Talk:Operation Goodwood

Tactical victory

Hart states the operation was a tactical failure and Dempsey says the operation was very good tactically. Is this enough to support a tactical victory?

Content debate

Objective discussion

@AD Monroe et al. Is it really still controversial? Regards Keith-264 (talk) 06:53, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

@A D Monroe III:: Reproduced by Jackson, 8 Corps: Normandy to the Baltic, p. 81, are the orders issued by Dempsey (GOC 2nd Army) on 17 July:

"4. 8 Corps will establish armoured divisions in the area:-

(a) Vimont.

(b) Garcelles-Secqueville.

(c) Hubert-Folie-Verrieres.

The task of these three divisions will be to get their main bodies so established that there can be no enemy penetration through the ring, to destroy all enemy troop concentrations and installations in the area; to defeat enemy armour which may be brought against them.

Vigorous patrolling an exploitation will be carried out to the east and south-east to the line of the Dive-to the south in the direction of Falaise-to the south-west as far as the River Orne at Thury Harcourt.

Main bodies of the three divisions will be be moved from areas (a), (b), (c) without reference to me."

With that in mind, I believe it is quite safe to say that the previous version that stated the operation's objective was "objective = Attrition of German forces, limiting of British infantry casualties, capture of Caen hinterland" is accurate (limiting infantry casualties are referenced elsewhere) and not exactly controversial since the orders predate the various post-operation and post-war debates, which I agree should be "explained fully in body in Aftermath". Regards, EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:59, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

I agree but I'm not sure about what the RS say about it, because I've been on the Western Front 1915-1917 for so long. I read Buckley Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe a while back but nothing recent. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 22:32, 22 August 2016 (UTC)

First, using a primary source to state that the objectives should be uncontroversial is SYNTH. Second, the three separate objectives suggested are rather wordy and vague -- not the sort of thing to go in an infobox anyway, per infobox guidelines. More importantly, our own Operation Goodwood#Aftermath section spells out different views on the objectives, specifically using the word "controversy", and has two full paragraphs explaining them, without a clear resolution. To make this worse, the views tend to fall into two main opposing camps -- aligned with pro-Monty (mostly Brit) and anti-Monty (mostly US). Putting anything in the infobox for objectives can be bait for drive-by POV editors, "fixing" the order of the 3, "improving" the wording, and just plain replacing them with the TRUTH. It's not particularly succinct or informative, and we have better things to do than constantly maintaining this. --A D Monroe III (talk) 02:52, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

The 8 Corps History is a published 2ndary source and my question is about recent (last 10 years) writing by RS.

* {{cite book |first=G. S. |last=Jackson |authorlink= |others=Staff, 8 Corps |title=8 Corps: Normandy to the Baltic |publisher=MLRS Books |year=2006 |origyear=1945 |isbn=978-1-905696-25-3}}

Succinct is good but the motive for the attack is actually motives so succinct here needs more words than some of the other operation boxes. Your point about setting up a thorn in our sides is well taken but there hasn't been much done to the article of late, hence my spring clean. Perhaps the Aftermath needs looking at first? I was hoping that pro- and anti-Monty bias was a little old fashioned and that there were grounds for moving past it. It certainly helps to keep description and explanation separate. Keith-264 (talk) 06:45, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

So don't let sleeping dogs lie? Yes, the war is long over, the good guys won, so why quibble? Yet people do. Nationalism isn't rationalism. Wars a lot older than WWII still stir pointless heated arguments; we can't just wish them away. There was disagreement about the objectives during and after the war by the people involved. That disagreement was never officially resolved (no military need to do so), and now all the participants are dead, so the disagreement is still a fact, and will likely remain so forever. And it's still argued; in the last few months, on several occasions I've had to trim bits added to Aftermath that tried to put an unsourced POV on the objectives.

And, yes, there is probably no succinct way to state the objectives even if it wasn't controversial. That's why a lot of battle infoboxes leave it out.

Again, don't we all have better things to do than stir this up? --A D Monroe III (talk) 14:03, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

I'm not sure you're assuming good faith, I hope I'm mistaken. Having looked at the Analysis section, it seems rather sparse to me. The history of the controversy should be there but also the facts of the plan, such as its objectives which were given in a directive before the attack. I put them in and you took them out. If you don't want to have this discussion, you're welcome to step aside but in the meantime I think I'll re-edit the Analysis fully to cover the history of the controversy. Regards. Keith-264 (talk) 14:31, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

I would note that despite never being able to give this article the attention it deserves in order to make an FA run, it has remained largely stable in its current form. I have yet to see any ongoing edit waring over that objective box until this discussion.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:06, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

It has been a topic of discussion on this talk page and in the pages of the sources. DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:53, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

There's no dispute about the fact of the controversy but neither is there about the truth of the matter. From the point of view of the article, the Analysis needs a fuller treatment of the controversy but after that is added, I see no impediment to returning the facts to the operation box. It's a quite interesting story, the deception at the time to get the bomber barons off their bottoms, the early writing without benefit of primary sources, its use for credit claiming by people who should have been a little more humble and the later contextualisation. I'm quite happy for the moment to leave the box as it stands and work on the Analysis. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 17:14, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

To add to my comment just above, the official US history of the Normandy campaign (Blumenson, p.188) says that Goodwood was a breakthough (not breakout) attempt and that if it had succeeded, COBRA would have been unnecessary. On p. 189 he goes on to mention the controversy we are discussing here.

None of that makes Blumenson right or others wrong. It is rather good evidence of controversy though. The signals irregularities cited in old talk simply add to that.

regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:23, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

Quite agree but Blumenson is 1961, before the release of documents under the Thirty Year rule and the disclosure of the Ultra secret. Buckley is 2013 and discusses motives for not communicating the reduced objectives of 15 July and Monty's directive .Keith-264 (talk) 21:30, 23 August 2016 (UTC)

Powers, The Battle of Normandy the Lingering Controversy, suggests - based off a quick glance of the first few pages and the summary, which is all I have time for at the moment - that all controversy (including if Goodwood was suppose to be a break out or not, and the issue of pinning down troops or not) was a product of post-war disputes etc.

I would suggest restoration of the previous version (essentially cited to pre-operation orders via a secondary source, and other details cited to other secondary sources that are not controversial), and present the findings of the post-operation and the post-war debate in the aftermath section which would appear to be aptly named for the actual controversy.

Disclaimer: I do have a few other sources I wish to check, when time permits, and of course opinions are open to change on additional evidence.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:15, 24 August 2016 (UTC)

It doesn't matter where the dispute came from, it still exists. We can't deny it exists in the infobox -- simple as that. --A D Monroe III (talk) 14:29, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

We have RS that state plain as day what the operation was (based off pre-dispute material). Why should that be ignored?

That does not distract from the point that following the operation, a debate opened up over what the intentions of the operation were due to various factors including careers and personal riviarlies, political, and nationalist. As Keith noted, is there even still a debate?

I feel that two issues are being mixed up, and irrespective of the debate on the strategic aims of Goodwood the previous version was not controversial nor ignored the debate (I.e. no one has objected that territory was part of the operation, no one has objected limiting infantry casualties was not either, and likewise for writing down German armor).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:17, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

I suggest that the dispute existed and has been rendered obsolete, except perhaps in tertiary hackwork. The fact of the dispute deserves inclusion in the article but not in the operationbox since the truth of the matter has been established from primary sources in the secondary literature. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 15:43, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Hold on there please. The dispute did not arise postwar, it absolutely arose immediately after the operation - within days. Eisenhower didn't get mad in the 1960s, he got mad in July 1944.

See the draft analysis below.Keith-264 (talk) 16:44, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

The orders issued to 2nd Army units cannot dispose of this issue one way or the other. part of the origin of the controversy is the difference between those orders and communications to the next higher headquarters, i.e., SHAEF. Again, this is a fact from July 1944, not some postwar issue. It is *highly* irregular to report to your commander one thing and order your subordinates to do something quite different. An uncharitable observer might call it "lying". I'm charitable though, and this is an encyclopedia, so we'll just say irregular.

See the draft analysis below.Keith-264 (talk) 16:44, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Blumenson's work cannot be dismissed as hackwork. Old, yes. But still very highly regarded.

except perhaps in tertiary hackwork I didn't dismiss it as hackwork, I dismissed recent tertiary literature as hackwork. Blumenson's work is a secondary source.Keith-264 (talk) 16:44, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

The truth of the matter has not been established and frankly probably never will be. It would take new primary evidence to resolve and I am not sure that will ever exist. Possible but unlikely. I am not sure why we don't simply acknowledge this. The heart of the matter is the objectives of the operation, so the article should squarely reflect that somehow.

DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:15, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Documents up to 15 July demonstrate the facts beyond peradventure.Keith-264 (talk) 16:44, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Oh, whew! Then all these authors can stop arguing now. It's all a silly mistake.  ;) DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:29, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Fnar! Is Blumenson still alive? A lot of myths and legends grew up until official documents were released and many continued for years, because it suited commercial publishers to encourage polemic instead of empirical research. A 1961 publication is even older than me (just) but surely in the last 15 years or so a historicised Battle of Normandy has emerged, that acknowledges the debt to past historians limited to first-hand accounts and cagey official publications while moving debates to a more objective plane? Keith-264 (talk) 17:58, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Let's stick to the fact instead of conjecture about why someone published something. It's unworthy of you. Blumenson was publishing a noncommercial work by the way.

Yet again you fail to see the distinction between the US official historian and commercial hackwork, I've explained it twice, would you like me to do it a third time or is that unworthy of me too?Keith-264 (talk) 19:18, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

While looking for something else I just found this: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/30059/ww2_normandy.pdf

And on page 4 - "The controversy that subsequently surrounded the extent to which Operation Goodwood could be deemed a success stemmed from the differing understanding of the objectives of the offensive." This is a British gov't publication from 2005, 60 years after the operation.

Written in the past tense and the contemporary British state isn't a RS.Keith-264 (talk) 19:18, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

DMorpheus2 (talk) 18:23, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

To play devil's advocate, that doesn't really change anything that has been said. The primary sources show us that Second Army knew what they were doing. What had a different expectation based off different information.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:51, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Quite agree, there was no misunderstanding of the nature of Goodwood's aims except among those that it was expedient for Monty to have kept ignorant. Perhaps they were annoyed at being managed by a subordinate? The primary sources are well represented in the secondary sources. If you look below (in what is admittedly one of Buckley's lesser efforts and atrociously copy-edited) a mass market paperback manages to separate the controversy from the facts relatively efficiently.Keith-264 (talk) 19:18, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Such as his commander, Eisenhower? One can argue in good faith about the objectives; one can argue in good faith about who was told what and when. One cannot in good faith deny that a controversy exists and has existed since July 1944. DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:52, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

No one has. The only question posed, is does the controversy still exist? Not to mention the controversy mostly surrounds expectations rather than what orders were issued to VIII Corps.

I should have time later, and I will dig through the sources I have or can access to see if we can get some sort of consensus on this otherwise it is the 4 of us having a round about argument.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:06, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Montgomery states in his memoirs IIRC that he had explained his plan to Eisenhower and that Eisenhower had agreed to it but that subsequently Ike later made statements that appeared to show he had not grasped Montgomery's basic strategy and still seemed to be basing his view of intended events on the original COSSAC plans that Montgomery had subsequently changed with Eisenhower's full approval - my italics.

And the reason Montgomery didn't 'inform' Eisenhower about what he was doing was becasue as far as Montgomery knew, he already had informed him.

All this controversy and almost certainly all due to very sloppy Staff work by people at SHAEF. It was their job to make sure that everyone was 'singing from the same hymn sheet'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.9 (talk) 09:39, 5 February 2018 (UTC)

Candidate for edit

This sentence in the intro is a good candidate for an edit: "The objective of the operation was a limited attack to secure Caen and the Bourguébus Ridge beyond, pinning German formations in the east flank of the Normandy beachhead." This asserts the objective is known, when in fact it is an open issue. It is inconsistent both to leave the info box as it is and also have this sentence as it is. DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:00, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Sources that argue these were not objectives of the operation?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:05, 25 August 2016 (UTC)

Analysis

This is something like what I have in mind,

In 2014, Buckley wrote that by the afternoon of 18 July, it was clear to Dempsey that Goodwood was going to have no great strategic effect; from 18–20 July, the British lost about 400 tanks (about 140 being write-offs). There was a drop in the morale of tank crews and the British and Canadians suffered about 5,500 casualties. The British had made tactical mistakes but the effect of the two operations drove the Germans back from Caen on the south bank of the Orne and I Corps captured ground to the east. The effort to pin down powerful German units in the east of the bridgehead had succeeded. When Operation Cobra began on 25 July, more than 600 German tanks, including all three Tiger battalions, faced the Second Army, leaving about 100 tanks opposite the First US Army. The Anglo-Canadian set-piece attacks in the east had ground down German units as they arrived in Normandy and by the end of July the German defence was close to collapse. Goodwood had inflicted significant losses on the Germans, the 12th SS Panzer Division having been reduced to 15 operational tanks and the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division being disbanded.

The morale of the German leadership in Normandy fell, already hit by the loss of Rommel, wounded in an air attack previous to Goodwood and the Bomb Plot on 20 July.

On 18 July, Sepp Dietrich wrote

The position has inevitably deteriorated, as we have lost a good deal of ground, this can only be to the enemy's advantage. I see their next effort as being crucial for them and us.

— Dietrich

and Eberbach wrote that

Daily losses by the divisions in a struggle which is terrible all the time are so great that in a short time their strength will be used up and it will be no longer possible to make good that strength.

— Eberbach

Buckley called Goodwood a success, a failure and neither; it had greatly increased the pressure on the Germans, causing them many casualties. The operation was part of the operational process that had begun in mid-June but had departed from the principles of the earlier attacks. Insufficient attention had been paid to the tactical implications of the changes, despite the first phase objectives, even after the constraints imposed by Montgomery on 15 July, being ambitious, taking the attackers beyond the range of artillery support.

Under the impression that Goodwood was a breakthrough attempt, Eisenhower was deeply disappointed that 7,000 long tons (7,100 t) of bombs had yielded 7 mi (11 km) of progress and a botched press-briefing by Montgomery late on 18 July was called "bloody stupid" by the senior 21st Army Group intelligence officer. The possibility that Montgomery faced the sack after Goodwood is an exaggeration but Churchill, Bradley and George Marshall began to harbour doubts about him and Tedder agitated for his removal. Brooke continued to support Montgomery and Buckley wrote that he was correct in his view that there was no-one better to replace him. Dempsey faced little criticism and later wrote that Montgomery took the credit for success and responsibility for failure, rather than scapegoat others.

After meeting with Eisenhower and being rebuked on 20 July, Montgomery wrote in his diary that he had contradicted the impression that the eastern flank was becoming quiet and the burden being passed off onto the First US Army. Montgomery also allowed a visit from Churchill and criticism abated slightly. In a new directive, Montgomery ordered pressure to be maintained along the front, which led to the "bungled" Operation Spring by the Canadians on 25 July and the transfer of the weight of the Second Army to the west, the new First Canadian Army headquarters taking over to the south-east of Caen. Six weeks of battle had led to the impression of stagnation, the desperation of the German commanders and the defence being on the brink of collapse, not being clearly known to Allied intelligence. American advances southwards since the capture of Cherbourg, had been slow and the Anglo-Canadian holding operation to the east, had resulted in only small gains of ground, despite extravagant firepower. Tactics had been intended to limit casualties but high infantry losses had occurred, leading to the attempt to substitute tanks for men. A week later the situation was transformed by the success of Operation Cobra.

References

Keith-264 (talk) 08:23, 24 August 2016 (UTC)

I'm generally against replacing sections wholesale, except where the previous version is beyond salvaging in any way. What specific problems are we attempting to fix here? --A D Monroe III (talk) 16:30, 26 August 2016 (UTC)

The fact that controversy exists over the objective(s) of this operation. I really have no opinion on whether this is the best way to do that. DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:34, 26 August 2016 (UTC)

Are both of you having a laugh? This is something like what I have in mind isn't a suggestion to dump the existing analysis, rather the lines of a comprehensive one, whatever the sources. I've looked at Blumenson who is exhaustive on the US operations in Normandy but clearly left narrative of Anglo-Canadian operations to the respective OHs, rather than duplicating them. (Excellent maps by the way.) I wouldn't use Blumenson as the main source for its lack of detail rather than inaccuracy or obsolescence and I wouldn't use Buckley exclusively either but as a summary of the events and later accounts it's fairly good. OK? Keith-264 (talk) 17:50, 26 August 2016 (UTC)

No, this isn't funny. Neither is this a WP:FORUM. I simply don't see where this is heading. --A D Monroe III (talk) 14:27, 27 August 2016 (UTC)

Have you had generic management training? Keith-264 (talk) 16:21, 27 August 2016 (UTC)

How is that a useful comment to make? Again, what problem is any of this addressing? If there is no response, I can't see this having any affect on the article, and the section should be closed per FORUM. --A D Monroe III (talk) 21:25, 27 August 2016 (UTC)

I think you're being disingenuous but just in case you aren't, we were discussing the analysis and my view that it is not sufficient. I offered an example paraphrased from Buckley and you began to make procedural objections. The discussion has not strayed into forum, far from it and I suggest you refresh your memory of WP:Gaming. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 21:43, 27 August 2016 (UTC)

It helps to AGF; making enemies won't build consensus.

