Talk:World War II/Infobox/Archive 7

Archive 1

←

Archive 5

Archive 6

Archive 7

Archive 8

Archive 9

Archive 10

So...

Since this is the only infobox with an established talk page, would anyone object if I moved this to the main article? The reason for this it would be a lot easier for a new user to edit this if they wanted to add something and it is unlikely that a new user is going to know how to find something based off of {{}}'s surrounding a word. It's just an idea, but it would be better to help make the article a lot easier to edit in all respects. Kevin Rutherford (talk) 00:12, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

The status quo seems to work well enough, why change it. I don't think a newbie's alleged inability to figure out how to find something based off of {{}}'s surrounding a word is sufficient reason. --Martin (talk) 22:29, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Adding a notification to the WWII talk page that there is an active discussion about the template on this talk page would be reasonable imo. (Hohum ^@) 00:07, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Thailand

Thailand actually signed the Tripartite Pact, so shouldn't it be listed as an outright axis power? CuboneKing (talk) 01:21, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Yup, signatories as well as aiding Japan additionally by prior alliance. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 01:37, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Major gap in the period 1939 to 1941

There is a major gap in the period from 1939 to 1941 in the infobox. I've made some edits to fill that gap. --Martin (talk) 08:32, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

Please, no more marginal POV without discussions and unproven fairy-tails "Germany and USSR were co-belligerents". --Sambian kitten (talk) 12:24, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

Sambian, I support your request for discussion, but perhaps you could also try another, constructive response to Martin/Tammsalu. Because what we have here is difference of opinion, rather than fact versus fable. The relationship between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union prior to summer 1941 is certainly controversial among Wikipedia editors, but the sources often support Martin's general sentiment in a way. I don't recall the phrase "co-belligerent" being used in the sources; but I do recall more than 12 reliable, verifiable sources at WWII Talk referring to the Nazi-Soviet relationship as an "alliance". As far as I recall we're still waiting to see a source that states it was not an alliance, which I'd truly like to see. If you've got such a source, I'd appreciate you transcribing the relevant quote so that we can fold it in to consensus-building. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:39, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

As far as I recall we're still waiting to see a source that states it was not an alliance, which I'd truly like to see. Do you see the title "non-aggression pact"? --Sambian kitten (talk) 03:18, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Additionally, on first thought, I would not support the Baltic States going on the left because it suggests alignment with Britain and France. Also, the creeping coups in the Baltics were not de facto war-fighting. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:54, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

(edit conflict)We are not, because no proof of the opposite is needed per WP:BURDEN. In addition, the alliances may be political and military. For instance, two separate negotiations (about the political and military alliances) took place between the USSR, France and Britain in 1939. Being a political ally does not automatically impliy co-belligerence.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:57, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

Re Baltic states, I agree. Moreover, to list a neutral state in the military infobox is absolutely ridiculous.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:59, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

While it is true that two separate negotiations about the political and military alliances took place between the USSR, France and Britain in 1939, the fact remains that after 1939 until 1941 the Soviet Union had a pact with Germany. That is a considerable length of time, almost half the duration of the Great Patriotic War, yet this significant period in WW2 is seemingly ignored. That is a major gap. --Martin (talk) 21:20, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

One way or another, the Nazi-Soviet relationship needs to be added to the infobox, to reflect what the article says. There are a range of options - from a flag, to a subdivision and flag, to a box indicating tripolarity, to a box with top-down chronology, to a footnote. -Chumchum7 (talk) 22:09, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

And/or the map below added to the article, for clarity. -Chumchum7 (talk) 22:11, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

@ Martin. From 1940 until the June 1945 it had similar pact with Japan, so what?

Re "the Nazi-Soviet relationship needs to be added to the infobox", please, propose an adequate way to do that; however, other treaties, for example, the Grand Alliance, the Tripartite pact, etc, should be reflected too, to avoid one-sided view.

Re the map, strongly oppose. Leaving the bad (and obviously propagandistic) appearance beyond the scope, I do not see why do we need to focus on this part of this theatre only, as opposed to, e.g., the Western Europe, Scandinavia or Mediterranean.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:35, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

As it stands the infobox only presents a partial and misleading picture, listing the Soviet Union's involvement from 1941 to 1945, yet there were significant military operations involving the Soviet Union in the period 1939 to 1941, such as the Winter War, the Soviet invasion of Poland, the Occupation and annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union (1940) and the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. This needs to be reflected some way in the info box. Chumchum7 made some good suggestions, I think a box with top-down chronology would be the best solution. --Martin (talk) 02:54, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

yet there were significant military operations involving the Soviet Union in the period 1939 to 1941, such as the Winter War, the Soviet invasion of Poland, the Occupation and annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union (1940) and the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. And also undeclared war with Japan in 1935-1941. And even if we close eyes to absence of cooperation in Poland, how did Soviet actions to Finland, Baltic states and Romania let you to add Soviet to Axis? --Sambian kitten (talk) 03:15, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

I think a box with top-down chronology would be the best solution. Belligerents are listed by their contribution. 75% of Wehrmacht was eliminated by USSR. --Sambian kitten (talk) 03:15, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

We have two other footnotes; what's wrong with adding one noting why the Soviets only officially entered the war on the side of the Allies in 1941 (i.e. Operation Barbarossa)? No need for judgement calls this way. Ed ^{[talk] [majestic titan]} 03:36, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

But we already have the note (1941-1945). --Sambian kitten (talk) 03:54, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

...and? This would explain why they didn't fully enter the war until 1941... Ed ^{[talk] [majestic titan]} 04:05, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

I don't understand logic: to add footnote about USSR and not to add footnote abour USA, Poland, China and so on. What is special in USSR that absence of its open participation in war with Axis before June 1941 (border war with Japan in 1935-1939 and war in China with Japan in 1937-1941 were undeclared) require footnote, but late entry of USA doesn't require the same? --Sambian kitten (talk) 04:16, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Correct. Why the neutrality of the USSR, by contrast to that of other nations, e.g. Sweden, Finland (in 1939-41), Spain, Portugal, needs in additional explanations? In addition, if we add the footnote explaining why the USSR was neutral in 1939-41, we will need to explain that it was neutral towards Japan, etc.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:56, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Sorry, but USSR and Japan were only de-jure neutral. De-facto they waged war before April 1941. I wonder that no Russian storms this infobox for inclusion this fact (though almost every Russian knows about undeclared border war and about half of them knows about Soviet Volunteer Group). --Sambian kitten (talk) 05:06, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Dear Paul, one question about reliability. Suppose we have a book about Stalin rule. The book is written by respected authors, they are very popular in some countries, the book describes Stalin rule more or less precisely. But in one place authors claim: "Stalin liked to eat 1-month children on breakfast" - without any proof. Will this book be reliable source for Stalin's alleged cannibalism? (My example is not far from reality: some Russian so called "historians" report about "110 million victims of Stalinist rule", giant meat grinders and bloody sulze in NKVD's cellars; that's how in Russian language the ironical expression "One billion people was shot personally by Stalin" was introduced). --Sambian kitten (talk) 03:54, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

The example is artificial. No reputable scholar is able to write such a bullshit. As a rule, if some statement similar to that you refer to appears in a book, it has other flaws. For instance, if you show me concrete books and concrete authors who claim that Stalinism killed 110 million people, I will easily demonstrate you (with sources) that this source is either fringe or not notable. The commonly accepted number of Soviet Communism related deaths, including Civil war deaths, famine, GULAG and deportation deaths, repressions etc is in between 15 and 20 million. The commonly accepted (in Russia and the West) figures of military deaths is 8.5 million, plus 1.5 to 3 million POW deaths. If some source states otherwise, the search in western scholarly journals will demonstrate that this source is not reliable. For instance, Suvorov is highly criticised in the West (the only reputable scholar who supports him is Raack), Sokolov is generally ignored, and Rarzinsky is regarded as a playwright, not a historian.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:13, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

if you show me concrete books and concrete authors who claim that Stalinism killed 110 million people, I will easily demonstrate you (with sources) that this source is either fringe or not notable. Alexander Solzhenicyn, "Archipelag GULAG". No need to give me sources: I'm aware that NKVD executed 800 thousand people by NKVD documents.

OK, then another example. I saw in one Wikipedia article (I don't remember exactly where) that Soviet Union treated Soviet POWs as treasoners and sent all of them from German camps to GULAG. Moreover, there was reference on it. But this claim totally contradicts to NKVD documents which state that only 4% of former Soviet POWs were condemned and sentenced for treason. I know your answer: "Therefore those source isn't reliable". I agree. And something like that is with Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact. If one source claims that it was alliance, then it is as marginal as Japanese far-right leaflet denouncing Nanking Massacre. And while article may mention some marginal POV, the infobox should be left in mainstream. --Sambian kitten (talk) 05:38, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Re Archipelago. It is commonly accepted that the early estimated provided by Solzhenitsyn were gross exaggeration. Currently, Western scholars believe that the Great Purge deaths amounted 1.2 million (600+ executions and the rest camp executions and other camp deaths). Total GULAG deaths were about 2 millions. These deaths, combined with Soviet famine 1932-33, Civil war, collectivisation deaths, etc together amount 15-20 million. The sources saying otherwise are, as a rule, non-reliable or fringe.

This article is GULAG. This statement is there, because the sources, that meet reliable sources criteria, stat that. However, the same article gives the statistics you refer to. Since neutrality is one of WP pillars, we need to give both viewpoints.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:12, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Guys, this hypothetical discussion about reliability is off-topic to this thread "Major gap in the period 1939 to 1941". Per WP:NOTFORUM, please spin this hypothetical discussion out into its own thread somewhere else. --Martin (talk) 06:08, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes, this talk page is not a forum. However, the discussion is not too long.

@ SK. Please, keep in mind that the talk page is supposed to be used only for discussion of the article's subject. If you have more general questions, please ask them on my talk page.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:12, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Indeed there was significant military activity by the Soviet Union between 1939 to 1941, resulting in significant territorial expansion through the use of force or the threat of force. While Germany was occupying and annexaing territory in the West, the Soviet Union was occupying and annexing territory in the east. Yet this Infobox does not give due weight to this and I thing a foot note is insufficient. --Martin (talk) 05:29, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

How Soviet actions relate with the fairy-tales "USSR and Germany were co-belligerents" and inclusion of USSR to Axis column? --Sambian kitten (talk) 05:38, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

I'm not saying these Soviet actions relate to "USSR and Germany were co-belligerents", I am saying that for almost two years between 1939 and 1941 the Soviet Union was involved in significant military actions of a global nature (see also the Second Russo-Japanese War), the question is how do we properly reflect that fact in the infobox. --Martin (talk) 05:51, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

But it was you who created fantastic infobox with USSR and Germany in one column. --Sambian kitten (talk) 06:04, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

If mainstream POV states that USSR entered WWII on 22 June 1941 then everything happened before has no value. --Sambian kitten (talk) 06:04, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

(edit conflict)Ecuador and Peru also were at war during that period of time, so what?

Re "Indeed there was significant military activity by the Soviet Union between 1939 to 1941, resulting in significant territorial expansion through the use of force or the threat of force." Invasion of Poland (which lead to no declaration of war) and Soviet-Finnish war (a war of two powers that were not the member of any alliances that would later be transformed to the Allies and the Axis.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:12, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Never the less, the period from 1939-1941 saw the transfer of over 376,842 square kilometres through military means, that is pretty significant. Now it is a fact that during that period of territorial acquisition Stalin collaborated with the Nazis, for almost two years, how do we reflect that fact in the infobox. --Martin (talk) 06:47, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

If it's not part of WWII then there is absurdous to reflect it. Personally, I would like to reflect Soviet fighting with Fascism since 1936, it's undisputably significant. But I also understand that Spanish Civil war, Soviet-Japanese Border war, Third Soviet-Finnish (Winter) war aren't considered parts of WWII in mainstream viewpoint. So I don't bother Wikipedia with it. --Sambian kitten (talk) 17:31, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

That's a recognised but not universal viewpoint, and it's one of at least two recognised but not universal viewpoints. Another recognised but not universal viewpoint that the Soviet Union's alliance with Hitler "was cemented in blood," as Stalin described it.

Somehow we need to accommodate the two viewpoints in this infobox. Thank you for disclosing you'd like to see WWII characterised as a primarily Soviet struggle against fascism, that started in 1936. I'm an advocate of Wikipedia including the sometimes embarrassing truth (for those who champion the Western record) that the Soviet Union bore the vast majority of the burden of defeating Hitler by contrast to the Western Allies (e.g. US casualties in WWII were 1.5% of Soviet casualties). At the same time, we should be including the sometimes embarrassing truth (for those who champion the Soviet record) that the Soviets cooperated extremely closely with the Nazis 1939-1941, a cooperation that resulted in material gain. Many reliable sources have included this as an aspect of WWII. As a piece of trivia for your interest, this latter view is even shown in the political (therefore unusable) newspaper Socialist Worker here: [1] Note the newspaper describes the Soviet propaganda line being devoid of anti-fascism between late 1939 and early 1941 - and that Stalin could point to the refusal of the British and French to seal a pact against Hitler but his priority was not fighting fascism but establishing control of Eastern Europe in order to create a buffer zone between Russia and Germany. Personally I would prefer the use of a tripolar infobox, with the USSR, Tuva, Mongolia and communist China and communist Poland in the same vertical bar. But I would not pitch this because I would not expect it to ever get wide approval, and I suspect the only solution that could win consensus is a footnote. In that regard, I'm with Ed. But the wording would have to be very elegant and discussed here at length. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:04, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

I don't think a mere footnote would adequately convey something that significant. Perhaps a combination of a tripolar/bipolar with a top-down chronology, so for the period 1939-1940 we have a tripolar listing, then from 1941 it becomes a bipolar listing. I could make the change on the infobox to demonstrate it. --Martin (talk) 20:21, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Martin I agree with you in part, and with a few qualifications. This first phase of the war, 1939-1941, poses several complications for the current infobox: We have to consider that the USSR fought a war with Japan in 1939, during WWII. The USSR also fought an undeclared war against Allied Poland (the lack of declaration per se is no grounds for exclusion, Stalin was simply being the great strategist by not declaring war on an Allied power - we care about realpolitik, not propaganda), in some battles cooperating with the Nazis at a tactical level (note the photo of the joint Nazi-Soviet victory parade in the article), and took Allied prisoners of war. Japan was not, in fact, at war with the Allies Britain, France and Poland. But Japan was at war with China, which was not yet an Ally. And Japan was not yet, afaik, a member of the Axis either. Also, the USA significantly supported Britain and afaik fought a lethal naval war against Germany on the Atlantic. In any case I'd be curious to see your draft infobox, with the first phase of the war at the top. Perhaps it could work as a timeline/infobox hybrid, but try running that past American consensus ;-) -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:34, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

I've done a first trial of a proposed scheme, which can be adjusted further, what do you think? --Martin (talk) 21:22, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

I think you should self-revert and place it here! -Chumchum7 (talk) 21:44, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Since Martin haven't self-reverted, I reverted him. I strongly recommend Martin to keep in mind that the WWII is one of the most popular WP articles, and by making edits that contain blatant errors or national POV he undermined a credibility of Wikipedia as whole. I also recommend him to familiarise himself with literature before making these changes. Although the errors are quite obvious, I explain them below:

1. According to Martin's version, one of belligerents during 1939 was "Molotov-Ribbentrop pact".
   i. How can a "non-aggression pact" be a belligerent?
   ii. I saw only one flag in this section. Does it mean that the USSR signed a Pact with itself?
   
