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SIGINT

Collapse old unclosed reflists, pls ignore

Article says "SIGINT (signals intelligence) was the countering process of decryption". SIGINT refers to all forms of signals intelligence, such as traffic analysis, interception of non-encrypted traffic, and processing of info acquired by intercepts. Sentence should say "Cryptanalysis was the countering process of decryption". Next sentence about deception, how about mentioning Englandspiel (aka Operation Nordpol) on the Axis side. The overall section covers good stuff but IMO it should be expanded, since it had longer reaching consequences than a lot of battles and operations that (while consequential for the participants) are important taken as an aggregate but individually start sounding all the same. 67.119.3.248 (talk) 03:53, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Support..I like this proposal...can only help readers understand better if we link this up.Moxy (talk) 04:10, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Neither the current text or the proposed replacement reads well. I'd suggest that it be reworded as something like "The Allies and Axis attempted to break their opponents' codes, with the most successful examples of this being the Allied cryptanalysis of the Enigma and breaking of the Japanese naval codes." I'm not very familiar with Axis codebreaking successes, but they weren't comparable in their scope to those of the Allies so any comparison would need to be carefully worded. Nick-D (talk) 04:30, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Per Hinsley[1],

They [Allied cryptanalysts] were hardly ever rivalled by Axis success in reading our ciphers. There were two major exceptions to the lack of success by the Axis against Allied ciphers. One was that they did have some success in reading a British naval cipher which was for a longish time also shared with the American navy in relation to convoy escorting.

They were successful in reading that for a long period from 1940 to the end of '42. And the other was that they didn't exactly capture but they managed to extract of copy of the cipher that was being used by the American Military Attache in Cairo for a period when Rommel was at his most dangerous. And from that too the Germans obtained some great advantage.

But generally speaking, except possibly in relation to the convoy cipher, there was never any great cryptanalytical rivalry. The Germans were completely outclassed in terms of Ultra. The Italians also made very little progress against any important allied cipher.

German cryptanalysis of British naval ciphers is also discussed a bit in Stephen Budiansky, "Battle of Wits" chapter 8, "Paranoia is our profession". The Germans also broke the US M-209 machine cipher but that was only used for lower level traffic AFAIK. There is some info in the M-209 article. A book came out a few years ago about German cryptanalysis based on recently declassified info. I've been wanting to read it but I don't remember the title. 67.119.3.248 (talk) 05:18, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Might be worth mentioning the Western Allies never shared the Ultra secret with their Soviet ally, which left the USSR at distinct strategic disadvantage in fight against Hitler. See Winterbotham et al. Communicat (talk) 16:20, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Hinsley discusses that a little in the talk that I cited just above. It's been a while since I read Budiansky's book but I think it's also mentioned in there. Basically they were sure that the Soviets wouldn't have been able to keep it secret. Winterbotham's book created a sensation when it came out, because it brought info about Ultra to a public that knew nothing about it before, but Winterbotham himself wasn't that aware of the big picture, and the book is full of errors. It's better to go by newer sources that have the benefit of info that came out after Winterbotham's book. 67.119.3.248 (talk) 16:54, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Winterbotham's book has some errors because he was forced to write it completely from memory, Brit govt having denied him access to official docs of the time. His assertion that at no time did MI consider sharing Ultra intel with the Russians has never been contested, not even by MI. His book is notable because it opened the floodgates for other works about Ulta, most notably Bennett's authoritative work with which you're no doubt familiar. Importance of Ultra in Western Allied strategy is either absent from or completely downplayed in wiki milhist articles. When I did submit a reliable Bennett reference (journal article "Ultra and some command decisions") with sourced page numbers etc to one milhist article Western Betrayal some time ago, it was promptly thrown out by consensus as "commie propaganda". That kind of censorship by a reactionary clique has got to change. An uphill task. Communicat (talk) 00:08, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

Do you have a diff about your Bennett reference being rejected? I haven't read Bennett's books but AFAIK they should be usable as Wikipedia sourcing, though I think they are from the 1980's. A lot of formerly secret US and UK Ultra-related docs were released in the late 1990's, and so books published in 2000 or later that used this material should be considered the most reliable. According to Hinsley, the UK did give Ultra intel to the Soviets, though they didn't tell the Soviets about the actual Ultra program (they said the info was coming from spies rather than from codebreaking). Budiansky may also say something about this. Anyway, please try to relax a bit. 67.122.209.135 (talk) 01:38, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

I can provide releant diff at opportune and appropriate time. Meanwhile, I don't agree with your assessment as to which books are "most reliable". if you're not acquainted with Ralph Bennett, then we're not on the same page. I'd recommmend his work Ultra and Mediterraen Strategy, and also his article "Ultra and some command decisions", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 16, 1981.

As for intel provided to Soviets: I'm fairly certain Churchill's selective provision of Ulta intel to the Soviets was strategically self-serving. Also, it's one thing to provide someone with intel that YOU surmise he needs, and another thing entirely to provide intel that he knows he needs. Far as article is concerned, the point is that 10 years after the article's first appearance, reliable Hinsley and Bennett remain conspicuously absent from references, (as is conspicuously absent from the article content the crucial matter of strategy per se); whereas there's a preponderence of minutae about mostly side-show issues, and what one editor has aptly described as "crappy POV pushing references." In other words, sloppy and partisan editing, whatever the reason or reasons for it. Communicat (talk) 17:41, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

Communicat, please consider this to be an opportune and appropriate time to provide the diffs. I'm interested in looking at them. There is absolutely no reason to keep them in your pocket. I can't evaluate your claim of having had a Bennett citation rejected unless I see a diff. You can keep repeating the claim until you are blue in the face, but it won't be taken seriously until a diff appears. I'm just not interested in hearing any more about that claim unless you provide a diff. That's part of the culture here: no diff = no credibility.

I'm aware of Bennett's books, I just haven't ever gotten around to reading them. If you want me to check out your claim that they say something about Churchill withholding Ultra intel from the Soviets, you have to give page numbers. If you do that, I will go to the library and see if I can check them. I'm not going to read through 1000's of pages (IIRC there are 4 volumes) looking for mentions of intel withheld from Soviets. I did manage to download and skim the "command decisions" article (from 1981) and it basically said a lot was unknown because relevant docs weren't released. The docs came out later so I'd expect a lot of the then-unknown stuff is now known, thus the notion that newer sources are better. I also didn't notice anything in it about intel sharing with the Soviets but again, if you give a page number I will check it.

More cogently, Ultra right now occupies about half a sentence in the article. I'm in favor of expanding it considerably, like maybe to two or three sentences, e.g. about its use in the North Africa campaign. Anything about the details of intel transfer to the Soviets would IMO be way too deep in the weeds to mention in this article unless you can show multiple sources giving that issue quite a lot of prominence. Again, it would be fine in one of the subsidiary articles if you've got cites to Hinsley or Bennett with page numbers. The overview article has to present a stupendously complex subject in a limited space, so has to give a very selective, high-altitude view. If you're interested in writing about fine-grained details about intel transfer, that's great, you're just in the wrong article for that. 67.122.211.178 (talk) 21:06, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

OK, I found the diffs myself. You added material cited to Hinsley and Bennett to Western betrayal on 23 February 2010[2] and removed it yourself on 16 March.[3] In the edit, the relevant paragraph with cites says:

At no time during this period and throughout World War II did the Western Allies consider sharing with the Soviet Union their decisive strategic advantage over the enemy, namely the copious and vitally important military intelligence obtained from the ultra-secret interception and decoding of German mility signals at every level of command. This operation, one of the most closely guarded secrets of World War II and code-named Ultra, provided the Western Allies with constant and reliable information about the strength, disposition and intentions of the enemy at any given time. Armed with this vital intelligence, Western military commanders at pivotal moments of the war in Europe made a series of seemingly inexplicable command decisions, the end results of which served to prolong the fighting in Europe while depriving the Red Army of relief on the Russian-German front where the Soviet Union continued to carry the brunt of the war against Hitler.

The cites include a book by Winterbotham, 4 volumes by Hinsley, and 2 volumes by Bennett, all without page numbers and therefore unverifiable, plus Bennett's "Ultra and Some Command decisions" article which (yay!!!) finally includes page numbers (pp. 145-6). I downloaded the article through my library's subscription (JSTOR 260620) and skimmed through the whole thing (not too bad since it's just 21 pages) and I read pp.145-6 carefully. I didn't see anything in the whole article supporting the thesis that the Allies kept Ultra intel away from the Soviets, and nothing on pp.145-6 had anything to do with the Soviets or the Russian-German front (the pages were about operations inside Europe). The only thing I found about Russia at all was on p. 141, which mentioned Hitler pulled back troops from Russia into France to fight back the Allies after D-day. The claim in your paragraph's first sentence (that the Allies didn't share intel with Russia) contradicts other sources including Hinsley himself (see [[4] Q&A at end). With no slight intended to Winterbotham, I don't think his book is much of an authority on high-level strategic stuff like that. He was an RAF Group Captain whose role in Ultra was basically to take processed intel from Bletchley and route it out to field units in the European theatre. Our article F. W. Winterbotham is pretty consistent with other materials I remember reading and explains further. He doesn't sound likely to have been involved in UK-Russian diplomacy and his book is acknowledged to have many flaws. Budiansky (ISBN 0743217349) p. 268-9 does discuss the issue a little bit but his take is much more nuanced than yours. Basically the UK did give stuff to the Russians but had to be careful because they knew that the Germans had broken the Russian codes, and the Russians refused to fix their procedures, and the Russians were a pain in the neck to deal with in regard to intel cooperation in general.

So overall, your addition above really does come across as propaganda and its sourcing is nowhere near acceptable by Wikipedia's standards for disputed content. It's good that you used some more respectable sources than Stan Winer in that edit, but you really have to change your whole approach to editing. Every contentious statement has to be cited to a specific source with a page number. You have to be able to source not only facts, but also any interpretations of the facts. If a fact or interpretation is disputed or doubtful in any significant way, you can't present it without in-text attribution no matter how good a source you use. You can't write "X happened [cite]"; you have to write "So-and-so says X happened [cite]". The one verifiable source you gave (the Command Decisions article) could support a claim that European theatre commanders didn't always use Ultra intel as well as they might have (the errors sounded to me like standard military snafus), but your connecting that with the Soviets looks like pure WP:SYNTH. So I can't really defend you from much of the criticism you've received at this point. I dug up your edit so I could give you some independent corroboration if the edit was any good, but I'm afraid it totally failed. Probably anything else you've written that's still in WP articles has to be checked against its citations as I did above, or else removed if the cites don't have page numbers. Regards, 67.122.211.178 (talk) 05:53, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

This is not the only article where Communicat is making claims (that whether true or not) are not supported by the sources. I discuss some of this briefly in the last section of Talk:History of South Africa. The evidence provided here by 67.122.211.178 convinced me it was better to scrap Communicat's edits there rather than pick through and attempt to find the bits actually supported by the sources. Edward321 (talk) 13:46, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Eward, If you have a problem with my edits at South Africa history page, please raise queries and discuss them there before reverting without any discussion. Your attention is drawn to WP:CON. Communicat (talk) 22:20, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Pls see Wikipedia:Burden of proof and Wikipedia:BOLD, revert, discuss cycle.Moxy (talk) 22:32, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Unsigned editor above: WP:TLDR By the way, Cavendish sugests Philby told Russians about existence of Ultra, so Churhill hiding it from them was probably a waste of time anyway. Thanks for your interest. Try to relax a bit. Communicat (talk) 22:28, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Yeah, Hinsley says the same thing in that talk I linked. I wonder if anything has come out of the former USSR archives about it. Anyway, look, your editing has a bad problem and I went to some trouble to lay it out for you (or for other users if it comes to that). You write like a historian, combining data from multiple sources to create your own thesis and present it. That's great for history journals, but unacceptable for Wikipedia. I hope you can change your pattern. If not, there is IMO enough evidence already for a fairly solid RFC against you. Please change. 67.122.211.178 (talk) 23:12, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Moxy, I get rudely rapped over the knuckles when I refactor. But you get away with it. Never mind, because in any event there seems to be a WP rule for everything, and a WP rule against everything. The real intellectual challenge seems to be to find a balance between the two, which nobody inluding myself seems able to do.

Re unsigned editor above: Thanks. You have been the very first editor to provide helpful criticism and guidance, which I believe is supposed to be the function of administrator. Usually my work is simply undone and reverted by admin and others without discussion; a kind of slap in the face. Talk about civility. Hmmm. Nice people.

Suggestion: instead of administrators and others engaging in endless displacement activity, why isn't anyone prepared to address the real issue around here, namely the primary issue I raised (again) at Reply to uninvolved intervening party which bears repeating:

WP:FRINGE, (and probably other wiki rules as well), states that: "In general, Wikipedia should always give prominence to established lines of research found in reliable sources and present neutral descriptions of other claims with respect to their historical prominence (and) ideas should not be excluded from the encyclopedia simply because they are widely held to be wrong." Please note that the rule does NOT state: Wikipedia should always give prominence to established WESTERN lines of research found in reliable WESTERN sources." Yet this is exactly what the existing WW2 article does do. Not even one non-Western source is cited among the 340 odd sources cited ....

On my bookshelf right here beside me are no less that seven English language non-Western histories of WW2, some of them by Soviet historians. So there's no question about the existence of English language non-Western histories. These are considered reliable and established lines of research in their respective non-Western countries of origin, just as the Western sources cited in the article are considered to be reliable and from established lines of research in the West. Therefore both Western and non-Western positions should be reflected in the article, if it is to claim that it's NPOV, which it is not. Forget about all the efforts to discredit me, some of which are perfectly valid. Just address the issue at hand, namely POV bias through omission as repeatedly alleged by me, and which has resulted in a lot of displacement activity that seeks to evade the central issue of NPOV. Even or especially the intervening administrator has managed to evade the issue. The unsigned editor in this section admits that he has reliable access to history library resources so, if he has the time and inclination, maybe HE can come up with some reliable non-Western sources in the interests of NPOV, which everyone claims I'm contravening (among other things). Communicat (talk) 23:51, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Sorry that was misinterpreted.... I was not trying to bite you i was just trying to show you a few more pages...before someone else goes into a rant quoting the 2 pages.(juts trying to prevent long talks about nothing.)Moxy (talk) 00:01, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Unsigned editor Re page numbers issue: allow me to confess my modus operandi. When I've been submitting material, my primary objective was /is to introduce an IDEA, with some supporting material to show the direction the idea might take. The material as submitted either has page numbers, or no page numbers, or page numbers that are not entirely accurate. This is because I don't want the refs to be plagiarised to the benefit only of college students who trawl these pages in search of reliable refs for their "own" essays. If, in the unlikely event, the IDEA is accepted and contribution retained, then I can and do correct the page numbers. It can then still be plagiarised of course, but having been accepted by wiki, the refs are of benefit not only to college kids but also and especially to wiki. I emphasise, my submissions have NOT been rejected solely because of page number references. It is the very IDEA that has been rejected outright and usually without discussion, and so the question does not even arise as to the accuracy or otherwise of the page numbers. You may not like it, but that's the way it was. And there's no point complaining or referring to comment or whatever, because I'm more or less done with that article and its editors, in any event. Communicat (talk) 00:25, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Incidentally, with regard to the Western Betrayal article that you're citing for my lack of page numbers, I seem to recall that the entire article was itself notable for an absence of page numbers and/or very poor referencing. I merely followed suit, for sake of consistency. Maybe somebody has fixed it since then, probably not. I can't be bothered to check. I think, if you cite tht article, you should read the entire discussion that accompanied it at the time of my involvement, most notably the insults and abuse that I endured, which had nothing to do with page numbers, I assure you. But enough of this. I look forward to your response re Western / non-Western POv primary matter, which is the real matter at issue. Communicat (talk) 01:59, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Communicat. Are you ever going to suggest a concrete edit, providing reliable sources, as you have been asked many times, which is the way changes are made; or continue to disrupt the talk page with endless complaints, which will achieve nothing constructive? Several experienced editors have given you this advice. Yes or no will suffice. (Hohum ^@) 01:49, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

No. See my recent posting under poll results, at Revisionism consensus Thanks for your interest. All will become clear later. Communicat (talk) 01:59, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

ussr

whats ussr??

also its not right that america is above britain because we fought all of it but they didnt maybe it should be China, britain, ussr, america, then commonwealth, cos china fought more than all of it and france shouldnt be in it cos they were rubbish and surrendered just so paris wouldnt be ruined but go bombed afterwards anyway

what is ussr? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.2.249.20 (talk) 11:26, 5 September 2010 (UTC)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or better known as the Soviet Union. Nick-D (talk) 11:48, 5 September 2010 (UTC)

This does raise the question of how the listed nations are ordered. They don't appear to be by casualties taken, size of the armed forces, or date of entry into the war. Edward321 (talk) 18:47, 5 September 2010 (UTC)

I find it tragic that you don't know what the USSR was. Someone please go check if Lenin is rolling over in his tomb, forgotten already. --Habap (talk) 21:34, 5 September 2010 (UTC)

i find it tragic that you think you are funny

and yeah the order should be changed —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.86.197.76 (talk) 17:07, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

Does it even matter how the top three are ordered? How would you want them ordered and why? Jmlk17 17:16, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

(edit conflict)How do you propose to do that? Before making any proposal, please, familiarise yourself with previous discussions there[5] and there[6]. --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:18, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

I myself posted here[7] stating for the order to be changed agreeing with Staberinde, to UK-USSR-USA for allies, would seem more logical chronologically ordered, plus even if you raise the argument of contribution then the United Kingdom was fighting on many fronts across the globe, not to mention the impact of the British Commonwealth. However El gato verde wasn't having it and with most things here was conveniently ignored. --SuperDan89 (talk) 05:13, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

Chronological order seem to make more sense to me. It's clearly defined and avoids arguments over who made the greatest contribution or sacrifices. Edward321 (talk) 14:22, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

it should go ussr uk usa china commonwealth i dont think usa should be second, it never faced invasion and not one us civilian died..it's insulting, if they lost their freedom was never really on the line they were a million miles from it all

While far more civilians died in other allied countries, American territory was attacked and American civilians died at Pearl Harbor. Edward321 (talk) 14:22, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

Agreed Edward321, no one should be questioning the victims in relation to American territory (and the person who did hasn't even signed their comment), now back to the ordering question, how to you go about putting forward a vote in relation to the order of the allies? Seems this issue (which has been raised for a long while and has gotten nowhere) needs to be settled. --SuperDan89 (talk) 15:32, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Belligerents

How are they ordered? It appears the Axis is listed by entry into the war but I can't identify one for the Allies 86.180.84.115 (talk) 21:16, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

There are loads of discussions on this. See Template talk:WW2InfoBox for an example, or right on this page.

Edit request from Jon9876543, 17 September 2010

{{edit semi-protected}}

1) "quickly conquering significant part of the region" - "a significant part"? or "significant parts"? 2) "in 1942 after defeat of Japan" - "after the defeat of Japan"? 3) "with a series of German defeats in the Eastern Europe" - no need for "the"? 4) "The war in Europe ended with capture of Berlin" - "ended with the capture of Berlin"? 5) "peacefully stabilise after war relations" - "after-war"?

Jon9876543 (talk) 01:18, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

Done. Thanks. Salvio ^{Let's talk 'bout it!} 01:36, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

Allies ordering question

How to you go about putting forward a vote in relation to the order of the allies? Seems this issue (which has been raised for a long while here and here, and which has gotten nowhere) needs to be settled. --SuperDan89 (talk) 15:43, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I am not sure this question should be resolved by vote. As a rule, vote is not welcome per policy. For me, it is not clear how vote will help to settle the issue. However, I am ready to discuss this question, if someone has new arguments.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:50, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Ah I see, no problem well I'll just put would I said in the 'ussr' archive discussion -

"I think the list should be UK-USSR-USA for allies, would seem more logical chronologically ordered, plus even if you raise the argument of contribution then the United Kingdom was fighting on many fronts across the globe, not to mention the impact of the British Commonwealth."

This is my reasoning. --SuperDan89 (talk) 15:58, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

That does not take into account all factors.

Pro:

Britain deserves to be first because it was fighting on many fronts across the globe, not to mention the impact of the British Commonwealth. For more than one year it was the only military opponent of the Axis.

The USSR deserves to be first because it took a major brunt of the war in Europe, which was a major and decisive theatre of WWII. For about two years (which were the pivotal years) the Eastern front was the only major land theatre of war.

The USA deserve to be first because they provided immense economic aid for other Allies, because they played a decisive role in the Pacific War and because they played the major role in Western Europe after D-Day. It is also important that the USA were a political leader of the western world, which adds more weight to their contribution.

Contra:

Britain cannot be first because its contribution in Pacific and in Europe after 1942 was not impressive.

Not impressive after 1942? what about all of this? [8] --SuperDan89 (talk) 13:15, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

The USSR cannot be first because of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and other Soviet action between Sept 1939 and June 1941.

The USA cannot be first because they joined the war only in December 1941 and because their role in the war in Europea was not decisive.

And now, based on all said above, try to propose more correct ordering.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:14, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

SuperDan89, although you may want it to be settled, I think that is a pipe dream. After a great deal of argument and wasted time, a decision may be made, after a few months, different editors will argue it all over again, ad nauseam - per the previous several years.

National pride intermingles with good faith attempts to reach a fair order/inclusion based on how deserving each country is. How deserving we feel each country is, I think, borders on our own POV. It would be better to use the common inclusions and order of a respected source - but then we'll just argue about which source. Do it by date of entry - where does China go? Every order will be challenged, again, and again. (Hohum ^@) 15:48, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

I also think that whatever order we decide upon, it will be challenged and revised later. I honestly think it's both too contentious and too unimportant to bother with. Paul, I am surprised to read that the US role in Europe was not decisive, though I think a discussion of that would go nowhere (so everyone knows, I do agree that the Soviets did most of the fighting). --Habap (talk) 16:02, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

There are 6 possible permutations of the 3 countries so how about just cycling between the 6 on a monthly basis. 75.62.108.42 (talk) 08:35, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Why not just delete both lists and leave the Allies of World War II and Axis Powers links? It would avoid all issues of ordering would it not?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:15, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

75.62.108.42 and EnigmaMcmxc both make good points and would make things fairer, what do others think? --SuperDan89 (talk) 13:05, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

I agree with Enigma's suggestion - it would reduce the size of the infobox while directing readers to the appropriate article. I'd suggest also removing the lists of leaders at the same time (which is rather confusing given that it lists political and military leaders together for no clear reason) Nick-D (talk) 12:13, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Concur that Enigma's idea is very good. Not sure about removing the leaders, since there is not a similar article to which we could link for quick reference. --Habap (talk) 13:23, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Not just a preety face :P EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:25, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

In other words, the EnigmaMcmxc's proposal is to come back to the old version of the infobox (e.g. [9]). I don't remember why, by whom and for what reason the old infobox was replaced with the current one, however, we probably need to look through the infobox's history (and through its talk page) to avoid repeating the same arguments.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:05, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

@SuperDan89. Under "not impressive" I meant that after 1942 British contribution into naval warfare (and in Pacific as whole) had been dwarfed by the USA, whereas on land she was dwarfed by the USSR.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:36, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Origins of the war

Just scanning through the first few sections of the article and it appears that the origins of the war are not discussed but there is a essentially a list of events that happened in the run up to the war; shouldnt something as important as the origins be discussed? i.e. the economic theory, 30 year war theory, that it was purely Hitler etc etcEnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:12, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Take it or leave it

I know you take some of my ideas seriously, but the truth of the matter is you should, otherwise I would not have managed to precipitate a major revision of the lead and aftermath sections. So I'll try precipitating something further, this time at a macro level. (I'm not complaining about your article, just making some hopefully constructive suggestions towards its overall improvement).