All this analysis isn't something we can add to the article; it amounts to SYNTH. It in no way proves there isn't controversy, it only implies that there shouldn't be. I've already agreed there shouldn't be, but that doesn't change anything. No issue that needs to be fixed has been expressly identified. I literally don't see what all this discussion is trying to achieve. Can this be succinctly identified before we spend any more effort on this? --A D Monroe III (talk) 14:29, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

WP:Gaming I look forward to you setting a better example, it will make a refreshing change. Synth? Come off it, it's paraphrase. It doesn't deny that there was a controversy, it puts it in a historical context not available 52 years ago. In short, the analysis is crap, uses marginal sources and can easily be improved by sources that reflect scholarship since 1961. Is this too difficult to understand? (You're a generically trained manager aren't you? ;O)) Keith-264 (talk) 14:46, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

Thus far, and more sources will be added below as and when possible, three sources have been extensively quoted (excluding Buckley for the moment and the short snippets fron the US green book) and all say exactly what the objective of the operation were.

While opinion will be revised as more information comes to light, the impression thus far is that there has been a huge debate over nothing since the "controversy" stems from miscommunication between Second Army and SHAEF. This raises the question of what was the justification for removal of material from the article that sparked all this? EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:17, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

I didn't take exception to your header, I thought it was an attempt to inject some levity into the discussion. On a constructive note, I've been delving into D'Este who, despite writing a book that was well thought of when it was published, looks less impressive each time I look. That said he has views about Goodwood and devotes a chapter to the controversy.Keith-264 (talk) 16:50, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

D'Este was next on my list. I was looking through Colossal Cracks last night to see if there was any debate; in the limited time I had I found little.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:15, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

Further discussion

Even D'Este notes that the operation was scaled back from Dempsey's original idea, that the attack was limited, that the attack was not a breakout, and that the objectives were essentially what were in the infobox.

While I continue to preface my comments with the disclaimer that they are open to change pending new information, it does seem that everyone - thus far - is in agreement of what the operation was, and that the controversy arose afterwards over miscommunication between Second Army and SHAEF. I feel that we need some justification (i.e. sources) for the removal of the infobox now.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 23:42, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

Golly, that's a lot of effort devoted to killing off a nonexistent controversy. The lady doth protest too much, methinks. DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:31, 29 August 2016 (UTC)

What non-existent controversy? We're discussing the obsolete one.Keith-264 (talk) 18:23, 29 August 2016 (UTC)

@DMorpheus2:, @Keith-264:, and @A D Monroe III:: DMorpheus2 and Keith, I have moved your comments from below to here to try and keep all discussion together and separate from the quoted sources.

This whole debate was sparked by the removal of the infobox from the article on the understanding that what it stated was controversial. Both DMorpheus2 and Monroe have argued in the above discussions that the objective of the operation is either not known or controversial in nature. Thus far, several sources have been provided (in the above discussions and below) that all seem to indicate that this is not the case.

So, do we keep looking at sources to see what they say (despite it apparently being too much of a protest)? When do we reinsert the infobox into the article (since it accurately reflects what the sources looked at, thus far, say)? I would also argue that there is enough material there to further help Keith with his proposed (above) redraft of the Analysis section in regards to the controversy (i.e. the miscommunication and varying expectations of the operation) that resolved around the operation.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:18, 29 August 2016 (UTC)

I agree there is no good can come from people disagreeing with the goals of this operation after all this time. I agree that the walls-of-text SYNTH provided indicate the goals needn't be debated. I do not agree that any of this means anything to WP; we go by sources, only. We have sources stating a controversy about the goals occurred between the Allied leaders, during and after the war, and nothing about it being resolved, or in what way. The fact that some editors are still willing to put so much effort into "resolving" this indicates how it's still a subject of POVs.

And, even if it were not controversial, the objectives (as proposed) are too long and vague for any infobox. Items in infoboxes are for very quick summaries of basic, simple facts. This "fact" is just the sort of thing to leave out of an infobox -- not significant to the identification of the subject, and vague to the point of inaccuracy.

Added to this discussion are suggestions that the Aftermath section needs to be fixed. No one has specified what exactly is currently wrong with it. I cannot comment on an issue that hasn't been stated, much less agree with it.

This has been the same state since the beginning of this discussion. I welcome and will respond to anything succinctly addressing this points, but until then, I (at least) have more useful work to do. --A D Monroe III (talk) 01:02, 30 August 2016 (UTC)

Now hold on one minute, you cannot cause a crap storm and then state you have better things to do!

I would like to understand how you arrive at the conclusion that multiple RS all saying the same thing is somehow a breach of WP:Synth and still lack of support of what was in the article. How was a practically verbatim quote vague bordering on inaccurate?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 02:51, 30 August 2016 (UTC)

There is no synth, it's a red herring.

A talk page is the right place to claim that something in an article is SYNTH. The policy does not forbid inferences on talk pages that would be SYNTH if made in an article.

SYNTH is when two or more reliably-sourced statements are combined to produce a new thesis that isn't verifiable from the sources. Summary is necessary to reduce the information in lengthy sources to an encyclopedic length -- even when the information being summarized comes from multiple sources. It's not necessary to find a source that summarizes the information. As long as what's in the article is an accurate, neutral summary, and each of the statements is verified by an appropriate source, then the summary is also verified by the same sources. Summary is not forbidden by any Wikipedia policy. On the contrary, "coming up with summary statements for difficult, involved problems" has been described as "the essence of the NPOV process". [1]

Listing the comments in several sources to see what they say is the opposite of synth. I see no reason why we shouldn't replace the Analysis with the (suitably adapted) paraphrase of Buckley. Perhaps the controversy should be treated separately under a level 4 header? That way we can use the survey of sources to describe it and the way it has evolved since 1944. Hinsley's writing seems to contradict much of what was written until 1993. Keith-264 (talk) 07:42, 30 August 2016 (UTC)

It's just occurred to me that we could put See Aftermath section in the operations box too. Any objections? Keith-264 (talk) 07:55, 30 August 2016 (UTC)

Agree with both suggestions. I have never been happy with the tactical defeat in the infobox due to it being poorly sourced (my own fault), and linking to the aftermath section would be more informative following the suggested edits.

Should I continue to provide material below to help you out? Off the top of my head, I have yet to relook at Ellis, the 7th div history, and a few other sources that may shed additional info.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:13, 2 September 2016 (UTC)

Please do, I dusted down Daglish earlier to add.Keith-264 (talk) 17:19, 2 September 2016 (UTC)

Forgot about Daglish! The trouble of not being near the books. I'll get on that over the next few days.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:01, 2 September 2016 (UTC)

• Daglish OTB 2005

The principal goal of Goodwood was to make disengagement of the Panzer divisions from that sector unfeasible. That clarity of that simple goal has been clouded by debate as to whether Goodwood itself was a breakout attempt. Whatever his true intent, Montgomery certainly allowed his superiors (and many of his troops) to believe that a breakout was being attempted. But Montgomery's true intents are, as ever, hard to divine; in his accounts of the campaign, he consistently maintained that whatever happened was exactly what he had intended from the outset. (p. 14).

The storm of protest that followed the Goodwood battle.... Montgomery's enemies took every opportunity to criticise his failure to achieve a clean breakout. Eisenhower had been allowed to form the impression that Goodwood was to be a decisive breakthrough battle.... Montgomery had gone a step too far in his 18 July announcement.... But, as has been shown, the battle had made a deep impression on the German defenders of Normandy.... Strategically, Goodwood had contributed to the materiel and morale weakening of the German army in Normandy. Tactically, it had shown up British weaknesses and (a few at least) strengths.... Goodwood was a step in the honing of operational and tactical skills which would take [the British] to the Baltic. (pp. 204–206) Keith-264 (talk) 08:14, 9 September 2016 (UTC)

Sources, objectives, and controversy

• Wilmot (1997, original year 1951), The Struggle For Europe:

"...make such a demonstration of armour and air power on this flank that German attention, and therefore reserves, would be concentrated east of the Orne, just when the Americans were ready to break out west of the Vire." ... "From this request [for air power] Eisenhower and the staff at SHAEF seem to have assumed that the attacks by Dempsey and Bradly were similar in purpose." Wilmot then quotes Ike stating Goodwood was suppose to exploit towards the Seine and Paris. "One source of this misconcenption was the Operation Instruction issued on July 13th by Dempsey's Chief of Staff. This declared that VIII Corps would 'attack southwards and establish an Armd. Div. in each of the following areas: Bretteville-sur-Laize, Vilmont-Argences, Falaise.' It was this instruction which staff officers of Second Army took to England when they went to present the case for air support. The naming of Falise as one of the objectives es inevitably gave the impression that this attack ... was intended to achieve a clean break-through."(pp. 353-354)

On July 15th ... Montgomery gave O'Connor a personal memorandum which made his intention clear beyond dispute ..."

"1. Object of this operation

To engage the German armour in battle and write it down to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle. To gain a good bridgehead over the Orne through Caen and thus to improve our positions on the eastern flank. Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.

