Talk:Battle of the Falkland Islands

Personal

My wifes grandfather, Cpl George Bowie of the Royal Marines, served on HMS Canopus in this engagement. In her possession is his diary written at the time describing what happened. His own view and that of his shipmates was one of grievance that HMS Canopus received no recognition for the part played by it and that the crew received no prize money.

Contact:email lea@creton95.fsnet.co.uk

The "Naval Warfare in the Southern Hemisphere" section of the article had at the least a calculation error in the number cited, and moreover, appears to basically repeat a military and physics 'urban legend' rather than offering a serious analysis. I have left it intact, but written a large rebuttal of the original text, discussing the several reasons why the Coriolis effect probably did not have the significance claimed, and why the story that it did have significance may have originated.

Brooksindy 12:20, 12 March 2006 (UTC)

I, also, have heard and believed this story. It would make sense for the engineers to put in a fixed correction for a small effect and let spotting the splashes fix it up in the southern hemisphere. If however, there is no evidence of a correction other than its being claimed as an excuse for which it is too small, the subject seems to be set to rest. David R. Ingham 03:24, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

J.E. Littlewood, who worked on ballistics in the First world war, wrote this:

“ I heard an account of the battle of the Falkand Islands (early in the 1914 war) from an officer who was there. The German ships were destroyed at extreme range, but it took a long time and salvos were continually falling 100 yards to the left. The effect of the rotation of the earth is similar to "drift" and was similarly incoporated into the gun-sights. But this nvolved the tacit assumption that Naval battles take place round about latitude 50 N. The double difference for 50 S and extreme range is of the order of 100 yards. ”

This seems reasonably credible, from a mathematician expert in ballistics of the time. Richard Pinch 19:56, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

did gunsights have a built in compass which automatically corrected for whether the gun was pointing north or south, or some point in between? The effect would be in the opposite direction depending on whether pointed N or S. Similarly, if it was something taken into account manually, then just reverse the direction. The effect would also differ depending upon the latitute, if it was big enough to do anything. I thought the idea was to point the gun, see where the shells hit and then try 'a bit to the left'. Only the very first shot would be upset by any calculation error. I would have thought an initial shot 100 yards off at long range was quite good. Sandpiper (talk) 15:56, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

@Sandpiper no ... gunsights (in themselves) relate range-to-elevation and allow a separate lateral deflection correction to be applied. They may also factor in ballistic drift faithfully or largely, and also account for bore wear and other things that cause the ballistics to deviate from standard. The deflection input would be the one this legend discusses and the dimension of this effect. That said, it's plain to me that Coriolis effect had no impact on the battle. Its influence on ballistics were not explicitly treated in gunsights or procedures, and if any untreated effect on the shells' flight attributable to its effect on test firings that helped inform the range tables that assisted in the design of the sights existed, its impact was both dwarfed by other factors (such as cross-tilt of the trunnions) and/or eliminated outright upon the first spotting correction. I write about it on the wiki I co-edit with Harlsbottom. I think the reason this urban legend exists is because it is a fun means of illustrating an effect that is difficult to fathom. DulcetTone (talk) 21:44, 17 April 2012 (UTC)

Unneeded parts

The part "Naval Warfare in the Southern Hemisphere" is both huge and mostly irrelevant for the battle, it bloates the article. To a lesser degree, the same is true for "Admiral Spee's intentions" - compare the other articles in "The Command of the Oceans 1914-1918" for more to the point examples. I suggest removing the first and seriously shortening the second part. --Xeeron 19:57, 14 October 2006 (UTC)

seeing as no one has raised any objections and I Agree in full, I have made the suggested changes. However, I felt the coriolis effect section was too interesting and well written to sinply discard, so I have attached it to the Coriolis Effect article. Getztashida 11:46, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

I have restored it as per the above discussion. (It has been removed from the Coriolis effect article. I think it is useful, even if it is misplaced. If there is no consensus, we can export it to a new self-contained article. Feel free to contact me via talk-page if there's any change. Nimur 09:17, 21 March 2007 (UTC)

You know I've heard of parallax error, relative motion error, and about a dozen other errors, all of which can contribute to the problems of a correct fire control solution. This section is complete and total junk (not the thought that comes to mind but let’s keep it clean). Modern artillery using rocket assisted projectiles can reach further than 30 miles and we are not dealing with this issue. Plain old fashion 5"/62 naval gun's reach 13 nm and we don't worry about this... standard deviation of a sub-minute error of accuracy would be more than 50 yards, (and I doubt that any ordinance piece of that period was that good) now why is this in a naval warfare article? I'm asking for or consider it deleted Tirronan 00:54, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

I note that in a text of the Accademia Navale di Livorno it is stated that the latitude datum is not usually supplied to the fire directions, because during the motion in the planetary limit layer the lateral air drag nearly cancels the Coriolis effect. pietro2001:760:2C00:8004:CACB:B8FF:FE34:3BA6 (talk) 09:32, 29 September 2015 (UTC)

Fire control WW1 version

this is a copy of a USN fire control instructions manual its interesting but it doesn't support what was said above.