2. "The Axis" has been listed as a second belligerent since 1939. Does it mean that the Axis existed by Sept 1939? (In actuality, the Tripartite pact was signed on September 27, 1940, so on Sept 1, 1939, Poland was attacked by Germany, not by the Axis).
3. According the the Martin's infobox, the "Molotov-Ribbentrop pact" was at war with Poland until June 1941. Does it imply real hostilities or a de jure state of war? (If I remember correct, none of that was true: hostilities started on Sept 17 and ceased soon. I do not remember if the "London Poles" declared a war on the USSR, but the Polish government, before it left the Polish territory, didn't do that.)
4. The Martin's infobox absolutely ignores the fact that, during Sept 1939- June 1941, becides Poland, the opponents of Germany were Britain, France, Norway, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Greece, etc., in addition Japan and China were also de facto at war with each other, and full scale hostilities took place in East Asia.

All these blatant mistakes are a demonstration of how dangerous is to edit Wikipedia based on narrow national POV. Such a style is especially intolerable when we deal with the article about such global events as the WWII.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:04, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

@ Chumchum7.

Re "the lack of declaration per se is no grounds for exclusion, Stalin was simply being the great strategist by not declaring war on an Allied power - we care about realpolitik, not propaganda" Partially agree: the was between China and Japan had also not been declared until Dec 1941. However, you made two omissions during your considerations. Firstly, Poland was not an Allied power sensu stricto by that moment, because the Allies existed during that time were just France and Britain, and this alliance was a former Triple Entente, which became an Franco-British alliance when the Russian Empire ceased to exist. The British guarantees for Poland were strictly anti-German, stipulated a support only in a case of German attack. Neither Britain nor France had any obligation in the case of the Soviet attack, so had Stalin declared a war on Poland, that would not automatically lead to a war with the UK/France. Secondly, the fact is that Poland also declared no war on the USSR, and that fact is equally important.

Re "note the photo of the joint Nazi-Soviet victory parade in the article" This was a parade aimed to demonstrate that German troops were not forced from Brest-Litovsk by the Red Army, but left the city voluntarily. That is a normal ceremony between the armies of non-hostile states. Of course, that was a clear demonstration of good political relations between these two states, but that is insufficient for making a conclusion about military cooperation.

Re "And Japan was not yet, afaik, a member of the Axis either." A situation was even more tangled. Japan was not a member of the Axis simply because this pact would be signed only in Sept 1940. However, although Japan was not the member of the Axis, she was a member of a political alliance (Anti-Comintern pact) directed not against the UK, France or other western country, but against ... the USSR, and its provisions remained in force in 1939-41.

In summary, I suggest to add a footnote explaining that during 1939-40 the USSR, being formally neutral, militarily occupied and annexed the Eastern part of Poland, and waged a war against Finland, that lead to considerable Soviet territorial gains.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:41, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

If you don't forget to write that USSR decisively defeated Japan in border wars and fought with it in China, it will be very good footnote. --Sambian kitten (talk) 03:55, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Before you rather uncivilly accuse others of "national POV" you might want to disclose your own nationality here, otherwise please refactor your statement. I made the changes as a trial balloon on the apparent suggestion of Chumchum7 to illustrate a possible solution, I didn't see his subsequent request to move it to here as I was offline. As for your other points, as been discussed elsewhere, while the USSR was "formally neutral", it certainly was involved in significant hostile military action against its neighbours and supplied material assistance to Nazi Germany in the form of blockade breaking oil and raw material supplies and naval facilities and ice breaker assistance for German surface raiders navigating Arctic Ocean routes to the Pacific Ocean. I don't think a footnote is sufficient to convey the scale of collaboration from 1939 to 1941. --Martin (talk) 04:01, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

No "trial balloons" in such a high level article, please. You discredit Wikipedia as whole by using such an article as your sandbox.

Re "national POV", I do not care what your nationality is, and I am not intended to disclose mine. I also do not care about your POV, however, your edits have a strong Baltic POV, and, although it may be tolerable in less popular articles, it is hardly acceptable here.

Re "while the USSR was "formally neutral"". Please, read the talk page archives. A two-weeks long invasion of Poland and the war with non-aligned Finland (that would become soon an Axis co-belligerent) is not sufficient to speak about hostilities that allegedly lasted for almost two years. I already suggested how to reflect these two facts (I believe you do not request us to describe annexation of a part of Romania and the Baltic states as hostilities?), and, in a combination with the SK's proposal, it would be a balanced representation of what took place during Sept 1939-June 1941. Btw, I also suggest to add the footnotes explaining some details of the SSJW.

Re economic aid etc, that did not go beyond normal economic cooperation, similar to that between the USA and Japan during first years of SSJW. Again, please, read the archives. We discussed all of that less than a year ago.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:26, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Re "Baltic POV" is rather far fetched, given the body of Western literature on the matter; "Western POV" would be a better characterisation, unless you believe authors like James Mace and Robert Conquest are Balts. As far as the issue of "formal neutrality" and the discussion in the archives, that is a bi-polar view related to the alignment of the USSR with one side over the other. Certainly you cannot disagree that the USSR was following its own agenda during the period 1939 to 1941, which involved military hostilies (and yes its activities in the Baltics were seen as agression) and strategic cooperation with Nazi Germany at the expense of the Allies. Hence a tri-polar configuration is a better fit prior to 1941. --Martin (talk) 04:41, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Tripolarity is best solution for whole period, because even after 1941 there were clashes between pro-Soviet and pro-American/pro-British Allies (China, Yugoslavia, Greece, Poland). However, it's not mainstream POV, so it's definitely not for infobox. Infobox is just for common information by mainstream. Anything else is for article: non-mainstream versions and so on. --Sambian kitten (talk) 12:32, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Once again: if, by mainstream, USSR didn't participate in WWII before 22 June 1941, why should we bother with its behaviour before entry and reflect it? Does anybody worry that Turkey almost entried the war on Axis-side? Does anybody worry that UK and France before their entry were on pro-German side? What's unique in USSR, that pre-entry actions of anyone else shouldn't be mentioned but footnote for USSR's action is compulsory? --Sambian kitten (talk) 12:32, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

@Martin. The "Baltic POV" is not far fetched, because the mainstream historian of WWII do not believe that the USSR and Nazi Germany were equally responsible for WWII outbreak, that they were equally the aggressive, and that they were the allies. Mace and Conquest are not experts in the history of WWII. The Soviet actions against the Baltic states was forceful, but no serious scholars speak about them in terms of military aggression or conquest, because no hostilities took place there.

Re tripolarity, I do not see how it would reflect the state of things adequately. The USSR committed the act of aggression against Poland, however, that lasted for just a couple of weeks; (ii) was not an act of aggression against the UK/France de jure, and was not considered by them as such; the USSR started a war against neutral Finland, which had been morally supported by both France/Britain and Germany (the planned Franco/British military intervention was aimed primarily against Germany, because its major goal was to protect Norway and deprive Germany of Swedish iron ore), and later had fallen into German embraces; the USSR annexed a part of Romanian territory; the latter would become the Axis member soon. Therefore, the action of the USSR included one very short period of hostilities without declaration of war, one short war against one non-aligned state, and one border conflict against the future Axis state, which started spontaneously, because the officers of Kwantung Army had too mush free hand there. To list the USSR as a WWII belligerent in this situation is hardly correct. During the same period, Germany conquered Poland, Benilux, France, Greece, Yugoslavia, Noeway, Denmark, conducted full-scale naval warfare against Britain (including major engagement of large battleships), started and lost the air war against Britain, and started a war in Africa. That was a real war, and to list the USSR as a belligerent in this situation is simply misleading.

@ Sambian kitten. Your "Does anybody worry that UK and France before their entry were on pro-German side?" You should read more. Although the UK had no clear policy towards Germany, only some fraction in British leadership shared pro-German mood. The Vansitart's fraction, which was always strong, advocated anti-German policy. France, which had a long common border with Germany feared the latter much more, and was more prone to dialogue with the USSR. The problem was that the appeacers' fraction prevailed in the leadership of these two countries for short period of time, which eventually lead to WWII.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:42, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

@Paul, where have I stated "USSR and Nazi Germany were equally responsible for WWII outbreak" in this thread, please do not misattribute things to me I did not say and thus in that light your claims of "Baltic POV" may be seen as a baseless personal attack, I ask you to refactor your comments in that regard. Your justification that Soviet actions between 1939 to 1941 are inconsequential because "the action of the USSR included one very short period of hostilities without declaration of war, one short war against one non-aligned state, and one border conflict against the future Axis state" is amazing, that is three conflicts initiated by the USSR in less that two years! The notion that the aggression against Poland can be dismissed "because that lasted for just a couple of weeks" is gobsmacking, Germany's war against France only lasted a couple of weeks too, and Soviet aggression continued long after September 1939 with the Katyn massacre of 1940. It is simply a fact accepted by the mainstream that the USSR was an aggressive power pursuing its own interests between 1939 to 1941. That is why a tri-polar scheme for the pre-1941 period is necessary, otherwise to ignore this to leave a major gap in the mainstream history of WW2 --Martin (talk) 20:08, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Martin, to clarify, I only suggested you move the changes to here because the WWII article seems to have an unspoken convention of everything being thrashed out on the Talk pages first. Your proposal deserves respect and consideration and I will work with you toward consensus. Thanks for your ideas and please keep them coming. -Chumchum7 (talk) 19:00, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Re "please do not misattribute things to me I did not say" You probably didn't, or you believed you didn't. However, since I am discussing not you, but your contributions, let me re-iterate that the idea that Nazi Germany and the USSR were two major aggressors during the first phase of WWII follows directly from your contributions, independently on what you wanted to say in actuality. Let me re-iterate, it is not important what do you think, or what do you want to say, it is important what your edits read. Therefore, I have nothing to refactor.

Re Katyn'. It was the crime of the same type as the Great Purge was, i.e. it was a peace time mass killings.

Re "that is three conflicts initiated by the USSR in less that two years!" You definitely should read more: the Khalkhin Gol conflict (as well as a Lake Khasan conflict) was initiated by Japan.

Re "It is simply a fact accepted by the mainstream that the USSR was an aggressive power pursuing its own interests between 1939 to 1941." Agreed regarding "pursuing its own interests". I would say, the USSR continued the same policy (to pursue its own interests) even after that date. The only excuse for that is the fact that all other powers were doing the same. Regarding aggressions, please, list aggressive acts of the USSR in late 1940-41.

Re "Germany's war against France" One should take into account intensity of the hostilities. The USSR irrecoverable casualties during the invasion of Poland was close to those during the only one German naval battle .--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:35, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Paul, you are again appearing to continue to cast aspersions and mischaracterise my contributions rather than focus on the content issues at hand, even when I asked you to stop and refactor your previous comments about "Baltic POV", which you now refuse to do. Others have warned you of this behaviour before. If you insist on focusing on editors contributions, some may view your contributions as having a certain pro-Soviet POV and a tendency to obfuscate any negative aspects of Soviet rule, if one views your contributions to articles like Mass killings under Communist regimes and your efforts in renaming the article Mass rape of German women by Soviet Red Army if this discussion is anything to go by. However I will not focus on your contributions, because I know that in attacking another's contributions rather than focusing on content, one demonstrates the weaknesses of one's own position. So I trust there will be no further discussion of editor's contributions.

Paul, in regard to the content issues, I don't think any author considers Katyn a "peace time mass killing", and the fact that the Soviets allowed the Germans to do most of the fighting in Poland only to basically mop up near the end of that campaign two weeks later, therefore having relatively low casualties is irrelevant, afterall, the Anglo-American suffered relatively low casualtis after allowing the Soviet Union do the bulk of the fighting, only opening a second front in mid-1944 to basically mop up an almost defeated Germany. Let's not forget the 200,000 killed in the Winter War, which everyone acknowledges as being a parti of WW. As far as aggressive acts of the USSR in late 1940-41, they were busily considating their territorial gains, deporting over 300,000 Poles to Siberia and killing another 150,000, surely a breach of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 had the Soviet Union been a signatory. In the meantime the Soviet were also negotiating entry into the Axis in late 1940. Given the extensive discussion by others regarding co-belligerency, I think there is merit in Chumchum7's initial idea of a tri-polar layout as a third way. --Martin (talk) 05:25, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

Martin, it is interesting that the post where you discuss me as a contributor has the following edit summary Paul, please focus on content, not contributors. Verily, "Physician, heal thyself".

I am not sure if the mention of warning I allegedly got in the past is the good tactic, and I suggest you not to resort to that in future. With regard to my mischaracterisation of your contribution, let me remind you that to comment on a contribution is allowed by policy, and, whereas the statement that some text is POV-charged may be correct of wrong, it is not a violation of the behavioral rules.

Re my alleged pro-Soviet POV. Yes, I am active in the articles that are redundantly anti-Soviet, and I have to be slightly pro-Soviet to balance this bias. However, since I use (almost exclusively) mainstream western scholarly sources, and I am trying to stick with what they tell, my alleged pro-Soviet bias cannot be significant (I hope). For instance, if I find a statement that Stalinism killed 60 millions, I immediately remove it, because I know from western mainstream sources that total amount of premature deaths (from all causes) was 15-20 millions. If someone will try to add the statement that Stalin killed, e.g. 100,000 people, I'll revert it too, however, since Communists are much less active in Wikipedia than anti-Communists, I had no chance to do that so far.

Re my activity in MCuCR and MRoGWbSA, your allegations are simply false (sorry, but I cannot find more polite word). In addition, your attempts to present my behaviour as disruptive looks funny when we compare your and my user histories. BTW, my user history can be traced quite easily, because I never changed my user name.

Re the second part of your post, leaving your somewhat original statements beyond the scope, I see no problem in re-aggangement of the infobox, provided that they will adequately reflect a whole set of the events and opinions. try to propose your version. It would be good if you will take into account the argument I already put forward.