Firstly, You need to get rid of the curious notion that this is a "summary" article. It is the main WW2 article, the overview article, and therefore must present clearly what is arrived at through consensus as the main points of WW2. I suspect it's somehow ended up being dubbed "summary" article because its just so much easier for editors to rehash or summarise existing WW2 sub-articles, rather than engage in the really challening work of researching and establishing by discussion the main points for themselves.

The article is too long by far. Some of the bottom sections can usefully be moved to become stand-alones for further development. This will release space in main article to expand remaining sections and/or include what's currently absent and IMO should be among the main points of the overview (not summary) article, viz.,

(1) Run-up to the war (appeasement etc)

(2) The Big Three and the wartime relationship between them.

(3) Strategy or strategies of all concerned.

(4) Crucial role of signals intelligence (relates to strategy and tactics)

Composite photo at top page has very cluttered appearance (in keeping with clutter of article as a whole). Move the excellent Big Three colour foto from Western Betrayal page to replace cluttered composite pic on top page WW2 main article. Find another pic for Western Betrayal. Yes, I know they (the Poles etc) will complain bitterly, but what the hell, you can find ways 'round that.

Narrative text throughout is dense and far from reader-friendly. Unsigned editor has made very valid comment (under New Aftermath section somewhere) to the effect "Generally I prefer an approach of threading a narrative through some especially sharp events, rather than rattling off a bunch of stuff as a big blur." 67.122.209.135 (talk) 08:36, 2 September 2010 (UTC). And that article sure is one big blur.

That's all I have to say. Take it or leave it. I'm done. Nice knowing you all. Communicat (talk) 02:50, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Starting from the end. How do you propose to understand your "I'm done"? Does it mean that you decided to stop your work on this page? If yes, please, disregard my next comments.

With regard to "an approach of threading a narrative through some especially sharp events", I believe that that would be a good idea, provided that, but only provided, that a consensus has been achieved about these key event. Although I am not sure if it is possible, we can try. Please, propose your list to initiate the discussion.

Re collage. What concretely is wrong with this picture?

Re 4. You haven't demonstrate so far that that role was critical. Please provide sources and quotes.

Re 3. How, in your opinion, can it be represented concisely and consistently (taking into account that different scholars have different views on that account)?

Re 2. Yes, however, another Big Three (Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito) should also be discussed. Let's think about a separate section devoted to internal relations within these two blocs.

Re 1. Some scholars, mostly Central European, believe that the genuine Stalin's goal was the alliance with Hitler or a war, not collective security in Europe, so the Soviet position during Munich agreement was a pure hypocrisy. We need to demonstrate that, according to the majority views, the Litvinov's line was a genuine Soviet position before discussing the appeasement policy.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:54, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

I'm done with trying to help edit this article. But I'll respond to your queries anyway.

Re collage: it's "noisy" and cluttered. Tries to convey simultaneously too much visual information. Basic tenet of communication theory: if excess of information is transmitted, the less chance there is of actual communication taking place. (Bit like the discussion page). Big Three pic ex Western Betrayal applicable only if Big Three (or five or six) section included.

Re 4. Plenty of reliable sources, including especially Hinsley, and very active unsigned editor above probably has access to plenty more.

Re 3. A challenge, but there's definitely a concise and objective way of doing it. Problem is, established non-Western lines of research and also Western revisionist sources would need to be given parity with "mainstream" Western sources for NPOV, and as everybody knows, there exists very clear aversion towards any of that.

Re 2. Concur.

Re 1. Yes, all that and more, esp. Chamberlain's involvement etc. etc. Communicat (talk) 17:54, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Six pictures showing different aspects of WWII are hardly too much. By contrast, the Big Three photo would shift an accent form ordinary people to the leaders, which is hardly appropriate.

re 4. Imo, intelligence (except information obtained by Richard Sorge) had minimal effect on the course of the war on the Eastern Front. Intelligence appeared to be unable to anticipate German counter-attack in Ardennes. It was useful against Japan in Pacific and Germany in Atlantic, however, that is not sufficient to devote any specific attention to it in this article. However, my knowledge on that account may be insufficient, so, if you believe I am wrong, please, explain (with sources and quotes, if possible, to save my time). Thank you in advance.

re 3. So do that, please. If the text will be short and good enough I'll try to help to introduce it into the article.

re 2. Try to propose concrete wording (e.g. "Leaders" subsection).

re 1. Older versions of this article devoted some space to it. However, that lead to fierce debates regarding the balance between POVs on that account (see [10], [11] etc. There were looong debates last year), so finally a consensus was achieved that any historical interpretations of these events should be left beyond the scope of this article. Please look through these debates first. If upon having read all of that you will have some new arguments and ideas, I will gladly discuss them with you, because I myself is not completely satisfied with this compromise.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:08, 5 September 2010 (UTC)

I have always found it easier to show what changes are believed needed with refs, as this is much easier to follow then wishing to change the tone of the article as a whole or sections as a whole...Like done below as only an example...note this could be doen over and over again and in most cases shows what and y at the same time...Moxy (talk) 20:21, 5 September 2010 (UTC)

• In July 1937, Japan captured the former Chinese imperial capital of Beiping after instigating the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which culminated in the Japanese campaign to invade all of China.

to-

• In July 1937, Japan captured the ancient' Chinese imperial capital of Beiping since tensions between the Empire of Japan and China had been fanned since the Invasion of Manchuria in 1931.<ref here> After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japanese began a campaign to invade all of China.<ref here>

—Preceding unsigned comment added by Moxy (talk • contribs) 20:20, 5 September 2010

Communicat appears to have quit editing this article, which is probably a good thing for now, since until he gets more experience he's better off editing articles that aren't under as many types of pressures and constraints as this one. I stopped by here to try to help with his situation and ended up commenting a bit on the article itself, so I'll address the above before moving on (keep in mind that my WW2 knowledge is mostly limited to one very narrow area, that being the cryptologic side of Ultra):

• 4. Sigint was quite important -- Hinsley claims Ultra shortened the war by years. In particular he says D-day could not have happened in 1944 without it. His talk linked above[12] is pretty interesting. I wouldn't give sigint a lot of space in the article but I'd reorganize the article a bit and then mention sigint in several places. I'd compress the "technology" section at the end to a short paragraph and move it to the end of the introduction, so that technological stuff could be referred to later. Sigint was especially important in the Pacific, in North Africa, in the U-boat war, and post D-day. The Ardennes were a notable exception, and that was because (Budiansky p. 326) "Allied generals paid one last terrible price for their slipping into the old familiar habits of commanding armies and too little time reading the enemy's intentions. ... Ultra had in fact provided ample warnings".
• 3. Not many ideas on this and not sure how interesting it is.
• 2. I agree about concentrating more on the people and less on the leaders, the exception being Hitler, since (for better or worse) in popular conception, he is the single personality most associated with the war.
• 1. I'd like to see something said about what the different countries wanted from the war. I.e. Germany's desire to seize other countries' resources to get out of post-WW1 economic stress (if that's an accepted explanation), and whatever the corresponding issues in Japan might have been. I'd briefly mention the German-Japanese agreement about how they would carve up the US after the war as a point of interest/amusement even if it didn't have much overall importance.

I'm not crazy about the collage (it really does look cluttered) but don't have bright ideas for alternatives.

Sharp events (pop history version since that's all I know): 1) rise of fascism and Hitler; 2) entry of main belligerents (invasion of Poland, battles of Britain and France, bombing of Pearl Harbor); 3) D-day and surrounding actions; 4) atomic bombing of Japan and decisions leading to it. The current "course of the war" section reads to me like "list of explosions in World War II" and I can barely read it. I'd like to have some more stuff on technology. Here are some good notes from a talk by the mathematician William Kahan: [13]. They're probably not directly citeable as RS, but could be a good source of inspiration for further research. 67.122.211.178 (talk) 05:14, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

67.122.211.178 (talk) 05:14, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the lead image. I think it would be almost impossible to gain consensus on a photograph of a single event as representative of the entire war, and would consume a lot of bandwidth arguing about discussing it. Collages have been used on similar articles in order to show the breadth, and likely satisfy some national pride issues. It may be possible to have a single image rather than a photograph - for instance a world map with axis and allies - although agreeing on the format of that would likely be time consuming too. It's an old chestnut (see the archives, also the infobox archives), which took significant discussion to get where it is now. (Hohum ^@) 15:02, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Concur.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:59, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Re: "Communicat appears to have quit editing this article, which is probably a good thing for now..." I am not sure. Although he proposed only few concrete things, he initiated several discussions that lead (and will lead) to improvement of the article.

Re: " Sigint was especially important in the Pacific, in North Africa, in the U-boat war, and post D-day." i.e. only for the smaller part of key WWII events.

Re: "Sharp events (pop history version since that's all I know)..." The problem is that not all of these events were really sharp (or they are sharp only in popular western culture; I would say, the events you listed are simply the events where the US or the UK were directly involved), whereas many other sharp and strategically important events have been left beyond the scope. The current version of the "Course of the war" section tries to describe these events, mostly ignored by mass media, which makes it hard to read for unprepared reader. The problem is, however, that we don't have to and cannot strengthen existing stereotypes, we must build the article based on what reliable academic sources say. --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:59, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

(Speak of the devil). Paul, you've explicitly invited me to comment on worth of Ultra, etc, so I trust this will not be interpreted as fringe-POV pushing or sockpuppetry or whatever. Firstly: each and every strategic and important tactical wartime decision to act (or not act) was based essentially upon reliable intelligence. (Much the same applies in peace-time diplomacy as well, for that matter). The ultra-secret interception and decoding of German mility signals at every level of command.during WW2 provided the Western Allies with a very clear and decisive strategic advantage over the enemy. It was one of the most closely guarded secrets of World War II , and it provided the Western Allies with constant and reliable information about the strength, disposition and intentions of the enemy at any given time (except for a relatively short period in respect of German naval codes in the Battle of the Atlantic) . (REF; FW Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1974; FH Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its influence on Strategy and Operations, (4 Vols), London: HMSO, 1977-1988 (official history); Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West, London: Hutchinson 1979.)

Yet, even though armed with such vital and accurate intelligence, the Western military leadership made seemingly inexplicable command decisions that served to prolong the fighting in Europe while depriving the Red Army of relief on the Russian-German front, where the Soviet Union continued to carry the brunt of the war against Germany. Ralph Bennett, so far as I know, is the only Western historian to have touched upon some of those decisions, without offering any provable hypothesis as to WHY such seemingly inexplicable decisions (not to act) were made. Investigative journalist and researcher Stan Winer is the only other writer to have focused on the issue at any length, (and for which he has drawn much flak). However, as you yourself have observed, although Winer's hypothesis has not yet been proved, his sources are accurate and reliable. Moreover, as Winer himself states in the introduction to his much maligned work, his purpose is neither to produce a comprehensive history nor to postulate a hypothesis or to get people to agree with his own conclusions. His stated purpose, as he puts it, "is simply to motivate readers to pursue their own lines of research and form their own conclusions."

Now, to address the Ardennes question that you've raised, and quoting Winer whose sources are accurate and reliable, the Ardennes needs to be viewed against a wider panorama of Western failures on the Western or Second Front. The intelligence was certainly there for the Western commanders to use appropriately had they been ordered to do so. The perplexing question is: WHY did the Western command structure fail to act upon it? I quote from Chapter Six of Between the Lies:

START EXTRACT:

In Belgium, where the stated intention of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was to capture the crucial maritime port of Antwerp, SHAEF disregarded explicit intelligence warnings that the Germans were about to secure the approaches to the port. The invading force, failing to move swiftly on the offensive before the Germans completed defence preparations, ended up with Antwerp rendered entirely useless to them for the next six months. This made it impossible for an immediate advance on the Ruhr or on Berlin, which would have been practicable only if Montgomery's 40 divisions could be supplied through Antwerp. (REFS: Ralph Bennett, Ralph, "Ultra and Some Command Decisions", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 16, 1981 p.135; Basil Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, London: Cassell 1965, p.536)

It was virtually a repeat performance of the stalling and procrastination that had occurred just a few months earlier at Anzio in Italy, where the Germans were wholly unprepared for amphibious landings. Excellent conditions had existed here for providing substantial relief to the Red Army on the eastern front by launching a determined Allied thrust northwards through Italy. SHAEF clearly ignored available intelligence showing conditions to be ideal for an immediate and unopposed advance on Rome. Instead, the military command waited until the Germans had organised an effective defence and counter-attack. The New Zealand and Indian contingents of the landing force took particularly heavy casualties, with the enemy then retiring north of Rome in good order. There the Germans established a new and unyielding line in Tuscany where the Italian campaign would drag on for at least another year, at a cost of many more Allied lives. (REFS: The account of the Italian campaign draws on: Martin Blumenson, Anzio: Philadelphia: Lippencott, 1963: Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1986, pp. 511-2; Bennett, Ralph, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989, p.282. Fraser, David, And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983, p.282)

A final episode in the patterned distribution of intelligence "failures" and unheroic command decisions occurred in December 1944, when the invading force, even though armed with Ultra intelligence, "failed to anticipate" the German offensive in the Ardennes — the Battle of the Bulge -- where the Germans inflicted major casualties on the Anglo-American armies and nearly halted the Allied advance in its tracks. Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring was later to reveal that Germany's 10th Army, the defending force in Italy, was so unprepared that it would have been virtually annihilated had the Western Allies immediately advanced their attack once a beach-head was established. (REF: Albrecht Kesselring, Memoirs, London: Greenhill 1988, p.193.)

ENDS EXTRACT

There are many flaws in Winer's work, including his inability to provide conclusive proof of the reason or reasons why the Western Allies failed to act on constant, copious and reliable sigint, such as occured at the Battle of the Bulge which you've raised. The explanation he offers, remember, is that the West, and Churchill in particular, wanted to weaken and deprive the Red Army of relief on the Eastern Front. Winer manages to overlook that Churchill in particular did not consider the Italian threatre as one of immediate strategic importance. He had his sights set instead on the Balkans -- a flank from which to eventually thwart or threaten a weakened post-war Russia. There was friction between Roosevelt and Churchill in this regard. In short, Churchill's war ambitions and his strategic decisions, including his influence on SHAEF, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and especially on Montgomery during the Ardennes offensive arose from post-war imperial ambitions. (On Churchill and Balkans: see Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass: British Foreign Policy in the Age of Illusions, London: Jonathan Cape, 1983, pp.34-6

All of this could of course more usefully give substance to a wiki article on the subject of Alternative History -- except that someone has already laid claim to a wiki page en titled Alternative history, (and then filled it with a whole lot of science-fiction crap). So, if you're interested, you might want to pursue Winer's sources and see if something worthwhile comes of it in terms of any proposed Strategy and/or expanded Sigint section in possible improvement of the main WW2 article. If so, there will predictably be a great deal of acrimonious WP:BATTLEFIELD involved, from which I'd prefer to keep myself at a very safe distance. Remember, it is not Winer's controversial public domain "fringe" work that's suggested for citation, but rather have a closer look at his reliable sources, from which to MAYBE launch your own endeavours to improve/expand the article if or where appropriate. Good luck to you. Communicat (talk) 19:41, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

I am not sure what your proposing..should this talk not be at Ultra or Signals intelligence? Is there something you wish to change here? Moxy (talk) 20:54, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

...and it's all based on a source which has been found to be unreliable in dicussions here and elsewhere (and just because it cites reliable sources doesn't make it reliable). This is a waste of time. Nick-D (talk) 22:41, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Back to Winer again, Seriously? (Hohum ^@) 23:17, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Dear Communicat, I believe you realise that in any event we are talking about addition of just a couple of sentences devoted to this subject. Could you please propose the draft of these sentence with explanation of where they are supposed to be added?--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:23, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

You specifically questioned the importance of wartime intelligence generally, and its relevance to the Ardennes debacle in particular. I've answered your query as requested. Have a nice day. Communicat (talk) 13:33, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

Thank you. However, please, keep in mind that it is probably a good moment for stopping to educate others and for starting to propose some concrete text. You were an initiator of this discussion, so it is natural to expect you to propose some concrete text, not only general considerations. I am ready to discuss introduction of some text about sigint into the article, however, I am not ready to do your part of a job. Please, try to behave as a collaborator, not as a supervisor who provides just general ideas and expect others to develop them. We all have our own ideas and we cannot spend our time developing yours.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:09, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

PS. It would be great if you abandoned your aut Caesar aut nihil strategy and, for instance, commented on my comments of the Aftermath draft.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:21, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

Eurocentric. Communicat (talk) 20:56, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

Goodness, but Winer's writing is comically bad. He's trying to say that every failure in the West was intended to hurt the Soviets. That has to be the most ridiculous thing I've read in a long time. I told you I'd laugh out loud if you brought him up and I am. There is next to nothing in that excerpt that has anything to do with the Ardennes. A single sentence and not a particularly useful one at that. --Habap (talk) 12:25, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

Read the extract properly. It says "the Germans inflicted major casualties on the Anglo-American armies" at Ardennes. Never mind just hurting the Soviets. And at Anzio: "The New Zealand and Indian contingents of the landing force took particularly heavy casualties, with the enemy then retiring north of Rome in good order." Everybody (except the Germans) suffered as a consequence of available Ultra intel not being acted upon, and to this day nobody can prove why, though some like Winer have offered reasonably convincing hypotheses that are unacceptable to others. Incidentally, you might have noticed that that we were talking about SIGINT, not about personal attacks. Have you anything significant to contribute to the subject of SIGNINT and its apparently disputed importance vis-a-vis an article of military history? Communicat (talk) 20:39, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

You're relying on a ridiculously unreliable source. A lone sentence in three paragraphs "to address the Ardennes question" is hardly relevant. Winer puts "failures" and "failed to anticipate" in quotes, which leads me to believe he thinks it was done intentionally so that they would not be "providing substantial relief to the Red Army on the eastern front by launching a determined Allied thrust northwards through Italy." I'm not making a personal attack. I'm pointing out that his argument is ridiculous. In your time in the service, didn't you ever see commanders have a variety of pieces of intelligence and choose the wrong ones to believe? I think Anzio was a failure of command, and I squarely blame Mark Clark, not Ultra.I think you'll find a lot of historians firmly place the blame on Clark.

So, if you're quoting Winer and stating that he has "offered a reasonably convincing" theory, please state that theory. If it's that the western allies failed to properly use Ultra intelligence in order to hurt the Soviets, I would say you're not presenting a minority position, but, rather, a fringe position that is not evident in the literature.—Preceding unsigned comment added by Habap (talk • contribs)

The topic of this discussion is not Winer, nor is it the Italian campaign. The topic of this conversation is what I have suggested as the crucial role of wartime intelligence, the value of which was disputed by Paul Siebert who gave Ardennes as a rather facetious example. What is your view on the importance of wartime intelligence vis-a-vis this article of military history? I notice you do not provide any sources to substantiate Clark's culpability, so I guess I'll just have to find them for myself. As for my time in the service: We did things properly in the navy. (That's why it's called the Senior Service). Communicat (talk) 02:01, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

You brought Winer into the discussion as support for your premise. His work is not a reliable source, so why waste our time with three paragraphs of a work that is the "sort of thing that gives conspiracy theory a bad name." (from the Guardian review) Your three paragraph excerpt included information on the Italian campaign. In regards to the role of Ultra there, see p 140 of Wilson Heefner, Dogface Soldier: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press 2010 ISBN 9780826218827. Page 149 is available on Amazon. He discussed the value of Ultra in the preparation for Operation Shingle, allowing Clark to draw the troops in Rome (that were positioned to counter the operation) southward. According to Heefner, Clark had intended to have Lucas sieze the Alban hills, but

Haunted by his experience at Salerno, Clark modified his order on January 12, instructing Lucas to "advance on" the Alban Hills, rather than to "advance and secure" the hills.

So, Heefner feels Ultra helped at Anzio and that Clark failed. I'd offer to loan you my signed copy of the book, but shipping costs to South Africa probably make it beyond my means. I must admit that I'm surprised that your experience in the navy did not involve incorrect decisions made by commanders. --Habap (talk) 17:23, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks. Interesting. But you've still not expressed a view on the importance of intel in time of war. The only incorrect decision by navy commanders that I ever experienced directly was the one that sent me to the Ist Gulf War, (where I first came across Winer). Communicat (talk) 19:37, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

On that page of Heefner, he wrote how Ultra alerted Clark to the disposition of German troops, then confirmed the success in drawing those Rome-based reinforcements south, making Anzio possible. With that, and other instances in which Ultra proved useful (as well as Allied code-breaking in the Pacific, with it's impact on Midway, I think there ought to be a mention of it in the main article. I would, however, leave out any mention of the Winer conspiracy theories that the western Allies failed to utilize Ultra intentionally in order to hurt the Soviets. Similarly, there are a plethora of sources here, so we needn't cite him. --Habap (talk) 14:34, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

No-one has suggested using Winer as a source. As regards your "there ought to be a mention of (Ultra) in the main article": I think it needs slightly more than just a mention. A mention in several places would be better. To quote unsigned editor's posting of 6 Sept: Sigint was quite important -- Hinsley claims Ultra shortened the war by years. In particular he says D-day could not have happened in 1944 without it. His talk linked above[14] is pretty interesting. I wouldn't give sigint a lot of space in the article but I'd reorganize the article a bit and then mention sigint in several places. (My emphasis) I'd compress the "technology" section at the end to a short paragraph and move it to the end of the introduction, so that technological stuff could be referred to later. Sigint was especially important in the Pacific, in North Africa, in the U-boat war, and post D-day. The Ardennes were a notable exception, and that was because (Budiansky p. 326) "Allied generals paid one last terrible price for their slipping into the old familiar habits of commanding armies and too little time reading the enemy's intentions. ... Ultra had in fact provided ample warnings. Communicat (talk) 19:58, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

No one has suggested using Winer as a source? Perhaps you should read the edit history of Communicat some time.[15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] Edward321 (talk) 23:34, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

In case you haven't noticed, we're talking about the importance of Sigint to this article. Read the thread. Maybe you've got something useful to contribute? Nobody has suggested using Winer as a source with regard to Sigint, i.e. the subject of this thread. Why are you and a couple of others so obsessed with him? Beats me. Communicat (talk) 23:04, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

I am concern with the amount POV statements that i see all over with www.truth-hertz.net as the source...since its been talk about over and over that the link is not a valid source.Moxy (talk) 20:25, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

A fate of Soviet ex-POWs and civilian repatriants.

Below is a discussion between Nick-D and me which I took from my talk page following the Nick's advice.--Paul Siebert (talk) 11:33, 5 October 2010 (UTC)

//////////////

Hi Paul, Would you be able to provide a citation to support the material you reverted back to here? Thanks, Nick-D (talk) 08:41, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

The sources are:

1. Земское В.Н. К вопросу о репатриации советских граждан. 1944-1951 годы // История СССР. 1990. № 4 (Zemskov V.N. On repatriation of Soviet citizens. Istoriya SSSR., 1990, No.4. This is the article from the late Soviet/Russian scientific journal. The figures I refer to have been taken from this and other articles of this scholar. Unfortunately, this concrete article is in Russian, so it would be senseless to provide a quote here. However, Zemskov's data are being widely used by Western colleagues, e.g.
2. Edwin Bacon. Glasnost' and the Gulag: New Information on Soviet Forced Labour around World War II. Source: Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 6 (1992), pp. 1069-1086.
3. Michael Ellman. Soviet Repression Statistics: Some Comments. Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 7 (Nov., 2002), pp. 1151-1172.

