaceful balance of power. He refused to make permanent commitments to France. He approved military staff talks with France in 1905, thereby suggesting, but not promising, that if war broke out Britain would favour France over Germany. In 1911, when there was a second Franco-German clash over Morocco, Grey tried to moderate the French while supporting Germany in its demand for compensation. There was little risk that Britain would have conflicts with anyone leading to war. The Royal Navy remained dominant in world affairs, and remained a high spending priority for the British government. The British Army was small, although plans to send an expeditionary force to France had been developed since the Haldane Reforms. From 1907 through 1914, the French and British armies collaborated on highly detailed plans for mobilizing a British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 combat troops to be very quickly moved to France, and sent to the front in less than two weeks.^[10]

France could strengthen its position in the event of war by forming new alliances or by enlisting more young men. It used both methods.^[11] Russia was firmly in the same camp, and Britain was almost ready to join. In 1913 the controversial "three year law" extended the term of conscription for French draftees from two to three years. Previously young men were in training at ages 21 and 22 then joined the reserves; now they were in training at ages 20, 21, and 22.^[12]

When the war began in 1914, France could only win if Britain joined with France and Russia to stop Germany. There was no binding treaty between Britain and France, and no moral commitment on the British part to go to war on France's behalf. The Liberal government of Britain was pacifistic, and also extremely legalistic, so that German violation of Belgium neutrality – treating it like a scrap of paper – helped mobilize party members to support the war effort. The decisive factors were twofold, Britain felt a sense of obligation to defend France, and the Liberal Government realize that unless it did so, it would collapse either into a coalition, or yield control to the more militaristic Conservative Party. Either option would likely ruin the Liberal Party. When the German army invaded Belgium, not only was neutrality violated, but France was threatened with defeat, so the British government went to war.^[13]

The issue of German violation of Belgium neutrality allowed Liberal leaders and the rank-and-file to enthusiastically support the war effort. But defense of Belgium was not the main criteria – the invasion of Belgium meant the imminent invasion and possible defeat of France, and that defeat of France was A major threat to Britain. In any case, once France was defeated, Belgium and the Netherlands would become satellites of Germany. The German High Command was aware entering Belgium would trigger British intervention but decided the risk was acceptable; in common with most of Europe, they expected it to be a short war while their ambassador in London told Berlin that the imminent civil war in Ireland would prevent Britain from assisting France.^[14] The delay in declaring war was because the Liberal government preferred to wait until Belgium neutrality had been breached in order to maintain Liberal Party unity.

On 3 August, Germany demanded unimpeded progress through any part of Belgium; when this was refused, the German Army invaded on the morning of 4 August. The Belgians now called for assistance under the 1839 Treaty. Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914. The German goal of course was not occupy Belgium – indeed, it promised to make good any damages it did. Its goal was to quickly defeat France and force it surrender. With Germany dominatin Western Europe, Belgium and the Netherlands and Denmark would be German satellites. ^[15]

The decision for war was a partisan decision made by the Liberal cabinet on August 2; Foreign Minister Grey played the leading role. The Conservative party strongly supported entry into the war, but most Liberals were quite reluctant. Liberals voted for war for two primary reasons: as insisted upon by Foreign Minister Grey and Prime Minister Asquith were twofold: to support France, as Britain had repeatedly but informally promised. And second, to keep the Liberal party together, versus the alternative of turning over the government to a to the warmongering Conservatives, or to a coalition government. There was the fear that the Liberal party would be destroyed by coalition government, as indeed actually happened after 1916. The issue of Belgian was not a top priority for the decision-makers, however it was used as the explanation most acceptable to the basically pacifistic Liberal constituencies. ^[16]

Historians looking at the July crisis typically conclude that Grey:

was not a great foreign secretary but an honest, reticent, punctilious English gentleman.... He exhibited a judicious understanding of European affairs, a firm control of his staff, and a suppleness and tact in diplomacy, but he had no boldness, no imagination, no ability to command men and events. [Regarding the war]He pursued a cautious, moderate policy, one that not only fitted his temperament, but also reflected the deep split in the Cabinet, in the Liberal party, and in public opinion. ^[17]

The king's declaration of war automatically involved all members of the Empire. Canada, Australia abd India made significant contributions to the war effort, both in the provision of troops and civilian labourers.