In summary, I hope this exchange will be the our last quarrel, and you will follow your own advice, which you can find in your own edit summary.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:03, 24 May 2011 (UTC)

RE: "Yes, I am active in the articles that are redundantly anti-Soviet, and I have to be slightly pro-Soviet to balance this bias.", you conflate factual with "anti-Soviet" therefore justifying purporting manufactured versions of history to be equally relevant to encyclopedic article content. I strive to have absolutely no bias. That the facts support my position is not my problem, nor is it yours to adopt a POV in opposition to my alleged biased POV. You really should not tip your hat this way that your username indeed reflects your purposeful agenda here on Wikipedia (Nikolai Kuznetsov, aka Wermacht Oberleutnant Paul Siebert). PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 01:52, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Interesting. Yes, I am aware of the fact that some members of currently non-existing mailing list were discussing the origin of my nick name, and this hypothesis has been also proposed. However, you completely ignore a possibility that (i) it may be my real name, or (ii) that I love baseball and took the name of one famous pitcher, or (iii) that I took a name of one biochemist, who has authored one of the most cited works in the area of molecular biology. Who knows? However, another fact is, and this is absolutely indisputable, that your latter post is an absolutely clear and unequivocal personal attack. As I already wrote, I am not going to take any actions in response, and I am not planning to do that in future. However, that does not mean that by attacking me you give more weight to the viewpoint you are trying to defend.

BTW, according to Bellamy's "Absolute War", the Kuznetsov's name was Kurt, not Paul.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:32, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Really, you state you consciously pursue a POV biased toward the Soviet account of history, I point out that your username, in the context you volunteered is consistent with your explicitly stated POV and I'm attacking you? PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 17:40, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Firstly, I will appreciate if in future you will not wedge your comments inside the other's post without asking for permission.

Secondly, the discussion of possible origin of other's nickname, and drawing conclusions based on the choice of one's (quite neutral) nick name is hardly appropriate, and is reminds me the worst days of the history associated with some notorious mail list.

Thirdly, you directly misinterpreted my words. I never wrote I "consciously pursue a POV biased toward the Soviet account of history". My statement was quite different, and I reproduce it below verbatim:

"Re my alleged pro-Soviet POV. Yes, I am active in the articles that are redundantly anti-Soviet, and I have to be slightly pro-Soviet to balance this bias. However, since I use (almost exclusively) mainstream western scholarly sources, and I am trying to stick with what they tell, my alleged pro-Soviet bias cannot be significant (I hope). For instance, if I find a statement that Stalinism killed 60 millions, I immediately remove it, because I know from western mainstream sources that total amount of premature deaths (from all causes) was 15-20 millions. If someone will try to add the statement that Stalin killed, e.g. 100,000 people, I'll revert it too, however, since Communists are much less active in Wikipedia than anti-Communists, I had no chance to do that so far."

Just a simple comparison of my text with your interpretation clearly demonstrate that your statement is completely false and misleading. In addition, you accusations are as laughable as the accusation of an elastic spring, which always push towards the equilibrium state, in inherent bias.

However, if you believe that my perceived bias poses a threat for Wikipedia, feel free to initiate RfC on my behaviour. I am sure, however, that if you will try to do that, the result will be quite disappointing for you.

And, finally, let me remind you that that is a WWII infobox template, and this is not an appropriate place for discussion of my humble person. Try to follow the Martin's advice and discuss the contributions, not a contributor, please.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:23, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Japan & China

This infobox inaccurately gives the impression that Britain and France were at war with Japan from 1939; that China was a member of the Allies at least from 1939; and that Japan was a member of the Axis from at least 1939. Especially because this is a high profile article, we have a problem here that cannot be neglected any longer. Two solutions have come to mind so far. One would be to change the start date for Japan to 1941 (possibly with footnote to explain war with China had been raging since 1937) and change the China start date to whenever it became an Ally. Alternatively, to avoid having to make these changes, we remove the inflexible (and arguably too simplistic) terms 'Axis' and 'Allies' from the top - that might open up some fresh solutions for the infobox, perhaps making consensus easier to achieve. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:03, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Another solution would be for someone to design a cloud diagram as an alternative to this traditional, clunky infobox. This was a complicated war, and such precision is merited on such a high profile article. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:08, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Among other issues, there is a general bifurcation of WWII centering primarily on a number of events in 1941 which is not dealt with adequately (well, really, not at all) by the template as it now stands. One option is that contemporary history courses on WWII tend to align participants under the general headings of "Axis" and "Allies" and not applying the Tripartite signatories as the exclusive criteria of being on the Axis or Allied side, indicating events/transitions regarding countries being on one side or the other. As noted, there is also an artificial conflation of theaters of war. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 16:17, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

It's also a bit of a factual issue that the template implies Stalin was an "Allied" leader for the duration, let alone being shown atop the leader board. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 16:28, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

To what Chumchum7 says, I would add that neither the Axis nor the Allies existed in 1939. The Axis was created in late 1940, and the Allies (the Grand Alliance) was formed in late 1941. The initial Anglo-French alliance was the remnant of the Triple Entente (minus Russia), which ceased to exist after defeat of France in 1940. Poland was not a full member of this alliance, because, as it was stipulated by a secret protocol, British guarantees for Poland would come in force only in a case of aggression by Germany, and not by any other state. Therefore, the infobox, which implies that in 1941 the USSR and the USA joined some already existing alliance, is misleading: in actuality, this alliance had been created in 1941.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:38, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Results section, la deuxième partie

@Paul re: above, I've inflamed nothing. It's your contention that while you don't personally support Stalin you can kinda sorta see the Soviet point of view (code word for ravanchist version of history "restoring" the territorial integrity of the Russian empire). Likewise, you were the one who brought up the Poles as being immoral in international and domestic relationships therefore forfeiting sovereign territorial claims. (It's also odd that you wouldn't care about contemporary Russian rhetoric on the topic as it is unchanged from Stalin's, but another conversation.) The schism in Polish-Lithuanian relations between the wars was one of the great modern tragedies of history between two peoples, don't demean it by making it a pawn in a conversation to make a point—and what is that point, exactly? PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:55, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

You also appear to conflate 19th century colonialism with 20th century territorial aggression, also another topic. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:57, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Since the only concrete question you asked in your post was:

"The schism in Polish-Lithuanian relations between the wars was one of the great modern tragedies of history between two peoples, don't demean it by making it a pawn in a conversation to make a point—and what is that point, exactly? "

i believe you will not mind me to answer only on that. My point was quite simple: whereas the lands east from the Curzon line were not indigenous Russian territory (if under "Russian" we mean the state that developed from the Duchy of Moscow), these lands were not Polish either. They belonged to the Great Duchy of Lithuania, which was de facto the second major successor of Kievan Rus', and, during some period of history it was a biggest East Slav state, and more developed one. BTW, even the present days Russian grammar has been developed there. Later, this state united with Poland, and during last centuries of the history of Rzhecz Pospolita, this fact had been forgotten. In actuality, when we speak about division of Poland between Austria, Prussia and Russia, we speak about division of Polish-Lithuanian lands, not about Polish lands only. In XX century, when Poland re-appeared again, it emerged not as a multiethnic state, but as the mononational Polish state, where other nations were opressed (I can provide a reliable source for that). Therefore, Polish claims on the whole territory of former Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth's land were somewhat ridiculous. We can discuss if Cresy had to be divided between Belorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR and Lithuania (all these three nations were a successors of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and their claims did have some ground), or they had to be given to Poland, however, this question has only a theoretical value now, because Poland had successfully resolved this issue by means of her excellent cavalry, and then confirmed that by dyplomatic means by signing a treaty with Soviet Russia. Conquests of disputable lands were not unusual in XIX-begining of XX centuries, and I agree that the USSR was supposed to respect the treaties it signed. However, we must remember that, by contrast to Germany, the USSR in 1939 took the disputed land, that had been taken by force in 1920. Of course, that does not justify the Soviet actions, however, it does not allow us to speak about some outstanding crime. And, by the way, as a result of this Soviet action this land belongs to whom it should belong to: to the Ukrainians, to the Lithuanians and to the Belarussians. If you disagree with this my statement, you thereby imply that these three nations are currently illegally possess the land that de jure belong do Poland. It that what you wanted to say?--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:04, 2 June 2011 (UTC)

Another version

1939-1941 The USSR, in treaty with Nazi Germany, took most of Poland, annexed the three Baltic States and parts of Romania and Finland. The Nazi-Soviet relationship deteriorated from late 1940, and by summer 1941 the two powers were at war with each other.

Don't like it? Have another go. Like it? Say so. We need to get some progress going. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:28, 26 July 2011 (UTC)

"On the eve of the WWII the USSR and Germany signed the non aggression treaty, secretly dividing Central Europe onto two spheres of influence. After the war started, the USSR invaded and annexed territories that felt into its sphere of influence, and started the war against Finland. The Nazi-Soviet relationship deteriorated from late 1940, and on June 22, 1941 Germany launched the full scale invasion of the USSR."

That is longer, but much more accurate.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:19, 26 July 2011 (UTC)

If we are making progress I will support progress. I am a bit concerned that it would seem like the USSR had no role in starting that war. "after the war started" sounds like "it happened, so we just walked in", apparently a common way to say things for a certain recent politician. It misses completely the fact that the Soviet Union was waging a war of aggression, with components of genocide, against the Polish nation. The war with Finland was a continuation of the Winter War, and while contemporary with the events of WW2, is, as many other conflicts the Soviet Union provoked, a sideline and very hard to place in the two-team metaphor. But, as I say, progress is good. Let's make it NPOV and we could go home...

I have no problem with starting with "On the eve of the WWII the USSR and Germany signed the non aggression treaty, secretly dividing Central Europe into two spheres of influence.", (we could even cut the "spheres of influence" for brevity, but I know you hold to those...) inserting then an NPOV sentence about the Soviet aggression to Poland and the Baltics, and closing with "On June 22, 1941 Germany launched the full scale invasion of the USSR.". Are we getting there? YamaPlos talk 03:37, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Bessarabia and North Bukovina was annexed not militarily. Annexation of the Baltic states was not a military aggression. Most sources agree with that. It had been accomplished forcefully and illegally, however, we cannot talk about military invasion here, just about intervention (serious Baltic scholars, e.g. Lauri Malksoo agree with that). Many sources also describe Soviet action in Poland as intervention. The only territorial acquisition that had been made by the USSR in 1939-40 via the full scale war was the land around Leningrad (as a result of the Winter War against non-aligned Finland). Therefore, the wording should reflect that, to avoid confusion.

Regarding genocide, one has to keep in mind that there are two different way to define it. A strict legal definition of genocide cannot be applied to the Soviet actions. A loose definition can, however, the action of many democratic states also fit this definition (starting from starvation of Irish or Indian population by Britain to recent US actions in Iraq). Therefore, since we all live in the glass house, I would suggest to avoid throwing the genocide stones...

Regarding your concern that "it would seem like the USSR had no role in starting that war", it had. However, as the writing of such historians as Erickson, Gorodetsky, Haslam, Carley, Overy, Carr, Beloff and others demonstrate, his role in that was not greater that the role of Britain or France.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:48, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

RE "Annexation of the Baltic states was not a military aggression. Most sources agree with that. It had been accomplished forcefully and illegally, however, we cannot talk about military invasion here, just about intervention", that is incorrect. Most scholars agree they were militarily occupied. The Baltic states were under a naval and air blockade by the Soviets, who shot down one civilian aircraft, and massed hundreds of thousands of troops on the border and deployed across the Baltic states. "Forcibly" is just a euphanism for "militarily". --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 04:18, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

I propose the following changes in underlined text:

"On the eve of the WWII the USSR and Germany signed the non aggression treaty, secretly dividing Eastern Europe onto two spheres of influence. After the war started, the USSR invaded and incorporated territories that felt into its sphere and attacked Finland. Despite the Soviet Union's attempts to formalise their relationship, it deteriorated from late 1940 and on June 22, 1941 Germany launched the full scale invasion of the USSR."

A little bit bit more clarity. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 03:51, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Not bad. Minor comments. Firstly, whereas the definitions of Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe and Western Europe are quite strict, the term "Central Europe" is more vague. Finland, or Estonia, for instance, are not a part of Eastern Europe. I suggest "Central" Europe because vagueness of this term is more correct in this case.

Re "Despite the Soviet Union's attempts to formalise their relationship" Unsatisfactory and redundant. The attempts were mutual, and the initiative to start negotiations belonged to Ribbentrop. Moreover, by requesting too much during these negotiations, the USSR hardly demonstrated its genuine desire to join the Axis. And, if we go in these details, why don't we mention the "Soviet Union's attempts to establish the collective security system in Europe"?--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:05, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Apparently the Soviet's idea of "collective security system" in Europe was to have Europe within the Soviet sphere of influence. Certainly friendship agreements and border treaties were effected during the period and with regard to the axis talks, in the end the Soviets persisted in offering proposals while the German's stopped responding. In fact Hitler was annoyed that the Soviet would come up with yet another proposal before he could unlease his war! --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 04:13, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

No. You mix the Stalin's and Litvinov's lines. Try to read more, you have an access to good sources.

Re Soviet proposals, are you seriously claim that Hitler attacked the USSR because he had been annoyed with Stalin's proposals? You probably are joking... Again, I suggest you to read more good sources.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:18, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

What unusual did Soviet Union that its actions deserve to be mentioned not only in the article but in the infobox also? There is an article, it describes Soviet actions. Footnotes for controversial behavior will only inflate the infobox, almost every country made something controversial. Also, this infobox doesn't reflect complex three-sided nature of Warsaw Uprising with much more casualties than Soviet takeover of Western Belorussia and Ukraine. This infobox doesn't reflect that war in China was also three-sided. --Sambian kitten (talk) 04:44, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

The "unusual thing", Sambian kitten, is the changing of sides, and size of the affront. Soviet POV, which Mr Siebert here is defending, is to try to hide the despicable manoeuvrings of the Soviet authorities and government (they certainly are not unique at that, but proved masters), and pretend that the URSS participation in WW2 began in 1941 when they were attacked, when in fact and in any NPOV source it is clear to see that the URSS was an aggressor, in agreement with another one, that began the war in Europe. Because of the noted bulk and intensity of its role, since 1939, and later also, the USSR needs some special treatment, as Mr. Siebert has long held to explain why he supports to place it on top, even though he pretends it was not there for the first two years of the war... It is my opinion that an NPOV case should eventually made to consider the Soviets a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany for 1939-1941, but until we get there, this matter cannot be hidden any longer. YamaPlos talk 15:14, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Re: "Soviet POV pretend that the URSS participation in WW2 began in 1941" - sorry, but it looks like that you're not familiar with Soviet POV. Soviet historians always pointed out that USSR and Nazi Germany were sworn enemies since 1933, that USSR fought with fascism since October of 1936. 22 June of 1941 was never portrayed as entering in the war, moreover, Soviet historians never gave explicitly entry date of USSR. It's easy to understand why they did it: World War II was portrayed as struggle between Communism and Fascism. 2-year "coffee-break", of course, is completely uncompatible with this idea. "June 1941 as date entry of USSR" came to Russia only after the Soviet defeat in Cold war, when remnants of defeated country had to receive the propaganda of victors (USA). --Sambian kitten (talk) 18:38, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

The claim that I advocate Soviet POV is rather strong, and, since outstanding claims need in outstanding support, I expect such a support to be provided. In particular, I expect you to present the mainstream sources that prove, clearly and unequivocally, that such western scholars as Gorodetsky, Haslam, Resis, Carley, Overy, and Robert express the pro-Soviet POV. Taking into account that you presented not even a single reputable source so far, I doubt you will be able to do that, and until that hane been done I see no reason to discuss anything with you because the talk page is not a soapbox.