Although these authors do not reproduce the figures on ex-POWs, they confirm existence of special filtration camps, which were different from GULAG camps, they confirm that many of the filtration camps' inmates were sent home (although they add a reservation that those who died in these camps were also considered to be sent home: "The postwar filtration statistics, which purport to show that as of 1 March 1946, out of the 4.2 million people checked, 58% had been sent home, include those who died in the filtration camps among those 'sent home'." Ellmann, op. cit.). In addition, these, as well as other authors, including even late Conquest, widely use other Zemskov's figures, and do not question reliability of the data obtained by Zemskov. See, e.g., the Edwin Bacon's conclusion about the documents used by Zemskov:

"The arguments in favour of the archive revelations' worth are strong. The possibility of their being a recent fabrication is virtually inconceivable, as several scholars have worked from them, and in any case the atmosphere of glasnost' prevailing in the last years of the Soviet Union militates against a convincing motive for such subterfuge. Therefore, genuine secret state documents of the era are being dealt with. It may be supposed that the authorities wished to have the correct facts available to them, and hence sought to ensure that the reported figures were reliable and comprehensive. Many of the data, notably with regard to the labour settlers, sub-divide the numbers involved in terms of gender, age, nationality, offence of which they were convicted and geographical location. The various types of forced labour and definitions of categories also serve to increase knowledge in a previously sketchy area." (op. cit.)

I think what should be said in the article is that "Soviet ex-POWs and repatriated civilians were treated with great suspect as potential Nazi collaborators, and that some of them were sent to GULAG upon check by NKVD." --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:29, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

Thanks Paul. A rate of 42% of 4.2 million people being sent to prison camps seems higher than the wording "some of them" implies though. It might be best to quote this statistic in the text. Nick-D (talk) 23:00, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

You misunderstood the quote. Neither Zemskov nor Ellman implied that all the repatriants were send either home or to GULAG. The actual state of things was much more complex. In actuality, a full statistics is as follows:

Results of the checks and the filtration of the repatriants (by 1 March 1946)
Categogy	Total	%	Civilian	%	POWs	%
Sent home (including those who died in custody)	2,427,906	57.81	2,146,126	80.68	281,780	18.31
Conscripted	801,152	19.08	141,962	5.34	659,190	42.82
Sent to labour battalions of the Ministry of Defence	608,095	14.48	263,647	9.91	344,448	22.37
Sent to NKVD (spetskontingent)	272,867	6.50	46,740	1.76	226,127	14.69
Were waiting for transportation and worked in Soviet military units abroad	89,468	2.13	61,538	2.31	27,930	1,81
Totally:	4,199,488		2,660,013		1,539,475

You can see how deceptive statistics can be: although only 58% of the repatriants were released (and some of them in actuality died by that moment), only 6.5% were to NKVD as spetskontingent (the latter not necessarily meant they were sent to GULAG: sometimes, very frequently, that meant just 6-year exile to remote parts of the USSR.). The discrepancy between the number of sent home and the number of spetskontingent is quite simple: the heavily devastated country simply could not afford a luxury to allow these people just to go home and recover. Many ex-POWs and young civilian were conscripted to serve in the Red Army, others worked in labour battalions to rebuilt the infrastructure destroyed during the war. The labour battalions were closer to military service rather than to GULAG, and, accordingly, these battalions were run by the Ministry (Narkomat) of Defence. Of course, according to contemporary moral norms such a treatment of the peoples who survived in German captivity was inhuman, however, it is necessary to take into account that other Soviet people suffered in about the same extent during the war, therefore, our contemporary criteria of humanism are simply inapplicable to those time situation.

In addition, you have to agree that 226,127 real or alleged Nazi-collaborators out of more than 30 million of serving in the Red Army during a four years period is a quite realistic figure.

The number of those who died in filtration camps (i.e. of those who was released but didn't arrive home) was 32,381. --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:51, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

Thanks a lot for that Paul; I agree with your wording in light of those statistics. It might be best to copy and paste this discussion to Talk:World War II so there's a rationale for the change. Regards, Nick-D (talk) 07:14, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

////////////

Great work here...wow did not know this was so....00:55, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

Soviet fatalities

Casualties and War Crimes section states: The Soviet Union lost around 27 million people during the war,[260] But according to Professor John Erickson of Edinburgh University, Defence Studies department, (commenting after the opening of Soviet war archives), there were "more than 40 million Soviet civilians and soldiers killed in the war, a quarter of the entire population." The toll splits into a figure of 22 million combat deaths including Red Army soldiers trapped behind enemy lines, and 18 million civilians. ("20m Soviet war dead may be underestimate", Guardian, 30 April 1994). —Preceding unsigned comment added by Communicat (talk • contribs) 00:59, 17 October 2010 (UTC)

It is probably a confusion between casualties and demographical losses. I recommend to read the following article: Michael Ellman and S. Maksudov. Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 4, Soviet and East European History (1994), pp. 671-680. The authors explain:

"From a demographic point of view, the total population loss consisted of the excess deaths, plus net emigration, plus the decline in births, minus natural deaths among these hypothetical newly-born."

They further explain:

"Hence had there been no war, the population of the USSR at 31 December 1945 would have been greater by the sum of the losses (26-27 million) and the unborn as a result of the fall in the birth rate (11.5 million) minus natural deaths which would have occurred among these 11.5 million hypothetical children. (about 2.4 million) making a total hypothetical demographic loss at 31 December 1945 of 35-36 million (or about 40 million if no account is taken of the age structure of the female population and the declining fertility trend)" (ibid)

Another explanation would be that the Erickson's 22 million combat death were exaggeration. After opening Soviet archives it became clear that the number of combat death did not exceed 8.7 million:

"How accurate is this 8.7 million figure? The book which analyses military losses and which is the basis for the figure itself draws attention to the limitations of the underlying data on which it is based.18 Checking it requires studying the archival material which it used and also the estimating methods it used in the absence of firm archival figures. In the absence of such work, it is reassuring to note that the new figures, based on military records, are quite close to the estimates based on the method of demographic estimation, and published by one of us long ago.19 On the other hand, there are some factors which make the 8.7 million figure too high as an estimate of deaths due to the war. First, it is necessary to take account of natural deaths of serving members of the armed forces. With total armed forces of 11-12 million, using the age specific death tables derived from the 1926 and 1939 censuses, for males of 18-40, one would expect about 70 000 deaths a year (0.7 per thousand), or for four years about 300 000. Second, the number of war-related deaths in captivity is exaggerated. Also here it is necessary to deduct natural deaths (about 100 000), Soviet prisoners of war who stayed in the West after the war (about 200 000-in particular Balts and Ukrainians) and those released by the Germans or escaped and not reinstated in the Soviet armed forces (e.g. because of age, injury or hiding from mobilisation agencies) who may be estimated at about 300 000. These corrections have the effect of reducing the military dead caused by the war to about 7.8 million. Of these 7.8 million, it would seem that 5.5 million died at the front, 1.1 million died from injury in hospitals, and 1.2 million died in German captivity."(ibid)

--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:17, 17 October 2010 (UTC)

Certainly food for thought. Erickson, in the Guardian piece cited, says the Soviet archive figure of 22 million combat dead matched German wartime statistics, and were derived from casualty figures "for every battle and operation in the war". I wonder if either Erickson, the Germans, or your cited source took into account the casualties of irregular forces, which are unlikely to have been documented. (?)

Separately, Harrison Salisbury in his book about the seige of Leningrad (pp.133-7), describes how the Soviet leadership consistently understated the number of civilians dying of starvation. (To this day, estimates are still inconclusive, ranging from 1 million to 2 million). The Soviet leadership, it seems, did not want to alienate Russian public support for the war effort by revealing the full extent of civilian deaths, and the sacrifices and suffering at Leningrad. Given the leadership's apparent penchant for politically motivated understatement, it would seem a bit odd if the former official Soviet figure of 20 million war dead now turns out, by contrast, to be a gross exageration.

For purposes of the Aftermath section, however, it might be worth stating the number of years it took for the post-war population level to catch up with pre-war level. Erickson says it took 30 years.

Re Bretton Woods and other points raised, I'll try to put together some concrete text and refs for discussion, maybe in the next week or two, if/when time permits. Communicat (talk) 00:57, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

By contrast to Ellman and Maksudov, who independently from each other published a number of articles on population losses in the USSR, Erickson didn't do his own studies, but relied on the data of others. In addition, these two authors compare their own results with the works of Russian researchers and come to a conclusion the their figure almost coincide (see the underlined text in the quote above).

Re "it would seem a bit odd if the former official Soviet figure of 20 million war dead now turns out, by contrast, to be a gross exaggeration" 20 million was the official number of total population losses (military and civilians), not only military losses. It corresponds to today's official figure of 27 million.

Re: "or your cited source took into account the casualties of irregular forces, which are unlikely to have been documented. (?)" It does:

"The enormous non-military deaths of approximately 19 million (26.6 - 7.8 = 18.8) are so large and so various (deaths in the siege of Leningrad; deaths in German prisons and concentration camps; deaths from mass shootings of civilians; deaths of labourers in German industry; deaths from famine and disease; deaths in Soviet camps; etc) that it is desirable to try and break them down. It should be noted that not all these deaths are truly 'civilian'. This enormous figure includes the deaths of both Soviet non-conscript partisans and of Soviet citizens not conscripted into the Soviet armed forces who died in German or German-controlled military units fighting the USSR." (ibid)--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:46, 21 October 2010 (UTC)

Okay, you've convinced me. I've always harboured some uneasiness about Erickson, but couldn't quite put my finger on it. So, we'll stick with the 27 million figure. Thanks. Communicat (talk) 12:41, 21 October 2010 (UTC)

Animated map

Would this animation be a good addition to the article? Nergaal (talk) 20:05, 21 October 2010 (UTC)

The animation doesn't seem to work as a thumbnail. Nick-D (talk) 07:13, 22 October 2010 (UTC)

aftermath

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

---

I've made new 2nd para, no changes otherwise. RE clarification requested, will do when edit conflicts subside, and will also fix ISBNs if/when ref numbers revert to sequence, for some reason current sequence gone all over the place. Can anyone tell me consistent ISBN policy, i.e. 10-digit, 13-digit, spaces and/or dashes between numbers? Communicat (talk) 18:39, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

For complete coverage it would be interesting to add how the denazification / war crimes programs of the USSR developed after the war. Is there any source information about whether the USSR similarly used high end former nazis in relevant postings and thus diluted their denazification programs in the same way UK and US did? (I know they were interested in Werner von Braun, but the Americans got him) Arnoutf (talk) 19:04, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

No, I don't have sources for USSR. Why don't YOU look for them, seeing as its your idea? (You might want to add that USSR wanted British bombing of German civilians to be included in war crimes trials). Communicat (talk) 20:04, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

A minor clarification, and some page numbers are needed. I have fixed the ISBN syntax. 10 or 13 digit ISBN work, 13 is preferred, WP:ISBN is the relevant wiki page for ISBN presentation. (Hohum ^@) 20:06, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

I did have a look and found a few interesting publications. Russian denazification lasted from 1945-1948. Older sources accuse the Russians of political cleansing of anticommunist sentiments, but modern sources (Vogt) does not agree and sais that denazification was relatively fair albeit slow. March 1948 denazification was halted/ called complete. All 'remaining' nazis were no longer pursued. So apparently no conscious Soviet intention to employ high level nazis in the new governmental structures, but acceptance that the task to continue finding "small" nazis could take forever and would disrupt the new situation, hence a stop on active persecution. In other words, the Soviets applied a similar kind of realpolitik as the US/UK except for those few case where US/UK actively used former nazis for their goals. [www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/Vol4Denazification.doc] [40] [41] Arnoutf (talk) 20:24, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

Interesting. So, why don't you work it into topic with ref?

Re your "...few cases where US/UK actively used former nazis for their goals": No, there were not a few cases, especially in relation to US. Try reading the readily available works I've cited. Entire US-sponsored Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty network, operating from US, was run by numerous former Nazis including war crimes suspects. Plenty of sources, but the three sentences I've provided are sufficient to the task at hand, without needing to make a fullblown article out of it -- (but of course you're free to do so yourself if you're that way inclined). Communicat (talk) 21:55, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

Collapse previous reflist

I've just removed the para. The lack of page numbers is highly unsatisfactory, and I'm not convinced that it's either neutral (as other sources emphasise the harsh treatment of Germany in the post-war years and Germany's rehabilitation as a democracy) or about topics notable enough to be covered in this high-level article on the war (and not its aftermarth). As per the convention, it should also have been discussed here first. I've posted the para below to aid further disussions of it.

When the divisions of postwar Europe began to emerge, the war crimes programmes and denazification policies of Britain and the United States were abandoned in favour of realpolitik. Germans who were classified as ardent Nazis were chosen by the American secret services to become "respectable" American citizens. Secret arrangements were concluded between American military intelligence and former key figures in the anti-communist section of German military intelligence or Abwher, headed by General Reinhard Gehlen, to advise the Americans on how to go about establishing their own anti-Soviet networks in Europe.

In addition to the clarification request, and page numbers. Links to Operation Paperclip and Operation Osoaviakhim would seem relevant. Were Nazi Scientists gathered by the USSR too? - I believe Bower's The Paperclip Conspiracy covers this as well. The text starting "Secret arrangements were..." to the end of the paragraph goes into too much detail for an overview article IMO. (Hohum ^@) 23:34, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

Nick-D you could see that at the very time of your deleting my contribution, I was in the actual process of working on the paragraph you were busily deleting. If it wasn't for all the edit conflicts I was experiencing as a result of your interference, the required page number and "clarity" query would have been completed.

I have read and understand the rules and therefore see no need to first discuss with you what I propose to edit, except in the case of significant changes. I have not performed any significan change to existing text. I have inserted three sentences of new content, which editors can examine at their leisure and respond accordingly, as Hohum and others were in the process of doing before you butted in and acted arbitrarily without discussion. You're being extrememly objectionable and obstructive, and this latest instance will also be brought to the attention of arbitrator, in addition to other matters already filed today, of which you are no doubt aware, and of which you will no doubt be hearing further. In the meantime, please stop being retaliatory; you're only damaging your own case. Communicat (talk) 00:03, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

Nick-D has edited the article exactly twice in the last twelve hours. That is not a lot of edit conflicts. The WP:BOLD, revert, discuss cycle is normal practice. Please stop making threats, knuckle down, and discuss edits constructively, like anyone else manages to do. (Hohum ^@) 00:16, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

re Nick-D has edited the article exactly twice in the last twelve hours. Exactly. Isn't it quite odd then that he should remove my edit just a few minutes after I'd filed items containing edit summaries that made it obvious I was in the very process of methodically fixing the section at issue (page numbers, clarity query)? Coincidence is all very well when it happens, but this, given the circumstances, was IMO no coincidence.

Besides which, his remark about "aftermath" in relation to the article is quite incoherent. I've read it several times and still can't figure out what the blazes he's talking about. Perhaps he knows what he's talking about? Never mind.

By the way, I'm not making threats. I'm making promises. Arbitration request has already been filed. In the meantime, the aftermath item is easily fixed on basis of your observations, and I was in fact doing so before disruption ocurred. Doesn't seem much point in proceeding further with that edit under present conditions. I'll just let arbitration run its course before attempting any more wasted effort here. You can do what you like with Tom Bower et al. If the boss lets you. Communicat (talk) 00:48, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

I wish you spent your time on improving edits instead of non-constructive argument and tilting at windmills. (Hohum ^@) 01:29, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

Communicat, if you genuinely wish to discuss changes to articles it would be helpful if you'd stop your personal attacks on other editors - I'm not going to engage with them. Nick-D (talk) 02:26, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

If we want to go further with this para I would add a line immediately after the first: "Followed by an end to denazification by the Soviets in early 1948 " In any case, if we discuss the denazification we should fairly discuss US, UK AND USSR efforts otherwise we give an incomplete image which necessarily leads to a POV by omission.
I would also be perfectly happy to drop it, as I think the aftermath section is already very long for a high level overview article like this. So my preference would be to shorten rather than expand it. Arnoutf (talk) 07:02, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

Dropping it is my preference. If Germany is covered, all the other Axis countries need to be covered and this topic isn't particularly relevant to the subject of the article (the war). Nick-D (talk) 07:13, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

Communicat, in case you didn't check that RfA, please read Wikipedia:TINC. I found it amusing and quite relevant. --Habap (talk) 12:25, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

Read WP:OWN. As for Rfa decision, read Response to assertion in statement by Nick-D regarding "... proposed changes to and complaints (by Communicat) about the World War II article ... are generally not supported by the balance of mainstream sources ..."

The article relies exclusively on mainstream sources, to the total exclusion of other available non-mainsteam sources / positions, and this is the specific reason why NPOV dispute arose in the first place. See Observation by mediator in this specific regard, which is as follows: "I would express my disappointment at what seems to be the acutely partisan nature of the editing of this article ... it saddens me to know that there are articles with regular contributors who are either so devoid of a collegial outlook or who have not yet reported such a disruptive user for administrative attention." (AGK 20:10, 24 August 2010)

As Moxy has recognised, there are some wide and advanced issues involved here, and I'm definitely not gonna let it go. Sorry to disappoint you all. Communicat (talk) 19:41, 25 August 2010 (UTC)

It's an overview article. It should rely on reliable mainstream sources. Further exploration should be on the hundreds of linked articles. (Hohum ^@) 19:46, 25 August 2010 (UTC)

Lame excuse. Tendentious reasoning. Read the rules that require alternative positions to be stated in interests of NPOV, which rules I've already cited several times. I'm not going to repeat them endlessly for the benefit of a few editors apparently exhibiting "I can't hear you". It's clear the issue cannot be resolved via discussion with editors of that ilk, otherwise it would have been resolved a long time ago. I see not point in trying to discuss it further, and will pursue my options, of which there are still one or two. Communicat (talk) 20:07, 25 August 2010 (UTC)

Currently, every other editor who has expressed an opinion disagrees with you on your novel interpretation of wikipedia policies and guidelines. You are flogging several dead horses simultaneously with your current behaviour. (Hohum ^@) 20:12, 25 August 2010 (UTC)

You have evidently missed my posting, (two postings above), re Observation by mediator, now repeated again for your edification: "I would express my disappointment at what seems to be the acutely partisan nature of the editing of this article ...." (AGK 20:10, 24 August 2010) In short, if as alleged no other editors agree with me, the quoted mediator for one does in fact agree with me. If you don't like it, take it up with the mediation committee.

As for your tendentious "It's an overview article." Firstly, wherever did you people get the idea that it's an 'overview'? Nowhere is it said in the article itself that it's an "overview". The article is a main article, with various separate sub-articles. As a main article it should contain the main points about WW2, regardless of whether or not the sub-articles elabortate further, and if they don't, it's the sub-articles' problem, not the main article's problem. And a main point, among others, that should be mentioned in the main article, is that significant alternative positions exist as to the causes and courses of the war. The article itself need not go into a fullwinded saga about the alternative positions. That's a separate story. For the main article, just mention that fundamental difference exist between Western mainstream, Western revisionist, and non-Western i.e. Soviet positions. That's all that's needed. No more than two or three sentences with reliable sources, as I've already provided and which were rejected out of hand.

Secondly: your "(the article) should rely on reliable mainstream sources." You're defeating your own argument. "Reliable mainstream sources" to the exclusion of reliable alternative and/or revisionist position sources is vcompletely out of line with NPOV, and even Habap has recognised this by now. And so has the mediator as quoted above.

So how come you're still having so much difficulty in grasping this very basic historiographic concept? I would suggest it's because of ideological conservatism on your part and on the part of some other editors; conservatism by its very nature is highly resistant to change; and that includes editorial changes to the article by any editor with a fresh perspective, in this case me.

You conservatives, having achieved "good article" status, now apparently want to rest on your laurels and protect "your" territory against perceived intruders like me, i.e. anyone who proposes any meaningful and progressive change to "your" article. Well, I'm not intimidated by your sort. Communicat (talk) 23:06, 25 August 2010 (UTC)

AGK was clearly talking about the process of collaboration and not the content, of the article. And I would perfer to work together, but I think we should first agree on some basic issues about this article.

1. This article covers the whole of WWII. WWII was an extremely complicated conflict. To cover all of it and keep it at a readable size each issue should be treated extremely briefly.
   
2. If there are conflicting interpretations/theories, the most dominant should get more attention more or less in proportion to how dominant these are in todays literature. This is overall an encyclopedia where an overview of the body of current knowledge is presented and not a scientific journal where new opinions are advanced.
   
3. Since the issues are treated extremely briefly (point 1) there is limited scope to present minority views unless these are very broadly supported. The more detailed articles can be used to present these theories in more detail.
   

Can you agree to these arguments? To be honest, if you cannot I do not see how we can cooperate. Arnoutf (talk) 17:23, 26 August 2010 (UTC)

All I wanted to know re my posting above, was whether or not it was appropriate for me to submit the page numbers earlier requested by Hohum as supported by Moxy.

I don't agree with your interpretation of the mediator's observation re "the acutely partisan nature of the editing of this article". Communicat (talk) 22:37, 26 August 2010 (UTC)

ATG clarified on his talk page that he was saying that the "approach to editing is partisan", and wasn't commenting on content. (Hohum ^@) 23:03, 26 August 2010 (UTC)

@Communicat and others, with my 3 points above I am trying to come to agreements within which I think we should be able collaborate. Can you please respond whether you agree to these 3 points. (Looking back to the past and what AGK said (or intended) is not helpful to the future in any case so I would prefer to leave that be.) Arnoutf (talk) 07:14, 27 August 2010 (UTC)

Re Arnoutf's three points. I agree. To keep this already long article as brief and readable as possible, we can't go into much detail, this means leaving most alternative viewpoints to their main articles (and linking to them), yet keeping the wording open enough to encompass them here without being over specific, if possible.

Re page numbers. Even if a whole book is about a point being made, there will doubtless be an identifiable reference on a particular page, or a few pages, which should be used as a reference. (Hohum ^@) 12:27, 27 August 2010 (UTC)

Do you, or do you not want the page numbers? That's all I want to know. At this stage I do not want to be further involved in the aftermath topic nor any other WW2 topic until such time, if any, that certain ongoing policy matters are finally resolved.

As regards AGK clarification of "partisan editing", I have posted the following at AGKs talkpage:

Thanks AGK for clarifying what you meant by "partisan editing". The primary matter at issue as stated in my mediation request concerned partisan editing, so I surmised on that basis your comment was in direct reference to the issue of partisan editing, and not the now clarified "approach to partisan editing".

I agree with your disappointment that mediation was not allowed to take its natural course, viz., was blocked by those who did not want impartial mediation to occur. If mediation had indeed proceeded as intended by me, you would also have become better acquainted with the different points of view that exist on the article in question. You might further have understood how and why there is no discernable desire on the part of those who are opposed to mediation to consider alternatives or compromise, relative to partisan editing as complained of by me. Communicat (talk) 17:30, 27 August 2010 (UTC)

In answer to my direct question to you I interprrt this as that you do not explicitly agree with the 3 points above (and choose not to edit WWII anymore.) Arnoutf (talk) 18:10, 27 August 2010 (UTC)

Read my posting properly. Communicat (talk) 19:40, 27 August 2010 (UTC)

Well I asked a direct question, and in none of your posts do you explicitly respond. So clearly you do not explicitly agree. Your tendency to confuse your own posts by lengthy texts with little relevance to the issue does not hide that. But I can ask you again. Do you agree to the 3 points I raised above, a simple Yes or No will do. Arnoutf (talk) 15:29, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

I'm rather surprised to see that the para has been restored to the article before there's agreement on whether it should be included, how it should be worded or even page numbers for some of the references. I still regard it as a POV mess - in essence it argues that the west quickly papered over its opposition to the Nazis in order to gain access to German technology and intelligence networks. The suprisingly rapid democratisation of post-war Germany is ignored, as is the continuing western military-led occupation of the country. Moreover, it leaves out the substantial transfers of technology to France and Britain. The claim that "Britain and the United States soon abandoned their war crimes programmes" is plainly nonsense given that hundreds of key Nazis were successfully prosecuted and war crimes trials of individuals continue to this very day (including many conducted by Germany during the 1950s and 1960s). The statement that "large numbers of former Nazis" moved to Britain and the US is also very dubious - what's a 'large number'? All up, this para is attempting to push a fringe interpretation of post-war events and I still think it has no place in the article. Nick-D (talk) 00:03, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

I agree that it needs a fair bit of work. It is possible that the editor reintroducing it is having trouble finding the right thread on this cluttered and rambling talk page. (Hohum ^@) 03:11, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

Just in case there's any confusion about the unnamed editor and/or further discrediting of myself: I was not the mysterious editor who reintroduced the evidently disputed material. The editor responsible, more than likely, was the esteemed Hohum, who rightly observes that the talk page has become practically unmanageable.