Notes

^ Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-1935 (1966) p 51.
^ {cite journal |last1=Nilesh |first1=Preeta |title=Belgian Neutrality and the First world War; Some Insights |journal=Proceedings of the Indian History Congress |date=2014 |volume=75 |page=1014 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44158486 |accessdate=25 August 2018}}
^ Catriona Pennell (2012). A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland. p. 27. ISBN 978-0-19-959058-2.
^ Stephen J. Lee (2005). Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995. pp. 21–22. ISBN 9781134790401.
^ Brock, Michael (ed), Brock, Elinor (ed) (2014). Margot Asquith's Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street (Kindle ed.). 852-864: OUP Oxford; Reprint edition. ISBN 978-0198737728. {{cite book}}: |last1= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^ Stephen J. Lee (2005). Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995. pp. 21–22. ISBN 9781134790401.
^ Bentley B. Gilbert, "Pacifist to interventionist: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an issue?." Historical Journal 28.4 (1985): 863-885.
^ Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the origins of the First World War (1977) pp 235-237.
^ Thomas G. Otte, "'Almost a law of nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905-12." Diplomacy and Statecraft 14.2 (2003): 77-118.
^ Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: France and Britain Prepare for War, 1904-1914." (1969) pp 313-17..
^ James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security." International Organization 47.2 (1993): 207-233. online
^ Gerd Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War: The Introduction of Three-Year Conscription, 1913-1914 (1985).
^ Trevor Wilson, "Britain's ‘Moral Commitment’ to France in August 1914." History 64.212 (1979): 380-390. online
^ Brock, Michael (ed), Brock, Elinor (ed) (2014). Margot Asquith's Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street (Kindle ed.). 852-864: OUP Oxford; Reprint edition. ISBN 978-0198737728. {{cite book}}: |last1= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^ Otte, 488-89=-Clark 551
^ Clark 145; Wilson article; Kennedy page 461, Searle pp 522-24; Steiner pages 230-37.
^ Clayton Roberts and David F. Roberts, A History of England, Volume 2: 1688 to the present. Vol. 2 (3rd edition, 1991) p. 722.

External links

articles

Woodward, David R. "Great Britain And President Wilson'S Efforts To End World War I In 1916."

By:Maryland Historian. Jun1970, Vol. 1 Issue 1, p45-58.

Historical Period: 1916. Abstract: A study of the British rejection of an American-sponsored compromise peace in 1916. Concludes that the members of the British War Cabinet were hostile to a compromise because war hysteria in England had committed them to a policy of total victory and because British policymakers distrusted President Wilson's motives in initiating peace feelers. Only Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, favored Wilson's proposal for peace, and Grey's influence in the War Cabinet was waning. Grey, able to assuage American feelings, prevented a possible rupture in Anglo-American relations which could have had disastrous results for the Entente Powers. German refusal to state war aims precluded the possibility of any compromise, but the War Cabinet was pleased by German intransigence. (AN: 45757988)

The British Response To The House-Grey Memorandum: New Evidence And New Questions.

Academic Journal

By: Cooper, John Milton Jr. Journal of American History. Mar1973, Vol. 59 Issue 4, p958-971. 14p. Historical Period: 1916. Abstract: Presents newly available accounts of the British cabinet's War Committee meeting on 21 March 1916 to discuss the Colonel House's proposal to mediate an end to the war. The evidence contradicts the assertions of David Lloyd George that Sir Edward Grey was responsible for the rejection of the proposal. Grey's memo of the meeting and Maurice Hankey's minutes indicate a general lack of enthusiasm for the idea. Grey appears to have favored its acceptance, but the waffling of Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith and Arthur Balfour, the opposition of Andrew Bonar Law and Lloyd George, and the hopeful military situation in May 1916 ensured its rejection. 18 notes, 3 documents. (AN: 46631698)

Category:History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom Category:Causes of World War I Category:1914 in Europe Category:1914 in international relations Crisis Category:Military alliances involving the United Kingdom

[1] Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-1935 (1966) p 51.

[2] {cite journal |last1=Nilesh |first1=Preeta |title=Belgian Neutrality and the First world War; Some Insights |journal=Proceedings of the Indian History Congress |date=2014 |volume=75 |page=1014 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44158486 |accessdate=25 August 2018}}

[3] Catriona Pennell (2012). A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland. p. 27. ISBN 978-0-19-959058-2.

[4] Stephen J. Lee (2005). Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995. pp. 21–22. ISBN 9781134790401.

[5] Brock, Michael (ed), Brock, Elinor (ed) (2014). Margot Asquith's Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street (Kindle ed.). 852-864: OUP Oxford; Reprint edition. ISBN 978-0198737728. {{cite book}}: |last1= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

[6] Stephen J. Lee (2005). Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995. pp. 21–22. ISBN 9781134790401.

[7] Bentley B. Gilbert, "Pacifist to interventionist: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an issue?." Historical Journal 28.4 (1985): 863-885.

[8] Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the origins of the First World War (1977) pp 235-237.

[9] Thomas G. Otte, "'Almost a law of nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905-12." Diplomacy and Statecraft 14.2 (2003): 77-118.

[10] Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: France and Britain Prepare for War, 1904-1914." (1969) pp 313-17..

[11] James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security." International Organization 47.2 (1993): 207-233. online

[12] Gerd Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War: The Introduction of Three-Year Conscription, 1913-1914 (1985).

[13] Trevor Wilson, "Britain's ‘Moral Commitment’ to France in August 1914." History 64.212 (1979): 380-390. online

[14] Brock, Michael (ed), Brock, Elinor (ed) (2014). Margot Asquith's Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street (Kindle ed.). 852-864: OUP Oxford; Reprint edition. ISBN 978-0198737728. {{cite book}}: |last1= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

[15] Otte, 488-89=-Clark 551

[16] Clark 145; Wilson article; Kennedy page 461, Searle pp 522-24; Steiner pages 230-37.

[17] Clayton Roberts and David F. Roberts, A History of England, Volume 2: 1688 to the present. Vol. 2 (3rd edition, 1991) p. 722.

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User:Rjensen/Britain-entry wwI

Contents

Background

Copy ex"Allies of WWI" Sept 10 2018

Propaganda

Entry

See also

Notes

Further reading

Historiography

Primary sources

External links

articles