PS. In the case if you will be unable to present the sources, a simple apology from you and a promise not to throw such accusations in future will be sufficient to restore a friendly atmosphere and renew the discussion.

Regards.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:18, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Mr Siebert, this is a rather peculiar request you make. Especially when your posts systematically are out-of-topic, have an aggressive and curt tone, and insist in bringing in authors that other contributors to Wikipedia are pointing out as being known revisionists, and interpretations clearly against well known facts of history. Yet, noblesse oblige, I must thank you for opening my eyes to how widespread the Soviet POV is in WW2 pages. It will be a long haul to clean it all up! Please, again, let me ask you for NPOV, and since we're at it, for remaining on topic and courteous. Thank you! YamaPlos talk 01:34, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Up your eyes: I've explained why Paul's POV (supported by mainstream historians) can't be Soviet POV. Please read a little more Soviet historical books. --Sambian kitten (talk) 04:27, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Yamaplos, NPOV means representing fairly, proportionately, and as far as possible without bias, all significant views that have been published by reliable sources. The sources I use represent significant views and are3 reliable. I am ready to discuss other reliable sources presenting alternative viewpoints, however, neutrality requires us to present the sources used by me in any event. I reject (and I am intended to reject in future) all what you propose simply because you do not reveal your sources. However, I am ready to renew the discussion when (I hope "when", not "if") you will present the sources your opinion is based on. However, we have nothing to discuss so far.

Regarding my tone, your behaviour demonstrate much less respect to the opponent. I spend my time in attempts to present good quality sources and build concrete arguments based on that, and you respond that all of that is not what you like because that is a Soviet POV. That is much more insulting and unacceptable, so my advise will be "Physician, heal thyself".--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:21, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

It's interesting that in Warsaw Uprising Soviet Union and Polish insurgents are in different columns. But in the Invasion of Poland Germany and USSR moved in one column. We see completely different ways: "We cannot move USSR to one column with Poland because they almost didn't cooperate despite they fought against common enemy" but "We should move USSR to one column with Germany because they fought against common enemy despite they didn't cooperate militarily". --Sambian kitten (talk) 04:44, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

You SK don't understand a very simple thing. The USSR was bad and Poland was good, so they should not be together. By contrast, Nazi Germany and USSR were bad, so they should be combined in the same column. Speaking seriously, you are right. Try to discuss this question on the relevant talk page.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:12, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

If we are going to think in simplistic terms, it is a rather simplistic to think that since the SU was good between 1941-1945, that it was always good and we must not mention that it was bad between 1939-1941. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 05:53, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

On the exchanged here and the section above:

• Stalin already failed to overthrow the Estonian government in a failed Communist putsch in the 1920's (Lenin, to his credit, opposed acts of aggression against the newly independent former Russian Baltic provinces) and maps of the Baltic S.S.R.s were printed before the U.S.S.R. invaded in WWII
• The Hitler-Stalin collusion in the partition of Poland, starting World War II, is an undeniable fact.

Even if you paint every Soviet act of blatant aggression against its neighbors as an act of self-defense (BTW, this is made quite evident in the cornucopia of propaganda that was being churned out in 1939 and 1940 by the Soviets and their American Communist lackeys justifying their attacks on Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland--denouncing them all inter alia as nests of Nazi Fascism, also blaming Finland and Poland for being the obstinate ones in refusing Soviet "assistance"), that does not ameliorate or change its abrogation of international law in violating the sovereignty of its neighbors. If you murder someone who is attacking you, that is an act of self defense. If you murder a group of individuals between you and someone you think might eventually be out to murder you so you can pile up bodies in a barricade and impede your anticipated attacker's progress, it does not make those preemptive murders an act of self-defense. Speculations on Stalin's intents at the eve of WWII (although history is clear on his personal desires throughout his career to subjugate certainly the Baltics if not the rest of Eastern Europe) do not change the fact of co-belligerence in starting WWII. (Although going back to Roberts I should say he is correct about Hitler-Stalin-Baltics, there is strong evidence that Stalin's invasion of the Baltics was the straw that broke the camel's back and compelled Hitler to invade the U.S.S.R. as untrustworthy and dangerous.) PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 14:03, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

From a propaganda tome of 1943, e.g., related to Poland:

   "After helping the Nazi lion gobble up Czechoslovakia the Polish jackal suddenly realized that it was next on the Nazi menu. In the spring of 1939 Poland began shamefaced efforts to renew the ties it had dropped in the democratic camp and reminded itself that it was still a member of ihe League of Nations. It even began to consider the question of coming to terms with the Soviet Union. But there was a cleavage in the Polish ruling class which stultified any decisive step in that direction. The Polish bourgeoisie, with industrial interests mainly in Western Poland, i.e., in Poland proper, had most to fear from Germany and therefore pressed for a Soviet alliance. But the military clique of Marshal Smigly-Rydz and Colonel Beck, which was in the saddle, mostly East Polish landowners with vast estates in western White Russia and the Ukraine, had no stomach for a Soviet alliance. The dominant wing of the Polish ruling class preferred risking the independence of Poland rather than their private estates.

   "There is no doubt that the outbreak of this war was hastened by the disinclination of the Allies to accept the Soviet conditions for effective Allied-Soviet military cooperation, and that, in turn, was primarily due to the suicidal obstinacy of the Polish Government in refusing to permit the Red Army to occupy battle stations in "Eastern Poland." Nevertheless, when war broke out, the Soviet Union, if for no other than selfish reasons, was only too anxious for Poland's resistance to the Nazis to be as prolonged as possible."

The complete crock of s**t is available online for anyone interested. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 14:20, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

If you don't mind, I'll address only the second part of your post, because I am not intended to discuss unsubstantiated assertions. The main feature of propaganda is that it takes correct facts and presents in in a wrong light. The facts presented here are correct. Thus, Poland did participated in partition of Czechoslovakia (Zaolzie, October 1938), so, whereas the term "jackal" is not scholarly, I cannot say it was completely unadequate (of course, by no means I support usage of such a term on WP pages).

The claim that it was a conflict of interests in pre-war Poland is also quite reasonable: in almost every state (including pre-war USSR) different political groups existed that advocated different foreign policy (Litvinov vs Stalin lines, see Albert Resis. The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 33-56.)

Regarding the Baltic states and Polish refusal to permit its occupation, as an immediate cause of the war, that is also correct, although the wording is totally unsatisfactory. During the summer of 1939, the USSR, Britain and France conducted full scale negotiations about political and military alliance against Germany. Obviously, had this alliance been signed we would have no war (at least, the war would started in different time, in different place and between different participants). However, political, and then military negotiations had stalled over two reasons. Firstly, political negotiations had stalled because, whereas the USSR was supposed to field the largest army in the case of the conflict with Germany, and to take the greatest burden in the war against the later, it had no freedom of manoeuvre. The major Soviet concern was that Germany may secretly concentrate the military power in Estonia and Latvia, who were seen by him as deeply anti-Soviet, and whose actions supported this stereotype (Michael Jabara Carley. End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1993), pp. 303-341) and, under the cover of their formal neutrality, to attack the USSR at the moment suitable for them. Molotov proposed the term "indirect aggression", which meant that any political shift of these two Baltic states towards Germany should be interpreted as an act of the indirect aggression against the USSR, so the latter would have free hand in that case. Britain refused to agree on that because it could lead to the occupation of these two states by the USSR, and the political negotiations had stalled in July 1939. Later, after the Soviet request, the military negotiations started, where the concrete military actions were being discussed. The military alliance was supposed to be signed together with the political one, because (as Soviet and French delegations hoped) the political negotiations, which stalled but had never been terminated, would sooner or later be signed. However, "the negotiations stalled on the fundamental question of Soviet forces passing through Romanian and Polish territory in the event of war, to which the Polish government would not give agreement in advance." (see. Derek Watson. Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jun., 2000), pp. 695-722) (See also. Carley, Op. cit.)

So it would be quite correct to say that refusal of the Baltic states and Poland to collaborate with Britain, France and the USSR was an immediate reason of the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance that could prevent the WWII. Of course, we can speculate if it would be possible for Poland and the Baltic states to protect their independence in the case if they agreed to collaborate, however, it is impossible to deny the fact that instead of hypothetical loss of their independence we got a real world war. I suggest you to read more neutral English sources.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:07, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Re: "whereas the term "jackal" is not scholarly, I cannot say it was completely unadequate (of course, by no means I support usage of such a term on WP pages)." Churchill described pre-war Poland as "Hyena of Eastern Europe" :) It looks like Churchill was commie to the bones :) --Sambian kitten (talk) 18:43, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Re: "So it would be quite correct to say that refusal of the Baltic states and Poland to collaborate with Britain, France and the USSR was an immediate reason of the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance that could prevent the WWII", that is a misinterpretation of the source you cited above, which clearly states Britain refused to enter into a pact that could lead to the occupation of the Baltic states the USSR. The idea that a neutral state not party to the negotiations between the USSR, Britain and France somehow is responsible for the failure of that negotiation is preposterous. However Nazi Germany was quite willing to accommodate the territorial ambitions of the USSR and signed such a pact. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 21:20, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Which of two sources cited by me do you mean? Whereas Watson does not discuss the position of the Baltic states, Carley writes:

"The key issues were over guarantees of the Baltic states, a definition of 'indirect aggression', and negotiations for a military convention tied to the political agreement. The British feared giving the Soviet government licence to threaten Baltic independence. The Soviet Union feared German aggression through the Baltic with or without consent. Meanwhile, the Baltic states looked on nervously. They preferred a year of Nazi occupation to a day of Soviet-which was what worried the Soviet government."

so it would be correct to say that the Baltic states were not simply passive victims.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:50, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

The quote above attributed to Carley attempts to figure out intentionality in a cute antropomorphic way, "feared", Looked on nervously", "preferred", "worried". Again Mr. Siebert brings in an author that does not delve on facts, but on interpretations. It is printed material, thus valid for rourcing of Wikipedia. However, this is the wrong article for that, this one has no businnes about the emotional lives of European Powers of the 20th century. Please remain in topic. Thanks! YamaPlos talk 01:23, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

I understand that it is hard for you to accept what Carley writes, because that contradicts to your beliefs. If you have any doubts in the reliability of this source, you can get a third opinion about it on the WP:RSN. However, you will be disappointed with the outcome of this enterprise: the source is among the best mainstream secondary sources, and the RSN consensus will demonstrate that. If you will continue to in the same vein, I'll simply ignore your posts. Your complaints about my refusal to accept your viewpoint, references to the neutrality policy etc will be rejected by the WP community as unsubstantiated.

Meanwhile, anticipating further Martin's arguments, I inform him that Carley based his conclusion on the letters from Naggiar and Seeds (Naggiar, no s 449-54, 6 June 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10; and Seeds, no 139, 23 June 1939, C8928/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23069.) In the case if someone do not know who Naggiar and Seeds were, I suggest them to find that out by themselves. And, below is a continuation of the quote from Carley:

"The Baltic ambassadors made regular inquiries at the Foreign Office; British ambassadors reported Baltic anxiety and anti-Soviet hostility. In early June Estonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts with Germany; German officers supervised the building of their fortifications."

Regards.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:37, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Re: "German officers supervised the building of their fortifications", I note there is no reference or footnote in Carley's paper to support this assertion, because there was never any such thing, Estonia was formally a neutral country that had previously entered into an non-aggression pact with the USSR in 1932. What Seeds and Naggiar were reporting was their discussions with Molotov in Moscow where Molotov re-defined "indirect aggression" with the hypothetical scenario of the Germans assisting in the building of fortifications in Estonia: "One scenario, Molotov said, might be that the Estonian or Latvian military would use "German officers or instructors," who could transform "those armies into instruments of aggression against the Soviet Union."" (David Crowe, The Baltic states and the great powers: foreign relations, 1938-1940).' --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 11:32, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

We have one reliable source that state the fact, and another reliable source (although you provided no full reference, I believe it is reliable) that does not completely confirm that. What is the reason to reject the former? Your own speculations?

The "Baltic anxiety and anti-Soviet hostility" is a fact. The treaty with Germany, which had been signed exactly at the moment Molotov had been discussed its concerns with its western colleagues is also the fact. The German assistance with fortifications seems to be a fact also: Crowe's statement does not contradict to what Carley says.

Re "What Seeds and Naggiar were reporting was their discussions with Molotov", I do not think you are right. Carley writes "The Baltic ambassadors made regular inquiries at the Foreign Office; British ambassadors reported Baltic anxiety and anti-Soviet hostility", not "Molotov complained that the Baltic ambassadors made regular inquiries...". The most likely, Seeds and Naggiar were discussing the news Seeds got form London, or from its contacts with the Baltic ambassadors to Moscow. One way or the another all of that is the original research (which you started first), so I suggest you to accept the obvious and to stop.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:09, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

PS. Your reference to formal neutrality of Estonia as an argument seems to be a double standards: the USSR was also formally neutral in 1939-41, however, that does not prevent us form discussing its concrete actions, some of which did not fit its formally neutral status. Neutrality of Estonia and Latvia did not prevent them from allowing (inviting?) a German cruiser to arrive to Tallinn on June 13, 1939 and four German destroyers to Riga on June 15? Although I took that from the primary source (the reports of Soviet ambassadors to Moscow), these facts are easy to check, I believe.

Watson writes about "warm reception of a German military mission to Finland, Latvia and Estonia in late June", exactly during the triple negotiations in Moscow. I have a feeling that Estonia and Latvia were doing their best the negotiations to fail.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:56, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

As I recall at the time of the visits by German warships, Germany was not at war with anyone, while on the other hand the USSR happily provided naval basing for German U-boats and icebreakers to enable German surface raiders to travel to the Pacific via the Arctic during Germany's war with Britain. But it seems your original thesis "So it would be quite correct to say that refusal of the Baltic states and Poland to collaborate with Britain, France and the USSR was an immediate reason of the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance that could prevent the WWII" is synthesis, because no source you have presented actually makes such a wild claim. Along with your other claim "so it would be correct to say that the Baltic states were not simply passive victims", is tantamount to a robber blaming the victim for forcing him to rob him because the victim refused to hand over the money. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 21:09, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Yes, formally, Estonia and Latvia had a right to invite German warships, however, after such a clear demonstration of pro-German and anti-Soviet position it is hard to speak about their de facto neutrality. Interestingly, you carefully distinguish between nominal and actual neutrality when you speak about the USSR, but you seem to be much more liberal when you speak about the Baltic states. Double standards?

My thesis is fully supported by the sources cited by me. You have an access to them, please, read them in full. (I probably made some exaggerations, because that was not the sole reason. However, you should keep in mind that this is just a talk page, not the main article.)