As for Nick-d's observations: apart from selectively quoting out of context etc, his level of insight seems to be reflected by his own words: "The suprisingly rapid democratisation of post-war Germany ..." Post-war Germany consisted of Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and German Democratic Republic (East Germany), each of which disputed the legitimacy of "democracy" in the other. Neither of them turned out to be truly democratic. (Sources available) Nick-d himself does not source or define his own meaning of "democratisation".

Semantics aside; regarding Nick-d's assertion The claim that "Britain and the United States soon abandoned their war crimes programmes" is plainly nonsense given that hundreds of key Nazis were successfully prosecuted ... Those prosecutions were essentially token prosecutions and they were conducted on a very selective basis. (Copious Sources available). Consider for instance the celebrated case of Kurt Waldheim, who went on to become secretary-general of the United Nations. Another celebrated case is that of the war criminal (can't remember his name right now) who went on to become head of Interpol, and other very well documented cases for which numerous sources are also available. And speaking of sources, I have repeatedly offered to submit reliable sources and clarifications as requested by Hohum before Nick-d objected to the topic and reverted my edits while I was in the process of providing clarification and page numbers. I then repeatedly asked whether or not it was worthwhile providing the said clarity and page numbers, to which no response was forthcoming.

Re Arnoutf posting above: I seem to recall you're the same feller who earlier told me to "SHUT UP" (sic) and "find another forum". Now you are laying down itemised preconditions for my continued participation. I am unaware, (unless I've missed something), that you Arnoutf have any authority whatsoever to dictate to me or anyone else any conditions or preconditions for participation. I have already made it clear, and I repeat: I want nothing further to do with editing the aftermath or any other WW2 topic until such time as certain key policy issues are conclusively resolved. The rest of you, including especially you Arnoutf, are free to fight it out among yourselves. There is an unfortunate tendency, when descended upon by the equivalent of a pack of editorial wild dogs, to reduce oneself to the same level. You don't emerge intact from such attacks by being Mr Nice Guy; and I for one am thoroughly fed up with having to reduce myself to that level. It's all yours (for the time being, at any rate), and good luck to you. I trust I've made myself clear. Communicat (talk) 17:39, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

So, I have accepted the reprimand from the uninvolved admins and tried to involve you into a reasonable discussion by trying to suggest some boundaries within which I am confident we can collaborate. If you read back on this talk page and its archives you can easily find that it is indeed I who lowered myself to your level after a frenzy of unjustified personal attacks and extremely incivil comments on anyone daring to disagree with you (even if facts were presented). In spite of that I have made the effort to find common ground and being called a "wild dog" in response is utterly unwarranted and yet another example of the personal attacks that appear in a significant part of your comments. Arnoutf (talk) 17:59, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

PS I should not have said "shut up" and should have kept a cool head after after your extremely polite and constructive remark "Arnoutf, you are irritating and disruptive. Please stop your personal attacks on me, assume good faith". Arnoutf (talk) 18:32, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Nazis in Western and Soviet service

I have archived the presiding discussion, as it has turned into personal matters and is no longer useful in improving the article.

In the article itself I have added a paragraph with links to the main articles Operation Paperclip, Operation Osoaviakhim, Reinhard Gehlen and Gehlen Organization. Feel free to improve the wording or provide better references.

On the question posed by Nick-D, it is generally agreed that the integration of former Nazis and collaborators into the Western Cold War organizations played a key role in the origins of the Cold War. A Soviet decision to stop prosecution of Nazis played no such role – on the contrary, Soviet prosecution of collaborators was a major irritant in the West. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 19:54, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

Okay, so I've come out of hiding (for the moment). Only to point out that wiki rule doesn't allow use of links to other articles to serve as references. I note that Petri (nor anyone else for that matter), does not give any ref sources.

However, If anyone does want to pursue some of the numerous documented sources available on this topic, I'd suggest Stan Winer's Between the Lies (2nd edn) London: 2007, which provides a detailed, very well researched and sourced chapter (re the Cold War recruitment of nazis) that is of direct relevance to this topic. Milhist censors have of course banned the book from use as a reference source on wiki. But, as Paul Siebert has pointed out in earlier discussion, (now archived): "... the facts and sources he (Winer) cites are correct and reliable." --Paul Siebert (talk) 18 Aug 2010. Since Paul states on his user page that he has a Phd in History, he probably knows what he's talking about.

For my part, I'll not be engaging with any resultant talk arising from mention here of the book's disputed merits. It's a deadhorse for wiki discussion. The book is nonetheless out there for whoever wants to consult the correct and reliable references contained in it. I am not the author or the publisher of the book. Communicat (talk) 21:41, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

Re Petri, if that's the case (which, to be frank, I very much doubt, and particularly the 'key role' part) it should be stated plainly and be supported by appropriate reliable sources. The current text and references do not support the position. Nick-D (talk) 00:00, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

Re: "...it is generally agreed that the integration of former Nazis and collaborators into the Western Cold War organizations played a key role in the origins of the Cold War". I would say, the casual linkage is inverted here. Western countries abandoned denazification because the Cold War started.

"In the following pages denazification in the American zone of occupation only will be analyzed. As to the Soviet zone, it might be claimed that denazification has been a success, in the sense of the second group referred to above, since it was used to eliminate social groups like big land owners and industrialists, i.e., groups which to a large extent had been responsible for the access of Nazism to power, and whose continued power might conceivably facilitate seizure of power by a neo-Nazism in the future. However the wholesale political use to which denazification in that zone has been perverted precludes it from being considered genuine denazification in the sense originally understood by at least the Western partners of the anti-Hitler alliance."

"It seems significant that not only in Germany but everywhere in Europe such policies as purges of fascists and prosecution of Axis collaborators have by now been "coordinated" under the impact of the bipolarization of power in the world. They have thus been perverted into tools of the power politics of the two major blocs.

Thus, in the Soviet sphere, purge of Nazis and Fascists soon became the tool for indicting any opponent of Communist totalitarian rule and for eliminating him as a " fascist collaborator", whether or not he had been one under the Axis rule. Was it necessary, then, for the Western countries to welcome as " allies" in their anti-Communist stand not only those democratic non-Communists, on whom Communists undeservedly place the stigma of " collaborators" , but also the real former collaborators and Fascists? This may, indeed, have its advantages from the standpoint of power politics. As a German put it the other day: "After all, we are experienced Russenkampfer." If so, the moral superiority of the nontotalitarian West is " expendable ". Even from the standpoint of an apparently realistic power politics, however, this policy, in the specific instance of Germany, seems not to be without risk."(John H. Herz. The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Dec., 1948), pp. 569-594)

However, in any event, there was a deep linkage between CW and abandonment of the denazification policy.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:57, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

By "the integration of former Nazis and collaborators into the Western Cold War organizations" I mean not the lack of "denazification", but the role collaborators like Ain-Ervin Mere played in operations like Operation Jungle. None of this was public knowledge in the West in 1948; the Soviets however knew all about it. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 04:12, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

(edit conflict)If I understand correct, Operation Jungle and similar events were a part of already ongoing Cold War. They just further deteriorated Soviet-Western relations, that had already become bad. In other words, these events hardly triggered the Cold War, although they could significantly contribute into the growth of tensions between the USSR and the Western Allies.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:51, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

As it appears that there's no consensus to include the para, I've just re-removed it and posted it below to aid discussions/further work on it. I continue to regard it as being both unnecessary and inaccurate. Please do not re-add it to the article until there's a consensus to do so. Nick-D (talk) 04:43, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

German technology was transferred to the U.S. and Soviet Union in operations Paperclip, and Osoaviakhim. Britain and the United States soon abandoned their war crimes programmes and policies of denazification in favour of realpolitik, leading to large numbers of former Nazis being allowed to emigrate to these nations and their dependencies. Secret arrangements were concluded between American military intelligence and former key figures in the anti-communist section of German military intelligence or Abwher, headed by General Reinhard Gehlen, to advise the Americans on how to go about establishing their own anti-Soviet networks in Europe.

Re " both unnecessary and inaccurate" Please, explain, what concretely is inaccurate here. With regard to "unnecessary", please, keep in mind that the whole American Moon program became possible due to Werner von Braun, so the mention of Paperclip is definitely needed (cannot tell anything about Osoaviakhim, because the contribution of German scientists into similar Soviet programs seems to be much more moderate). Abandonment of denazification is also important, as well as the mention of ex-Nazi collaboration with the West. The para is probably too wordy for such a summary style article, so let's think how to make it more laconic.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:07, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

I've done so above Paul (in this edit). Nick-D (talk) 05:15, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

Protection of Nazi mass murderers and criminals by West Germany like Heinz Reinefarth definetely served as major source of animosity with Poland. Also see amnesty law issued by Adenauer:

[42] "As of January 31, 1951, the amnesty legislation had benefited 792,176 people. They included people with six-month sentences, but also about 35,000 people with sentences of up to one year who were released on parole. Frei specifies that these figures include a bit more than 3,000 functionaries of the SA, the SS, and the Nazi Party who participated in dragging victims to jails and camps; 20,000 other Nazi perpetrators sentenced for "deeds against life" (presumably murder); 30,000 sentenced for causing bodily injury, and about 5,200 charged with "crimes and misdemeanors in office"". --MyMoloboaccount (talk) 12:25, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

Re: "I still regard it as a POV mess - in essence it argues that the west quickly papered over its opposition to the Nazis in order to gain access to German technology and intelligence networks." Not completely correct. The para states:

"German technology was transferred to the U.S. and Soviet Union in operations Paperclip, and Osoaviakhim."

which by no means implies that cessation of denazification was connected to transfer of technologies. According to the para, the technologies had just been transferred (btw, both to the West and East. I see no POV here.). With regard to realpolitik, this statement seems to be supported by reliable sources.

Re: "The suprisingly rapid democratisation of post-war Germany is ignored, as is the continuing western military-led occupation of the country." The fact that something has been left beyond the scope is not an argument. The missing facts can be added; let's discuss that.

Re: "Moreover, it leaves out the substantial transfers of technology to France and Britain." If you think it was important, let's discuss how should this material be presented in the article.

Re: "The claim that "Britain and the United States soon abandoned their war crimes programmes" is plainly nonsense given that hundreds of key Nazis were successfully prosecuted and war crimes trials of individuals continue to this very day (including many conducted by Germany during the 1950s and 1960s)." I see no nonsense here. The fact that key Nazis were prosecuted after the war does not contradict to the fact that the denazification program had been partially abandoned later. This para's statement has been supported by the reliable source, I also presented the source confirming that, and I can present more. If you believe it is not a mainstream POV, please, provide a source confirming your point.

Re: "The statement that "large numbers of former Nazis" moved to Britain and the US is also very dubious - what's a 'large number'?" This piece of the text seems to be too detailed for this article, and I agree it should be made shorter.

Re: "All up, this para is attempting to push a fringe interpretation of post-war events and I still think it has no place in the article." I am still unable to understand what part of this para is fringe. The fact that German technologies were massively transferred to the West? Disagree. The fact that denazification was abandoned? Yes, it would be more correct to say that it was abandoned partially, so the para needs to be modified. The fact that ex-Nazi provided very significant help to into British and American intelligence during the Cold War? That fact is well known, although, maybe, we don't need to go into these details is this concrete article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:43, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

Restructuring Aftermath section

With 170Kb this is already a very long article. So let's be extremely careful not to add more detail than absolutely needed.

If we consider the whole aftermath section if is built from the following paragraphs (extremely abbreviated)

• Foundation of UN
• Descent into Cold War
• Soviet power over Eastern and Central European countries
• Denazification / move of nazis to the west (the discussed para)
• US influence over Japan & foundation of NATO (the latter is a bit weird first better with cold war para I guess)
• Peoples republic of China founded (communist take over)
• Korea war (*)
• Decolonization
• Economic restoration programs
• Quick economic recovery in France, USSR and Japan (*)
• Lagging recovery in China, big leap forward (*)

To be honest, reviewing all this I think there are several paragraphs that are in this section that are less imporant than a brief one about denazification. I doubt especially whether the Korean war requires much attention. Also, while the economic restoration programs are clearly relevant, the follow up in the two paras after that seem to hold too much detail. (I marked these para with a (*) above).

Of course we need to decide what we want with this section. If we want the immediate aftermath we need to include something about denazification (e.g. including reference to Nuremberg trials), if we are more interested in the long term consequences we should say more about the other issues. My preference would be to keep it to immediate aftermatch rather than a broad series of consequences, as that could fill many articles in itself. Arnoutf (talk) 10:27, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

I agree that the 'Aftermath' section is over-long (particularly as it's longer than any of the sections on the phases of the war, which is the actual topic of the article). The section is also European-centric, and devotes little space to events in Asia. I'd suggest that (at a high level) the coverage of Europe be trimmed as part of an effort to reduce this section to four or five paragraphs. As a start, the Korean War para could be either removed or reduced to a single sentence (the war started 5 years after the Japanese surrender) and the coverage of the on the post-war economic situation should be written at the global level and be reduced to a paragraph (rather than the current three or so paras covering events in different countries). Nick-D (talk) 22:58, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

How about building the aftermath in the following four paragraphs

• Global recovery of economy (Soviet Industry, Marshall Plan, Japan)
• New geopolitical organisation (foundation of UN, NATO, Warsaw pact and similar)
• Political changes in Europe (occupation and denazification of Germany (Nuremberg trial?), Soviet dominance over Central and Eastern Europe, decolonisation of European powers)
• Political change in Asia (American occupation of Japan (demotian of divinity of emperor), communist state of China emerges)

I think that would put a more global view on it, with one paragraph for each of the main theatres (Europe and Asia) and the other 2 truly global. What do you think? Arnoutf (talk) 19:40, 30 August 2010 (UTC)

Agreed. It would be good if you proposed your version of this section based on this plan.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:34, 30 August 2010 (UTC)

I concur on this four paragraph concept. --Habap (talk) 23:35, 30 August 2010 (UTC)

New aftermath section

Closing unclosed references

Below my suggestion for a first draft for a new, shorter, aftermath section

I have restructured and summarised the current content of the aftermath section into the suggested four paragraph structure. Can you comment whether I missed essential stuff, whether even more can be removed, the use of English and the general flow of it (i.e. everything). I may still have emphasised the European situation over Asia, that is because I am from Europe and much more familiar with the aftermath there, so if I missed something in Asia, feel free to add. Arnoutf (talk) 17:36, 31 August 2010 (UTC)

Main article: Aftermath of World War II

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-14059-0018, Berlin, Oberbefehlshaber der vier Verbündeten.jpg

The Supreme Commanders on 5 June 1945 in Berlin: Bernard Montgomery, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Georgy Zhukov and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny

Prime Minister Winston Churchill gives the "Victory" sign to crowds in London on Victory in Europe Day.

The global economy suffered heavily from the war. By the end of the war the largely undamaged US industry produced roughly half of the world's industrial output.Economic recovery following the war was varied in differing parts of the world, though in general it was quite positive. In Europe, West Germany recovered quickly and doubled production from its pre-war levels by the 1950s. In the 1950s, the Italian economy was rapidly growing France rebounded quickly, and enjoyed rapid economic growth and modernisation. The Soviet Union also experienced a rapid increase in production in the immediate post-war era. The United Kingdom was in a state of economic ruin after the war, and continued to experience relative economic decline for decades to follow. Japan experienced incredibly rapid economic growth, becoming one of the most powerful economies in the world by the 1980s. China had reached pre war production by 1953.

In an effort to maintain international peace, the Allies formed the United Nations, which officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, and adopted The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, as a common standard of achievement for all member nations. The alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had begun to deteriorate even before the war was over, and the powers each quickly established their own spheres of influence., leading to two international military pacts, the United States-led NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military alliances and the start of the Cold War between them.

In Europe, Germany and Austria were controlled by the allies; and a program of denazification was started. The Soviet Union, expanded its territory by directly annexing several countries it occupied as Soviet Socialist Republics such as Eastern Poland, the three Baltic countries, part of eastern Finland and northeastern Romania. The eastern and central European countries states that the Soviets occupied at the end of the war became Soviet Satellite states, such as the People's Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Hungary, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the People's Republic of Romania, the People's Republic of Albania,. Later East Germany would be created from the Soviet zone of German occupation. While the European colonial powers attempted to retain some or all of their colonial empires, their losses of prestige and resources during the war rendered this unsuccessful, leading to rapid decolonisation.

In Asia, the United States occupied Japan and administrated Japan's former islands in the Western Pacific, while the Soviets annexed Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands; the former Japanese-governed Korea was divided and occupied between the US and the Soviet Union, which was the precursor of theKorean War. In China, nationalist and communist forces resumed the civil war in June 1946. Communist forces were eventually victorious and established the People's Republic of China on the mainland, while nationalist forces ended up retreating to Taiwan in late 1949.

References hidden for readability

The new version is generally good. In my opinion, a greater emphasis on Europe/Atlantic is correct, because the WWII's focus was there. The first para draws somewhat idyllic picture. I think, it is needed to describe the situation in major European countries, including the degree of devastations, loss/gain of political influence, possibly border changes (others than expansion of the Soviet Union). The words: "The global economy suffered heavily from the war. By the end of the war the largely undamaged US industry produced roughly half of the world's industrial output." sound ambiguously, because the reader can interpret that as this "roughly half of the world's industrial output" was a result of WWII. However, off the top of my head, in 30s the USA produced even more than 50% of the world's industrial output.

"...and a program of denazification was started." Not only it started, but had been stopped soon after CW started.

" The European powers started a rapid decolonization after the war" I am not sure the initiative belonged to them. They were forced to start decolonisation because their influence and power were undermined by the war.

--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:43, 31 August 2010 (UTC)

Something went awry with edit conflict. Here it is again: Arnoutf You've got it wrong re sequence of events Korea: Here is what happened immediately after end of WW2: As World War II ended, the United States began its involvement in Korea with a three-year occupation from 1945 to 1948, in which the Americans operated a full military government. Feel free to use verbatim. Communicat (talk) 18:55, 31 August 2010 (UTC)

That looks excellent to me Paul - I endorse using that text to replace the current aftermath section. Nick-D (talk) 23:34, 31 August 2010 (UTC)

Oppose until more sources are added to keep this article a GA. I see several unreferenced sentences.--White Shadows ^{Your guess is as good as mine} 23:40, 31 August 2010 (UTC)

That's a fair point. I've added a reference for the Chinese Civil War (along with some dates) but could you please mark the other text which needs to be cited with fact tags? Nick-D (talk) 23:53, 31 August 2010 (UTC)

General support "The global economy suffered heavily during the war", may help to reduce the ambiguity at the start. It may be worth lengthening the sentence to describe what it was about the war that damaged the global economy if it can be briefly summarized (presumably mostly the interruption in sea & other trade), with a reference. (Hohum ^@) 00:59, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

(edit conflict)References and grammar are just a technical issues. The Arnoutf's text contains obvious and easily verifiable facts, so it is quite simple to find needed refs. Let's come to consensus about the text first.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:06, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

re: "The global economy suffered heavily during the war" is unneeded oversimplification, because it suffered very non-uniformly. American economy didn't suffer at all, French economy was destroyed only moderately, whereas German, Japanese, Chinese and Soviet economies were devastated. IMO, each major WWII participant deserves few words.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:10, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Agree to an attempt for each major participant being briefly itemized. "European powers underwent..." would seem to restore the balance to the decolonization sentence. (Hohum ^@) 01:37, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

The economy section is given too much emphasis, move it from the beginning, or at least trim it down. It would be useful to link to the Marshall Plan as well as to the Morgenthau Plan and Industrial plans for Germany. The text still retains the "Soviets occupied" while "Americans liberated" territory POV. Also note that the Soviet "enlargement" happened before the Soviet Union joined the war in 1941. The same inaccuracy seems to be repeated here Marshall Plan#Creation of the Eastern Bloc (Ooops, it was there, but now it is gone!). -- Petri Krohn (talk) 01:54, 1 September 2010 (UTC), expanded 02:17, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Perhaps I am missing something, I don't see liberated anywhere in the proposal, and see occupied used for US and Soviet actions. (Hohum ^@) 02:01, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Agree with this... could we get this in to replace the new additions to the section... that keeps making the section longer and longer and longer ... I like this short form Moxy (talk) 02:05, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

I like it. --Habap (talk) 02:16, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Returning to the occupation issue: The text now says: The Soviet Union, expanded its territory by directly annexing several countries it occupied as Soviet Socialist Republics such as Eastern Poland,[23] the three Baltic countries,[24][25] part of eastern Finland[26] and northeastern Romania.[27][28]. This is totally untrue: In 1944 these territories were "liberated" by the Red Army. They were annexed in 1940. So even if the statements were factually correct, they have nothing to do with the aftermath of the war. What could be said however, is that "the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states became a contentious issue in Soviet–U.S. relations." As to the other "eastern and central European countries that the Soviets occupied at the end of the war" you could as well say "countries liberated by the Red Army" – that is unless you want to push a DIGWUREN pov of Soviet occupations everywhere. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 02:32, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Words nuclear arms race conspicuously absent from new (and old?) aftermath. Nuclear arms race is/was a central feature of WW2 aftermath. Communicat (talk) 16:13, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

So, would ending that paragraph and the start of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race between them make sense? --Habap (talk) 17:07, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

I'm not concerned as to where the words nuclear arms race should be placed, I only know they should appear at least somewhere in section.

What conerns me more is this: "The European powers started a rapid decolonisation after the war". That particular issue was debated at great length in preceding rework of lead paragraph. Consensus then led to changes re decolonisation issue, and said consensus is not what is now again mis-stated, having gone full circle.

Re Petri reference to Baltic states: I think the Poland issue overshadows the (mucho complex) Baltic question. As one writer, quoting declassified official documents, puts it: "(The Cold War) began with a heated exchange of correspondence in 1945 (between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill) over whether the Polish Government in Exile, backed by Roosevelt and Churchill, or the Provisional Government, backed by Stalin, should be recognised. Stalin won." Ref: Stewart Richardson, Secret History of World War II, New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1986, p.vi. ISBN 0931933056 .

The main breakdown in East-West relations came shortly after, when Roosevelt died in 1945 and arch-Cold Warrior Harry Truman became US president. (The record shows a very cordial wartime relationship between Roosevelt and Stalin. But more of this later, at the appropriate time). Communicat (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 19:32, 1 September 2010 (UTC).

@ Nick-D "leading to the end of British, French and Dutch colonial empires." needs a source. (I know it's a wate of time since it is true and all but you know how things work here!) Once that is fixed, I'll happily support :)--White Shadows ^{Your guess is as good as mine} 20:45, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

As earlier pointed out two postings above, the proposed wording of the new aftermath re "rapid decolonisation etc" is not consistent with the relevant wording in the lead. The appropriate wording in the lead was arrived at after much discussion as first initiated in now archived thread Lead: problemsand continued to consensus at now archived thread Flawed overview, among others. Why then, after all that discussion, has the "decolonisation" issue now resufaced in its originally contested wording and meaning? Is this a subtle form of subversive editing or edit warring? (Possibly not: just incipient paranoia, hey?).