US Naval Fire Control, 1918 Byron Angel (byron@trident-usa.com) has extracted the chapter on Fire Control from Elementary Naval Ordnance and Gunnery, by Lieutenant H. C. Ramsey USN (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.), 1918. Byron comments

The book appears to reflect an earlier period. The author's foreword is dated 1 June 1918, so he could not possibly have taken advantage of any of the lessons learned through the 6th BS's North Sea service with the Grand Fleet. As a matter of fact, some of the stuff seems pretty archaic, such as single shot ranging and range-taking by one rangefinder only. There are also some really fascinating comments that merit further discussion IMHO. For example, the author claims that the newer warships were NOT being equipped with range and deflection clocks and that such devices were going out of use. What is this about? Is it possible that the new Ford FC computers coming into service had these clock functions built in and thus made separate devices superfluous? This claim alone begs further exploration.

---

Fire Control Let us consider the fire-control system for the main battery only of a large ship

RANGE-FINDER GROUP

The range-finder gives us, fairly accurately, the distance of the enemy ship at the instant of observation, the reading on the range-finder being direct in yards.

In the newest ships, the range-finder mechanism is mounted in the turrets themselves, the lense being located in arms which project a short distance sideways, one from each side of the front of the turret. In the older type of battleships, having two turrets, one forward and one aft, a range-finder is mounted on the tope of each turret.

The range-finder group consists of an officer and several men, well-trained in the practical use of the instrument and having especially keen eyesight.

When an enemy ship is first sighted, they take station at the most reliable range-finder on the ship and use this. In the event of casualty to it they either shift to another instrument, or the work is taken up by another crew stationed at the other range-finder.

When the enemy ship is forst sighted, and at the direction ofthe fire-control officer, a range-finder reading is taken to determine her distance, and the time noted by stop-watch. Also the bearing of the enemy vessel is taken at the same instant, with a contrivance called a "bearing-indicator". At intervals of 30 seconds from the first range and bearing, and from each other, take a series of ranges and bearings. By plotting each consecutive range and bearing at the proper time interval distance from each other, you can establish on a chart a series of fixes, or positions of the enemy ship at various short intervals. A line drawn carefully through these fixes will give the course of the enemy, and from it you can also determine his rate of speed. This is designated as the "determination of the course and speed of the enemy".

The actual determination of this course and speed is worked out in a station below decks, called the plotting-room, the ranges and bearings and the time intervals being communicated to the plotting-room by the range-finder group. As soon as the course and speed is found accurately, it is transmitted to the fire-control officer in order that he may make such calculations as are necessary to determine the initial (gun) range and deflection at which to open fire, allowing for all conditions at the time that are other than standard.

FIRE-CONTROL STATION

This is the station in battle of the "chief fire-control officer", who is also the "gunnery officer" of the ship. From this station he controls and directs the firing of all the guns of the ship, designating the poijnt of aim of the guns, either all on one target, or on several targets, as necessity dictates. He give the electric firing signals from this station, by what is known as the master-switch, operating all firing signals in the ship.

The fire-control station on the newest ships is located directly over the conning tower, which is the battle-station of the commanding officer of the ship. On other ships it is located at the base of the foremast, on the bridge, or on the upper bridge, when there is one.

The essential requirement is that the "fire-control station" must be in direct communication with the conning tower, which we call "ship control station". It is perfectly evident that the best results will be obtained only by the coordination of the ship and fire-control.

The commanding officer, in "ship control", is also immediately advised of the speed and course of the enemy as soon as this is determined. If the ship is operating singly, the commanding officer after a study of the situation will advise the fire control officer when to open fire, and how.

The command might be given in this manner: "Open fire at the enemy ship when she bears North-East and is distant 12,000 yards, using your 12-inch guns in salvo".

The fire-control officer will immediately calculate the initial range and deflection to be set on sight-bar and azimuth drum, making allowances for all conditions other than standard at the time, and for known errors of individual guns. These calculations will be made by the solution of problems similar to that covered in "Elementary Gunnery", or, in modern ships, they can be made with the aid of certain ingenious mechanical and electrical contrivances.

