Talk:Causal chain

Some additional Observations

Some philosophers believe that causality may not exist if determinism is true, as causality is merely the observation that one event precedes another, or that there is a pattern throughout spacetime in which events of one similar type tend to correlate with events of another similar type (that is, the mass-energy distribution in spacetime has an information theoretic 'pattern' where car crashes tend to be correlated with injury, say). There may be no ultimate reason for why a chain of causality occurs the way that it does beyond the fact that a chain of causality exists. The fact that certain events seem to 'cause' other events is the recognition of a pattern in the structure of spacetime and the matter that exists in spacetime, which is ultimately either due OR an instantiation of the laws of physics. Note: Stating that causality does not exist may be a bit misleading, as one would have to Define what is meant by 'causality' - it may be that causality is dependent upon counterfactual definiteness, that is, A causes B because, if A did NOT occur, then B would not occur (ie: A is necessary for B) AND because A is sufficient for B. It may be possible that causality is ultimately a meaningless concept (if one rejects counterfactual definiteness for instance, but that causal chains are still a valid concept (as they would merely be chains of events).

Again, determinism, in combination with accidentalism could imply that there is, ultimately, no rhyme nor reason to how events relate to one another (this is clearly unlikely if one believes in universal physical law - as it is the laws of physics which determine what patterns arise in spacetime). Empirical determination of Physical law is built upon the assumption that events of one type correlate with events of another type in some predictable or computable way, and therefore would tend to limit the haphazardness with which events are Likely to follow one another. Put another way, if determinism were true, then the whole chain of causality (finite or infinite) is already written, being specified by one link in the causal chain (though non-local hidden variable theories are more complex than this in that the hidden variables can also help to specify the link in the causal chain, and hence the whole causal chain, with the possibility, not borne out by experience, that reality could be completely unpredictable dependent upon the information encoded within the non-local hidden variables ). From this perspective, it makes no sense to speak about whether an event is probable or improbable (as it is fully determined by the chain of causality), though it might make sense to speak of whether a chain of causality is probable or improbable if we associated probabilities to Whole chains of causality from OUTSIDE the perspective of causality (one would assume that non-local hidden variables could be associated with an event, forming at least a partially hidden chain of causality in its own right - though, with the passing of time, we could gain some information of what the values of a hidden variable may have been at an earlier time from the events which actually happen in the chain of causality). Problems may arise in terms of definitions. For instance, the definition of a chain of causality in this article deals with a sequence that is indexed by the Natural Numbers or Integers. Sequences which are indexed by Uncountable sets (like the reals) are also possible. Therefore, sequences of events could be quite complicated if real numbers feature in the laws of physics (with it being possible to have a countably or uncountably infinite number of events between two events in the same way as it is possible to generate an infinite sequence of real numbers between two separate real numbers). Add to this the fact that, in different frames of reference, events which occur simultaneously in one inertial reference frame need NOT occur simultaneously in another inertial reference frame travelling relative to the first one, then the chain of causality (described, in party, by a spacetime diagram) associated with a particular reference frame DIFFERS from the chain of causality associated with another inertial reference frame (described by a spacetime diagram that, in special relativity, is skewed relative to the original one). That is the ordering of sub-events could be different in different inertial frames BUT the distribution of mass-energy within different inertial frames in special relativity may APPEAR different in the different inertial frames of reference, but is always a skew transformation away from being translated between different inertial frames of reference. There is the added question of how, in absolute or reasonable terms, we describe Time, perhaps requiring the involvement of Quantum Mechanics to define time in terms of fundamental physical processes that can be taken as Axiomatic in some way (viewing the wavefunction of a particle of matter would imply that mass is associated with a 'clock' that tells the time starting from when that mass was created - assuming that mass has not always existed).