2. Effect of this operation on the Allied policy

We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas. A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank. But the eastern flank is a bastion on which the whole future of the campaign ... depends; if it were to become unstable, the operations on the western flank would cease. Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base."

"Montgomery then defined the task of VIII Corps: The three armoured divisions will be required to dominate the area Bourguebus-Vimont-Bretteville, and to fight and destroy the enemy. Bur armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise and spread despondency and alarm and discover the form."(p. 354)

Wilmot goes on to note Monty's "indiscreet to say the least" conference, on 18 July, which announced "Early this morning British and Canadian troops of the Second Army attacked and broke through into the area east of the Orne and south-east of Caen" caused a storm at SHAEF. Wilmot states Monty's extremely positive outlook on the operation cannot be seen as one of attempting to deceive the Germans, and can only "be explained ... if it is judged in relation to [his] strictly limited objective" as defined on 15 July. Wilmot suggests Monty's choice of words, break through, was essentially a faux pas. With all this taken into account, the early draft given to SHAEF along with the news conference, Tedder seized the opportunity to try and nail Monty and steered up trouble with Ike who flew into a rage about it.(p. 361) The following page, Wilmot suggests that it was further a misunderstanding of Goodwood's intentions by Ike reinforced by a difference of opinion on the strategic use of forces: Monty wanted single thrusts, whereas Ike wanted the entire line striking the Germans. All together, the generation of the controversy.

• Fraser (2002, original year 1983), And We Shall Shock Them:

"VIII Corps ... was to be driven south into the area of Vimont, St. Aignan de Cramesnil, Verrieres, astride the Caen-Faliase road. Such force, poised for further advance, would surely bring upon itself all available German armour, and produce that 'writing down' of German strength which Montgomery had enjoined Dempsey to achieve."(p. 333)

Fraser quotes Monty, who latter admitted in 1958 that he "was too exultant", who issued a statement late on 18 July stating the operation was thus far a complete success, that 11th Arm had reached Tilly, 7th was nearing La Hogue, the Guards had passed Cagny and had reached Vimont, and "Have ordered the armoured car regiments of each division, supported by armoured recce regiments to reconnoiter towards and secure the crossings over Dives, between Mezidon and Falise". Fraser comments "This seemed optimistic and was received with jubilation. But it was pure fantasy and set the scene for subsequent disappointment."(p. 335)

Fraser compares Monty's comments with those of the initial orders, dated 14 July, which Fraser argues does show an initial intention to reach further with the operation. However, he goes on to say:

Had a great victory been won in the area originally envisioned, "Such a victory would have so stretched the German defence that a breakout would have presumably been ready to exploit with Second Army... . The point illustrates a paradox already noted about Montgomery. He declared and reiterated post facto that what occurred was, in the main, what he had always intended: a very limited advance. ... It is true that Montgomery had no intention of letting Second Army overreach itself." He then quotes the 17 July orders. "He was determined at no time to expose the eastern sector of the beach-head to a major German counter-stroke. ... Nevertheless Montgomery, if his own words meant anything, must have at least envisaged more exciting possibilities - to be sternly eschewed unless genuinely arising, but possibilities nonetheless. To take full advantage of a situation if matters went unexpectedly well - rather than be hogtied by a previously formed concept - was surely good generalship, to be declared rather than disavowed. ... He retained the obsession even with hindsight and did himself an injustice thereby. He was a better general than autobiographer.(p.336)

However, Fraser goes on to say: "As to the tactical objects actually set to Dempsey - to 'dominate the area Bourguebus - Vimont - Bretteville and to write down the German armour the objective was certainly neither dominated nor reached." and "Montgomery's declared strateic am, however, was to attract or hold German Panzer divisions in the east. In this Goodwood was some extent successful."(p.336)

• D'Este (2204, original year 1983), Decision in Normandy:

"The fact was that Dempsey had become weary of the essentially defensive role his army had been playing and was now convinced that there was an alternative method whereby he could comply with Montgomery's instructions and still achieve far-reaching results. ... Dempsey proposed to Montgomery that the Second Army be permitted to make a breakthrough on the eastern flank .... Montgomery gave Dempsey permission to begin planning..."(p. 334)

• Weary? It's a rather crass form of the great man theory, almost as if he's twisting the sources to create a disagreement to have a protagonist and an antagonist. Keith-264 (talk) 23:58, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

"It cannot be over-emphasized that both before and after D-Day the Allied commanders were not thinking in terms of a 'breakout' except as it pertained to the seizure of Brittany. The phrase 'breakout' is one which was coined after the fact and is intended to describe the events later precipitated by Cobra."(p.350)

"Montgomery had written to Eisenhower on 12 July: 'Grateful if you will issue orders that the whole weight of the airpower is to be available on that to support my land battle ... My whole eastern flank will burst into flames on Saturday. The operation Monday may have far-reaching results". D'Este makes very clear that "The same thing had been said prior to Charnwood". Ike replied "with an equally exaggerated letter", in which Ike states "O'Connor's plunge into his vitals will be decisive."(p. 361)

• Makes Eisenhower's post facto anger seem a little contrived.Keith-264 (talk) 23:58, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

"...Montgomery was making crucial and unexpected alterations to the Goodwood plan. Dempsey's original operation order had been published on 13 July, but by the 15th Montgomery had ... radically changed the 8 Corps mission to that of establishing all three armoured divisions in the area, Bourguebus - Vimont - Bretteville-sur-laize."(p.364)

"Two things now happened which were to prove a later source of trouble. First, knowledge of Montgomery's new directive to Second Army was confined to those involved, and not even Main HQ, 21st Army Group was aware that there been a change in the plan. Second, a revised operational was issued by the Second Army on 17 July but the copy destined for SHAEF never arrived. Thus, as the fate for Goodwood drew near, SHAEF still believed that the main object of the operation was to capture Falaise." (p. 364)

• Hart (2007, original year 2000), Colossal Cracks:

"Historians have debated ever since what precisely this strategy [Monty's master plan] was and whether Montgomery stuck to it. Despite this considerable debate, this author is convinced that the contemporary evidence demonstrates that Montgomery always intended that the Second (British) Army would engage substantial German forces on the eastern flank to facilitate an American advance in the west. The Second (British) Army operational plan of 21 February 1944 stated that its task was to 'protect the flank of the US Armies while the latter captured Cherbourg, Angers, Nantes, and the Brittany ports' and indicated that 'there is no intention of carrying out a major advance' until 'the Brittany ports have been captured'. Similarly signalled de Guingand on 11 June 1944 that 'my general object is to pull the Germans on to Second Army so that First [US] Army can extend and expand'. Montgomery largely stuck to this broad plan and resisted pressure from the Americans, and from Dempsey in Goodwood to radically alter this conception.(pp. 76-77)

"In Normandy, Montgomery sent Kit Dawnay to the War Office before Goodwood to clarify his intentions during this operation: 'Having broken out in country southeast of Caen,' Montgomery had 'no intention of rushing madly eastwards,' which would extend and hence weaken the security of Second Army's flank. Montgomery's request to O'Connor during Goodwood that he maintain both thrustfulness from the armor and the security of this eastern flank left the corps commander caught between two stools; the shortage of infantry that resulted from not taking risks with the security of this flank contributed to the failure of the attack. Even on 11 August 1944, with the German front close to collapse, Montgomery remained as concerned to hold a secure eastern flank as to exploit the imminent German disintegration."(p. 91)

"Indeed, the nationally orientated historical debate that raged during the 1950s and 1960s served both to increase these confusions rather than clarify them and to hinder objective analyses of Montgomery's generalship not excessively focused on his personality." (p. 128)

• The national bias suggests a shallow base of sources, reliant on memoir literature.Keith-264 (talk) 23:58, 28 August 2016 (UTC)

"...Goodwood - an attack for which Dempsey, privately, appears to have entertained the highest hopes for a decisive British breakout." (p.134) Hart also notes that a Brigadier Richardson studied the option of a British breakout, Operation Lucky Strike, but Montgomery would not allow such a deviation from his strategy and likewise was why he revised Goodwood. (p. 133)

• Buckley (2006, original year 2004), British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944:

"Montgomery initially approved [Dempsey's initial design] at a meeting with Dempsey on 12 July, only to clip its wings a little on 15 July, when he met with O'Connor and Dempsey. The prospect of real exploitation beyond the Bourguebus Ridge was downplayed to reconnaissance by armoured cars which would 'spread alarm and despondency and ... discover the form'. Only if the situation developed much in VIII Corps' favour would there be the option to 'crack about' as Montgomery put it. It is clear that although Dempsey's optimism had been dampened a little by his immediate commander, and that the expectation was not for a breakout but a writing down of German strength, the 2nd Army commander still harboured hopes for a decisive penetration of the German defences. At the very least, Goodwood was to be a major multi-corps operation involving the use of massed strategic bombers and political expectations were therefore high." (p. 34)

• Hinsley

On the night of 15/16 July Ultra showed that the Germans expected another Second Army attack but not east of the Orne and that it would by synchronised with an invasion between the Seine and the Somme. Some generals wanted a counter-offensive in Normandy but Kluge preferred to wait, until Allied intentions for the force waiting in England were revealed. Allied withdrawals of airborne troops from Normandy apparently foreshadowing another landing from 18–20 July were detected. On 16 July the preliminary operations were known to have deceived the Germans, Sperrle signalling that troop concentrations from Caen to Tilly (sur Seulles) showed the location of the offensive. Goodwood achieved tactical surprise shown by a decrypt of Jagdkorps II (JK II) operations being directed west of the Orne, until redirected by Luftflotte 3 late in the afternoon. Sigint had showed accurately the amount of infantry, anti-tank and tanks east of the Orne. Hinsley 1994 p. 501.