I would suggest another analogy. At a dark street some person approached to a man and, being convinced that he was a robber, started to wave with a fake gun in front of him. By accident, this man was armed, and being unaware that the gun was not real, he killed this person. In my opinion, this analogy is closer. I am not sure about real extent of Estonian and Latvian germanofily, however, they managed to create an impression that they are ready to join Germany, so, taking into account Stalin's paranoia, he saw no choice but occupy them. Yes, the Baltic states became Stalin's victims, however, before that happened, whole Europe became the victim of their unflexibility and egoism.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:48, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

This thesis of yours that "whole Europe became the victim of their unflexibility and egoism" is isn't published anywhere, it appears to be totally fringe. In any case the published pretext for occupying the Baltic states given by the Soviets was the claim that Estonia allowed a Polish submarine to escape Tallinn harbour. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 00:08, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

No more fringe than your allegories. However, since we do not discuss any concrete edits, but simply are friendly soapbixing, both your or my allegories are ok. However, if you suggest to stop all of that, I don't mind.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:57, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

Flag of slovakia

Flag of Slovakia in infobox is wrong. This looks like russian flag. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Kmeto (talk • contribs) 22:23, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

see here http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/sk-ww2.html

YamaPlos talk 20:50, 23 July 2011 (UTC)

Interesting reading on topic

On topic, here is military historian Andrew Bacevich (West Point, Ph.D. Princeton, now at Boston; he's an anti-war conservative opposed to neoconservatism, and endorsed Obama):

Extended content

The National Interest, Sept-Oct 2007 Man of steel, re-forged by Andrew J. Bacevich Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War; 1939-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 496 pp., $35.00. STALIN'S WARS by Geoffrey Roberts, a professor of history at University College Cork, is in many respects a model of scholarship. It draws on an impressive array of Russian, British and American archives as well as a large number of published documents and secondary sources. It is impeccably organized. The author writes with clarity, and authority. He advances a sharply defined and well-supported argument about an important topic, challenging the conventional wisdom and offering a thoroughly substantiated alternative. His canvas is large, but his brushstrokes are precise and vigorous. Stalin's Wars is revisionism of a high order. In brief, the story, that Roberts tells goes like this: Josef Stalin, uncontested leader of the Soviet Union from 1927 until his death in 1953, deserves to be remembered as a great statesman--indeed, as the greatest of the age. Although Stalin made his share of mistakes, especially in the early phases of World War II, he learned from those mistakes and thereby grew in wisdom and stature. Among allied chieftains, he alone was irreplaceable. He, not Churchill and not Roosevelt, was the true architect of victory, "the dictator who defeated Hitler and helped save the world for democracy." Furthermore, once Germany went down to defeat--with British and American leaders immediately turning on the Soviet Union--Stalin strove valiantly to sustain Allied unity. Time and again he exerted himself to avert the confrontation that became the Cold War. Even after his efforts failed, "He strove in the late 1940s and early 1950s to revive detente with the west." In British and American eyes, Stalin became the embodiment of the totalitarian ideologue and warmonger. This was a misperception. To the very end, "Stalin continued to struggle for the lasting peace that he saw as his legacy." In denying Stalin the reconciliation for which he devoutly worked, Western governments succeeded only in inflicting grave injury on the Soviet people. The East-West rivalry thrust upon Stalin nipped in the bud his postwar efforts to nurture within the Soviet Union a "more relaxed social and political order." Roberts neither denies nor conceals the cruelty and ruthlessness that marked the Stalinist era. He freely admits that Stalin was "responsible for the deaths of millions of his own citizens." He concedes that in the 1930s Stalin presided over the Great Terror in which "millions were arrested and hundreds of thousands were shot." He notes that Stalin directed "a process of ethnic cleansing involving the arrest, deportation and execution of hundreds of thousands of people living in border areas" of the Soviet Union. He holds Stalin accountable for the Katyn Forest massacre of 1940, involving the liquidation of 20,000 Polish officers and government officials. Although speculating that "Stalin must have bitterly regretted the subsequent embarrassment and complications" when the events at Katyn Forest became known, Roberts makes it clear that the Soviet leader employed mass murder as an instrument of policy--and did so without compunction. Still, Roberts leaves the distinct impression that when it comes to evaluating Stalin's standing as a statesman, such crimes qualify as incidental. He acknowledges them in order to dismiss them. Whether intentionally or not, Roberts suggests that Stalin's penchant for ordering people shot qualifies as a sort of personal quirk, akin perhaps to FDR's infidelities or Churchill's fondness for drink. For Roberts, there are only two marks on Stalin's report card that really count: The first conferred for defeating Hitler, the second for doing his level best to forestall the Cold War. In each instance, Roberts awards Stalin an A-plus. When it comes to Hitler, moreover, the achievement is an emphatically personal one. According to Roberts, it was not the Red Army or Stalin's generals that defeated the Wehrmacht, but the individual serving as both People's Commissar for Defense and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The author's account of the German failure to capture the Soviet capital in December 1941 makes the point. "Stalin Saves Moscow", it begins. Roberts is equally insistent that Stalin's well-intentioned efforts to sustain the Grand Alliance after 1945 foundered for one reason only: Britain and the United States maliciously obstructed his entirely reasonable quest "to establish friendly regimes in Eastern Europe" and to create "a united but peace-loving and democratic Germany." In essence, Roberts takes Stalin at his word as a man who sought only peace. Once having embraced this view, he finds nothing in Soviet policy at odds with Stalin's professed aspiration. "Time and again during the war", he writes, "Stalin denied that his aim was revolution or the imposition of communism." For Roberts, such denials affirm the benign nature of Stalin's wartime aims. In public remarks offered on the occasion of Germany's surrender, "Stalin emphasized that the defeat of Hitler meant freedom and peace between peoples." This, Roberts suggests, accurately represents Stalin's fondest hope. Roberts credits the Soviet dictator with a self-induced sincerity. He finds "no reason to suppose that Stalin and the Soviet leadership did not believe their own propaganda about the essentially peace-loving policy of the USSR." In this sense, Stalin's commitment to "freedom and peace between peoples" bears comparison with President Bush's post-9/11 commitment to eliminating tyranny. For Roberts, such high-minded professions mean everything. THERE ARE at least three problems with this depiction of Stalin as great statesman and man of peace. The first problem relates to the nature of the Grand Alliance, which Roberts misinterprets. The second relates to the nature of statecraft, which Roberts misunderstands. The third relates to the moral obligation inherent in the craft of history, which Roberts abdicates. The misinterpretation, the misunderstanding and the abdication all work to Stalin's advantage, adding luster to his reputation. Yet none of the three is persuasive or acceptable. The Grand Alliance existed for one purpose only, which was not to nurture "freedom and peace between peoples", but to defeat Nazi Germany. Absent the shared perception that Hitler posed an intolerable threat, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union would never have forged their compact in the first place. With Hitler's removal from the scene, the unraveling of that partnership became all but inevitable. Hopeful sentiments expressed by Stalin--or for that matter, by Churchill and Roosevelt--do not change that essential reality. Moreover, even during its heyday, the alliance was as much a competitive enterprise as it was a collaborative one. Even as the Big Three professed their common devotion to freedom and peace, they simultaneously maneuvered against one another for advantage on matters of far more immediate concern. This was true whether the issue at hand involved the opening of the second front, the disposition of the Balkans, the occupation of Germany or the future of the Far East. For any great power, the essential prerequisite of "peace" is that others should accede to the aspiring hegemon's own requirements. Certainly, this is how Stalin understood the term, whether during World War II or after. Note, for example, that sixty years before 9/11, Stalin promulgated a variant of what we today call the Bush Doctrine. "Defending our country", he told a graduating class of Red Army officers in May 1941, "we must act offensively." Stalin was anticipating the Bush Administration's rationale for invading Iraq: Peace tomorrow requires the initiation of war today against those who stubbornly resist our legitimate demands. To assign to the Soviet Union then (or to the United States today) a defensive orientation is to open up a rich vein of interpretive possibilities, which Roberts is quick to tap on Stalin's behalf. At first glance, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the subsequent Soviet complicity in dismembering Poland might seem reprehensible. Roberts sees these actions as entirely justifiable: the first an effort to avert war, the second a prudential attempt to acquire additional strategic depth. On the surface, the Soviet invasion of Finland that same year might look like naked aggression. Upon reconsideration, however, Roberts faults the Finns for bringing the conflict on themselves. "The 'Winter War' with Finland was not of Stalin's choosing", he writes. When the Finns refused to grant the Soviet Union territorial concessions needed to mount a proper defense of Leningrad, however, they left Stalin with no recourse. Besides, Roberts explains, Soviet leaders genuinely expected the Finns to welcome the Red Army as liberators. This pattern continued through the war and into the postwar period. To enhance Soviet power and influence, Stalin took whatever he could--or more accurately, whatever his legions enabled him to take. As long as the Red Army bore the brunt of the fighting against a common foe, Stalin's allies granted him considerable leeway to do as he wished, especially in Eastern Europe. Once Germany collapsed (and the successful testing of the atomic bomb rendered Soviet participation in the war against Japan less important), their attitude became less permissive. Hence, rather than fulfilling his vision of "a united but peace-loving and democratic Germany"--that is, one dominated by the Soviet Union--Stalin had to settle for a divided Germany partly occupied by Soviet troops. To attribute this outcome--and the Cold War that ensued--to British and American leaders obstructing or undermining Stalin's efforts to build a lasting peace is to wildly misconstrue the nature of international politics. Then there is the question of whether Stalin deserves to be included in the pantheon of great statesmen. In making his case for the affirmative, Roberts devotes well over 300 pages to the period from 1939 to 1947 followed by a mere 24 pages for the period 1948 to 1953, when his account abruptly ends. Yet gauging Stalin's achievements requires consideration of the years following his death. Statecraft is not a charitable pursuit. The measure of merit is clear: Success entails advancing the interests of the state. Based on that criterion, Stalin's legacy was almost entirely negative. The victory he engineered over Hitler cost the Soviet people dearly both in human costs and resources. Beyond survival, it yielded few tangible benefits. Moscow gained an empire, but it proved almost worthless. Certainly, it never turned a profit. Moreover, because Stalin had ruled by terror and intimidation, the system he bequeathed to his successors possessed limited legitimacy and almost no dynamism. Hoping to rejuvenate the Soviet economy, his successors almost immediately embarked upon a campaign of de-Stalinization. Although reform efforts continued sporadically from the era of Khrushchev to the era of Gorbachev, Soviet leaders never succeeded in eliminating the pathologies left over from the Stalinist era. The collapse of the Soviet empire and of the Soviet Union itself--drab, stagnant and soulless--stands as the ultimate verdict on Stalin's achievements as a statesman. If World War II produced a master of statecraft, then surely it was Roosevelt. He won the most at the least cost. Alone among great powers, only the United States emerged from the war stronger than when the war had begun. Fate dealt Roosevelt a strong hand--far stronger than Churchill's--and he played it well. As a consequence of victory, Washington too acquired an empire of sorts, but this empire helped sustain American prosperity and bolstered American security. Hardly less significantly, FDR succeeded by 1945 in restoring popular confidence in basic institutions, muting the impact of the Great Depression. To his successors Roosevelt bequeathed widely shared expectations that the "American Century" was meant to continue indefinitely, as it has, despite periodically ill-advised policies and reckless misadventures. The contrast with Stalin's legacy could hardly be greater. (Whether or not the American Century can survive the folly of George W. Bush remains to be seen.) Finally, there is the question of Stalin's crimes and how they should figure in reckoning with his place in history. As Roberts embarks upon his effort to re-evaluate the Soviet leader, he assures his readers that "we can undertake that task without fear of moral hazard." This strikes me as not only misguided but even dangerous. Although insisting that his intent is "not to rehabilitate Stalin but to re-vision him", Roberts shows negligible interest in considering whether Stalin's record passes muster with respect to any commonly accepted standards of right and wrong. His dispassion amounts to a form of ethical narcosis. The effect, even if inadvertent, is to subvert the moral consensus informing our understanding of the twentieth century. That consensus rests in no small part on the conviction that the Stalinist regime cannot be regarded as other than patently evil. Geoffrey Roberts now encourages us to think otherwise. Furthermore, Stalin's Wars appears at a moment when such encouragement to think otherwise is ongoing in other, even more sensitive quarters. The inclination to do so is especially apparent in connection with the suffering endured by citizens of the Third Reich. Matters once quietly ignored or viewed as off-limits are now receiving sympathetic consideration: The indiscriminate killing of German noncombatants as a result of the Combined Bomber Offensive of 1943-1945; the tens or hundreds of thousands of German women raped and assaulted by soldiers of the victorious Red Army entering Berlin; the forced expulsion of millions of ethnic Germans caught on the wrong side of borders when the war ended. Admitting these victims into the narrative of World War II is both justified and unavoidable. But to pretend that the process of doing so is not fraught with hazard is foolishness: If the victims of violence are all innocent, does it follow that the perpetrators of that violence are equally culpable? The answer to that question must be an unequivocal no. Here political historians have a particular obligation to render unambiguous judgments, discriminating right from wrong. By tacitly issuing Stalin a moral waiver, Roberts shirks that obligation. In doing so, he opens the door to further revisionism of the most pernicious sort. If Stalin gets a pass, then perhaps Mao deserves similar reassessment: Is it not likely that he too believed his own propaganda? Perhaps too the events of the 1930s and 1940s might look different if considered from Hitler's point of view. Not unlike Stalin, Hitler yearned for the peace that derives from absolute dominion. Stalin's Wars concludes with this strange injunction: "History can make us wiser, if we allow it to" (emphasis in the original)--seemingly suggesting that "we" are to sit quietly at History's feet receiving instruction. I prefer T. S. Eliot's warning about history's "cunning passages [and] contrived corridors." Stalin's Wars is such a contrived corridor. The unwary will enter at their peril. Andrew J. Bacevich is a professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is the editor of The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II (Columbia University Press, 2007). The National Interest, Inc.

Thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:29, 25 July 2011 (UTC)

Chumchum, I am not sure I understand the reason why have you posted this review. That Roberts' work is a revision of Cold War views is a well known fact, and that is quite natural: the situation had changed, the USSR had collapsed, many new archival materials became available for public, and, obviously, the history of the WWII, which (in the west) had been written based mostly on captured German documents (and in German memoirs), and, therefore, from German perspective, had to be revised. Roberts, as well as some other scholars has made this job, and, as many sources note, did that rather well. Of course, his writings are not impeccable, he, as well as almost every historian, has some weaknesses, and biases, however, most of what the sources called "revision" in early 1990s have become the mainstream views now. Bacevich's criticism is aimed mostly at the Roberts' moral assertions about Stalin, and I agree that his point, at least partially, is valid. However, that is not a subject of our discussion, and, based on what Bacevich writes about the archival job made by Roberts ("It draws on an impressive array of Russian, British and American archives as well as a large number of published documents and secondary sources. It is impeccably organized. The author writes with clarity, and authority. He advances a sharply defined and well-supported argument about an important topic, challenging the conventional wisdom and offering a thoroughly substantiated alternative. His canvas is large, but his brushstrokes are precise and vigorous. Stalin's Wars is revisionism of a high order.") I see no criticism of this aspect of the Roberts' work.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:29, 26 July 2011 (UTC)

Paul, so you can be sure: This is to establish that Mr.Roberts is described by a non-trivial scholar as a Soviet POV revisionist, and thus a rather unconvincing source to build NPOV Wikipedia articles especially in this particular instance, where the community objective is to redress POV, inaccurate content. YamaPlos talk 03:07, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Have you read the quotes from other reviews on Roberts presented by me?--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:29, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

I have. However, intent (for example, self-protection, taken at face value per Soviet propaganda) behind the allegedly prophylactic occupation and annexation of one's neighbors does not change its basic nature as an act of belligerence against sovereign neighbors. Alas, another book I will have to buy and read to find the source of your misinterpretation, as I cannot fathom a recognized scholar stating as you maintain here that the U.S.S.R. was not a co-belligerent in the start of World War II. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 14:10, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Of course, I do not maintain that the USSR was not a co-belligerent. I state that, since no singe mainstream opinion exists on that account, we cannot write it was. If we place the Soviet flag in the right part of the infobox, it would be tantamount to the statement that, according to mainstream views the USSR participated in WWII on the German side until June 1941, which, obviously is simply false (for the whole period of 1939-41), or questionable (for Sept-Oct 1939). That is why we discuss that in the main article, but not in the infobox.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:20, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Re "misinterpretation". I expect you to throw such accusations after you obtained (and presented) needed evidences, not before that. Otherwise, I will simply ignore your posts, and will not take into account your opinion, which, by the way, is easy to do, because it is not frequently supported by reliable mainstream sources. I neither request not expect apologies from you, the only thing I expect is that you will not do that in future.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:26, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Paul, your tone is starting to be out of place. Please, you are obviously a person with access to information. Is any of that NPOV? If so, do you mind sharing it, and limiting Soviet POV articles and authors to the respective page in Wikipedia? Thanks! 01:17, 28 July 2011 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Yamaplos (talk • contribs)

Firstly, I never throw an accusation in misinterpretation of sources without providing necessary evidences, and I myself am always trying to interpret the sources carefully. I act in full accordance with our policy and guidelines, and I expect others to behave accordingly. By contrast, your soapboxing is becoming unacceptable, and I suggest you to stop that.

Secondly, the sources cannot express NPOV, because neutrality is just an internal Wikipedia policy explaining how to deal with the sources, and it cannot be applied to the sources themselves. The sources may be reliable or unreliable, mainstream, minority or fringe, and NPOV requires us to describe all mainstream views, to mention significant minority views and to ignore fringe views. All sources used by me are reliable and reflect mainstream, or significant minority views. That is easy to confirm by going to WP:RSN and asking the question there. I am not intended to do that, however, because, from my previous experience I know the outcome in advance, and I am not going to waste other users' time by asking obvious things. However, should you have any doubts I advise you to go there and ask. In future all your claims such as "I believe this source is wrong" will be simply ignored by me.

Thirdly, I cannot share the sources with others, because our policy does not allow me to so that. In the rare cases when the links to free good quality sources are available, I provide them. For instance, I gave you the link to the Glantz's lecture. Have you read it?--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:52, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Move Greece up

I want to move Greece up in Allies list and set it right after Yugoslavia, because Greece fought with Axis more effectively (5 months against Italy and about a month with Germany-Italy, then 3 years of famous and heroic Resistance) than Belgium (17 days of official war and 4 years of less broad, than in Greece, Resistance) and Netherlands (4 days of anti-German war, 2 months of anti-Japanese war, less broad Resistance). --Sambian kitten (talk) 19:51, 25 July 2011 (UTC)

You have my support for that, provided you quit using kitsch words like 'heroic' ;-) Oh and while you're at it, you could do the Thailand change as discussed above. -Chumchum7 (talk) 19:56, 25 July 2011 (UTC)

This is an intriguing idea, that does have some merit: put the latecomers lower in the list, those whose role in the war was longer above. A couple problems: some interpret the Japanese attack on China as part of WW2, putting those nations ahead of anybody else in term of time. Also, there is the actual extent an impact of any given country to the overall effort of the war, and the "globalness" of their role. Without the US equipment, the Soviet Union and the Allied powers in general would have not been able to compete with Germany. Then we have Paul's argument, toward those that killed and died the most... I once had to draw the handicap regulations for a yacht race. This looks about as complex... :-). Yet, for this particular case, I concur to put Greece right after Yugoslavia.YamaPlos talk 03:58, 26 July 2011 (UTC)

Let me remind you that, per such a widely recognized expert as David Glantz, after the victories at Stalingrad the USSR could not lose the war, and after Kursk Germany was doomed to defeat. According to Glantz, without the USA the war would last for one more year, and the Soviet losses would be even higher, however, the USSR would win anyway. Let me also point out that during the Barbarossa, the most critical period of the war in the East the US were neutral, and the USSR got only a very limited help from Britain. By the moment of the Stalingrad victory the full scale lend-lease program had not started yet, so the help from the US was also very limited. Only in the second part of the war, when its outcome had already been pre-determined, did the USSR obtain a full scale economic and military assistance from the West. Indeed this aid saved many million lives of Soviet solders (who got more armament, and whose burden was made easier by distracting of the part (up to 40%) of the Wehrmacht troops to the West), and civilians, who otherwise would simply died from starvation, because the country simply had no food for both the army and civilian population, however, we must remember that this assistance had no effect on the outcome of the war.

Frankly speaking, constant disputes over the order of the flags in the infobox are the demonstration that many users see the infobox non neutral, which undermines a credibility of Wikipedia. I see no problem with changing the order from the present one to the chronological (or even alphabetical), or even if we replace the flags with the links to the articles devoted to the Axis and the Allies, accordingly. However, that would require us to modify the article, because, despite the recent attempts to improve a situation, the coverage of the Eastern front events, which by their scale and implication constitutes at least 50% of the WWII as whole, is still not adequate. The present order of flags partially compensates for this disbalance, however, if the infobox will be modified as you proposed, the article should be modified accordingly, and the latter is a conditio sine qua non.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:36, 26 July 2011 (UTC)

Since most Glantz's writing in peer-reviewed journals and books are not available for free, below is the quote from his freely available lecture, where he briefly summarized his views.

"Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken 12 to 18 months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet soldiers could have waded at France’s Atlantic beaches."

The lecture can be found here [2]. I advise you to read it carefully, because it dispels many western stereotypes about the WWII.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:10, 26 July 2011 (UTC)

Pardon me, I have a hard time believing this, maybe it's a typo. Do you mean to assert seriously that the US assistance to the Soviet Union had no effect on the war? Wow! Speaking of sine qua non, Paul, let's focus on NPOV, if you don't mind, and let us move forward. Otherwise this becomes an agitprop exercise. As to the war in the East, compared to the geographical extent of the Pacific, the geopolitics and long lasting impact of the reorganization of the Mediterranean and Near East, the East is not so hot, especially in our day and age after the Soviet empire broke down and its memory is receding where bad dream go. You are of course entitled to a personal opinion, but personal opinions should not be imposed on all Wikipedia users. We want of course to give the Soviet Union its due, its glory, its abuses, but to consider that the East, which was very much a one-sided operation, especially as you yourself assert, has to be the bulk of WW2 is missing point of NPOV and the globallity of WW2. My goal is to help this article escape the clutches of revisionism, and be updated to what is a NPOV approach. I wish you could help, since it is clear you are well versed in sources and procedures, but I am concerned that your priority might not be to improve the article, but to retain an albeit interesting, dated and one-sided approach to history. Forgive me, but the evidence is rather clear by now. YamaPlos talk 03:23, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Have you read my post carefully? By contrast to you, I assert nothing, I just reproduce what reliable sources say. Glantz says that, whereas American contribution was immense, it had no serious effect on the outcome of the war. It just made victory faster and easier, and decreased the number of Allied losses. Regarding your other assertions, I am not a proponent of the "What if" speculations, however you must concede that whereas the victory of Japan in Pacific would have no serious effect on the outcome of the WWII, victory of Germany in Europe would automatically lead to the global Axis victory. That is obvious, and that is why Churchill explicitly requested the USSR to join the war against Japan only if that would not distract it from the European theatre. The fate of the world has been decided in the Eastern Europe, and if you do not understand that you should simply read more.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:38, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Paul, I have given that article Glantz the amount of attention deserved. It is a gedenkexperiment, or whatever you say a thought thing, a maybe, a what-if scenario, not an expression of actual facts - I used to like that kind of thing when I was 10 or so, "Dad, what would have happened if ...". I like Makarenko, I really like Arkady Gaidar, but I can recognize a novel when I see one, even though Makarenko certainly should be considered a scholar in his field. Maybe that is the source of our problems: since Soviet historography is little more than fiction, or novelization, people who source from it cannot any longer separate one thing from the other. When I was 13 or so I enjoyed "SS GB", an interesting what-if exercise similar to what you shared with us from Glantz, but where the author was kind enough to present as a novel. Note that I mention that merely as a comparison, in no way do I want this to be a discussion about fiction, we have had too much of that already. Please, Paul, let's remain firmly on topic, and all contributions of yours are welcome if you can get NPOV ones, on topic, and related to facts. Maybe you can start a Wikipedia article of what-ifs, and source it from Glantz and Roberts. Otherwise, this is becoming to feel like you are taking advantage of our patience. This is not a place to be discussing "what could have happened". Thank you. YamaPlos talk 01:14, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

I'm not sure that a Japanese victory would have had no impact, as Stalin would then have to defend the Russian far-east diluting his effort in the west, finding himself in a two front war. See Axis power negotiations on the division of Asia during World War II --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 04:22, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

The USSR had. During the whole WWII the USSR kept more that half million troops along the Amur river, one thousand tanks, etc., which was sufficient to contain the million Kwantung army that also was permanently stationed along the Soviet border. Japan was ready to attack at least twice, in late 1941 and 1942, but the Knalkhin Gol lesson had been duly learnt by Japanese military, and they preferred not to take risk.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:56, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Never the less the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact allowed the Soviets to focus on the West. In any case, Albert Weeks states[3] that the view that US aid to the SU was inconsequential is a "boilerplated Soviet viewpoint" that has been refuted by modern Russian historians and documents from recently opened Soviet archives. In fact Soviet Army Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov said that U.S. Lend-Lease aid was indispensable, despite Soviet propaganda that sought to minimize its importance --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 06:00, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Never in my posts I claimed that the American help was "inconsequential". It came at the second phase of the EF, when the most decisive battles have been won by the USSR, however, that is not a sign of American bad will: it was technically impossible for the US to provide this help earlier. Lend-Lease help was extremely valuable, however, it "may be seen as a temporary substitute for foreign trade" (Roger Munting. Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 495-510). One also has to remember that the major recipient of the American help was Britain, not the USSR (Muntig, op. cit.), which gives us a hint about a real role of the Lend-Lease in Soviet war efforts.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:36, 27 July 2011 (UTC)

Paul, Martin, can we please remain on topic? This here is about moving Greece up. Which I support. Thanks! YamaPlos talk 01:14, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Yamaplos, let me remind you that the distraction was caused by your notion about the US/USSR you made on 03:58, 26 July 2011 (UTC). Regarding the gedenkexperiment, we are allowed to rely on the opinions of the experts in the field. You made an assertion (unsubstantiated), and I responded by providing the reliable source that makes the opposite conclusion, which noone can ignore. The Glantz's opinion, by contrast to yours, has significant weight, so I believe, the question is closed now.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:58, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

USSR footnote, Version #3: the dates version

Dates are British English usage, per article Talk page header. If we're going to use one date, we can use them all, as a quick chronology, like this version:

On 23 August 1939 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty, secretly dividing Eastern Europe. The USSR invaded Poland on 17 September 1939, attacked Finland on 30 September 1939, occupied the three Baltic States in October 1939 (incorporating them in June 1940), and took the region of Bessarabia from Romania by 4 July 1940. On 22 June 1941, Germany invaded the USSR.

Its getting about time for something to go up on the template. If this version gets support, I'll put it up. Yamaplos' initial query was legitimate and we have a responsibility to welcome him as a newcomer. Thank you, Yamaplos, and please don't go away.

Btw, to be sure, do we have references for Thailand and Iraq being co-belligerents? -Chumchum7 (talk) 19:03, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

1. "secretly dividing Eastern Europe onto the spheres of influence" This omission is critical.
2. The USSR did not occupy the Baltic states in 1939. It just stationed its troops there. The troops were located in strictly defined positions and did not interfere into the internal affairs. Remove as redundant.
3. The Baltic states and Finland are not a part of Eastern Europe. "Eastern" should be removed.
4. It is necessary to clarify that the USSR remained formally neutral (with regard to the Axis/the Allies) during the period of Sept 1939-June 1941.
5. "...and annexed a part of Romanian territory took the region of Bessarabia from Romania< by 4 July 1940. You forgot Bukovina.
6. "On 22 June 1941, Germany invaded the USSR." This footnote is about the USSR, not Germany. It is necessary to say that the period of nominal neutrality of the USSR ended on 22 June 1941, when Germany invaded the USSR.

Summarizing all said above, and, after removal of redundant info, the footnote should be:

"Shortly before the WWII, the USSR and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty, secretly dividing Europe onto spheres of influence. Whereas it was formally neutral, the USSR participated in division of Poland in September 1939, started a war against non-aligned Finland (November 1939 – March 1940), occupied and annexed three Baltic states and eastern part of Romania in mid 1940. When Germany attacked the USSR on 22 June 1941, it officially joined the WWII on the Allied joined the WWII on the anti-Axis side."

--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:44, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

PS. I agree with Chumchum that it would be good if Yamaplos continued to edit Wikipedia, because, despite his weaknesses he has a potential to become a good editor. However, his contribution will become useful only when he will realise how Wikipedia works. I will gladly help him with that if he will request me to do that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:54, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Re #1 Why is it crucial? Re #2 This seems like semantics. Re #3 For these purposes they are usually considered "Eastern Europe". Using just "Europe" gives a wrong impression. Certainly the MR Pact did not concern itself with a division of Spain or Cyprus. Re #5 Not sure that this is necessary. This is a footnote.

Also, what was "official" about "joining" the Allied side, on June 22 1941? AFAIR there was no treaty or anything of the sort signed on that day between SU and the Allies, nor anything of the kind. "Wound up on Allied side due to forces beyond its control" would be more accurate.Volunteer Marek (talk) 20:56, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Thanks VM. Of the several versions of the USSR footnote proposed on this page, which is your preferred one? -Chumchum7 (talk) 21:03, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

I think it's evolving in the positive direction. I think the one right at the start of this section is pretty good, though I'd add to its end that the Soviet Union then wound up on the Allies' side - though without the "officially" or a particular date.Volunteer Marek (talk) 21:24, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

(edit conflict)Re #1. Because the pact did not stipulate territorial division (except probably Poland). It was rather an agreement to refrain from any action in the other's sphere of influence.