The initial range and deflection, as soon as determined, is communicated to the "plotting room". Here it is immediately plotted on charts with relation to the course and speed of the enemy. From the plotting room the range and deflection is sent to each gun and turret, an dthe sights are set accordingly. The range and deflection is sent to the guns by three different methods to avoid any possibility of confusion: by telephone, by voice tube, and by "visual" indicator. Each turret or gun reports back "set" as soon as the sights are ready.

The fire control officer, after receiving the report, "set", watches closely the enemy shipWhen she isnearly on the predetermined line of bearing, by operation of his master switch, he causes the "buzzer" to sound in each turret or at each gun. At the instant the enemy ship is on the line of bearing, in this case north-east, he causes the "bell" to ring at each gun or in each turret.The buzzer signal means "stand by to fire". The bell signal means "fire". There is usually an interval of about five seconds between the two signals.

The exact instant of sounding the bell firing signal must be carefull judged by the fire-control officer, not only as regards the bearing of the enemy ship at the instant, but also as regards the motion of the ship. Range and deflection are both greatly affected by undue motion of the firing vessel: pitching and rolling. The signal should be given at such a time as the ship is steady longest in one position, such as the top or bottom of the roll.

At the firing signal, all guns fire in salvo or together, unless certain one have been previously designated not to fire.

Each turret, battery, or group of guns is usually fitted with a "relay switch" on the firing signal system. If for any reason certain guns are not to fire on the signal, by pulling this relay switch, the turet or battery officer cuts out the bell and buzzer at the particular turret or group of guns.

RANGING SHOTS

The foregoing has been based on all guns of the ship being fired together, or in salvo, at initial range and deflection. When the initial range an ddeflection can be determined with any degree of accuracy, the first salvo may strike and demoralize the enemy, and an important advantage to be scored.

On the other hand, if it is impossible to determine the inital range and deflection with any degree of accuracy, ranging shots are resorted to. Instead of firing together, the guns of a broadside are designated to fire singly, and in succession, at certain intervals. By means of "spotters" we judges the landing place of each shell with reference to the enemy ship and correct the next range and deflection until the target is "found". Then take up firing in salvo.

COLLECTIVE SHIP CONTROL

The method of opening fire covered in the foregoing has presumed the ship to be acting singly, under the control of its own commanding officer. In a modern engagement, there is no doubt but that the single ships would be under the control of a flag officer having station on the flag ship of the division, fleet, battleship force, etc.

In this case directions for opening fire would come from the flag ship, as would also direction for continuing it. The interior system of fire-control would, however, be the same as has been outlined.

SPOTTER'S GROUP

Our range-finders and other mechanical and electrical instruments would be ideal for giving us at any instant the exact range, course, and speed, etc., of the enemy if could compensate also for the various errors of gun-fire with which we have to contend.

Certain of these errors of gun-fire are variable and indeterminate in an exact sense, and for this reason we are compelled to resort to individual spotting, or judging of the landing place of each shell or salvo of shells fired.

Spotters for long-range firing are stationed usually in the "tops" of the cage masts, the aim being to give them the advantage of the most elevated position in the ship. An officer especially trained in "spotting" is stationed in each top, and is designated Spot #1 and Spot #2, respectively, for fore and main-masts. Each spotting officer has with him several men stationed at voice tubes and telephones to plotting-room, fire-control, etc. In action, with all guns firing at one target, Spot #1 does all the spotting. In case of casualty to him, Spot #2 continues. Where the fire of a ship is divided on two targets, each spotter controls one group of guns.

The duties of a spotter are to keep a constant, close watch on the target or enemy ship, and by various methods to judge as accurately as possible the point of fall of a single shell, or the mean point of fall of a salvo of shells with reference to the objective. A quick determination is made of the change in range and deflection necessary to make the next shot or salvo score a hit, assuming of course that both firing and target ships remained in the same position, without advancing, until the next salvo could be fired.

Immediately after each shot or salvo, the spotter telephones to the plotting room the result of his spot, giving the corrections in range and deflection direct.

Of course, both vessels are moving and so change their relative positions, so that the "spots" cannot be placed directly on range scales an dazimuth drums. The range and deflection must be further corrected for the position of both ships, their courses and speeds, at the instant of firing. This is done in the plotting room.

PLOTTING-ROOM CREW

The plotting-room in located in the interior of the ship, usually below the protective deck. As a rule it is well forward. In some of the newer ships it is below the protective deck and practically under the conning tower and the fire-control station.