After Goodwood, the Germans expected another attack and moved the 9th SS Panzer Division from Evrecy, the 2nd Panzer Division from Caumont and the 116th Panzer and 271st Infantry divisions from north of the Seine. The Germans also anticipated and attack in the west by the First US Army, expected it to succeed but sent no reinforcements. From 22–25 July, Ultra decrypts kept the Allies informed of the German OOB and the expectation of another attack east of the Orne. The LXXXIV and II Parachute Corps were known to have been severely damaged in the fighting for St Lo and their commanders did not think they could withstand another attack. Hinsley 1994 p. 505Keith-264 (talk) 12:31, 30 August 2016 (UTC)

Seems that D'Este et al. were wrong about the effect of Goodwood maintaining the Normandy strategy of diverting the Germans from the westenders. Keith-264 (talk) 18:23, 29 August 2016 (UTC)

Montgomery states:

"My master plan for the land battle in Normandy I have described already. Briefly, it was so to stage and conduct operations that we drew the main enemy strength on to the front of the Second British Army on our eastern flank, in order that we might the more easily gain territory in the west and make the ultimate break-out on that flank - using the First American Army for the purpose. If events on the western flank were to proceed rapidly it meant that we must make quick territorial gains there.

On the eastern flank, in the Caen sector, the acquisition of ground was not so pressing; the need there was by hard fighting to make the enemy commit his reserves, so that the American forces would meet less opposition in their advances to gain territory which was vital on the west.

In this master plan we were greatly assisted by the immense strategic importance of Caen. It was a vital road and rail centre through which passed the main routes leading to our lodgement area from the east and south-east. As the bulk of the German mobile reserves were located north of the Seine, they would have to approach our bridgehead from the east and would thus converge on Caen. To the south-east, between Caen and Falaise, was good ground for airfields. I was convinced that strong and persistent offensive action in the Caen sector would achieve our objective of drawing the enemy reserves on to our eastern flank: this was my basic conception. From the beginning it formed the basis of all our planning. Once on shore and firmly established, I began to get this strategy working and after the heavy battles in the Caen area, and the overrunning of the Cherbourg peninsular, it began to take shape.

I never once had cause or reason to alter my master plan. Of course we did not keep to the times and phase lines we had envisaged for the benefit of administrative planning, and of course, too, we didn't hesitate to adjust our plans and dispositions to the tactical situation as it developed - as in all battles. Of course we didn't. I never imagined we would. But the fundamental design remained unchanged; it was to that that I pinned my hopes and clung so resolutely, despite increasing opposition from the fainter-hearted. We did not capture Caen, for instance, till the 10th July and we did not finally clear the eastern suburbs till the 20th July. It had been my original intention to secure the high ground between Caen and Falaise as early as possible, as being a suitable area for the construction of airfields; but this was not vital, and when I found it could not be done in accordance with the original plan without suffering unjustified casualties, I did not proceed with that venture. This was not popular with the Air Command.

It was indeed a fundamental object of my strategy on the eastern flank to establish a force strong in armour to the south-east of Caen in the area about Bourguebus; this was the key to ensuring that we kept the bulk of the German armour on the eastern flank, and thus helped the American expansion on the west. We did not get on to this high ground until Second Army launched Operation GOODWOOD on the 18th July, with armoured forces. As soon as the armoured advance came to a standstill because of determined enemy resistance, and also because heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud, I decided to abandon that thrust. Many people thought that when GOODWOOD was staged, it was the beginning of the plan to break out from the eastern flank towards Paris, and that because I did not do so, the battle had been a failure. But let me make the point again at the risk of being wearisome. There was never at any time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic conception were responsible for much trouble between British and American personalities."

The original COSSAC plan called for a breakout from the Caen-Falaise area on the eastern flank. Montgomery hadn't liked this plan so he had changed it.

"All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed."

"By the middle of July there developed a growing impatience on the part of the Press; it appeared to them that stagnation gripped our lodgement area. Bradley's first attempt at the break-out, made towards Coutances early in July had failed. Then came Operation GOODWOOD in the Caen section and the Press regarded this as an attempt to break out on the eastern flank; and as such, that operation too, appeared to have failed. This was partly my own fault, for I was too exultant at the Press conference I gave during the GOODWOOD battle. I realise that now - in fact, I realised it pretty quickly afterwards. Basically the trouble was this - Both Bradley and I agreed that we could not possibly tell the Press the true strategy" [to draw off the enemy reserves onto the British sector] "which formed the basis of all our plans. As Bradley said, 'We must grin and bear it.' It became increasingly difficult to grin."

"The enemy had attempted to 'rope us off' in the 'bocage' country some 15 to 20 miles inland from the assault area. For a time this policy was successful; but it was only successful by a continuous expenditure of reserves to plug holes in his defences and at a heavy cost in men and materials. These enemy reserves prevented any substantial gain on our part east and south of Caen, but in doing this they were not available to counter the thrusts on the western flank. In short, they were being committed. As at Alamein, we had forced the enemy to commit his reserves on a wide front; we were now ready to commit ours on a narrow front, and so win the battle."

In short, it would seem that although deemed to be of immense importance to both the German defenders, and to some of the Allied High Command, Caen was considered by Montgomery himself merely as being a convenient place in-which to tie-down the German Panzer divisions, and its reserves, and to destroy them. The airfields that were deemed so important to Coningham, were deemed desirable by Montgomery, but not essential.

So GOODWOOD whilst not achieving what many of the critics thought it was meant to achieve, nevertheless did serve its purpose as fas as Montgomery was concerned. It forced the Germans to keep sending, and then using up, their panzer reserves in the area around Caen and thereby prevented these reserves being deployed in the west against Bradley and his Americans.

The confusion and controversy that has since arisen is due to Montgomery's critics judging his actions in terms of tactics, where he himself was actually operating using strategy.

And it would not surprise me if his other 'failed' operations coincided almost exactly with ULTRA reports of impending transfer of German forces from around the Caen area to be then sent to the west, and on to face Bradley. But that's just a guess.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.187 (talk) 11:53, 30 August 2016 (UTC)

References

I'm not sure where I'm supposed to respond amongst all these walls-of-text. I'm also not sure how stating things in bold makes them more true. It does make seem like it's demanding a response, though -- so I will.

Look, we all know the common process of adding stuff to WP: If I want to add a paragraph to any article, each statement I make (sentence or two or whatever) should be followed by a ref, citing a larger work, where my statement is an obvious and simple summary of the cited part of the work -- so obvious and simple that it isn't questioned. If, instead, I need additional explanation about how my statement is supported by the source, then that by definition is SYNTH. That doesn't mean the statement is wrong, it just means I need to do additional work to find more direct links between my statements and sources before I can add them to the article.

How else is any editor supposed to respond to all the above? Maybe we can say "yeah, I think that way too", but that doesn't get it closer to actually getting in the article. Maybe we can join in and add our own twists on the ideas, but that's really just deeper into FORUM. There's been a lot of effort put into this, but where is it going? What are the specific changes, with what specific cites (that do not need any explanation)? --A D Monroe III (talk) 19:40, 3 September 2016 (UTC)

I'm tired of your captious carping and gaming; if you have nothing constructive to add, then I suggest that you watch from the sidelines and make your views known when edits are made to the article. Keith-264 (talk) 20:01, 3 September 2016 (UTC)

GAMING requires a lack of good faith as a motivation. Addressing editors instead of possible edits is not constructive. So far, nothing here proposes anything article-worthy. Is there something along that line? --A D Monroe III (talk) 17:06, 5 September 2016 (UTC)

I refer you to my comments above. Keith-264 (talk) 17:25, 5 September 2016 (UTC)

Am sorry Monroe, but your comments do appear to be lacking good faith. You removed information from the article based off your perception that a controversy surrounds the objectives of the operation. You have not backed that up with a source. Numerous sources have been presented that state very clearly what the objectives of the operation were, and that the controversy has more to do with what the perception of the operation rather than on what the actual orders were (and thus what the objectives were). You have responses have included that these sources amount to beaches of WP:SYNTH and walls of useless text. Your latest comment: "nothing here proposes anything article-worthy". How does RS stating what exactly the operation was, somehow become nothing article-worthy? It is hard to AGF, when it appears that anything that does not meet your opinion of the operation should not be included.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:42, 5 September 2016 (UTC)

The "walls-of-text" mentioned above are mostly direct quotes from Montgomery's memoirs (with page references) and as he was in command of the relevant forces his words carry more weight than those of his subordinates, or of his critics, who for the most part, were not in a position to know what he intended.