Re #2. Probably. But my version is more accurate.

Re #3. "Eastern Europe" is a rather strict geographical term. However, all of that is really semantic.

Re #5. You seem to forget the purpose of this footnote. Its aim is to demonstrate the involvement of the USSR in the European politics in 1939-41.

Re "AFAIR there was no treaty or anything of the sort signed on that day between SU and the Allies" Because there were no Allies by that moment: France ceased to be an Ally after its surrender, Poland had no full scale alliance with Britain (just British guaranties in the case of the attack from Germany). The Commonwealth members, other than Britain, were not involved in the European affairs. The Alliance ("the Grand Alliance") started to form then Britain approached the USSR after June 22, 1941, and it was formalised later, in 1942, after USA joined it, and the declaration of the United Nations had been signed. In that sense, you are right, my wording is not precise.

Chumchum, let me remind you that that is not a vote. --Paul Siebert (talk) 21:26, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Quick comment on only one aspect: you link to the Wikipedia article on Eastern Europe. That article has one of the neutrality tags on it and opens up with "Eastern Europe is the eastern part of Europe. The term is highly context-dependent and even volatile, as there are "almost as many definitions of Eastern Europe as there are scholars of the region"". I believe in this context the term "Eastern Europe" is indeed used frequently to refer at least to the Baltics.Volunteer Marek (talk) 21:34, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Re "with the Allies" part - yes but the main point is that the word "official" does not belong in there. There was nothing "official" about it. And even though, strictly speaking there were no Allies in 1941 (well, you did have Britain, Polish Gov in Exile, couple others) notably at that point in time the USSR did not conclude any treaties or agreements with any of the countries that would become the Allies. Anyway, my main objection here is to the word "officially".Volunteer Marek (talk) 21:36, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Re Re#5 - oops, sorry that was meant as a comment on #4. For the Romanian one we could include "and Bukovina"?Volunteer Marek (talk) 21:39, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

So VM, would this cover it?..

On 23 August 1939 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty, secretly dividing Eastern Europe. The USSR invaded Poland on 17 September 1939, attacked Finland on 30 September 1939, annexed the three Baltic States in June 1940, and took the regions of Bessarabia and Bukovina from Romania by 4 July 1940. On 22 June 1941, the USSR was invaded by Germany and subsequently joined the alliance against the Axis powers. ?

Btw did you ever read round to reading this http://www.economist.com/node/17249038 ? -Chumchum7 (talk) 21:55, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

(edit conflict)Re Eastern Europe, this region is defined by the United Nations geoscheme

Re the Allies, I believe our viewpoints coincide. Are you satisfied with the change I made?

Re Bukovina, imo, what is important is the information that it was the Eastern part of Romania. "Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina" seems to be redundant and confusing for non-specialists.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:57, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Chumchum, your version does not take into account some of my concerns. Please, explain why did you ignore them.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:00, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Re Eastern Europe - I'm not sure how useful a later definition by the UN is here. How do sources describe the area affected by MRP? We could go with "Eastern and Northern Europe" except that'd also be inaccurate since the MRP did not address Sweden and Norway. Other than that, if we have the part about neutrality in there it should be "while" rather than "whereas" and if we keep the spheres of influence (which I'm not sure we should) it should be "into" rather than "onto" - the obvious problem here is that while the treaty talked about 'spheres of influence' this was more or less a euphemism for territorial carving up of the region. I'm fine with just going with "eastern part of Romania" though I would change the end of that sentence to something like "between end of 1939 and mid 1940".Volunteer Marek (talk) 22:20, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

Paul's second point, the Soviet Union militarily occupied the Baltic states between June 13th and 14th, 1940, no scholar disputes this, and subsequantely the USSR claimed these countries requested to join the USSR in July 1940, both the USSR and Russia today deny annexing anyone. So it would be more accurately to call it occupation. Better wording would be "occupied the three Baltic States in June 1940".

His fourth point fourth point "the USSR remained formally neutral during the period of Sept 1939-June 1941." The literature claims this "neutrality" was a sham, for example Albert Weeks states:

Soviet "neutrality" was indeed abandoned with the era of collaboration between the Kremlin and Berlin. "Ours is a unique kind of neutrality, Without fighting, we aqcuire territory" declared Zhdanov with heavy irony to the plenum of the Leningrad Provicince Party Committee, November 20, 1940, amid laughter from the delegates[4]

The fact the USSR provided basing for German U-boats near Murmansk and icebreakers to assist German surface raiders to navigate Soviet territorial waters in the Artic to sink British shipping in the Pacific proves what a sham it was. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 23:36, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

We have had a long discussion on another talk page, and numerous arguments had been provided both pro et contra the term "occupation". We obtained even the opinion of a reputable scholar on how to interpret its own words. The conclusion was inconclusive, however, the single term "occupation" is definitely inappropriate.

The discussion you refer to relates to the applicability of the term "occupation" for the period up to 1991, where as in the context of June 1940 nobody disputes that the Baltic states were occupied. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 02:17, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

Regarding Weeks, the only strength of this scholar is his anti-Sovietism. It is a very superficial writer, who doe not work carefully with sources, and who trust everything that paint the USSR in black colours. Thus, Michael Jabara Carley (Review: Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936-1941: A Review Article. Author: Michael Jabara Carley. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7 (Nov., 2004), pp. 1081-1093) notes that Weeks uses the alleged Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo on 19 August 1939, a document that has definitely been forged and not used by serious scholars. In addition, the fact that Weeks supports Suvorov's (Resun's) writing speaks for itself. No serious western historians (except probably Raack) support this "historian". Carley concludes that

"Pons demonstrates the kind of work that can be done in Soviet archives even with limited access. Whether one agrees or not with his main contentions, one must respect his archival research. The same cannot be said of Weeks, whose book seems a caricature of the emigrd or US State Department view of a bellicose and duplicitous Soviet Union." (ibid.)

Therefore, if you want to present some example, Weeks can hardly be used for that. try to find more reputable historian.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:54, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

@VM. These details are minor, so if we agree in general, I don't mind to add that, although I think "whereas" is better because we use British English here.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:01, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

Ok, so just to sum up: the major issues in the wording left are the "neutrality" and the "spheres of influence" - correct?Volunteer Marek (talk) 01:54, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

The word "neutral" must be there simply because otherwise is not clear why the Soviet flag is not among the belligerent before June 1941. Let me also point out that the WWII article ("The Axis Advances" section) devotes a whole paragraph to the assistance of the US to China and Britain. Obviously, the US had been de facto the ally of these states, however, the US are not listed in the infobox before their official entry into the war. To omit the word "neutral" in the case of the USSR would be definitely double standards.

Regarding "spheres of influences", by omitting these words we would imply that before the outbreak of the WWII the Germany and the USSR agreed about territorial division of Europe, however many reliable sources disagree with that. We can speak only about spheres of influence, and that is not an euphemism. --Paul Siebert (talk) 05:34, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

If USSR is so unique that it deserves footnote (however, Sino-Japanese and Yugoslavian wars were more unique), add the comment that USSR fought with Japan before April 1941. --Sambian kitten (talk) 04:44, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

Good point, we totally forgot about the battle of Khalkhin Gol. I think the footnote should start with that undeclared border war. Something like

""Shortly before the WWII, the USSR won the undeclared border war with Japan and signed a non-aggression treaty with Nazi Germany... "

I believe some inaccuracy with chronology is acceptable here, because the battle had been de facto won by the USSR by the moment MRP was signed. We also need to add a footnote to Japan and especially to China, who waged a full scale, although undeclared war before the war in Europe had started. Regarding Yugoslavia, I do not see the need in footnote (although that may be explained by the lacunae in my education).--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:34, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

And what about Soviet Volunteer Group in China? And Soviet "cold war" with Germany and Italy in Spain? --Sambian kitten (talk) 06:28, 30 July 2011 (UTC)

Interesting solution about start/end dates

Norsk version of article gives in one template start/end dates in both Asia and Europe. If we introduce it, we'll prevent any conflicts "When did China and Japan enter WWII?" --Sambian kitten (talk) 04:51, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

Version #3, tweaked

On 23 August 1939 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty, secretly dividing Eastern Europe. The USSR made peace with Japan on 16 September 1939; invaded Poland on 17 September 1939; attacked Finland on 30 September 1939; forcibly annexed the Baltic States in June 1940; took eastern Romania by 4 July 1940. On 22 June 1941, the USSR was invaded by Germany and then joined the alliance against Axis power.

This is now 60 words, about same as the footnote for France, and at maximum.

-Chumchum7 (talk) 08:03, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

Unsatisfactory, Chumchum. You again ignored my major points without providing any explanations, and add even more inaccuracies. For instance, the phrase "The USSR made peace with Japan on 16 September 1939;" implies that it was at war with Japan before that, however, that was not the case. BTW, it did not "made peace", but signed armistice. As I already explained, the USSR could not join the alliance against the Axis because no such alliance existed by that moment: it formed the alliance with Britain and the US(Derek Watson. Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 51-85). Your persistent refusal to accept my proposal (without providing any rationale) hardly makes the achievement of consensus closer.

Re length, I do not care about that when accuracy is concerned.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:47, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

What's the difference between "made peace" and "signed armistice"? Certainly there existed the Anglo-Dominion or Commonwealth alliance, being an alliance between Britain and Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, see R. Holland (1981), Britain and the Commonwealth alliance, 1918-1939, London: Macmillan. ISBN 9780333272954. And certainly while both Poland and France (both of which were in alliance with Britain) were occupied, free Polish and French forces continued to fight on the side of Britain. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 21:24, 31 July 2011 (UTC)

"Made peace" implies termination of the conflict, whereas armistice is just a cessation of hostilities. Such a cessation can lead to renewal of hostilities or to signing a peace treaty. In the case we discuss that had lead to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed on April 13, 1941, so "made peace" refers to the latter.

Re Poland and France, you step to the realm of original research. The legal successor of the Third Republic was Vichy France, and Free French had been recognized as the representative of the French state only at later stages of the war. USSR didn't join any existing alliance, it had signed a totally new alliance with the UK and the US. To state that two major Allies (the USSR and USA), joined the British lead alliance is a British-centric views, not shared by majority of mainstream historians.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:57, 31 July 2011 (UTC)

So "making peace" basically makes permanent the armistice via treaty and you are correct that the Soviet Union did not formally join the Commonwealth Alliance, so tweaking the text:

On 23 August 1939 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty, secretly dividing Eastern Europe. The USSR signed an armistice with Japan on 16 September 1939 (formal peace in April, 1941); invaded Poland on 17 September 1939; attacked Finland on 30 September 1939; forcibly incorporated the Baltic States in June 1940; took eastern Romania by 4 July 1940. On 22 June 1941, the USSR was invaded by Germany and then aligned with Britain and her allies against Axis power.

--Martin Tammsalu (talk) 23:16, 31 July 2011 (UTC)

Good. However, there are two things that need to be specified. The non-aggression treaty (its secret protocol) did not stipulate division of Europe (except probably Poland). "Spheres of influence" was not an euphemism: the USSR agreed not to interfere in German business west from the agreed line, and Germany made a symmetrical promise. Therefore, "spheres of influence" should stay. The second objection is " and then aligned with Britain and her allies against Axis power". It is also incorrect. The full scale alliance was signed between Britain, the USSR and USA, during Molotov's visit to the US and Britain in June 1942, and British allies were not mentioned during these talks as full scale participants.(Derek Watson. Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 51-85) Watson speaks about two belligerents, Britain and the USSR, who were later joined by the US, and does not mention any Britain led alliances existing before that. Therefore, it would be correct to write

"On 22 June 1941, the USSR was invaded by Germany and then formed the anti-Axis Grand Alliance with Britain and USA."

If we agree on that, I see no problem with adding the footnote.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:17, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

The problem is that the so called Grand Alliance between Britain, the USA and the USSR wasn't officially formed until 1942 (the USA did not enter the war until December 1941), so I think "then aligned with Britain and her allies against Axis power" is accurate for the period between the start of Barbarossa in 1941 until the creation of the formal Grand Alliance in 1942, particularly since the USSR was accepting convoys of war material from Britain since August of 1941 and the No. 151 Wing RAF based on Soviet soil since September (how would that be possible if there was no formal military alliance agreement in place?). In regard to your objection to "dividing Eastern Europe", well oddly enough all of the territory designated the Soviet "Sphere of influence" ended up being incorporated into the USSR, with the border confirmed by the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Demarcation (which also contained secret protocols to swap Lithuania for a part of Poland). So yes, "Spheres of influence" was an euphemism and "dividing Eastern Europe" is entirely correct. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 01:30, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

Coming back to the first point, the first opening paragraph from Geoffrey Roberts' Litvinov's Lost Peace, 1941-1946 (Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 4, Number 2, Spring 2002, pp. 23-54) states that the Soviet Union aligned itself with Britain:

"The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 prompted a rapid reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. In a radio broadcast on 3 July, the Soviet leader, Josif Stalin, defined the struggle as an antifascist war of liberation and a war for national independence and democratic liberties that would align the Soviet Union with other freedom-loving peoples and states, including the United States and Great Britain."

Therefore the phrase "and then aligned with Britain and her allies against Axis power" is absolutely correct. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 02:48, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

There were no official alliances between Britain and the USSR before the US entered the war. Watson (Op. cit.) reviewed the Anglo-Soviet relations during the period from 1939 to 1942 (the date the Gtand Alliance signing), and, according to him, only a very general political agreement and economic agreement were signed during that period (one of the reasons for the delay was a British refusal to recognise Soviet 1941 borders). The true alliance was signed only in 1942, and it was a totally new alliance with three participants: the USSR, USA and Britain.