Separately and at the same time, I'd be much obliged if text and refs that are under discussion are not refactored by anybody (without edit summary or identification) while the discussion is still in progress, thus causing confusion between the discussants, (as happened recently re Brutal Korea). Communicat (talk) 22:59, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

I think there is too much link piping (WP:EASTEREGG) in the draft, though that's a minor quibble. 67.122.209.135 (talk) 02:01, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

In my humble opinion this draft is a pathetically watered-down rendition of what's been discussed and usually agreed upon by everyone except you-know-who. Denazification reduced to half a sentence? Gimme a break. Communicat (talk) 03:59, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

This uncivil behaviour is getting out of hand Communicat....Stop insulting people Communicat-- Communicat --read Wikipedia:Civility...At this point i think its best Communicat that you simply leave this talk page altogether. Moxy (talk) 04:46, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

(edit conflict) Should the Marshall plan be mentioned in the economy section? What about the Berlin blockade in the cold war part? I realize there's a lot of stuff to get through but there was quite a bit of tension around these things, at least in my limited understanding. Generally I prefer an approach of threading a narrative through some especially sharp events, rather than rattling off a bunch of stuff as a big blur. 67.122.209.135 (talk) 08:36, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

I've provided refs for the sentence on decolonisation. I've also tweaked the sentence in these edits; all the sources I consulted stated that the European powers initially tried to restore/retain their empires, but gave up after being either unable to put down revolts (eg, the Dutch in Indonesia and French in Indochina and Algeria) or realised that they couldn't compete against popular nationalism (eg, the British and French in Africa). The reason consistently given for this was the impact the war had on the prestige of the colonial authorities and their resources. Nick-D (talk) 08:28, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

Are there any objections to including the above text in the article in the place of the current aftermath section? Nick-D (talk) 22:52, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes, there are.

Text: "The global economy suffered heavily from the war. By the end of the war the largely undamaged US industry produced roughly half of the world's industrial output.Economic recovery following the war was varied in differing parts of the world, though in general it was quite positive."

Comment: As I already wrote, this text implies that "US industry produced roughly half of the world's industrial output" as a result of WWII. In actuality, the USA produced even more than 50% of the world's industrial output before WWII.

Proposal: "'The global economy suffered heavily from the war. By the end of the war the USA were the only major WWII participant whose economy had not been damaged as a result of the war. Economic recovery following the war was varied in differing parts of the world, though in general it was quite positive."

Text: "In Europe, West Germany recovered quickly and doubled production from its pre-war levels by the 1950s. In the 1950s, the Italian economy was rapidly growing France rebounded quickly, and enjoyed rapid economic growth and modernisation. The Soviet Union also experienced a rapid increase in production in the immediate post-war era. The United Kingdom was in a state of economic ruin after the war, and continued to experience relative economic decline for decades to follow. Japan experienced incredibly rapid economic growth, becoming one of the most powerful economies in the world by the 1980s. China had reached pre war production by 1953."

Comment: I already proposed to mention the effect of the war on the economy of major WWII participants separately. It is simply incorrect to discuss economic revival of, e.g., France, which suffered quite moderate damage, with that of Germany or the USSR. In addition, it is necessary to add that not only British economy, but its political influence (not only in a context of decolonisation) started to decline after the war. The same was true for France. In addition, as soon as we write about West Germany, it is necessary to explain where it came from. The text seems to completely ignore splitting of Germany, change of its borders etc, whereas change of the borders of the USSR is discussed in details.

Proposal: I propose to think about that again. Maybe the next para should be moved up and division of Germany should be added there in a context of spheres of influence. It is necessary to describe the fate of East Prussia, Silesia and other land Germany was forced to cede to Poland.

Text: "In an effort to maintain international peace, the Allies formed the United Nations, which officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, and adopted The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, as a common standard of achievement for all member nations. The alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had begun to deteriorate even before the war was over, and the powers each quickly established their own spheres of influence., leading to two international military pacts, the United States-led NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military alliances and the start of the Cold War between them.

Comment: As I already proposed, it would be better to move this (and next) para up, before the economic sections, and to add the story about division of Germany and formation of two independent German states along with neutral Austria (which did not fall into any sphere of influence).

"In Europe, Germany and Austria were controlled by the allies; and a program of denazification was started. "

Comment: this para should go first because the sequence of the events was as follows: (i) occupation and establishment of Allied administration; (ii) border changes, deterioration of relations; (iii) formation of two independent German states, political blocs etc. With regard to this concrete sentence, it is not clear from it that massive denazification started immediatelly, but had been essentially halted in the West later.

Proposed text: "In Europe, Germany and Austria were controlled by the allies, who implemented a large scale denazification program, which was suspended later."

Text: "The Soviet Union, expanded its territory by directly annexing several countries it occupied as Soviet Socialist Republics such as Eastern Poland, the three Baltic countries, part of eastern Finland and northeastern Romania. "

Comment: Again, it is not clear for me why the changes of the Soviet borders are being discussed in details, whereas change of German, Polish etc borders remain ignored. In addition, the text is awkward and factually incorrect: no separate Soviet republic were created from the Polish territory east from the Kurzon line: it was annexed to Ukraine and Belorussia. Annexation of the northern part of Eastern Prussia is not mentioned. In addition, the list of border changes is exhaustive, so no "such as" are needed.

Proposal: The Soviet Union expanded its territory west as a result of annexation of the northern part of Eastern Prussia, part of Polish territory east from the Kurzon line, Eastern Romania, part of eastern Finland and three Baltic states, " In addition, this text should be supplemented by a discussion of German and Polish border changes.

Text:"The eastern and central European countries states that the Soviets occupied at the end of the war became Soviet Satellite states, such as the People's Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Hungary, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the People's Republic of Romania, the People's Republic of Albania,. "

Comment: Again, no "such as". The most essential is that Communist regimes were installed in there countries and they fell into the Soviet sphere of influence. Yugoslavia is not mentioned at all.

Proposal: "Communist regimes came to power in the eastern and central European countries with full or partial assistance of the Soviet occupation authorities. As a result, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and East Germany fell into Soviet sphere of influence and became Soviet Satellite states. By contrast, Communist Yugoslavia retained full political independence and never aligned to any political bloc."

Text: "Later East Germany would be created from the Soviet zone of German occupation.

Comment: Should be discussed in the first para along with the West Germany

Regarding the rest, I have no objections.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:59, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

References hidden for readability

Arbitrary break

Below is the revised draft of the Aftermath section. I changed original Arnoutf's structure (which I initially supported), because I realised that political changes should go first (at least, to explain where East and West Germanies came from).

Main article: Aftermath of World War II

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-14059-0018, Berlin, Oberbefehlshaber der vier Verbündeten.jpg

The Supreme Commanders on 5 June 1945 in Berlin: Bernard Montgomery, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Georgy Zhukov and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny

Prime Minister Winston Churchill gives the "Victory" sign to crowds in London on Victory in Europe Day.

The Allies established occupation administrations in Austria and Germany. The former would eventually become fully independent and neutral state, non-aligned with any political bloc. The latter was divided onto western and eastern occupation zones controlled by the Western Allies and the USSR, accordingly. A wholesale denazification program was started in Germany immediately after the war ended, leading to prosecution of major Nazi war criminals and removal of many ex-Nazi from power, although this policy would be replaced soon by the policy of broad amnesty and re-integration of ex-Nazi into new West German society. Germany lost part of its eastern territories: Silesia, Neumark and most of Pomerania were transferred to Poland, whereas East Prussia was divided between Poland and the USSR. The later also annexed part of Polish territory east from the Kurzon line, Eastern Romania, part of eastern Finland and three Baltic states,

In an effort to maintain international peace, the Allies formed the United Nations, which officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, and adopted The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, as a common standard of achievement for all member nations. The alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had begun to deteriorate even before the war was over, Germany had been de facto divided, and two independent states, Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic were created within the borders of Allied and Soviet occupation zones, accordingly. The rest of Europe was also divided onto Western and Soviet spheres of influence. Most eastern and central European countries fell into the Soviet sphere of influence, which led to establishment of Communist led regimes there, with full or partial support of the Soviet occupation authorities. As a result, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and East Germany became Soviet Satellite states. By contrast, Communist Yugoslavia conducted fully independent policy which had eventually lead to significant tensions with the USSR.

Post-war division of the world was formalised by two international military alliances, the United States-led NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact; the long period of political tensions and military competition between them, the Cold War, would be accompanied by unprecedented arm race and proxy wars.

In Asia, the United States occupied Japan and administrated Japan's former islands in the Western Pacific, while the Soviets annexed Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Korea, formerly under Japanese rule, was divided and occupied by the US in the South and the Soviet Union in the North between 1945 and 1948. Separate republics emerged on both sides of the 38th parallel in 1948, each claiming to be the legitimate Korean sovereign, which led ultimately to the Korean War.In China, nationalist and communist forces resumed the civil war in June 1946. Communist forces were eventually victorious and established the People's Republic of China on the mainland, while nationalist forces ended up retreating to Taiwan in late 1949. While the European colonial powers attempted to retain some or all of their colonial empires, their losses of prestige and resources during the war rendered this unsuccessful, leading to rapid decolonisation.

The global economy suffered heavily from the war, although different WWII participants were affected differently. The US emerged much richer than any other nation involved in World War II; by 1950 its gross domestic product per person was much higher than that of any of the other major powers and it dominated the world economy. However, economic recovery following the war was rather fast, though it varied in differing parts of the world. In most of West Europe recover was fast, partially due to massive American economic aid: heavily devastated West Germany recovered quickly, and doubled production from its pre-war levels by the 1950s;, the Italian economy was also rapidly growing; France rebounded quickly, and enjoyed rapid economic growth and modernisation. By contrast, the United Kingdom was in a state of economic ruin after the war, and continued to experience relative economic decline for decades to follow. The Soviet Union, despite enormous human and material losses, also experienced a rapid increase in production in the immediate post-war era. Japan experienced incredibly rapid economic growth, becoming one of the most powerful economies in the world by the 1980s. China had reached pre war production by 1953.

References hidden for readability

Feel free to fix/change the proposed text directly. Just explain what have you changed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:05, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

The claim that denazification was generally "not successful in the west" needs a much better reference than a 1948 journal article - this is much too early to assess the performance of denazification and vast amounts have been written on this topic in the 62 years since then. The claim that "USA were the only major WWII participant whose economy had not been damaged as a result of the war" is also dubious in economic terms (the war forced a massive reallocation of resources away from more productive uses, even if it had overall positive results) and is also backed by a weak reference (a book focused on US-Japanese trade relations). In terms of the Marshall Plan, it's wrong to only associate it with West Germany, as aid was provided to virtually all western European nations and even offered to the Soviet satellite countries. Nick-D (talk) 11:10, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

The Korea part is misleading. It states "the former Japanese-governed Korea was divided and occupied between the US and the Soviet Union, which was the precursor of theKorean War" (ref James Stokesbury, Short History of the Korean War). Grammar and choice of words: It should read "Korea, formerly under Japanese occupation ..." Secondly, as Publishers Weekly noted in its review of the book quoted, "the author leaves nothing out but the details." One of those details, judging from the wording you've given, is the fact that an American military government ruled throughout Korea from 1945 to 1948. THAT was the precursor to the war. There was no division, as alleged, between the Americans and the Russians. The Russians were in Korea for only a comparatively short period of a month or so, during which they attacked and forced the Japanese to retreat down the Korean peninisula, immediately prior to Japan's surrender. That is not an "occupation" in the generally accepted meaning of the word; whereas America (which had seen no fighting in Korea) became the occupying force, after the Japanese surrender. The words as they currently stand in the "old" aftermath are therefore correct, and IMO should not be thrown out with the bathwater. The accurate and appropriate words as previously provided, are: "The United States began its involvement in Korea with a three-year occupation from 1945 to 1948, in which the Americans operated a full military government." REF Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The unknown war, London: Viking, 1988, p.16 [[ISBN 0670819034]] Space limitations don't encourage much more to be stated, unless you want to add, "which was a precursor to the Korean war." (There were other precursors as well). —Preceding unsigned comment added by Communicat (talk • contribs) 15:49, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

Re political economy: America emerged much richer than any other nation involved in World War II. By the time the war ended, Washington controlled gold reserves of $20 billion, almost two-thirds the world's total of $33 billion. REF Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, New York: Harper and Row 1968, pp.264-5. Communicat (talk) 16:22, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

Dear Nick-D and Communicat. Thank you for your comments. I mostly agree with that, I'll try to modify the draft and to add sources in close future. However, you are also welcome to do it by yourself.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:16, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

Communicat's view on the Korean War, not surprisingly, appears to be rather odd. The claim that the war was caused by the US occupation of South Korea is nonsense and Soviet military forces were also based in North Korea until 1948 (during which time they installed the Communists in power as what they hoped would be a puppet government). Nick-D (talk) 08:50, 10 September 2010 (UTC)

Korea was divided according to the decision of Potsdam conference, and it was agreed later that the regimes would be installed there which share their sponsor's ideology (which eventually occurred both in the north and the south). Regardless of Stalin's intentions, Korean regime was not his puppet (partially because of Stalin-Mao competition). Both North and South regimes planned to unify Korea, although their vision of Korean political future was opposite. That eventually lead to Korean war, although formally it was North Korea who started first. In any event, Korea was not under Soviet and American occupation by the moment the war started, although the US kept a military contingent there. In addition, the US were directly and significantly involved in the conflict, whereas the USSR was not (except limited air support of Northern troops). In connection to that, the words "the former Japanese-governed Korea was divided and occupied between the US and the Soviet Union, by which the prerequisites for the Korean War were created", although formally correct, are not accurate, because they imply that Soviet and American occupation forces were directly involved into the Korean war, which was not the case. I think the wording should be changed to the following:

"the former Japanese-governed Korea was divided and occupied between the US and the Soviet Union, and the regimes were installed there which shared their sponsors' ideologies, thereby the prerequisites for the Korean War were created".

With regard to Communicat's " It should read "Korea, formerly under Japanese occupation ..."", it is simply incorrect. Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910; by doing that Japan terminated the state of occupation. Consequently, "Japanese-governed Korea" is correct.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:14, 10 September 2010 (UTC)

Nick-D, I did not say "the war was caused by the US occupation of South Korea". Please don't misquote me, otherwise I might take it as personal harassment..

The fact remains: "The United States began its involvement in Korea with a three-year occupation from 1945 to 1948, in which the Americans operated a full military government." REF Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The unknown war, London: Viking, 1988, p.16 [[ISBN 0670819034]] (A couple of other available and reliable sources say the same thing). Why are you people so averse to that fact? Hey? Communicat (talk) 19:05, 10 September 2010 (UTC)

In my opinion, too much focus on the US/USSR is not correct in this case, because both regimes were much more independent than many peoples think. Of course, Soviet and American occupation helped to install leftist and rightist authoritarian regimes there (the regime in the South had evolved towards democracy later). And that made a conflict inevitable, because both regimes wanted to unite Korea (by force, if necessary). I tried to reflect this fact. Do you have any objections against my wording?--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:55, 10 September 2010 (UTC)

I agree; the US provided the South Korean government with little concrete support after 1948 and the North appears to have invaded the South largely on its own initiative. The war also started two years after the occupation of Korea ended. Nick-D (talk) 01:36, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

I changed the description of denazification. New text is written based on the newer book, which is highly commended in the review published in American Historical review (Jay Lockenour. Reviewed work(s):Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration byNorbert Frei ; Joel GolbSource: The American Historical Review, Vol. 108, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 1237-1238)

I changed the third sentence to "However, economic recovery following the war was rather fast, though it varied in different parts of the world", to provide a better logical linkage with previous and subsequent sentences.

I also changed the text about the US, because the Communicat's point seems valid: the fact that the US emerged as the sole financial superpower is really important. I checked the source (Gordon Wright. The Ordeal of Total War), it is highly commended (see, e.g. Fritz Stern Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Mar., 1970), pp. 162-164; John C. Cairns Reviewed work(s):The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 by Gordon Wright Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 7 (Dec., 1970), pp. 2041-2043), so we definitely can use it.

I also added the mention of Marshall plan in a context of West Europe as whole.

Hopefully, I addressed all criticism.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:13, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

You still miss the point, or maybe I didn't make it clear. The US, from 1945 to 1948, operated a full military government throughout Korea, viz., North AND South. Communicat (talk) 02:12, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, but they didn't. The US only occupied the South while the USSR occupied the North (with the 38th Parallel being the dividing line). The Soviet-backed Provisional People's Committee for North Korea ran the North from 1946 while the United States Army Military Government in Korea ran the South until 1948. Nick-D (talk) 02:29, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

Getting back to the above, gold reserves are not a meaningful measure of national wealth - gross domestic product (and GDP per capita) is the normal measure of this along with manufacturing output as they describe the size of the economy. From memory, the US had an extraordinary dominance of world GDP and manufacturing in 1945, and this is a much more meaningful figure for its economic position - I'll dig up some references on this and tweak the wording accordingly. Nick-D (talk) 03:37, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

I, probably, didn't make my point clear, but the US had already been an industrial superpower before the WWII: they were responsible for ca 60% of world's industrial output before the war. Therefore, the war had no effect on that parameter. What is important, that American industrial power had been complemented by enormous financial power after the war, which resulted in creation of the Bretton Woods system --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:45, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

Re: Korea, again. Nick-D, you don't state sources, so I don't know how your interpretation arises. Korean communists, after division of Korea 1945, established their own government headquartered Seoul but anchored in "people's committees" in the countryside. The US shunned and refused to recognise the rural committees, and set up a full military government with jurisdiction throughout Korea. Russia withdrew its troops soon after. Various uprisings broke out against the US military presence, which presaged the Korean war that ultimately erupted in 1950. The clear fact of the matter remains: America operated a full military govt with jurisdiction throughout Korea. This is a little known fact that is usually omitted from most if not all existing and purportedly "reliable" mainstream accounts of the lead-up to the fullscale war. Because it is missing from mainstream accounts does not necessarily mean it should be missing from wiki. In interests of NPOV, therefore, the alternative reliable work of Stone, Hastings and Halliday/Cumings should in this regard be considered for incorporation

Re: US productivity etc. Remember the Wall St crash and the depression of 1930s, before the war? It was armaments manufacture and trade in arms to Europe that pulled US out of doldrums, and that started happening some considerable time before US eventually and belaltedly entered the war as a fighting ally. So, it's maybe misleading to be quoting US productivity figures "before the war", without mentioning that US was in an economic depression, and WW2 in Europe pulled US out of economic depression. Productivity stats should therefore be qualified as "immediately before the war." Just a thought. Communicat (talk) 19:10, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

According to this, pages 10-11, General Order No. 1 split Korea in two in 1945. (Hohum ^@) 20:25, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

Indeed. Max Hastings' book on the Korean War also states that Soviet troops remained in North Korea until 1948, at which time they left behind a Communist North Korea (pp. 34–35). Nick-D (talk) 23:13, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes, yes, we know all that. North Korea was communist from 1945. Communism is government of the people by the people through "people's committees". The Americans unsurprisingly did not recognise the "people's committees", which had the political effect of negating the legitimacy of the communists' nominal govt in Seoul. (You'll find all this in Hastings, et al). I repeat my proposal, with concrete text and ref, (for the fourth time): "The United States began its involvement in Korea with a three-year occupation from 1945 to 1948, in which the Americans operated a full military government (with jurisdiction throughout Korea)." REF Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The unknown war, London: Viking, 1988, p.16 [[ISBN 0670819034]] That brief, concrete text is accurate in all major particulars. Otherwise it's a long and complicated story, including the fact that the Americans had not been involved in fighting the Japanese in Korea, and all of which is unsuitable for a mere summary article. Communicat (talk) 18:09, 12 September 2010 (UTC)

I don't have Hasting's book here with me right now, so am unable to check what you've said about "Soviet troops remained in North Korea until 1948", but it doesn't ring entirely true. I trust you're not just viewing a snippet view from googlebooks (which a surprising number of editors seem accustomed to doing). My own reliable source, Halliday & Cumings, p.60, which I have here beside me, states that (after Red Army withdrew following Japan's surrender), only 200 Soviet military advisers (not "troops") remained in the north by 1946, and that number dropped to 31 in 1947. This is a minuscule number by comparison with the fullscale American army of occupation garrisoned in South Korea but with military jurisdiction throughout Korea. In fact, as Halliday & Cumings go on to elaborate in detail, North Korea can be regarded as the Asian equivalent of Yugoslavia, i.e. well detached from Soviet influence. If anything, N Korea was (and still is) far more closely aligned with the Chinese communists, many Korean communists having fought in Manchuria alongside the Chinese guerrillas against the Japanese. The short version is: draft aftermath section with reference to Korea is inaccurate and misleading. Communicat (talk) 23:02, 12 September 2010 (UTC)

"so am unable to check what you've said about "Soviet troops remained in North Korea until 1948", but it doesn't ring entirely true"... ......-> The North Korean revolution, 1945-1950 - Charles K. Armstrong, Unequal partners in peace and war: the Republic of Korea and the United - Jongsuk Chay A calendar of Soviet treaties, 1917-1957, Volume 1917 Robert M. Slusser, Jan F. Triska Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War - Dennis Wainstock Multinational Operations, Alliances, and International Military Cooperation North Korea - Clive Gifford see here for a list..Moxy (talk) 23:31, 12 September 2010 (UTC)

Leaving the Korean dispute beyond the scope, does anybody see any other issues with with the proposed text?--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:26, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

I've tweaked the wording on the US economy; it it's satisfactory with other editors I'm happy for it to move into the article. Nick-D (talk) 08:19, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:02, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Re Moxy's searches: thanks for all your trouble; interesting exercise. Note that none of the works cited give any count of Soviet "troops", whereas the only count given for US troops 1947-8 mentions figure of 45,000 US troops. The last of the works cited has convincing pictures but is unsourced and clearly propagandistic. None of the works cited by Moxy mention the previously well-kept secret of full US military government with jurisdiction througout Korea 1945-8, and all of them works imply the usual Cold War rhetorical view of Soviet puppet regime in the north, blah blah. Would be interesting to know whether those works were published before or after release of classified docs as used reliably by Hastings and Halliday/Cummings. Wonder why the Moxy search results didn't state that Soviets, by 1947, had only 31 military advisers in the north (compared with approx. 45,000 US troops in south). My money remains on the reliable Hastings/Halliday/Cummings version of events. It's up to consensus whether or not to use the latter version. But one thing's for sure: there are (and will always be) differing though ostensibly reliable accounts of specific wartime events. This raises important issues of method vis-a-vis wiki milhist and NPOV, which I have raised constantly since the outset of my brief acquaintance with the project, and which has raised the ire of many. It (milhist NPOV) IMO appears to be an insoluble methodological problem. Prove me wrong. Communicat (talk) 18:25, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

You did say "feel free to change it" so I've done that, showing changes, at Korea part. Communicat (talk) 19:35, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

I've tweaked the wording to remove the euphomistic claim that the Soviets merely 'maintained a presence' in the North (Max Hastings refers to a Soviet occupation lasting from 1945-48) and restored the useful link to the article on the division of Korea. I'm somewhat bemused to see that you're claiming that the US occupation of South Korea is a "well-kept secret"; this was explicitly discussed in all the books I looked at, including the US official histories, and the shortcomings of the military administration are generally discussed at length. Nick-D (talk) 22:52, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

I agree, however, it is not clear for me why did you remove the link to Japanese rule.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:24, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Communicat removed it, not me. I've just re-added it as I agree that it's clearly useful and relevant. Nick-D (talk) 08:23, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes, I removed it in error, apologies. Nick-D, regarding your bemusement, please don't misquote me as per usual. I did not say US occupation was a secret. I said the US military government with jurisdiction throughout Korea was a previously well-kept secret.