The 'controversy' only exists because of certain people who were wrong in their assumptions, or who received misleading information from others, who were themselves wrong. Many of these took press releases at face value when it ought to be fairly obvious to everyone that press releases could be read and heard by anyone, including the enemy, and so such releases might not be entirely accurate.

The only persons who knew what Montgomery intended was Montgomery himself, and whoever he chose to confide in at the time, e.g., Bradley.

... and one of the most noticeable things about Montgomery's then-contemporary critics is that they could not keep their mouths shut. Much of their criticism ended up on the front pages of newspapers, which could also be read by the enemy. Just as well Montgomery never revealed to the critics his true strategy, or that may well have ended up there as well.

Luckily the erroneous criticism spread all over the front pages suited Montgomery just fine. It reinforced the German defender's view that they were doing the right thing.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.11.216 (talk) 10:18, 9 November 2017 (UTC)

Recent edits

I really do thing that the big addition to the Analysis adds noting but verbiage to what was a succinct piece. To avoid 3RR I won't delete again but really, come on.....Keith-264 (talk) 21:04, 9 January 2018 (UTC)

It's pretty badly written too. Hopefully the editor in question will respect WP:BRD. (Hohum ^@) 21:14, 9 January 2018 (UTC)

If it is badly written then state where. Do you know what it is saying? Do you know what it is adding?

I get the distinct impression you do not. I will not tolerate a revert because you think so. 94.5.30.223 (talk) 22:12, 9 January 2018 (UTC)

Most of the wording is awkward. Your WP:BATTLEFIELD attitude is also not helpful. Your current revert is a violation of WP:3RR. Please revert yourself, abide by WP:BRD and try and gain consensus for your edit, instead of pointless handwaving. (Hohum ^@) 23:25, 9 January 2018 (UTC)

It is not violating anything at all. It is all referenced. It was reverted a few times without any proper explanation. If the writing is awkward then state where. It is easy to do so. IF you do not understand the point(s) then ask. I sense attitude. I don't need consensus, just what people see is wrong and and tell me. I see a wikipedia ganging up here. BTW, the article as a whole is poor for sure. 94.5.30.223 (talk) 23:50, 9 January 2018 (UTC)

I have to agree, it is wrote poorly. That is something that can be improved, however. More importantly, the introduced text was a mixture of what appeared to be original research and using reliable sources to come to unsupported conclusions. Much work is needed. As for the whole article being poor, please highlight where so it can be improved.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:35, 10 January 2018 (UTC)

The trouble with any Normandy article is that there are lots of books but many of them are derivative hackwork full of gossip and melodrama instead of analysis from primary sources. If 94.5 wants to improve the article I suggest that he asks more experienced editors why some sources are deprecated. Enigma and I have been associates for years after collaborating with others to improve the Normandy articles but Hohum is most certainly his own man and doesn't answer to either of us. The article is B class which isn't poor but means that it can be better. B Class

• B1. It is suitably referenced, and all major points have appropriate inline citations.
• B2. It reasonably covers the topic, and does not contain obvious ominie or more sections of content.
• B4. It is free from major grammatical errors.
• B5. It contains appropriate supporting materials, such as an infobox, images, or diagrams.Keith-264 (talk) 08:46, 10 January 2018 (UTC)

I know how to do it, that is pretty obvious, thank you. I will rewrite a little and put it back in. All is sourced. Your opinion of the quality of the source is irrelevant. Your first change was saying "pin down the Germans" was not in the quoted text. It was....and you want me to to take you seriously? The first editor to change the text didn't know what he was doing, now another. No wonder it is called childrens-pedia and lacks credibility. The point(s) I made were clear, do you know what point(s) I was making? 94.5.30.223 (talk) 10:38, 10 January 2018 (UTC)

I'm not advocating any point of view but I predict that if you flood the article with sources that advert to the great man theory of history, you will be reverted because it's already been covered with the prominence that it deserves. The vexed question of what Goodwood was supposed to achieve became controversial the day it began and has been a political football ever since. The article contains a description of what the sources say and the way that these writers and historians have changed their views, as primary sources and official secrets have been revealed. Bradley was Monty's subordinate, not his judge, Tedder was Eisenhower's deputy and angry that Monty put one over on him by getting the strategic bombers under false pretences. None of these people are reliable because of conflicts of interest and subsequent revelations about how it really was. I suggest you keep the wah! and yah boo! comments to yourself WP:Civil. As I pointed out earlier, Enigma can think for himself, Hohum isn't part of any cabal involving me and I'm too vain to participate in one that would have me. You might try asking for opinion on the milhist noticeboard Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Military history or approaching User:Anotherclown, User:Hawkeye7 or User:AustralianRupert etc for an informal look at these exchanges, if you think you are being reverted for unfair reasons. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 12:21, 10 January 2018 (UTC)

94.5.30.223 wrote: "Your opinion of the quality of the source is irrelevant..." Well I certainly disagree with this at least (although I'm out of my depth in terms of content). Personal opinions of editors about sources where based on the interpretation of relevant Wikipedia policy in good faith absolutely are relevant and should be discussed. Just because something is sourced does not automatically entitle it to inclusion by any stretch. Ultimately it comes down to editorial judgment, consensus (built through discussions on the talk page), and policy. Wikipedia:Identifying reliable sources is probably a good place to start if you wish to read more about this. Anotherclown (talk) 12:40, 10 January 2018 (UTC)

Operation Goodwood was a part of the whole Overlord plan for the British to "pin down the Germans" as General Bradley stated, in which it succeeded in doing, allowing Operation Cobra to succeed. As a result, American armies in Normandy performed primarily an infantry role as US tanks rarely engaged German tanks (https://tankandafvnews.com/2015/01/27/zaloga_interview/).

No where in the source provided, does the phrase "pin down the Germans" appear; Goodwood does not crop up; Cobra does not appear in the context you provided. If I cannot find it in the source provided, one has to assume that any other reader cannot either. What this appears to be is your own conclusions drawn up, with a random source attached.

The above also implies that Goodwood was part of the pre-invasion plan, when it was in fact drawn-up on 14 July. If Goodwood fell into the over-arching master plan is another matter, which the above quote does not necessarily describe before meandering off another unrelated subjects.

In regards to the Americans serving a primarily infantry role in Overlord (which has what exactly to do with this article or assessing Goodwood?) Zaloga comments "But in the case of both German Panzer divisions they didn’t see much fighting against US tank forces, they were fighting mostly against US infantry and tank destroyers and they took significant losses." That is a far cry from the position you propose, and ignores the heavy US infantry-armor co-operation seen throughout the campaign. However, to reiterate, what does any of that have to do with the scope of this article?

If you want to be taken seriously, you will accept feedback and engage without the ad hominem attacks.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:01, 10 January 2018 (UTC)

The aims of Goodwood

Monty's plan was not for British forces to take territory. He specifically wanted to draw in German armour onto British forces to grind them up to keeping them away from the US forces for them to break out (Operation Cobra). That was even stated at St.Paul's school in Fulham in the planning, but low key so as not to lower British soldiers morale. To do that Monty was confident British armour could match German armour - US armour would struggle or most likely be overwhelmed. A 12 mile sector around Caen saw more concentrated German armour in all of WW2. Goodwood was not British forces taking territory, as the plan was for the US forces to do that, Monty specifically states this here in this link in an interview with Edward R Murrow. Transcript....

"The acquisition of territory on the eastern flank of the beachhead in the Caen sector was not really important. What was important there was to draw the maximum number of German divisions, and especially the armour, into that flank. The acquisition of territory was important on the western flank [the US sector]." ...."an accusation drawn at me, that I ought to have taken Caen in the programme on D-Day! And we didn't. I didn't mind about that because....The air force would get very het up because I didn't go further down towards Falaise and get the ground suitable for airfields. I didn't bother about that, it would have meant enormous casualties in doing it and it wasn't necessary."

"I could reply to that criticism that on the American front the line from which the breakout was finally launched was a line the St.Lo-Periers road, should have been captured in the initial plan by the American 1st Army on D-Day plus 5, that was the 11th June. But they didn't actually capture it until the 18th July. But I have never returned the charge with that accusation. ...until now"

"I have never understood why Ike said in his dispatches that, when the British failed to break out towards Paris on the eastern flank. The Americans were able [to break out], because of our flexibility, to take it on, on our western flank. I have always thought that was an unfair criticism of Dempsey and the 2nd British Army."