Regarding the broadcast, this was more an allegory: Stalin mentioned the US, which were neutral in 1941, therefore, it would be incorrect to interpret this speech literally.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:19, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

Sorry Paul, but your argument is weak. It is Roberts who interprets this speach as a reorientation of Soviet foreign policy, citing Stalin's speech to show a re-alignment with the Western powers was caused by the German invasion. This re-alignment first manifested itself concretely with the Anglo-Soviet Agreement which saw British, Australian and New Zealand pilots flying from Soviet airbases (you have not explained how it was possible that these airmen could operate on Soviet soil without an agreement for military collaboration). --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 04:08, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

Sir John Arthur Ransome Marriott in Anglo-Russian relations, 1689-1943 (Taylor & Francis, 1944) on page 214

"The Agreement of July 12, 1941, was replaced by a formal Treaty, Part I of which was designed to remain in force until the re-establishment of peace amd Part II for a period of at least twenty years. The former (Part I) reiterated the military terms of the Treaty of 1941"[5]

So there we have it, the military terms in the formal 1942 treaty was mostly identical to the military terms contained in the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of 1941. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 04:26, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

So, in other words, the agreement signed on 12 of July, 1941 was an informal alliance (it was replaced by a formal treaty in 1942), and it was the agreement between the United Kingdom and the USSR (not between some pre-existing British led alliance and the USSR, who was supposed to join this alliance). Therefore, even if we agree that the alliance was initially signed between the UK and the USSR, and then was joined by the US, we cannot speak about joining of some alliance by the USSR, because the agreement it signed was bilateral. However, even that was not correct. The tripartite negotiations between the USSR, Britain and the US were conducted not based on the prior Anglo-Soviet agreements, but de novo, so the Grand Alliance was not an extension of some Anglo-Soviet alliance that existed by that moment, but a totally new alliance. If no references had been made during the tripartite negotiations to some Anglo-Soviet alliance, then the agreement signed in July 1941 was hardly an alliance. For instance, Molotov was trying to persuade the British, who seemed to be more prone to recognise the 1941 Soviet western borders, to act more in concert as opposed to the US, who entered the war late, however, the British delegation refused to do so.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:10, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

You have not provided any new arguments. The 1941 border was not agreed in the 1942 treaty, so I am not sure why you think this is somehow relevant. The proposed text is "then aligned with Britain and her allies against Axis power", no where does it claim the USSR formally joined a British led alliance. However the British were at war with Germany before the USSR, so in that sense the USSR aligned with Britain in fighting against Germany, whereas previously the USSR was claimed it was neutral and thus was non-aligned. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 05:57, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

"The British signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Soviet Union on 12 July 1941... From the beginning of the alliance there was dissembling - on both sides." Rees (2009) p. 97. -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:28, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

Regarding the spheres of influence, your "the territory designated the Soviet "Sphere of influence" ended up being incorporated into the USSR" is a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: the fact that this territory had been absorbed by the USSR did not mean that this absorption was stipulated by the pact. Secondly, you totally forgot that Germany did not occupy a major part of the countries in its sphere of influence: Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria had not been occupied by June 1941. Therefore, "spheres of influence" was not just an euphemism.

Re Britain, let's separate two things: (i) do we mention just a British-Soviet treaty (and omit the US who came later), or we speak about the Grand Alliance as the first full scale formal military treaty? And (ii) in the case if we chose the first option, do we speak about Britain or some "British lead alliance"? Whereas I can agree that the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1941 was close to the de facto alliance (although not de jure, and you are very sensitive to these details when we discuss other things), I still obtained no proof that the USSR conducted negotiations (and signed an agreement) with some "Britain led alliance", not just with Britain alone.

In summary, I insist on "spheres of influence", and, if the mention of the Grand Alliance is not acceptable for some reason, I agree to write "then aligned with Britain against European Axis powers." (The word "European" is important because the USSR remained neutral in Asia until August 1945).--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:31, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

Given that this footnote relates to the period 1939-1941 mention of the Grand alliance is out of scope. Taking on board your comments:

On 23 August 1939 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty, secretly dividing Eastern Europe into "spheres of influence". The USSR signed an armistice with Japan on 16 September 1939 (formal peace in April, 1941); invaded Poland on 17 September 1939; attacked Finland on 30 September 1939; forcibly incorporated the Baltic States in June 1940; took eastern Romania by 4 July 1940. On 22 June 1941, the USSR was invaded by Germany and then aligned with Britain against the European Axis powers.

--Martin Tammsalu (talk) 01:18, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

As a rule, the sources tell about these "spheres of influence" without quotation marks.

As I already noted, I do not insist on the mention of Grand Alliance, however, as I just realised, the sequence of the events was different: the USSR entered the war against "European Axis powers", not only against Germany, because it was attacked by German, Hungarian, Romanian and Slovak armies, and later by Italian troops (let's forget about Finland for a while). I apologise for withdrawal of my own proposal, however, the casual linkage should be restored: the start of the Axis-Soviet war preceded the Soviet alliance with the Western powers, not vise versa. Let's think how to reflect it correctly in the footnote.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:43, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

The text already mentions "against the European Axis powers", so I don't understand your point, were not Hungary, Romania, etc deemed members of the "European Axis powers"? Seriously Paul, this objection appears to be frivolous and pendantic. I've removed the quotes and added a clarification:

On 23 August 1939 the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty, secretly dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. The USSR signed an armistice with Japan on 16 September 1939 (formal peace in April, 1941); invaded Poland on 17 September 1939; attacked Finland on 30 September 1939; forcibly incorporated the Baltic States in June 1940; took eastern Romania by 4 July 1940. On 22 June 1941, the USSR was invaded by Germany and on July 12th aligned with Britain against the European Axis powers.

I trust that this meets with your satisfaction. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 02:16, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

"On 22 June 1941, the USSR was jointly invaded by all European Axis powers and on July 12th aligned with Britain." would meet, and that modification is not frivolous. The USSR was invaded by all European Axis powers (plus Finland), not by Germany alone. With regard to the alliance (or, more precisely, "agreement", because that initially was not a full scale alliance), we do not need to repeat the words "Axis powers" here.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:12, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

One more thing. Not "formal peace in April, 1941", but "a non-aggression treaty in April 1941", because there was no formal state of war between these two powers in 1939-41. Alternatively, we can remove these words completely.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:24, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

Paul, I am absolutely astonished by your last minute objections. Just above you agreed: ""Made peace" implies termination of the conflict, whereas armistice is just a cessation of hostilities. Such a cessation can lead to renewal of hostilities or to signing a peace treaty. In the case we discuss that had lead to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed on April 13, 1941, so "made peace" refers to the latter." and thus I had believed that matter was settled. It was you who mentioned the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact as making peace as opposed to an armistice ending the Soviet-Japanese Border War (1939). Looking at the wording of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact it is obvious that the intent was to make peace:

• Preample to the Pact: The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, have decided to conclude a pact on neutrality
• Article one of said pact: Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party.
• Declaration by Molotov after signing the pact: In conformity with the spirit of the Pact on neutrality concluded on April 13, 1941, between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Japan, in the interest of insuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solemnly declare ...

And published sources confirm that this pact made peace:

• Stalin then made peace with Japan in April 1941
• The peace the USSR had achieved with Japan with the neutrality pact

With regard to 22 June, 1941, strictly speaking only German forces were operating on that date, the other axis members did not begin operations until some days/weeks later. So "On 22 June 1941, the USSR was invaded by Germany and on July 12th aligned with Britain against the European Axis powers" is absolutely accurate since by July 12th all the European axis members were involved.

I have to say I am disappointed that you continue to raise a fresh objection just as I thought this was resolved, which leads me to wonder whether you are conducting this discussion in good faith or whether this is some kind of attempt to filibuster the addition of a footnote. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 06:57, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

I do not find my last comments frivolous, because the phrase "the USSR signed an armistice with Japan on 16 September 1939 (formal peace in April, 1941)" creates an impression that Japan and the USSR were officially at war with each other, which in actuality was not the case. Despite the large scale of the Khalkhin Gol hostilities, this conflict started as a result of the actions of the Japanese Kwantung Army officers, who acted independently from the central government, and neither Japan nor the USSR declared war on each other. Since the WWII is one of our good articles, I would oppose to addition of any ambiguous statements to it.

Regarding 22 June, 1941, the sequence of the event was as follows: Barbarossa started with the invasion of the USSR by Wehrmacht, Romanian and Hungarian armies and by the Slovak and Italian expeditionary forces (all of them were acting in the Army Group South zone). War was officially declared by all of those states on the USSR. Only after that Britain and the USSR signed their agreement. By contrast, your wording ("On 22 June 1941, the USSR was invaded by Germany and on July 12th aligned with Britain against the European Axis powers.") creates a wrong impression that the USSR aligned with Britain against the European Axis powers not because these powers attacked the USSR, but because they were at war with the new Soviet ally, Britain (similar to what happened to the UK/USSR/Finland: Britain declared war on Finland not because the latter attacked her, but because it was at war with her ally, the USSR). I have to check if the Romanian and other Allied Axis troops started their operation on July 22, or few days later, however, for now we can simply replace "On 22 July, 1941" with "In July, 1941".

We cannot afford a luxury of imprecise wording in such a top level article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:02, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

What a strange idea fix about USSR. To remind in every paragraphe that it did something controversial. Your footnote will be soon more than article itself. --Sambian kitten (talk) 18:07, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

The USSR really was among the most controversial Allies. Taking into account its immense contribution in the WWII, this controversy is desirable to explain, otherwise some readers may conclude that this article is biased, which may undermine credibility of WP as whole.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:59, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

Paul, if the article is biased, then it is biased by Anti-Soviet side. Photo of "common military parade" (while it's just a theory that it was parade, it's portrayed as undisputable fact), long speech about economic relations, and many other attempts to portray USSR as German ally and firestarter of war. In the contrast, neither Britain nor France received such attention for Munich agreement (while French diplomats admited to Soviet ones that secession of Sudetenland would give Germany an excellent strategic position and then the war would be unevitable). Who can consider this article as pro-Soviet? Only the person with idea fix about USSR: "Every sentence where USSR is portrayed in neutral way and isn't blamed for anything - is pro-Soviet POV". --Sambian kitten (talk) 04:32, 3 August 2011 (UTC)

Paul this argument because "neither Japan nor the USSR declared war on each other" the text "formal peace in April, 1941" creates "the impression there were officially at war with each other" is not a valid argument, particularly when published sources characterise the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact as making peace. Note also the Winter War was an undeclared war, yet the USSR and Finland signed the Moscow Peace Treaty.

Regarding who invaded the USSR on June 22, every single author I have read characterises it as a German inspired, planned and implemented operation. Previously you even proposed "When Germany attacked the USSR on 22 June 1941, it officially joined the WWII on the Allied side". Now a few days later you propose "On 22 June 1941, the USSR was jointly invaded by all European Axis powers and on July 12th aligned with Britain." The text you proposes adds undue weight to the involvement of others and creates the wrong impression that the other members were of equal standing and made a joint decision to invade. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 21:26, 2 August 2011 (UTC)

Martin, you are right that this has been discussed long enough. Consensus is not unanimity, and everyone has to budge a little. Talk page discussion is not a democracy; nor is it a dictatorship, per WP:OWN and WP:TE. So a version of the footnote should go onto the Template as soon as possible, with the understanding that this is an attempt to find a compromise alternative to Yamaplos' idea of having the USSR flag on the Axis side (under some definition or other).-Chumchum7 (talk) 18:29, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

On that note, we better abstract "Britain against the European Axis powers" to "the alliance against the European Axis powers" to accommodate the Polish-Soviet agreement of 30 July 1941, in which the Soviets and Poles "agree to render one to another aid and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany" [6]. -Chumchum7 (talk) 18:29, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

Additionally, I'd support indication of what statisticians call 'size and scope' for the Soviet war effort (any number of ways of indicating this are possible, one way could be a last line stating combined US and British fatalities in the war amounted to about 3% of Soviet fatalities). Or alternatively, a fatalities pie chart under the infobox. This footnote would reflect the Rees thesis: that there have been too many false dichotomies in WW2 revisionism (e.g. Stalin was as bad as Hitler versus Stalin was the Great Liberator who destroyed Fascism, anyone who disagrees is a nationalist) but rather, there weren't any totally good guys in WW2; Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin all have blood on their hands. Cheers, -Chumchum7 (talk) 18:29, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

Trimmed by 21 words: accommodates Finland not being an Axis member, the Polish-Soviet agreement, and cuts formalization of Japan armistice as TMI...

23 August 1939, USSR and Nazi Germany sign non-aggression pact, dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. USSR signs armistice with Japan 16 September 1939; invades Poland 17 September 1939; attacks Finland 30 September 1939; forcibly incorporates Baltic States June 1940; takes eastern Romania 4 July 1940. On 22 June 1941, USSR invaded by Germany and satellites; USSR then aligns with countries fighting the European Axis.

Cheers -Chumchum7 (talk) 19:20, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

I would say,

"23 August 1939, USSR and Nazi Germany sign the non-aggression pact, secretly dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence(My comment. Division of EE was done secretly, and that was not the major result of the pact. The major result was the Soviet promise of non-aggression, so Hitler got the opportunity to avoid two front war, which he immediately used). USSR signs armistice with Japan 16 September 1939; invades Poland 17 September 1939; attacks Finland 30 September 1939; forcibly incorporates Baltic States June 1940; takes eastern Romania 4 July 1940. On 22 June 1941, USSR invaded by the European Axis powers Germany and satellites(My comment. Italy was not a German satellite. I realise that by writing that we leave Finland beyond the scope, however, the latter was not a German satellite either, so your version is equally imprecise); USSR then aligns with countries fighting the European Axis. (My comment. Despite the non-aggression treaty with Japan, the USSR aligned with the countries fighting Japan (Britain, USA), not only with the countries fighting the European Axis only ).

If my correction is accepted, I see no obstacles for adding the footnote immediately. And, after that, we need to think about the footnotes for China and Japan (a full-scale undeclared war between these powers started in 1937).--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:07, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

Subject to further correction in the future, I second that the footnote be inserted, as written by User Chumchum and as modified by user Paul Siebert. At least a footnote gets established! YamaPlos talk 03:29, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

What does "subject to further correction in the future" mean? If you have some corrections in mind, please, explain us, otherwise your position looks somewhat odd. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:39, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

Re Chumchum's "I'd support indication of what statisticians call 'size and scope' for the Soviet war effort..." etc. In my opinion, you mix two things: the military contributions of some particular country and its position at the "good-bad" moral scale. For instance, noone can argue that the Hitler's regime was almost perfect incarnation of the realm of evil, however, that does not prevent us from recognizing the German Reich as a leading Axis power that made the major contribution in the joint Axis war efforts.

I totally agree with your notion that the manichean approach to history ("good guys vs bad guys") is hardly encyclopaedic.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:46, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

Paul Siebert, I merely want to leave it clear, especially for you, that arriving to a particular drafting does not mean it establishes a permanent wording. YamaPlos talk 14:00, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

Surely, any WP text can be changed if this change is supported by consensus, is verifiable, neutral, and contains no original research. However, by writing what you have written, you implied that there is something in this text you disagree with. Could you please explain us what concretely causes your concern?--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:21, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

Paul's claim "Despite the non-aggression treaty with Japan, the USSR aligned with the countries fighting Japan (Britain, USA), not only with the countries fighting the European Axis only" isn't entirely correct. After the Doolittle Raids of April 1942, the Soviet Union confiscated the aircraft and interned the crew for a year when one of the B25 aircraft was forced to land at Vladivostok after it raided the Japanese home islands. This is closer to the behaviour of a country honouring a neutrality pact than one aligning with the USA against Japan. Therefore Paul's original proposal of August 1st where he said "The word "European" is important because the USSR remained neutral in Asia until August 1945"[7] is more accurate. --Martin Tammsalu (talk) 10:34, 7 August 2011 (UTC)