As regards Soviet presence: Nick-d kindly specify estimated troop numbers / exact strength of alleged Soviet "occupation" force. (We know the Americans had approx. 49,000 troops in south by 1947; and my source says 31 Soviet military advisers in the north).

Regretably, I loaned my Hastings book to someone who didn't return it, so I can't immediately check what you're saying. My recollection of what I did read in Hastings some time ago does not conform with what you're now claiming (without reference). Incidentally, if consensus decides to use the nick-d amendment, please add his reference, and don't leave the relevant sentence with only the Halliday/Cumings ref that I provided, and which seems not to support what nick-d says. Thanks. Communicat (talk) 20:20, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Another glaring error introduced by nick-d lies in his choice of the words "Korea was divided and occupied by the US in the South and the Soviet Union in the North". Korea was NOT divided by the US and the SU. It was divided on the orders of the US War Department by just two army colonels, who spent all of 30 minutes pondering where to draw the line of division. They chose the 38th parallel because it would place the capital city in the US zone of demarcation. REF Halliday/Cumings, p.16, which adds: "The Russians accepted the division in silence." (p.16) C'mon nick-d, let's get it right, (even though it might deviate somewhat from the peculiarly romanticised versions of fictional accounts). Communicat (talk) 21:01, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

I see also that the word "rapid" has crept back into the decolonisation aspect. Nick-d was asked by White Shadows to provide ref and preview in that regard, which he did. The word "rapid" did not appear in the preview given. Now that preview appears to have disappeared / refactored from the thread, without trace, while the inaccurate "rapid" has mysteriously reappeared, even though it was earlier contested, discussed and changed. To repeat: there was no generally "rapid" decolonisation, except maybe for Nigeria/Ghana/India/Pakistan. Most of the colonial world had to fight long wars of attrition for independence from colonialism, e.g. Algeria, Vietnam, etc etc. Others, like Rhodesia, Hong Kong e.g. remained colonies after WW2 for three decades or more. To reiterate: decolonisation was generally not rapid, it was in most instances protracted, though there were a few exceptions that do not prove the rule, nor was there anything philanthropic about decolonisation. Communicat (talk) 23:25, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

I am inclined to agree that "rapid" draws too optimistic picture: e.g., decolonisation of Africa started only in mid 50s. It probably would be better to write: "which would lead to rapid decolonisation in late 1950s-60s."--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:48, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Please, keep in mind that the draft we discuss is my post, not the text in the article's namespace. Although, as a rule, editing of other's posts is not allowed, I invited all users to modify this post, provided that, but only provided that it is being done friendly, and politely.
Cheers, :-)
--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:09, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

Above noted. Thanks also for restoring my recent postings, which were deleted by some aggressive busybody who shall for the moment remain nameless, though edit history has a seemingly reliable record. Jeez, who needs all this crap? Communicat (talk) 00:18, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

No aggressive busybody. According to Edward321, the text was removed by accident[43].--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:32, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

I have to object to the wording in following, if not to the inclusion in the "Aftermath" section: "The later also annexed part of Polish territory east from the Kurzon line,[23] Eastern Romania,[27][28] part of eastern Finland[26] and three Baltic states." These territories were "annexed" by the Soviet Union before the war and could not be part of the outcome or aftermath. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 00:14, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

Cannot agree. This para describes the changes as a result of the war, not necessarily after the war. Although these territories were annexed before the Soviet-German war, that happened after the WWII started, and as a result of the war. In addition, most of these border changes had been discussed again by the Big Three at the end of the war.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:32, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi all, sorry for the 'radio silence'. I have been abroad and am now running into several deadlines at the same time at work. I realise that my silence following my own proposal may come across as weird. I am afraid that I won't have any realistic time slot in the foreseeable future (i.e. untill half October) to spend attention on Wikipedia. Please take from my original idea what you like and change it to your liking, and don't feel in any way the necessity to withhold critisism or discard parts or the whole of it. I had hoped to be present during this process, but since I now realise I won't don't stop any of it and just make the article better. Cheers Arnoutf (talk) 13:22, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

I have Hastings The Korean War, and can verify passages and their context if asked. p.16 (context 1945)"To the relief of the Committee in Washington, the Russians readily accepted the 38th Parallel as their limit of advance. Almost a month before the first Americans could be landed in South Korea, the Red Army reached the new divide - and halted there... At no time in the five years that followed did the Russians show any desire to stake Moscow's power and prestige upon a direct contest with the Americans for the extension of Soviet influence south of the Parallel".

pp 34-35. "The Peaceful departure [by context of earlier paragraph, 1948-49] of the Red Army from North Korea diminished American fears of overt communist aggression in the peninsular. North of the 38th Parallel, the Soviets left behind a ruthlessly disciplined totalitarian Stalinist society."

I cannot find anywhere in the Chapter "Origins of a Tragedy" a reference to the USA holding any control north of the parallel.

(Hohum ^@) 15:35, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

Thanks hohum. Your extracts don't disprove the Halliday/Cumings version earlier provided. A pity that no actual Soviet troop numbers are stated in the extract, nor their time of departure. But peacefully depart they certainly did, (whereas the Americans in S. Korea remained behind in full force occupation). So, Nick-d still appears to be incorrect in that regard, as also with regard to claiming the US and SU divided Korea. The Americans divided it unilaterally by themselves, and the Soviets accepted it. (They had little choice, seeing as the Soviets didn't at that time have a deterrant nuclear weapon at their disposal, and Truman was openly threatening to use one in the north).

To cut a long story short, if Nick-d is supported by consensus to use his version about division and occupation, then my Halliday/Cumings reference source should be removed, because that's not what THEY say, and nick-d must provide his own source reference(s). In fact, I've already removed my reference as provided (viz., Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The unknown war, London: Viking 1989, p.10 ISBN 0670819034) because it does not support nick-d's edit. If anyone wants to revert his edit back to previous version, then feel free to use the Halliday-Cumings citation, otherwise it's not appropriate. All the problematic facts and matters raised are IMO satisfactorily and practically resolved in the (since reverted by Edward321) version that I earlier provided. Communicat (talk) 17:03, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

This is probably irrelevant for purpose of brief aftermath text, but hohum recently referred to the issue here at this current thread. So, Re Full US military government in Korea 1946-8: Here's snippet and ref ex-googlebooks, for independant source (viz., apart from or in addition to Halliday/Cumings): "On Jauary 14, 1946, United States Military Government in Korea was created as a unit of XXIVth Corps under the command of a military Governor of Korea ... (with jurisdiction throughout Korea) p.78

Title: American military government in Korea Author: Edward Grant Meade Publisher: King's Crown Press, 1951 Original from the University of California

Separately: New aftermath seems almost complete and hundred times better than existing old aftermath: Suggest moving it now to replace old aftermath, because this discussion where it's still at is becoming quite cumbersome and sort of unnavigable. Then after moving it to article, open fresh section for any ongoing discussion / unfinished business? Speaking of unfinished biz, and unless I've missed something, I see the key words "Cold War" and/or "Nuclear Arms Race" are still conspicuously absent, even or especially after considerable prior discussion. Communicat (talk) 18:12, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

I'm VERY confused by the statement that Truman is identified as "openly threatening to use" a nuke against the Soviets in North Korea, yet he fired MacArthur to avoid entangling the Soviets in the war. Could you provide some sources supporting the "openly threatening" statement?

I would also prefer that you include the next sentence few sentences of Meade's book instead of summarizing it as "with jurisdiction throughout Korea" as that it the most contentious part of your statement. Since other statements specifically identify US jurisdiction only in the south and Soviet jurisdiction in the north, you're going to have to provide more evidence than your own interpretation of the next few sentences.

It's frustrating that when you see a lack of specifics about the Soviets (number of troops, for example), it always leads to a positive spin for the Soviets, while any lack of specifics for the US (Military Governor of Korea, when other sources state that the US only had jurisdiction in the south) leads to negative interpretation. This tactic is sometimes overwhelming. --Habap (talk) 00:26, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

The Republic of Korea (or "South Korea" as it is popularly referred to) was inaugurated in the south on 15 August 1948; the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (or "North Korea") was inaugurated in the north on 9 September 1948. Before then, Korea was geographically named Korea, (regardless of the 38th Parallel line of military demarcation, which was not a geographical demarcation). It follows therefore that when reference is made to pre-1948 Korea, it means the whole of Korea, as in "American Military Government of Korea 1946-8" and "Governor of Korea".

I note that you've not provided any citations to support your assertion that "other sources state that the US only had jurisdiction in the south". Read, for example and among others, I F Stone's famous 1950s book about Korea, which says the opposite.

As regards the bomb: This is not a forum for general discussion. I have read and understood the primary documents. I suggest you do the same. You will find them at Library of Congress in Washington. I am unable to account for any apparent absence of those primary sources from secondary citations. I shall not be responding here to any subsequent postings concerning this matter which, due to the demands of brevity in new aftermath section, is in any event seemingly irrelevant to the issues at hand. Communicat (talk)

Claiming jurisdiction, and exerting control are two different things. From the citations I have already given it is clear that the US could exert no control in the North of Korea 1946-48, since they didn't have any forces there, and the Soviets did. (Hohum ^@) 17:32, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

Communicat, did you miss Hastings, above? p.16 (context 1945)"To the relief of the Committee in Washington, the Russians readily accepted the 38th Parallel as their limit of advance. Almost a month before the first Americans could be landed in South Korea, the Red Army reached the new divide - and halted there... At no time in the five years that followed did the Russians show any desire to stake Moscow's power and prestige upon a direct contest with the Americans for the extension of Soviet influence south of the Parallel". Or perhaps, page 5 of Wainstock, "But the Soviets and Americnas could find no common ground on the issue of Korean unification. While the Americans sought to integrate the two zones, the Soviets wanted to keep them separate." As such, the two parts were occupied by the two separate sides, regardless of what names they used for their governors. If you simply assert that the two sides were under US control, but provide no evidence, only a lack of contradiction to your theory, it does not follow. If I name my house as the location of the Military Governorship of Virginia, no one is going to follow my instructions because I have no authority outside my own home. I did not cite these sources because they'd already been cited.

I think you're confused about the year in which Truman's "openly threatened" to use nukes. That was in November of 1950, not during 1945. Since you're stating that he did make the threat in 1945, discussion of whether that is so is quite germane to this discussion of those years. --Habap (talk) 18:16, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

Okay, tell you what: have it your way. Namely: the Red Army in August 1945 did not occupy Korea behind its own lines in forcing the Japanese to retreat down the Korean peninsula. It is not true that the Americans failed to arrive in Korea until the war was well and truly over. The USSR was at all times consulted politely and participated fully in the division of Korea at the 38th parallel. Stalin and the Red Army were completely unfazed by America's exclusive possession of atomic weaponry and America's willingness to use atomic bombs against civilian targets as already demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which had nothing to do with the drawing up of post-war boundaries. America loved the communists, especially the Korean people's committees. Happy now? Communicat (talk) 00:33, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

If you make statements and fail to back them up with RS citations, you will be challenged. If you fail to read others posts properly, you will be reminded to re-read them. If you stamp your feet and threaten to quit if you don't get your way, you will be ignored. --Habap (talk) 14:17, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

The rules say be bold, and seeing as nobody has objected to my earlier suggestion of moving more or less completed new aftermath to replace old one, I've done so. Also cleaned up & did general copy edit for narrative flow, grammar, punctuation, syntax etc, and made some few additions such as postwar radioactive effects Japan. Communicat (talk) 18:17, 17 September 2010 (UTC) PS: I did take fully into account all the prior discussion points, and trust I've not trampled on any sensitive toes, like by adding a bit about Malaya emergency, earlier raised but somehow absent from ensuing edits.

I see no reason to include the sentence on the military governor of Korea when no such detail is provided for any other occupation by either side. --Habap (talk) 20:55, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

Your posting above is a bit incoherent. The reliable reference as cited and previously stated in discussion makes it clear there was US military govt "under Governor of Korea". This is not contradicted by any other known sourcee, (unless you can come up with one). You did not oppose this (verbatim) wording in preceding discussion, and I can see no understandable basis for you doing so now. "Military Governor" remains, far as I'm concerned. I trust you're not going to be argumentative about this simply for the sake of being argumentative / disruptive. Thanks. Communicat (talk) 22:42, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

I've just replaced that with the version discussed above, which seems to have widespread support. There's plainly no consensus that all of Korea was under US military government (not least because this is wrong, as has been demonstrated by multiple sources above) so this shouldn't have been included. The claim that the country was divided "on the orders of the US War Department" seems simplistic at best given that this division was implemented jointly by the US and USSR. The material on Malaya needs to be verified, and I'm not sure why it was included given that at the same time there were high-intensity wars of independence going on in Indochina/Vietnam and the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia which seem better choices if other editors think that it's worth including examples of where the Colonial powers tried to hang on (which the agreed text states they did, so I personally don't see the need for singling out examples). Nick-D (talk) 23:38, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

I objected now because I re-read the section after you posted it to the main page. The sentence about the military governor sticks out because it is a level of detail not provided for any occupying power in any formerly enemy terrirtory. For example, there is no mention made of which unit provided the government in the Soviet-occupied portion of Germany. I don't think we would provide that level of detailed information about every single occupying power and territory, so to identify the command structure only in Korea seems to give excessive importance to which US Army Corps commanded in the area. If that doesn't clarify it for you, could you specifically identify what it is that you do not understand, so that I can explain it further? I thought I was being simple, as in "one of these things is not like the others". --Habap (talk) 18:48, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

Yes, you are being simple. Thank you. One of these things (Korea) is not like the others (Soviet-occupied zone in Germany, etc) in so far as America's unilateral division of Korea, and its full military government in Korea 1945-8, created the conditions that led to a fullscale war. Hundreds of thousands died, including 117,000 Americans. So, IMO, it is appropriate to provide a level of information consistent with the enormity of the resultant conflagration.

To answer both you and nick-d simultaneously, the 38th parallel division of Korea in 1945 was conducted unlilateraly by the US. (Dennis Wainstock, Truman, McArthur and the Korean War, publisher Greenwood, 1999, p.3; corroborates Halliday & Cumings source previously provided). This was in abrogation of the earlier agreement reached at Yalta, that an undivided post-war Korea would be placed under four-power multinational trusteeship. (Dennis Wainstock, Truman, McArthur and the Korean War, publisher Greenwood, 1999, p.3). The Americans, in abrogating that agreement, and having unliaterally divided Korea at the 38th parallel, then established two separate administrative brances of military government under the American-appointed Military Governor based in Korea's capital city of Seoul. One administrative branch had military-tactical responsibility to patrol and monitor the communistic “people’s committees” south of the 38th parallel, while the other branch of the administration was meant to be responsible for the civilian administration of Korea proper. (See The Epic of Korea by A. Wigfall Green, Public Affairs Press, Washington 1950, p.54).

The 38th parallel was not a political line but a military line, though it later became a political line in 1948. Seoul, just south of the 38th parallel, had been the seat of civilian administration throughout Korea under the former Japanese Military Governor, with jurisdiction throughout Korea under Japanese rule. The Americans took over that administrative role in 1945, giving them full control of and responsibility for all the usual administrative functions throughout Korea as previously under the control and direction of the Japanese governor, including all government files in departments such as Taxation, Justice, Health, Police, Mining, and Agriculture. The Americans were reticent about performing that administrative role north of the 38th parallel, even though it was their responsibility and within their civilian jurisdiction to do so, and they also failed to perform it competently south of the 38th parallel, which led to food shortages and widespread civil unrest there. (See generally Wigfall Green)

Having abrogated the Yalta agreement with impunity (their possession of the atomic bomb would account for that0, American policy under the Truman administration also completely disregarded a UN order in 1948 for all foreign troops to leave Korea. The Russians complied immediately. The Americans did not. They only left a year later, and they left both the north and the south in seething discontent and in an administrative mess. (Wainstock, p.6). Not to mention the installation by the Americans of a murderous puppet regime under Rhee (and for which there are multiple reliable sources, but I'll reserve them for a separate venue).

To turn to nick-d's assertions:

(1) I've just replaced (the cleaned-up version that I uploaded to article) with the version discussed above, which seems to have widespread support. No, it did not have "widespread support". It had only your support; in fact, you wanted to upload much earlier and unsatisfactory versions of the new aftermath long before it even reached its present level of completion. Among the dissenting views, for instance, was your disputed reference to "rapid decolonisation", which has been the subject of much discussion but which you've disregarded entirely. I corrected that in the version I uploaded.

(2) The claim that the country was divided "on the orders of the US War Department" seems simplistic at best given that this division was implemented jointly by the US and USSR. I've answered this above with a reliable source to corroborate the source already provided.

(3) The (deleted) material on Malaya needs to be verified, and I'm not sure why it was included given that at the same time there were high-intensity wars of independence going on in Indochina/Vietnam and the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia which seem better choices Firstly, the material on Malaya was reliably sourced. Secondly, as a military history editor/administrator you might benefit from an understanding of the crucial difference between the military terms "high-intensity" and "low-intensity" warfare. I recommend Michael Klare & Peter Kornbluh (eds), Low Intensity Warfare, New York, 1988. The conflicts you've cited as examples were low-intensity conflicts. Thirdly, The material on Malaya is significant because the Malayan Emergency, which was long in duration, involved Commonwealth troops versus communist forces that had only a short while earlier been fighting as allies against a common foe in WW2. This did not apply to the other independence wars that you've cited, and that's perhaps why I singled out the Malayan example. (Interestingly, Malaya is/was the only time Western forces have ever managed to defeat communist forces. But never mind all that).

It is noted that you've not included i.e. undone my reliably sourced addition re aftermath effects of nuclear radiation on 370,000 immediate post-war survivors of atomic explosions in Japan. Is that not a highly relevant issue worth mentioning? I think so. Communicat (talk) 19:16, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

PS: In the version (undone by nick-d) that I earlier fixed and uploaded, I tried to conform to what unsigned editor rightly suggested as: ... an approach of threading a narrative through some especially sharp events, rather than rattling off a bunch of stuff as a big blur. 67.122.209.135 (talk) 08:36, 2 September 2010 (UTC) Not to mention the grammatical errors (and also some POVs)that I fixed, but which are now regretably back in the nick-d uploaded version. Communicat (talk) 20:12, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

I didn't notice that you'd also inserted, without any prior discussion, a claim about those deaths in Japan as well as the other changes I didn't note in my statement explaining why I'd reverted the edit; my above point about the lack of consultation about your addition seems to have been strengthened as you'd made even more changes from the version which was jointly developed and discussed than I realised. As for the rest of your post; TLDR I'm afraid, though I note that you're still claiming that the US ran all of post-war Korea. Nick-D (talk) 10:48, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

The trouble is that we have a very contentious section of the article and we're attempting to finalize it here, with attempts to get everyone to agree here on what should appear in the actual section. Not only did you push out a version that contained items still under discussion, but you threw in some points that hadn't even been discussed. That's not being bold, it's being inconsiderate. I think we need to start a new discussion section that shows the proposed version and find out what points we can agree on.

Your version had only your support, so you're accusing Nick-D of doing exactly what you did yourself. That's hypocritical.

If you want to make the point that the US decided on the 38th parallel and contend that the US controlled all of Korea, the sentence you placed in there does neither. All it provides is a description of the org chart. If you wish to make a point, make it, don't add something that is merely an attempt to imply the point you're trying to make. --Habap (talk) 15:12, 22 September 2010 (UTC)

Everybody knows that this article is under the control of a few untouchable western propagandists, and woe betide any one else who contributes anything, no matter how well sourced, that does not conform to the personal political prejudices of the controlling untouchables. Communicat's sources are very reliable, you can find them on books.google, and at least two of them state clearly that American military government of Korea was responsible for civil administtration of "Korea proper" (sic). "Korea proper" means just that: Korea proper. Not north Korean, not south Korea, but Korea proper, meaning the whole of Korea. The sources given by communicat also confirm that Korea was divided by the US and by the US alone. Comunicat's postings might not appeal to certain editor's sense of patriotism or national pride, but communicat is historically accurate, like it or not. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 196.210.159.89 (talk) 12:32, 27 September 2010 (UTC)

One of the sources (Hastings), presented by Communicat to support this assertion, instead flatly refutes it. Additionally, the division of Korea by the 38th Parallel by the US left Russian armed forces to the north and US forces to the south, so even if they had claimed control of all of Korea, they could only exercise it in the south. (Hohum ^@) 16:49, 27 September 2010 (UTC)

You've not read my posting properly. Read it again. US controlled civil repeat civil administration throughout Korea, and military administration south of 38th parallel. Check the sources I've provided, if you've any queries. I am unable to account for the reason why Hastings failed to mention American military govt of Korea. Ask him. Communicat (talk) 22:55, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

On the contrary. You have failed to understand my posting. (See how pointless saying that is?). I don't need to question Hastings, he's a reliable source. I and others have questioned the conclusions you are drawing, and refuted you with one of your own sources - this exemplifies the reliability of your contributions. (Hohum ^@) 23:07, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

I've not give Hastings as a source. Where did you get that idea? You are the one who's been quoting Hastings.

Meanwhile, I'm trying to propose some concrete text and refs in Renewal section, but am having a problem with getting sources to show. Am working on it. Communicat (talk) 23:17, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

Oh, by the way, thanks for your kind words. Seeing as you seem know so much about the subject why don't YOU propose some concrete text and refs? As for Hastings, I said earlier that I seem to recall he said something about military govt, but I recalled incorrectly. I was actually thinking of I.F. Stone. I never gave Hastings as a concrete source. I've given other concrete sources, which you people simply don't want to acknowledge. Wonder why. Communicat (talk) 23:30, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

It appears you have had a memory lapse. Your words earlier on this very talk page "My money remains on the reliable Hastings/Halliday/Cummings version of events." ... "Prove me wrong." (Hohum ^@) 23:53, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

Yes okay, my error, brownie points to you. But I did not attribute concrete text and ref to Hastings. But for the other (more reliable than Hastings) sources Epic of Korea and Truman, MacArthur and Korea sources as cited (for US military govt and involvement in Korea), they can be verified here and here Communicat (talk) 00:56, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

From a quick skim of those links, pages 94–95 of the first link clearly states that North Korea was occupied and administered by the Soviet Union, who had set up a communist government and large North Korean Army by 1948, and pages 3–6 of the second link also clearly states that the Soviet Union was occupying and administering North Korea while the US did the same for South Korea. Nick-D (talk) 01:11, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

Your "quick skim", as you put it, has not proved useful to your understanding of the subject. Indeed, quite the opposite seems to have occurred. To rectify your misunderstanding, (and to save me the trouble of having to repeat myself), please read properly my posting of 19:16, 21 September 2010 (UTC) above, which you didn't bother to read at the time because, in your view, it was "TL:DR". Communicat (talk) 18:23, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

Do we really need to post excerpts from the pages Nick referred to? Like Hastings, they also flatly and comprehensively refute your assertions. (Hohum ^@) 20:38, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

Yes, maybe you should post a few (preferably verbatim) exercepts and refs, like I'm doing here (again):

Re American military government of Korea: Of notability: The 38th parallel was not a political line but a military line, though it later became a political line in 1948. From 1946 to 1948 the US operated a full military governmen. One of two administrative branches of governance, under the executive direction of an American Governor of Korea, was responsible for "the civilian administration of Korea proper." (See The Epic of Korea by A. Wigfall Green, Public Affairs Press, Washington 1950, p.54). As some unsigned contributor here has already noticed, the words "Korea proper" mean just that; neither north nor south, just Korea proper.