- Field Marshall Montgomery (1959)

The RAF chief Tedder, wanted Monty fired as he wanted open territory to the south towards Falaise to setup his airfields saying Monty was not pursing territory aggressively enough. Monty would have none of it. Operation Goodwood was engaging the massed armoured German defences drawing them in to British lines, grinding them up moving slowly. Here is a 1970s objective British Army Sandhurst internal video analysing Operation Goodwood, with even German commanders who were there taking part. At the beginning it specifically states Monty told Generals O'Connor and Dempsey not to run south to Falaise, not to take territory. Look at 6 mins: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udW1UvSHXfY

Monty was not too concerned with Caen as it would consume too many resources to take. He was more concerned with grinding up German armour in the field and acting as a decoy for the American armies to break out. Although by the time of Goodwood only the southern suburbs of Caen were in German hands.

Monty was in charge of all of Operation Overlord. He wanted the German armour away from US forces, to allow them to break out. It worked. That is what he wanted and planned. Monty never saw Caen as important but never criticised US forces..... until 1959 when they were at him about Caen, he criticised them for taking St.Lo a month late - with little German armour around for a month. The Germans did eventually send some armour to St.Lo with the US forces making it worse for themselves to capture the place.

Even Bradley agreed with Monty. Bradley wrote that:

"The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we [the Americans] were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded".

At Goodwood's the Germans had five lines of dug-in anti-tank defence and heavy Tiger and fast Panther tanks for mobility. Goodwood was mostly 'not' bocage but open ground more suitable for tank battles, where the German long range 88mm's would be at an advantage. Caen saw the densest concentration of German armour ever seen in WW2. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front. There was not 8 panzer divisions within 12 miles.

There were EIGHT Panzer Divisions in the Caen sector by end of June 1944. Monty had no option but to engage them head on and also draw in their reserves. The Germans kept sending more and more panzer divisions around the Caen area as June progressed and into July. The panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area:

• 21st Panzer Division - 117 Panzer IVs.
• Panzer Lehr Division - 101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers.
• 2nd Panzer Division - 89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers.
• 116th Panzer Division - 73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers. (In reserve just behind the front).
• 1st SS Panzer Division - 98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers.
• 9th SS Panzer Division - 40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers.
• 10th SS Panzer Division - 38 Stugs, 39 Panzer IVs.
• 12th SS Panzer Division - 98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers.
• Tiger Battalion SS101 - 45 Tigers.
• Tiger Battalion SS102 - 45 Tigers.
• Tiger Battalion 503 - 45 Tigers.

Source. Bernages Panzers and the Battle For Normandy and Zetterling's Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness.

Subsequently the US forces hardly met German armour in Normandy, performing mainly an infantry role, with most German armour being eliminated by British forces. 94.5.30.223 (talk) 11:31, 10 January 2018 (UTC)

Hitler initially committed his panzer forces to what became Goodwood issuing a 'No withdrawal' order that he was subsequently forced to rescind, when the SS Hitler Jugend division division, which had arrived some time later in the battle, had been almost annihilated, and with the same process occurring to the Panzer Lehr, he also reluctantly allowed their withdrawal too.

The claims of the participants are primary sources and should be used with caution. Wiki prefers secondary sources, with a tendency to favour newer ones because they can incorporate new information. WP:SCHOLARSHIP

• Articles should rely on secondary sources whenever possible. For example, a review article, monograph, or textbook is better than a primary research paper. When relying on primary sources, extreme caution is advised: Wikipedians should never interpret the content of primary sources for themselves. See Wikipedia:No original research and Wikipedia:Neutral point of view.

  Keith-264 (talk) 13:31, 10 January 2018 (UTC)

The people mentioned in the linked YouTube video as primary sources are in fact speaking within an official MoD Army Department documentary (classified as 'Restricted') and this in itself is a secondary source.

• Part one here: [2]

Presumably if the linked documentary on Goodwood hadn't been historically accurate the Army would not have used it for educational purposes. The film was made by Gerard Holdsworth Productions, Holdsworth himself had previously been in SOE. Contributors to the above documentary include "Pip" Roberts and Hans von Luck.

"The object of this operation [i.e., Goodwood] is:

• ... to engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.

• ... to gain a good bridgehead over the Orne through Caen and thus to improve our positions on the eastern flank.

• ... Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel." - from a personal memo sent from Montgomery to Dempsey and O'Connor on July 15th. It was sent to countermand Dempsey's orders for an advance on Bretteville-sur-Laize, Vilmont-Argences, and Falaise.

This quote is from the linked documentary, Part 1.

"My discussion yesterday with the commanders in the Caen sector, has afforded regrettable evidence that in face of the enemy's complete command of the air, there is no possibility of our finding a strategy which will counterbalance its truly annihilating effect, unless we give up the field of battle. In spite of our intense efforts the moment has drawn near when this front, already so heavily strained, will break, and once the enemy is in open country an orderly command will be hardly practicable in view of the insufficient mobility of our troops. I consider it my duty to bring these conclusions to your notice Mein Fuhrer, in good time" - Von Kluge - from a signal sent to Hitler on the day Goodwood ended.

... and the above quote is taken from the linked documentary, Part 3d.

The films were originally shown to the troops of the BAOR.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.9 (talk) 11:05, 4 February 2018 (UTC)

Several writers mention army views on Goodwood and pooh-pooh them for the usual failing of using a win-lose paradigm during an attrition battle, masturbating over the fanciful stories of Kurt Meyer and moaning about lack of "doctrine". Keith-264 (talk) 14:51, 4 February 2018 (UTC)

Most of the critics will never face an angry man in battle nor command an army, and in fact many of Montgomery's contemporary critics were safe back home in England. Their views are mostly worthless. Much of the criticism seems to be based on resentment due to not being told everything. Un-informed or ill-informed criticism is generally not worth anything. Any fool can be a critic.

One suspects that if the Army views on Goodwood were deserving of being 'pooh-poohed' the army would not have gone to the expense of commissioning a film and then showing it to BAOR troops on the front line in West Germany whose job it would be to delay any Soviet advance (God forbid) into the West. Presumably the MoD/Army Department (and NATO) considered these troops of sufficient importance not to want them to be misled by erroneous information or distorted, 'massaged', history intended to entertain and flatter the intended audience rather than inform them.

'Doctrine' is all very well but it is to some extent dependent on the opposition allowing you to use it and stick to it. Often the enemy will not be so co-operative. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.9 (talk) 08:48, 5 February 2018 (UTC)

I watched the documentary many years ago before the arise of YouTube. Glad to see that it is now easily accessible for wider viewing. With that said, it is both a Primary and Secondary source. When you have people stating what their experience was, what their opinion was, then regardless of the format that particular moment is a primary source.

As is the danger of using primary sources on the wiki, you have already indicated a prime example. You started this section off with that the British did not want to take ground but rather write down the German armor. The very first interview with Pip contradicts your argument, yet you have only quoted the parts that support you. He stated that he had "no knowledge of the memo" at the time, which had been passed around 21st AG (the one that is already referenced in the article that declares Goodwood to be a limited attack), and that his "first objective was to establish ourselves on the high ground ... after that ... we might be able to exploit further to the south." I.e. Pip, in reflecting on his role in the battle, believed he had to capture territory and exploit south (towards Falaise one would imagine, based off the original plan ... also referenced in the article).

So, we have established thus far, that additional sources already support what is in the article:

Detailed planning began on Friday 14 July but the next day, Montgomery issued a written directive ordering Dempsey to change the plan from a "deep break-out" to a "limited attack".[54][55] Anticipating that the Germans would be forced to commit their armoured reserves, rather than risk a massed British tank breakthrough, VIII Corps was instructed to "engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans".[56]

So, what exactly is the point of this discussion?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:02, 6 February 2018 (UTC)

A final note, completely dismissing civilian historians or critics because they "will never face an angry man in battle nor command an army" is completely baseless and foolhardy to the highest degree. It is thanks to the work of many civilian historians that we have the wealth of knowledge about the war. I do not recall John Buckley or David French (both of whom are leading examples of modern historians tackling the revisionism that has surrounded the British Army for the last few decades) as being ex-squaddies; "Un-informed or ill-informed criticism is generally not worth anything. Any fool can be a critic"; quite.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:07, 6 February 2018 (UTC)

Montgomery was the ground commander and so is the only one in a position to know what he intended, and as-such all the other speculation, both contemporary, and post-war, is mere hearsay or inference from paperwork written in less than ideal conditions, at a time when events were fluid.

Many of the historians weren't there and so much of their information is second-hand, Montgomery was there, and what is more, kept notes and briefing documents.

Roberts may well not have known about Montgomery's memo to Dempsey, there was no reason for him to know, he (Roberts) was there to carry out Dempsey's instructions, not to be privy to all signals that went between Montgomery and Dempsey. Roberts was in a tank or other vehicle at the time, and so unless he personally visited Dempsey most if not all his communications would have been by wireless that the Germans could intercept.