As regards the currently incorrect, specific words "...divided by..." (US and USSR), they should be changed to read accurately read "...divided between..." I've repeatedly provided at least two reliable sources relating to this. You'll find them somewhere above. Communicat (talk) 18:59, 5 October 2010 (UTC)

Arbitrary section break

Wigfall Green (2007) The Epic of Korea pp. 94, 95

• "It was impossible to determine what the Russians had done in the area of Korea occupied by them because they had made that area impenetrable."
• "It can be accepted as fact now that the Russian area of Korea was an armed camp in which the natives had been communistically regimented. It appears that during their occupation the Russians built up an army of from a quarter to half a million native Communists ... The Russians also established a government from which the taint of Communism can never be washed."

My own bolding to highlight contexts. Your own source refutes you, utterly. Here is a fuller context of Communicats isolated phrase.

• "The American administration of Korea fell into two illogical classes. It was, in effect, an administration consisting of two kings in half a realm. These two clases were (1) the supervisory and tactical administration and (2) the civil administration of Korea proper." (the paragraph goes on to give more details of (1) USAFIK and (2) USAMGIK )

My emphasis added. In context it is clear that "proper" is referring to the civil administration, not Korea, which has just been referred to as a half realm (i.e the south only) with the two US bodies administering that part. (Hohum ^@) 22:11, 5 October 2010 (UTC)

Yep. The first volume of Bruce Cummings' well regarded book The Origins of the Korean War also discusses the division of Korea between the US and USSR in great detail. Chapter 11 in particular discusses the Soviet occupation and administration in comprehensive detail (see in particular pp. 384–390 on the Soviet occupation and post-war administrative policies). Nick-D (talk) 22:45, 5 October 2010 (UTC)

So once again, Communicat is quoting sources that not only don't support his claims, but directly contradict them. It seems this "feature" of Communicat's edits is not going to go away any time soon. Edward321 (talk) 00:39, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

Re Hohum extract & interpretation of "half a realm" as posted above:

The American administration of Korea fell into two illogical classes. It was, in effect, an administration consisting of two kings in half a realm. These two clases were (1) the supervisory and tactical administration and (2) the civil administration of Korea proper." (the paragraph goes on to give more details of (1) USAFIK and (2) USAMGIK )

My emphasis added. In context it is clear that "proper" is referring to the civil administration, not Korea, which has just been referred to as a half realm (i.e the south only) with the two US bodies administering that part. (Hohum @) 22:11, 5 October 2010 (UTC)

American-style governance consists of two HALF-realms: the executive realm (i.e. Governor's realm) and the administrative realm. The administrative realm was half a realm, remember, divided in turn between the two sub-realms of (1) tactical administration south of the military line (which did not become a political line until 1948), and (2) the realm charged with the civil administration of "Korea proper", meaning civil jurisdiction throughout Korea. Three reliable sources (already cited above) confirm that full US military government of Korea had jurisdiction throughout Korea.

Nick-d's reference to Soviet "administration polices" in the North are not supported by any concrete text or verifiable reference, so I'm unable to respond thoughtfully to that. Who was the Soviet Governor of Korea? for instance. Communicat (talk) 15:53, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

corrected / refactored for clarity minor changes at posting above. Communicat (talk) 16:29, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

Communicat, it's been pointed out to you that the sources you've provided directly contradict your position that the US had any role in administering North Korea. I have provided a further source which discusses this in further detail. Instead of re-reading your sources and/or following up on the one I've provided, you're instead continuing to assert something which is clearly wrong. This is a textbook example of WP:IDIDNTHEARTHAT. Nick-D (talk) 07:17, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

I don't agree with your incorrect view. I have provided perfectly reliable sources, and have asked you for a preferably verbatim extract to support your own contentions. You have failed to do so. Which is why I "didn't hear that". The burden of proof rests on you. Please provide that proof in the form of verbatim extract and ref, as repeatedly requested, and in accordance with the rules. You have also managed to skirt around the key issues of post-war Japanese war crimes trials, radioactive contamination, and Malayan Emergency -- a text book case of Eurocentricism, dissolution and ignoring eminently notable events as though they did not happen, and never mind the perfectly reliable sources cited by me.

It's clearly a waste of time trying to reason with POV-biased people who're determined to be unreasonable. The notion of any "collegiality" in this "discussion" is a charade. Similarly, I don't believe this article is "under the control of a few Western propagandists", as someone has alleged above. I believe this article and the milhist project as a whole is actually out of control, and I believe one of the reasons for this (apart from the obvious reactionary element) is because everybody wants to be a supervisor here, and nobody wants to be an active editor. That is why so many fomerly active editors have been driven away of late, and/or are no longer interested in being involved with this article, its partisan editing and its intolerable lack of collegiality.

It's noteworthy that my most vocal and disruptive detractors (e.g. Edward321 etc) are the very same ones who do the least active editing of this article, especially when it comes to providing concrete text and refs. IMO their motivation for being here does not arise from any sincere interest in improving this article. Rather, they are using this discussion page for their own peculiar form of unsocial networking characterised by vindictiveness, harassment, personal attacks, rumour mongering, disruption, unfounded allegations, and suchlike unreasonable and unpleasant behaviour directed currently at me in particular, though there have of course been other similar victims in the past.

Communicat (talk) 13:39, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

I'm especially keen to learn from nick-d just how exactly did the Russians manage to conduct civil administration of the north when, at the same time, they were effectively barred from the administrative machinery of governance located at Seoul, the administrative capital of Korea just south of the military line and hence under American occupation? Communicat (talk) 15:31, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

Interestingly, Wainstock, after mentioning the four-power trusteeship agreed to at Yalta, states on page 3

After Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, President Harry S. Truman met with Stalin and Churchill at Potsdam, Germany, in July 1945. Following the surrender of Japan, they agreed to establish a joint American-Soviet occupation of Korea. Although no boundary was agreed upon, the Soviets would occupy the northern half and the Americans the southern half.

This contradicts your proposed sentence "This abrogated an earlier agreement reached between the Allies at Yalta, that an undivided post-war Korea would be placed under four-power multinational trusteeship." In fact, Wainstock goes on to detail that the Soviet-American Joint Commission, met in December 1945 to work out the 4-power, 5-year trusteeship (page 5).

He also relates that in 1947, when the UN General Assembly tried to set up a Temporary Commission on Korea to supervise national elections, the Soviets "refused to serve on the temporary commission or to allow it to enter North Korea." That sure sounds like the Soviets controlled the northern part of Korea and, even if the Americans had been contending that their administration had control of all of Korea, it seems doubtful that there was any truth to it north of the 38th parallel. 'De facto' control by the Soviets (I would say the Potsdam meeting indicates 'de jure' control as well.) --Habap (talk) 15:53, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

Communicat, in reference to your earlier statement, "American-style governance consists of two HALF-realms", I believe you are incorrect. Let's look at what Green wrote, with some bolding by me

The American administration fell into two illogical classes. It was, in effect, an administration consisting of two kings in half a realm. These two classes were (1) the supervisory and tactical administration and (2) the civil administration of Korea proper.

That is, two illogical classes being like two kings, and the two classes being the supervisory/tactical administration and the civil administration. Those two classes administered, together, only half a realm, not each of them administering half a realm. Otherwise, he would have said "two kings, each in half a realm" or "two kings in one realm." --Habap (talk) 16:11, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

As I read more of Green's book, I'm beginning to wonder if you read it. For example, on page 94, Green quotes Molotov writing to Marshall in April of 1947 about the significant achievements toward democratization in the northern area, lamenting that "such wide democratic reforms have been carried out only in northern Korea" by the Soviets. On page 117, Green notes that the Soviets planned to finish withdrawing by the end of December 1948 (not immediately in November 1947, when the UN recommended that all troops be withdrawn within 90 days after the May 1948 elections). Or back on page 58, when he's explaining the reach of the American Military Government in Korea and states, "A Provincial Military Governor headed each of the eight provinces of the area occupied by the Americans." So, either you've not read the whole book or you're cherry-picking quotes that support your point of view while ignoring the rest of the book. --Habap (talk) 17:15, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

Honest question. Communicat, is English not your first language? - because it appears you aren't comprehending it. (Hohum ^@) 19:09, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

If you disapprove of or find my postings difficult to understand, then nobody's forcing you to read them. You're under no obligation. Communicat (talk) 17:07, 8 October 2010 (UTC)

For those who are able to understand English: No-one has so far managed to explain how the Russians managed to conduct civil administration of the north when, at the same time, they were effectively barred from the administrative machinery of governance and bureaucratic civil administration infrastructure located at Seoul, the administrative capital of Korea just south of the military line and firmly under American control. I concede there did exist what is described by one source (James M. Minnich,The North Korean People's Army: origins and current tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005 pp.4-10) accessible here as "Soviet civil administration of the north." That so described "civil administration" was definitely not a "civil administration" in the generally accepted meaning of the term. It consisted essentially of disarmement and demobilisation of nationalist guerilla foreces repatriated to north Korea from Manchuria, after the Japanese surrender. There was effectively no northern civil administration in the generally accepted meaning of the term. Korea's main national resource, for instance, the state-owned mining industry located in the north was not administred, the machinery of administration being under American control in Seoul. The Americans thus had civil administrative jurisdiction over Korea proper, but failed to implement it in the north.

The course which "development" of this topic has followed since its inception a few months ago is interesting. First it was proposed (by Arnouf)that Korea and the Korean War were unimportant and must not be mentioned at all. That objection was eventually overcome. Then it was argued by just about everyone that there was no American Military Government of Korea. That objection too was eventually overcome. So, as you can see, there has been some progress. But then it was and is still being argued that the Americans did not have civil administrative jurisdiction in the north. I F Stone, Hidden History of Korea, pp.5-6, states that American civil administration had jurisdiction throughout Korea. Cumming and Halliday p.16 (cited above) states that from 1945 to 1948: "The Americans operated a full military government in Korea". The same source quotes New York Times editor AM Rosenthal: "The government of Korea functioned throughout the peninisula in 1945, but was undermined by the Americans ..." (p.16)

For the purpose of this aftermath renewal section and its brief mention of Korea, and to keep things simple and uncontentious, I suggest the appropriate wording relative to the proposed new text submitted above, be simply: " Korea, formerly under Japanese rule, was occupied and divided between the USSR in the north, and the Americans in the south. (Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The unknown war, London: Viking, 1988, pp. 10, 16, ISBN 0670819034; Dennis Wainstock, Truman, McArthur and the Korean War, Greenwood, 1999, p.3) Separate republics emerged on both sides of the 38th parallel in 1948, each claiming to be the legitimate Korean sovereign, which led to the Korean War two years later. Viz., American military govt of Korea not mentioned at all. Happy now?

This discussion, for what it's worth, has become disambigulated. Recent Parts of it are now at bottom of "Renewal" section. Communicat (talk) 17:20, 8 October 2010 (UTC)

WP:TLDR. Your inability to understand plainly written sources and your history of cherry picking phrases out of context to support the opposite meaning makes it very difficult to assume good faith from you. You have undermined your own credibility with this constant behaviour. Please stop. (Hohum ^@) 17:35, 8 October 2010 (UTC)

For those active editors who may still be interested, if any, this is link to Naval Institute source mentioned above. Communicat (talk) 20:25, 8 October 2010 (UTC)

In regards to your last para above, that seems to be the wording which was agreed earlier and is currently in the article. Nick-D (talk) 23:29, 8 October 2010 (UTC)

No, it does not contain the wording that you say was agreed earlier. The words "divided and occupied by" should be replaced with "divided and occupied between ". Although division of Korea and its placement under four-nation trusteeship had been agreed in principle by the Allies at Yalta and Potsdam, there was no documented agreement (or none that can be found) as to where exactly would be the military line of division. The US forces in Korea, on the instructions of the US War Department, then unilaterally divided Korea at the 38th parallel, placing the capital city of Seoul under US control, while the Russians looked on in silence. I've already provided two specific RSs in that particular regard.

Arbitrary section break 2

As regards the issues of post-war Japanese war crimes trials, radioactive contamination, and general narrative flow: no-one has raised any objections to my proposed version. I therefor presume concurrence, and will upload that version shortly (i.e. the version that was undone by Nick-d a few weeks ago because "there had been no discussion). —Preceding unsigned comment added by Communicat (talk • contribs) 17:41, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

I objected to it, no-one has stated that they support it and I don't understand why you didn't ask whether people were happy to include it before adding it to the article given the length of the above discussion concerning the material on Korea and the previous objections to the material you've added to the article. I retain my concerns about why Malaya is being used as an example given that much better examples of resistance to the reintroduction of European rule in Asia exist (and doubt that the Communists came anywhere near seizing power as the text implies - the fact that you've claimed that the state of emergency began in 1947 to head off a Communist takeover when the sources I can find put the date as 18 June 1948 and attribute it to either industrial unrest or a combination of Communist intimidation of ethnic Chinese and the killing of three European farmers is a bad sign (see: [44], [45], [46] and [47], for instance)), the material on the radiation sickness in Japan is placed in a rather odd location and cited to a not great source (surely there are more scholarly and recent sources on this topic than something written by the journalist Wilfred Burchett in the early 1980s) and much of the other material isn't cited at all. As the above discussion has demonstrated, the material you add also needs to be carefully verified by other editors against sources. As such, I've reverted the material pending clear agreement from other editors that it should be included (and I'd have no major problems if it turns out that other editors are happy with the material - I just don't see any evidence for this at the moment). Nick-D (talk) 22:35, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

I fully concur with Nick-D's reversion. There is repeated evidence that Communicat's edits are frequently not supported or even flatly contradicted by the sources he tries to cite and Nick-D has already shown evidence that this latest edit by Communicat is wrong in at least some areas. Contrary to Communicat's edit summary, this was not properly discussed and certainly was not concurred with by anyone. Edward321 (talk) 00:47, 11 October 2010 (UTC)

I also concur with Nick, especially in regards to the odd placement of the radioactive contamination. The sentence doesn't fit in the paragraph Communicat supplied at all. Paragraphs should typically deal with similar topics at least. The sentence about the radioactivity looks like it was thrown in at random in a discussion of military-political consequences with no linkage to any of the other sentences.

Since the contradictions between the sources cited above and your quotes has resulted in you trimming your suggested sentences on Korea, I will gladly drop the discussion of those contradictions.

I concur in limiting the discussion of the Korea peninsula to the two sentences Korea, formerly under Japanese rule, was occupied and divided between the USSR in the north, and the Americans in the south. (Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The unknown war, London: Viking, 1988, pp. 10, 16, ISBN 0670819034; Dennis Wainstock, Truman, McArthur and the Korean War, Greenwood, 1999, p.3) Separate republics emerged on both sides of the 38th parallel in 1948, each claiming to be the legitimate Korean sovereign, which led to the Korean War two years later. I don't feel that a discussion of by versus between would accomplish anything and between seems perfectly fine to me.

Communicat, I'm sorry, but you're starting to use a word I can't find in any dictionary: disambigulated. Could you explain what it means? --Habap (talk) 14:56, 11 October 2010 (UTC)

Oh, I just re-read, each claiming to be the legitimate Korean sovereign and that phrase doesn't sound particularly good. If both were claiming sovereignty over all of Korea (I don't know if that's what the sources say), then the phrase should state that, each claiming sovereignty over all of Korea. We have to double-check the sources as whether they claimed that or not (I think they would have, but as Korean history is not my main focus, I don't know.) --Habap (talk) 15:01, 11 October 2010 (UTC)

Thank you Nick-d for pointing out my error date 1947 (Malaya), which should be 1948. As for the rest of your posting: when silence ensues for a reasonable period of time after a proposal is made, it's natural to assume concurrence, which I did. It's also not my fault if you didn't read my earlier posting which, in your own words, was "TL:DR".

Now, to repeat myself in response to your latest complaint: The material on Malaya is significant because the Malayan Emergency (or Anti-British National Liberation War, as the communists called it) was long in duration, lasting 12 years from 1948 to 1960. Communist leader Chin Peng then renewed the insurgency in 1967; it lasted until 1989, and became known as the Communist Insurgency War. In terms of duration, there was no comparable independence war in the aftermath of WW2. Contrary to your claim above that the communists had nothing to do with it, the war was fought between Commonwealth armed forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party. (REF Mohamed Amin and Malcolm Caldwell (eds.), The Making of a Neo Colony, (1977), Spokesman Books, UK, footnote, p. 216.) The communist-led insurgents and the Commonwealth forces had of course earlier been fighting alongside each other as allies against the Japanese in WW2. This did not apply to the other independence wars that you've cited, and that's a further reason why the Malayan example has notability.

It has notability also because your version claims incorrectly: " While the European colonial powers attempted to retain some or all of their colonial empires, their losses of prestige and resources during the war rendered this unsuccessful, leading to rapid decolonisation.[244][245] " Your incorrect claim of "rapid decolonisation" was debated at length, and consensus was that it was wrong. It was changed, and then quietly reverted again when nobody was looking. I complained thus: I see also that the word "rapid" has crept back into the decolonisation aspect. Nick-d was asked by White Shadows on 1 September to provide ref and preview in that regard, which he did. The word "rapid" did not appear at all in the preview. Now, that preview appears to have disappeared / refactored from the thread, without trace, while the inaccurate "rapid" has mysteriously reappeared, even though it was earlier contested, discussed and changed. To repeat: there was no generally "rapid" decolonisation, except maybe for Nigeria/Ghana/India/Pakistan. Most of the colonial world had to fight long wars of attrition for independence from colonialism, e.g. Algeria, Vietnam, etc etc. Others, like Rhodesia, Hong Kong e.g. remained colonies after WW2 for three decades or more. To reiterate: decolonisation was generally not rapid... Communicat (talk) 23:25, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Significantly, User Edward321 then promptly deleted that posting from the discussion page, later claiming it was deleted "by accident". None the less, Paul Siebert undid Edward321s apparent vandalism, and concurred with the restored version thus:

I am inclined to agree that "rapid" draws too optimistic picture: e.g., decolonisation of Africa started only in mid 50s... User:Paul Siebert|Paul Siebert]] (talk) 23:48, 14 September 2010 (UTC) And so, here you are a month later, still trying to undermine my credibility, still making personal attacks, and still reverting my edits while complaining that I've not tried to discuss my changes. Everbody can see what's going on here; I need not spell it out for you.

As for nick-d's objection to award-winning journalist Wilfred Burchett as a source: the objection is completely biased and unfounded. Burchett was there on the ground while it was happening. Enough said.

Since you would now like further discussion, here below is the latest new aftermath version, essentially same as before but with the Malyan Emergency date suitably corrected, and with a replaced reference for same.

Aftermath The end of World War II ushered in an era of Cold War tensions centered mainly on the establishment of post-war boundaries, an East-West nuclear arms race, and Third World proxy wars. The alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had begun to deteriorate even before the war was over, In the interests of maintaining international peace, the Allies had formed the United Nations, which officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, and adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, as a common standard of achievement for all member nations. The Allies established occupation administrations in Austria and Germany. The former would eventually become fully independent and neutral state, non-aligned with any political bloc. The latter was divided onto western and eastern occupation zones controlled by the Western Allies and the USSR, accordingly. A wholesale denazification program was started in Germany immediately after the war ended, leading to prosecution of major Nazi war criminals and removal of many ex-Nazi from power, although this policy would be replaced soon by the policy of broad amnesty and re-integration of ex-Nazi into new West German society. Germany lost part of its eastern territories: Silesia, Neumark and most of Pomerania were transferred to Poland, whereas East Prussia was divided between Poland and the USSR. The later also annexed part of Polish territory east from the Kurzon line, Eastern Romania, part of eastern Finland and three Baltic states.

The post-war division of Europe was formalised by two international military alliances: the United States-led North American Treaty Organisation NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact; The Allies established occupation administrations in Austria and Germany. The former would eventually become a fully independent and neutral state, non-aligned with any political bloc. The latter was divided into western and eastern occupation zones controlled respectively by the Western Allies and the USSR.. A denazification program was started in Germany, leading to prosecution of major Nazi war criminals and the removal of many ex-Nazis from power, although this policy was soon replaced by a policy of broad amnesty and re-integration of ex-Nazis into new West German society. War crimes trials were also conducted in Tokyo against Japanese war criminals. Apart from those killed instantaneously by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, radioactive contamination or "radiation sickness" continued to afflict about 370,000 post-war civilian survivors of the two explosions. Korea, formerly under Japanese rule, was divided between the USSR and the United States, which occupied the Korean peninsula north and south of the 38th parallel respectively. Separate republics emerged on both sides of the 38th parallel in 1948, each claiming to be the legitimate Korean sovereign, which led to the Korean War two years later. In Europe, Germany lost part of its eastern territories: Silesia, Neumark and most of Pomerania were transferred to Poland, whereas East Prussia was divided between Poland and the USSR. The later also annexed part of Polish territory east from the Kurzon line, Eastern Romania, part of eastern Finland and three Baltic states, Germany was de facto divided, and two independent states, Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic were created within the borders of Allied and Soviet occupation zones, accordingly. The rest of Europe was also divided onto Western and Soviet spheres of influence. Most eastern and central European countries fell into the Soviet sphere of influence, which led to the establishment there of communist-led regimes, with full or partial support of the Soviet occupation authorities. As a result, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and East Germany became Soviet Satellite states. By contrast, communist Yugoslavia had conducted a fully independent policy which led to significant tensions with the USSR.

Elsewhere in the world, the United States occupied Japan and administrated Japan's former islands in the Western Pacific, while the Soviets annexed Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. In China, nationalist and communist forces resumed the civil war in June 1946. Communist forces were eventually victorious and established the People's Republic of China on the mainland, while nationalist forces fled to Taiwan in late 1949. The European colonial powers attempted to retain some or all of their colonial empires, but their losses of prestige and resources during the war rendered this unsuccessful. The pace of decolonisation varied in different parts of the world. A state of emergency was declared in July 1948 by the British colonial authorities in Malaya to counter an insurgency by the communist-led national independence movement. Communicat (talk) 17:21, 11 October 2010 (UTC)

References collapsed for readability.

I won't vote in favor of this for a number of reason, starting with the fact that most of paragraph one is repeated verbatim in paragraph 2. I also find the phrase each claiming to be the legitimate Korean sovereign to be poorly written -- I suggest again (assuming the legitimacy claim is valid) each claiming sovereignty over all of Korea. Also, the radiation sickness information does not fit in the location it is currently placed, though it ought to be included in any discussion of post-war Japan. Similarly, if we are going to include Malaya, please move it forward to just after the mention of Taiwan as it ruins the flow of the paragraph by being plopped on the end.

In looking back on earlier versions, I see we have completely dropped the opening paragraph on the economic situation, which saddens me. --Habap (talk) 20:13, 11 October 2010 (UTC)

My concern with the Burchett source is that it's outdated. Estimates of the number of people affected by the atomic bombs keep changing as better data becomes available and the stigma against admitting to suffering from radiation diseases in Japan lessens. Lots continues to be written on this topic, and if we're going to include an estimate of the number of people who suffered radiation sickness (and I agree that it's not well placed as proposed - it probably belongs in the 'Casualties and war crimes' section), it should be the best available data, and not something written almost 30 years ago by a non-specialist. You seem to have miss-read my post if you think that I stated that the Communists weren't involved in the Malayan Emergency - the point I was making is that the state of emergency wasn't instated to stop them from seizing power as the text states, but rather as a response to either industrial action or the beginings of a Communist insurgency. The resulting war lasting for a long time but was of very low intensity for most of its duration. I'm not going to bother responding to Communicat's personal attacks and continued paranoia against myself and Edward. Nick-D (talk) 21:58, 11 October 2010 (UTC)

Habap, maybe you've not been paying attention, but the economic thing that you're complaining about was done a long time ago, (not by me) after a lot of discussion. Malaya was placed by me to where it now is because it fits in with post-war decolonisation (which Nick-D is fond of describing as "rapid").

Nick-D, since you seem to be knowlegeable about the Far East and about radioactive contamination, I'm confident we can rely on you to provide the latest and best available data.

For my part, after months of banging my head against your stonewalling, you'll be glad to learn that I'm done with trying to improve this aftermath section. You're now left with are just the three of you: Nick-D, Habap, and the ubiquitous Edward321 -- none of whom have so far proved noticeably prolific in their concrete edits, so it's a dead horse as far as I'm concerned, and likely to remain that way. Communicat (talk) 23:51, 11 October 2010 (UTC)

Paragraphs 1 and 2 are extremely redundant, heavy trimming is needed. Aftermath of World War II should be used as a guideline for organization and where possible I recommend the same wording. The suggested section needs better organization.

The aftermath of WWII led to the Cold War, but that is not all it led to. Sections on the forced resettlements in Europe should be covered. War crimes trials and decolonialization should be covered without trying to shoehorn them into being part of the Cold War. The economic aftermath should also be mentioned, as should the Marshall Plan.

When dealing with postwar treatment of Nazis, the Nuremberg trials should be named, not just linked to. The suggested text is glaring in its silence about what happened to Nazis in Eastern Bloc countries, or indeed anywhere save West Germany. Forced labor of Axis populations in the Soviet Union needs to be mentioned, as well as the treatment of Soviet POWs as Nazi collaborators by their own government. .

The number of post-war Japanese casualties from the A-bombs seems cherry-picked, the Japanese government recognizes only 228, 000 not 370, 000 hibakusha, and says only 1% of those are certified as suffering from bomb related diseases.

The section should mention post-war-division of Korea between the US and USSR was decided at Yalta. It should be mentioned that the Korean War started when North Korea invaded South Korea.

The section on Malaya gives undue weight to that part of decolonialism and to the influence communists had in post-war Malaya. Independence was supported by the majority of the Malays, the communist guerillas were supported primarily by the Chinese minority. Edward321 (talk) 01:33, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

Paragraphs 1 and 2 were an unmitigated disaster - the kind of sloppiness that would make Wikipedia useless. --Habap (talk) 14:55, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

Re "The suggested text is glaring in its silence about what happened to Nazis in Eastern Bloc countries." Since the Germans were largely expelled from other countries than Germany, you probably mean Easter Germany? We can add that in the Soviet occupation zone denazification was fast and complete, although it was not selective, so it affected also those who were not involved in Nazi crimes. I cal find sources if needed.

Re: "Forced labor of Axis populations in the Soviet Union needs to be mentioned, as well as the treatment of Soviet POWs as Nazi collaborators by their own government." That has been done in another section.

Re: "Sections on the forced resettlements in Europe should be covered." Added the link to the German expulsion.

In general, I think we must stick with the chronological order: occupation of Germany and Austria, denazification, territorial changes, and only after that formation of two blocs. In that sense, the present version seems optimal (although I can be biased because the present version was largely proposed by me).--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:25, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

Not all Nazis were German. Not all denazification to place in Germany. Soviet denazification was not complete, they had their equivalent of Operation Paperclip.

I see forced labor is mentioned in the Impact section. Doesn't that make the Aftermath section redundant.

German expulsion was only one of the forced resettlements. Poles, Ukrainians, Albanians, Finns, Hungarians, Romanians, Serbs, and Japanese were all forcibly resettled.

Chronological order is a good way to go, but this version needs a lot of work before its ready. 00:29, 13 October 2010 (UTC)

Yes, it is optimal. Suggest you upload it now, before someone tries to rub the shine off it.

Can't help noticing that Edward321 above, who's always quick to rubbish my usually reliable sources, somehow fails to provide any sources whatsoever to support his own posting, which contains several inaccuracies. Communicat (talk) 22:27, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

When I point out where the sources you list contradict your posts, that is not "rubbishing your sources". Edward321 (talk) 00:29, 13 October 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, I probably was not clear enough. Under "present" I meant the version that is already in the article. It starts from the fate of Germany, then it tells about the fate of Nazi, about border changes an so on. By contrast, the talk page version jumps from one topic to the another without clear logic. Do you think it is an improvement? If yes, then explain me please, why do you think this structure is better.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:58, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

I'll agree the exiting version is notably better than the version proposed on the talk page. Edward321 (talk) 00:34, 13 October 2010 (UTC)

Paul, your version fine except that it is somewhat Eurocentric. I said so a long time ago, when you invited me to comment on your draft. I still say so. Communicat (talk) 22:31, 13 October 2010 (UTC)

It is Eurocentric because the focus of the war was in Europe. However, if you believe it is too Eurocentric we can think about either shrinking European part or expanding the Asian part. Do you see any problems with the former?--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:39, 13 October 2010 (UTC)

Apart from the Eurocentric problem, your version comprises a confusing blur of country names, without conveying any sense of meaning. This, IMO, is because so much minutae is packed into a fairly brief summary, while overriding "macro" issues are excluded. Macro issues absent from your version include among others: Betton Woods Agreement; abrogation of promises contained in Atlantic Charter IRO Poland and colonial territories, (Malaya, Indochina, Kenya etc) together with abrogation of agreements reached at Yalta particularly IRo multinational trusteeship of Korea.

But if you still consider it appropriate to organise your Eurocentric version in terms of proportionality relative to where the "focus of the war" (sic) was, then greater proportionality should perhaps be applied to the aftermath effects of the principal and decisive front of the war in Europe, viz., the Eastern or Russian-German Front. Churchill's Fulton speech, and Russia's succesful testing of its own A-bomb might be germane. Communicat (talk) 16:55, 15 October 2010 (UTC)

(I believe you don't mind me to re-format your post). Re country names, which names have been blurred and how do you propose to fix it? Re Bretton Woods. I also mentioned that during the discussion, and if you have an idea how to include it without inflating the section, please, do that.

Re: abrogation. Do you think it is important enough to include it here? Since no initial promises were mentioned in the Course of the war section, it would be illogical to mention the abrogation of the promises which have never been discussed before.

Re: "But if you still consider it appropriate to organise your Eurocentric version ..." Again, I already asked you what concrete disbalance you disagree with and how do you propose to fix it. Please, explain.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:01, 15 October 2010 (UTC)

All I'm saying is I much prefer the approach mooted by unsigned editor six weeks ago, and which was apparently shunned by all (except me) in subsequent discussion and in your concrete edits. That editor suggested, quite rightly IMO, that the Marshall plan could be mentioned in the economy section; and that the Berlin blockade also be mentioned, adding: Generally I prefer an approach of threading a narrative through some especially sharp events, rather than rattling off a bunch of stuff as a big blur. 67.122.209.135 (talk) 08:36, 2 September 2010 (UTC)

Now, don't you agree with me that this might conceivably come across as "rattling off a bunch of stuff as a big blur"?: Germany lost part of its eastern territories: Silesia, Neumark and most of Pomerania were transferred to Poland, whereas East Prussia was divided between Poland and the USSR. The later also annexed part of Polish territory east from the Kurzon line,[8] Eastern Romania,[9][10] part of eastern Finland[11] and three Baltic states[12],[13] Could that be construed as more deserving of mention than, say, e.g. the Marshall Plan and/or Berlin Blocade, or any of the "macro" points I've suggested above? Why not just say: "Germany lost part of its eastern territories", and relegate the rest of the sentence to a footnote, as you did with UN Declaration of HR? By using footnote method, you might be able to trim other text, to make way for, e.g., Truman Doctrine, Fulton speech, Russian A-bomb test, and even Bretton Woods Agreement. Not to mention post-war reparations and other sharp points presently absent from your version.

Speaking of the currently absent but IMO very noteworthy Bretton Woods Agreement, it was included by me at the top of my first bold bid to improve the aftermath section, which was then swiftly undone and reverted without discussion by one of our many "supervisors" (who don't seem to do much else, other than revert and/or condemn me and my contributions).

As for balancing Eurocentric content with non-Euro content: I don't think the two elements should be treated as completely separate entities by placing the Euro stuff in one para and the non-Euro in a separate para. Why not intertwine them and let chronology and "sharpness" dictate their position in the text? Same applies to economic stuff. Why confine "global economy suffered, US emerged richer" to an "economic category"? They are sharp issues, and and such could come near the top if not at the very top with Bretton Woods perhaps.

Finally, some of the unsourced POV might be removed, especially nick-d's incorrect "rapid" decolonisation and your desription of Japan's "incredibly rapid" recovery. All of which is academic, given that your version has consensus approval, so maybe it's best to just let it remain as -- otherwise we'll be going around in endless circles, like a dog chasing its tail and getting nowhere. Though I still think a brief, neutral, introductory sentence be provided at the start of the section, (before the blur sets in), as I did with The end of World War II ushered in an era of Cold War tensions centered mainly on the establishment of post-war boundaries, an East-West nuclear arms race, and Third World proxy wars. Which, needless to say, was quickly undone and reverted, as usual. Communicat (talk) 19:26, 16 October 2010 (UTC)

PS: Other "sharp" events currently missing from the existing version and which I consider to be relevant aftermath issues are: Balfour Declaration IRO Palestine; and Greek civil war. Also, some kind of agreement may be useful as to what is cut-off date of Aftermath. Are we talking about immediate aftermath? Or beyond that, viz., aftermath of the aftermath (which is where a lot of the current version economic recovery content seems to be). (It may also be argued that the aftermath of WW2 exists to this day, and will continue to do so for some time to come). Communicat (talk) 00:43, 17 October 2010 (UTC)

So, does silence confirm concurrence? Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet split, India-Pakistan tensions, might be worth including if you're still short on sharp, non-Euro issues for potential inclusion. Communicat (talk) 11:42, 18 October 2010 (UTC)

No it doesn't. You seem to be simultaneously complaining that this section of the article covers too many topics while suggesting additional topics for it to cover while not actually proposing any concrete text to be discussed. Nick-D (talk) 11:48, 18 October 2010 (UTC)

IMO, some of these proposals deserve discussion.

Re " threading a narrative through some especially sharp events" Hard to tell how it will work. Please, give us few examples.

Re "Silesia, Neumark and most of Pomerania were transferred to Poland..." Frankly speaking, I introduced this text to balance a detailed description of the territorial changes of the Soviet Union (the previous version contained a detailed description of the Soviet expansion but completely ignored other territorial changes). I agree that too much attention is devoted to minor territorial changes in Europe. Please, propose how to present that more compactly.

Re Bretton Woods Agreement, I already wrote that it does deserve mention. Please, propose concrete wording.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:07, 18 October 2010 (UTC)

Re Bretton Woods and other points raised, I'll try to put together some concrete text and refs for discussion, maybe in the next week or two, if/when time permits. Communicat (talk) 01:01, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

Nick-d, you're demanding that I (again) provide concrete aftermath text. I'll be glad to do that after you do me the courtesy of responding thoughtfully to a couple of unanswered issues earlier conveyed to you, concerning some of your points of disagreement. Namely: how exactly did the Russians manage to conduct civil administration of the north when, at the same time, they were effectively barred from the administrative machinery of governance located at Seoul, the administrative capital of Korea just south of the military line and hence under American occupation? Communicat (talk) 15:31, 7 October 2010 (UTC) And: Nick-D, since you seem to be knowlegeable about the Far East and about radioactive contamination, I'm confident we can rely on you to provide the latest and best available data. ... Communicat (talk) 23:51, 11 October 2010 (UTC) Also, do you agree that the Aftermath time-line be left open, i.e. no firm cutoff date? That would be helpful to know. Thanks. Communicat (talk) 11:46, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

It has been repeatedly shown that the USSR was administering Korea north of the 38th parallel. Sources you have used to try to show otherwise have shown that the USSR was administering Korea north of the 38th parallel. The question is well and truly answered, even if you refuse to admit the facts disprove your personal theories.

You have provided a source for the long-term effects of radioactivity in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese government appears to use significantly lower numbers.

Aftermath should be limited to events immediately after WWII or directly tied to the same by reliable sources. Edward321 (talk) 13:32, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

You still haven't answered the question. But never mind. The American book sources upon which you evidently base your assumptions are all garbage. They were written and published under conditions of strict military censorship and in the McCarthy era, when writers faced being charged with "giving aid and comfort" to the Cold War enemy, if they deviated from the official line. Apart from the exceptional American author IF Stone, there is only one other reliable (British) source that I'm aware of, viz., Halliday/Cumings, which I've already cited as a reference in my earlier rejected contributions. I suggest you and others read the section about Korea and censorship in Phillip Knightley's The First Casualty.

Re Hiroshima: it would be helpful, and also in the best interests of working collaboratively, if you could cite and source the Japanese govt figures or any other figures you keep refering to while derogating my own properly sourced contributions.

Re Aftermath cut-off date: Before any firm decision is reached, we should await the opinion of Paul Siebert, who is more-or-less the only editor actively engaged in improving this section. If the aftermath is to be limited to "immediate aftermath" as you want it to be, then most of Paul's carefully detailed contribution on economic recovery issues will have to be thrown out (even though already approved by consensus). Communicat (talk) 20:02, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War by Dennis Wainstock was published in 1999. [48] Unequal partners in peace and war : the Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948 - 1953 by Jongsuk Chay was published in 2002. [49] The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 by Charles K. Armstrong was published in 2004. [50] The Epic of Korea by A. Wigfall Green was published in 2007. [51] North Korea by Clive Gifford was published in 2010. [52] Your claim that these five sources that refute you are "written and published under conditions of strict military censorship and in the McCarthy era" is obviously false. Edward321 (talk) 01:13, 21 October 2010 (UTC)

Okay, I provisionally retract, even though there are other, contradictory sources and reliable alternative viewpoints. And there is still no satisfactory explanation as to how so-called civil administration of N. Korea was conducted without access to the administrative files, revenues, records etc kept in the former adminstrative capital of Seoul, under American control. The Americans had amicably recruited Japanese administrative bureaucrats to continue conducting administrative duties, the very same duties they had performed prior to their surrender. Needless to say, these post-war Japanese bureacrats were afraid to venture north of the military line, where the Russians and the demobilised anti-Japanese guerrillas who'd returned from Manchuria would almost certainly have been less accommodating. (Sources available, if you're really interested).

Moreover, the books you cite have presumably relied on surviving declassified primary official docs, which would almost certainly have been sanitised by the military and McCarthyist censors of the time, not to mention the present censors. But never mind. What exactly is the concrete text and source you propose, if any? And where are the post-war radioactive contamination figures for Japan? Communicat (talk) 13:25, 21 October 2010 (UTC)

Still waiting for those figures of yours, plus your suggested concrete text if any. Meanwhile, the book Epic of Korea by Wigfall Green which you refer to above is a reprint and it was first published in 1950. I've not bothered to check the original publication dates for the other books you've cited, but it wouldn't surprise me if they too are relics of the rabid McCarthy period. And there may also be a few other relics around, who shall remain nameless. Communicat (talk) 16:59, 24 October 2010 (UTC)

Perhaps you should check the 21 September post by Communicat. He thought that Wigfall was an unbiased and reliable source. [53] As for numbers, if you'd followed the link I gave to hibakusha you'd have seen numbers and sources - that article is remarkably well-cited for how short it is. Edward321 (talk) 18:07, 24 October 2010 (UTC)

Edward321, are you ever going to propose some concrete text? As for Wigfall, I've not described him as as "unbiased and reliable" source. Wigfall and other related writers in the context of this thread were refered to by me for the intended purpose of constructive discussion in trying to unravel a complex historical issue with a view to improvement of this article -- (something from which you continue to hold yourself aloof). Communicat (talk) 23:37, 25 October 2010 (UTC)

Re radioactive fallout. The article to which you've directed me states quite clearly: The memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki contain lists of the names of the hibakusha who are known to have died since the bombings. Updated annually on the anniversaries of the bombings, as of August 2010[update] the memorials record the names of more than 420,000 hibakusha; 269,446 in Hiroshima[5] and 152,276 in Nagasaki.[6] This more than corroborates the allegedly "out of date" figure of 370,000 cited by me from source Wilfred Burchett, which was then reverted by Nick-d with your support, because it was "cherry-picked" (your words) and supposedly an exagerration. In fact, as you can see for yourself, Burchett's 370,000 figure is reasonably close, and if anything, it is an understatement. So, what exactly is your problem? You might care to explain it to arbcom. Communicat (talk) 23:58, 25 October 2010 (UTC)

Renewal

Clear unclosed references

Though it appears we may have lost one of our interested parties, I don't think we'd finalized our discussion to come up with the replacement section. Or am I wrong and we've agreed on what's currently posted? --Habap (talk) 14:06, 30 September 2010 (UTC)

I added the above to the article in the place of Communicat's version as it seemed to have support here - I'm sure that it can be improved though. Nick-D (talk) 08:49, 1 October 2010 (UTC)

No, we did not all agree on the replacement section. My own disagreement rested on three issues, namely: (1)the new version was Eurocentric; (2) decolonisation was misrepresented, and (3) I concurred with another editor about narrative blurr. To overcome those problems, I propose that the following concrete text and verifiable sources replace the currently unploaded text, from beginning of Aftermath section to the last paragraph commencing "The world economy ..."

Proposed text and sources follow:

The end of World War II ushered in an era of Cold War tensions centered mainly on the establishment of post-war boundaries, an East-West nuclear arms race, and Third World proxy wars. The alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had begun to deteriorate even before the war was over, The post-war division of Europe was formalised by two international military alliances: the United States-led North American Treaty Organisation NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact;

The Allies established occupation administrations in Austria and Germany. The former would eventually become a fully independent and neutral state, non-aligned with any political bloc. The latter was divided into western and eastern occupation zones controlled respectively by the Western Allies and the USSR.. A denazification program was started in Germany, leading to prosecution of major Nazi war criminals and the removal of many ex-Nazis from power, although this policy was soon replaced by a policy of broad amnesty and re-integration of ex-Nazis into new West German society. War crimes trials were also conducted in Tokyo against Japanese war criminals. Apart from those killed instantaneously by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, radioactive contamination or "radiation sickness" continued to afflict about 370,000 post-war civilian survivors of the two explosions. Korea, formerly under Japanese rule, was divided at the 38th parallel on the orders of the US War Department. This abrogated an earlier agreement reached between the Allies at Yalta, that an undivided post-war Korea would be placed under four-power multinational trusteeship. Separate republics emerged on both sides of the 38th parallel in 1948, each claiming to be the legitimate Korean sovereign, which led to the Korean War two years later.

In Europe, Germany lost part of its eastern territories: Silesia, Neumark and most of Pomerania were transferred to Poland, whereas East Prussia was divided between Poland and the USSR. The later also annexed part of Polish territory east from the Kurzon line, Eastern Romania, part of eastern Finland and three Baltic states,

In the interests of maintaining international peace, the Allies had formed the United Nations, which officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, and adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, as a common standard of achievement for all member nations. Germany was de facto divided, and two independent states, Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic were created within the borders of Allied and Soviet occupation zones, accordingly. The rest of Europe was also divided onto Western and Soviet spheres of influence. Most eastern and central European countries fell into the Soviet sphere of influence, which led to the establishment there of communist-led regimes, with full or partial support of the Soviet occupation authorities. As a result, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and East Germany became Soviet Satellite states. By contrast, communist Yugoslavia had conducted a fully independent policy which led to significant tensions with the USSR.Elsewhere in the world, the United States occupied Japan and administrated Japan's former islands in the Western Pacific, while the Soviets annexed Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. In China, nationalist and communist forces resumed the civil war in June 1946. Communist forces were eventually victorious and established the People's Republic of China on the mainland, while nationalist forces fled to Taiwan in late 1949. The European colonial powers attempted to retain some or all of their colonial empires, but their losses of prestige and resources during the war rendered this unsuccessful. decolonisation. The pace of decolonisation varied in different parts of the world. A state of emergency was declared in 1947 by the British colonial authorities in Malaya to counter an attempted seizure of power by the communist-led national independence movement.

The global economy suffered heavily from the war ... etc to end.

Any queries re Korea, refer to my earlier postings above, in that regard. The Epic of Korea and Truman, MacArthur and Korea sources as cited (for US military govt and US involvement in Korea) can be verified here and here Communicat (talk) 01:00, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

REFERENCES

References collapsed for readability.

something's gone awry, can't get temporary references to show in proper sequence in main view, so I've simply deleted refs command. All the references cited are in the edit version, so you should get the general idea. Maybe some kind soul might fix them to show in main view, in the unlikely event it's considered important enough. Communicat (talk) 23:40, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

I have added a collapsible box with the correct references (again). (Hohum ^@) 23:55, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

Thanks. Communicat (talk) 01:00, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

Disambigulation, relevant talk diverts to & continues at bottom of section above. Communicat (talk) 16:33, 6 October 2010 (UTC) talk continues here Communicat (talk) 20:18, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

Wigfall clearly does not support your claim that the Americans administered all of Korea. Note the "half a realm" phrase. Or the "two areas of Korea phrase". [54] The Russians proposed joint withdrawal of Russian and American troops from Korea in 1948.[55] Wainstock does not support your contention either. It clearly shows that the Russians still had troops in North Korea in late 1948.[56] It mentions the joint Russian-American administration of Korea, with the Russian occupying the northern half of Korea was agreed to by England and both of those powers in 1945.[57] Edward321 (talk) 13:47, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

:::: None of your links above explain how the Russians managed to conduct civil administration of the north when, at the same time, they were effectively barred from the administrative machinery of governance and bureaucratic civil administration infrastructure located at Seoul, the administrative capital of Korea just south of the military line and firmly under American control. I concede there did exist what is described by one source (James M. Minnich,The North Korean People's Army: origins and current tactics, Naval Institute Press, 2005 pp.4-10) accessible here as "Soviet civil administration of the north." That so described "civil administration" was definitely not a "civil administration" in the generally accepted meaning of the term. It consisted essentially of disarmement and demobilisation of nationalist guerilla foreces repatriated to north Korea from Manchuria, after the Japanese surrender. There was effectively no northern civil administration in the generally accepted meaning of the term. Korea's main national resource, for instance, the state-owned mining industry located in the north was not administred, the machinery of administration being under American control in Seoul. The Americans thus had civil administrative jurisdiction over Korea proper, but failed to implement it in the north.

The course which "development" of this topic has followed since its inception a few months ago is interesting. First it was proposed (by Arnouf)that Korea and the Korean War were unimportant and must not be mentioned at all. That objection was eventually overcome. Then it was argued by just about everyone that there was no American Military Government of Korea. That objection too was eventually overcome. So, as you can see, there has been some progress. But then it was and is still being argued that the Americans did not have civil administrative jurisdiction in the north. I F Stone, Hidden History of Korea, pp.5-6, states that American civil administration had jurisdiction throughout Korea. Cumming and Halliday p.16 (cited above) states that from 1945 to 1948: "The Americans operated a full military government in Korea". The same source quotes New York Times editor AM Rosenthal: "The government of Korea functioned throughout the peninisula in 1945, but was undermined by the Americans ..." (p.16)

For the purpose of this aftermath renewal section and its brief mention of Korea, and to keep things simple and uncontentious, I suggest the appropriate wording relative to the proposed new text submitted above, be simply: " Korea, formerly under Japanese rule, was occupied and divided between the USSR in the north, and the Americans in the south. (Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The unknown war, London: Viking, 1988, pp. 10, 16, ISBN 0670819034; Dennis Wainstock, Truman, McArthur and the Korean War, Greenwood, 1999, p.3) Separate republics emerged on both sides of the 38th parallel in 1948, each claiming to be the legitimate Korean sovereign, which led to the Korean War two years later. Viz., American military govt of Korea not mentioned at all. Happy now?

:::: You might care to note this discussion, as I've already pointed out, has become disambigulated. The balance of continuing discussion, for what it's worth, is at bottom of that section. Communicat (talk) 17:01, 8 October 2010 (UTC)