What people other than Montgomery thought the battle was intended to achieve is immaterial, it is what the ground commander intended that counts. Montgomery's memoirs were published as far back as 1958 and it would seem that a good number of so-called historians posses an aversion to actually reading them, whilst the few that do seem to automatically assume he was a liar.

If you want to know what happened at a particular time you read accounts written by the people who were actually there, of all ranks and positions, and from both sides, bearing in mind what, with hindsight, it was possible for them to know at the time. Montgomery was ground commander and so his account of what he intended trumps everyone else's, however unsatisfactory that may be to some, historians or not.

The 'point of all this' is to show that what other people thought at the time, or since, is immaterial to the conduct of the battle that was fought, and that most of the views contrary to Montgomery's - who was actually in command at the time - were the result of insufficient information, whether accidental or deliberate, or for other reasons people may best be left to work out for themselves.

... or, to put all this more succinctly, if you want to know the name of the tune being played you ask the organ grinder - not the monkey.

BTW, Montgomery's manuscript to his Memoirs was read and checked ('for balance and accuracy') before publication by E. T. Williams, James Grigg, and Arthur Bryant. Williams was Montgomery's Chief Intelligence Officer for the relevant period.

... I nearly forgot, most historians don't have their own lives, or the lives of others, being dependent on themselves, the historians, being right. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.9 (talk) 11:07, 7 February 2018 (UTC)

That was a lot of waffle to dismiss every historian (again, whom we are indebted for our understanding of the past). I suppose we should do away with the profession since Monty wrote his memoirs. After all, there it is in black and white. How DARE anyone else say otherwise. I don't suppose Monty's own bias has factored into your thoughts? He wrote his opinion of the battle, years afterwards; opinions change, events and views are reconciled, egos protected. This is why PS are to be used sparingly within the wiki, to avoid one persons skewered interpretation over the weight of professional's SC. Otherwise, we might as well and go delete all the historians opinions from the Market Garden article as the operation was a "90 per cent success" - per Monty.

It is also a lot of waffle that misses the simple point, the orders wrote for the operation exist in SC and have been integrated into the article to describe the operation in the light you have so argued (with no need) for. We should not gut an article of reliable sources, including those referencing the memo, and replace it with: none of that matters, because Monty said so!EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:04, 7 February 2018 (UTC)

The point I was trying to make was that Montgomery was (and still is) the only person who knew what his intentions were, unless the other people giving their contrary opinions happened to be mind readers.

... and that unlike the later historians, Montgomery was in the position to have to gamble other men's lives on he, himself, being right. Historians OTOH can write whatever they like, correct or incorrect, and for the most part, very few people give a damn. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.30.162.158 (talk) 11:00, 15 February 2018 (UTC)

You are quite correct, Monty was the only person who knew what his true intentions were. That does not provide evidence that his own memoirs is the only trusted source on the subject. Monty can "write whatever [he wants], correct or incorrect, and for the most part, very few people give a damn." Not to mention, being responsible for the gambling away of lives has zero impact on analyzing what primary sources say ... you know, like the memo that is already cited in the article; the one that outlines exactly what Goodwood was and rendered this whole discussion rather pointless...EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:50, 16 February 2018 (UTC)

I was merely trying to point out that for his critics, contemporary or otherwise, arguing over Montgomery's intentions is logically-unsound and actually rather foolish.

... rather like me asking someone to think of a number and then arguing with them over the number they thought.

... on the basis of this possibly few of his critics were the sort of men likely to have been found wandering around Bethlehem in the middle of the night, c. 1 AD.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.55.111 (talk) 19:28, 21 March 2018 (UTC)

"The RAF chief Tedder, wanted Monty fired as he wanted open territory to the south towards Falaise to setup his airfields saying Monty was not pursing territory aggressively enough." - perhaps someone should have reminded Tedder that his air forces were there to support Montgomery's ground forces, not the other way round. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.127 (talk) 09:22, 22 January 2019 (UTC)

Below is a quote from Bradley, presumably from his memoirs, unfortunately I don't have a page number:

"While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty’s primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.

In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents, however, had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the German by diverting him toward Caen from the Cotentin, we would have also given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.

But while this diversion of Monty’s was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasising the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure at Caen. For Monty’s success should have been measured in the panzer divisions the enemy rushed against him whilst Collins sped on toward Cherbourg. Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clammered for a place name called Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them.

The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realise that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied world crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forbearing." - Omar Bradley

Bradley's memoirs were published in 1951, Montgomery's in 1958. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.53.142 (talk) 09:34, 8 June 2019 (UTC)

The article isn't bad, but it could perhaps make clearer that Goodwood and Cobra were intended as a joint operation launched on the same day. Cobra was held up because the US 29th Division didn't get St Lo till 18 July, and the thunderstorms that ended Goodwood then ruled out the air support necessary for Cobra, so the US operation jumped off a week late.

Even so, it's clear that, after the 10 July meeting in Monty's map caravan, Bradley went off to plan Cobra and Dempsey went off to plan Goodwood. Dempsey hoped he could make a big breakthrough to Falaise, but, given the number and strength of German formations standing in the way, Monty on 15 July limited Goodwood's objectives to Bourguebus Ridge with armoured-car exploitation south of there if all went well. Eisenhower seems to have got carried away with the idea that Goodwood would be a fatal blow. But the Germans had the same thought, which is why they threw everything including the kitchen sink into stopping Goodwood, to the great benefit of Cobra -- which suited Monty's overall plan.

The article fails to explain that Goodwood bogged down on the second German defence line because the B-24s of US Eighth Air Force, briefed to bomb that line with large numbers of 100lb and 20lb bombs (to replicate the effects of 5.5-inch and 25-pounder artillery), missed their targets and bombed all over the place, up to six miles long. The few bombs on target merely gave the Germans advance notice of the ultimate first-day objectives. The RAF and the Marauders and Havocs of US Ninth Air Force did their job well, but the lead bombardiers of Eighth Air Force simply couldn't pick their targets out from the map and their effort was wasted. This was critical because the targets were beyond the range of the British artillery in the bridgehead. So, around midday, 11th Armoured Division ran on to an unbroken line of enemy tanks and guns. Khamba Tendal (talk) 19:09, 7 November 2019 (UTC)

Found a reference for the above, not surprisingly Ellis, p.351:- 'The preliminary air bombardment, though faithfully carried out, did not prove equally valuable everywhere. The Royal Air Force heavy bomber attack on the two flanks fulfilled its purpose but the bombing of the Cagny area did not prevent its defence from holding out till evening. The American Eighth Air Force bombing was less effective. A large proportion of the 13,000 100-lb bombs and 75,000 20-lb fragmentation bombs which were used failed to reach their target areas, some falling in places as far south as Bretteville-sur-Laize. It is true that in this region were some of the enemy's main gun positions and immediate armoured reserves, but lightly-spread attacks by such small bombs did little more than warn the defenders that a ground attack was about to follow.'

It is a curiously under-emphasised aspect of Goodwood. A great deal of ink has been spilt over Cagny, and Ellis says that the problem at Cagny was the most immediate reason for the slowdown, which is true. But the failure of the Liberators in Areas P and Q, the Bourguebus area 'beyond the second railway line', tends to escape notice. Khamba Tendal (talk) 13:50, 8 November 2019 (UTC)

Better quality copy of the "Operation Goodwood" documentary now here:

Part 1: "The Background" - [3]

Part 2: "The Prelude" - [4]

Part 3: "The Battle" - [5]

Part 4: "Hindsight" - [6]

... the "Major Becker" mentioned is Alfred Becker.

Other participants include Brigadier David Stileman [7], Colonel Richard von Rosen - author of Panzer Ace, and Major William "Bill" Close - author of Tank Commander. The documentary itself dates from 1976.

The original orders issued to Brig Gen Roberts included capturing Cagny but he had disagreed with this as Cagny was off to one side of his primary objective and so he had successfully argued for Cagny to be by-passed, this he later regretted, as Cagny was only occupied at the time by some infantry and four Luftwaffe 88 mm flak guns, which his force could have taken relatively easily - see Part 3 above. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.8.159 (talk) 07:45, 15 July 2020 (UTC)

Recent edits Copyedit

@74.193.5.226: Apropos your comment, in Zetterling, Niklas (2000). Normandy 1944: German Military Organisation, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness. Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz. ISBN 0-921991-56-8. managed to talk down German tank losses and unwittingly demonstrate that the number of German tanks available for operations was consistent with Allied tank claims. That the Allies sometimes knocked out a German tank several times didn't make the effect of such losses any less. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 19:54, 19 September 2022 (UTC)

Oops wrong edition Zetterling, N. (2019) [2010]. Normandy 1944, German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness (2nd rev. Casemate, Oxford ed.). Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz. ISBN 978-1-61200-816-5. Keith-264 (talk) 20:20, 19 September 2022 (UTC)