A switchboard in the plotting room gives telephone connections to every fire-control group on the ship, to spotters, turrets, guns, etc.

The principal duties of the plotting-room group are to plot on charts or on plotting boards, or to represent graphically with reference to the plane of fire, the course and speed of the target, and the rate of change of range and deflection, so that at any instant we can determine from reference to the charts the range and deflection at the instant, and also the the continuous rate at which the range and deflection are changing at that particular time.

Separate plotting boards are provided; one for the determination of "range" and the other for "deflection". The initial range and deflection and the course and speed of the enemy ship are plotted on the charts at the beginning of an engagement, the range and deflection being sent out to the sight-setters, and "set" being reported to the fire-control station.

The spotter "spots" the first salvo and gives a correction, such as: Up 100, Right 2. This correction is immediately plotted on range and deflection boards, and the proper range and deflection for firing the next salvo is obtained, taking into consideration the course and speed of both firing and target ships. The new range and deflection is now sent to the sight-setters who correct their settings as ordered. "Set" is reported to fire control and at the proper moment the firing buzzer and bell are sounded.

The spotter estimates the mean point of fall of this second salvo, and gives correction again to plotting room, and the procedure is repeated.

When a sufficient number of "spots" have been obtained and the range is increasing or decreasing at a rate that can be determined, a line or curve representing the "rate of change of range" is plotted. "Deflection" may be handled somewhat similarly. At any instant, knowing the approximate rate of speed of the enemy ship, you may determine his rate of speed amde good on a course parallel to your own, as was done in computing original range and deflection. This, with the bearing of the enemy, gives "deflection" at the instant.

In cases where a salvo hits or straddles the target and the spotter does not desire to change either range or deflection, he reports to plotting room "No change". This is reported in turn to the fire-control officer by the plotting room.

RANGE CLOCKS

These are mechanical contrivances or clocks that are used in determining continuously ranges and deflections at which to set the sights in firing on an enemy ship. Certain data is placed on the clock, such as the rate of change of range and deflection, as soon as this is determined on the plotting boards. The clock gives, at any instant for this rate of change, the range and deflection to set on the sight-scales. "Spot" corrections may be placed directly on the clocks.

These clocks are little used at the present time, and ships are no longer being fitted with them.

CONTROL OF BROADSIDE BATTERY

The latest idea in the control of broadside batteries is that the officer in charge of the broadside, or of a certain group of guns in the broadside, not only completely controls the fire of these guns, but is himself the spotter for them also. In his spotting position he has a "relay or group control switch". When this switch is in, he receives the fire-control signals and fires with other guns or groups on the ship. When he is not ready to fire, he throws out his switch and no signal sounds for his battery. He has with him a man with a range and deflection board, who plots all "spots" and sends out range and deflection after each salvo.

This system is largely used for torpedo-defense purposes.

SUB-FIRE-CONTROL STATIONS

Where a ship is equipped with both 12-inch and 8-inch guns in turrets, and also comparatively heavy caliber, 6- or 7-inch broadside guns, it is possible that all calibers might be desired to be brought into action together.

In such a case, we employ sub-fire-control stations.

A sub is provided for each caliber gun - they are called Sub-12; Sub-8; and Sub-7, depending on the caliber of the gun, and each sub-station has the particular duty ofaiding in the control of the fire from its own guns.

Each sub sends out ranges and deflections to its own guns and reports "set" for that caliber to fire-control. In some cases, each sub has its own "deflection" and "rate of change of range" boards; also range clocks; and each works with the plotting-room to control in the simplest way the entire firing of the ship.

Spotting Spotting, as here used, refers to the judging of the point of fall of a projectile, with reference to a target or an enemy ship, in order to determine if a hit has been made, and, if not, to estimate what changes in range and deflection are necessary to make the next shot score a hit.

This is a subject which can and will be discussed only in the briefest and most general way, due to the desire of the Navy Department to keep the details of all methods employed and the results of all experiments conducted along these lines confined to confidential publications issued to officers of the Service.

The range-finder method of determining the range of an enemy vessel, in combination with other mechanically and electrically operated fire-control instruments, it is fully recognized, would be ideal for giving us at any instant the exact range, course, and speed of the enemy, were it not for the various and numerous "errors of gun-fire" with which we have to contend.

Certain of these errors of gun-fire are variable, and cannot be exactly determined, and for this reason we are compelled to resort to individual spotting, in combination with our range-finder and other instruments, in order to maintain an accurate control of the fire.

Spotters should be officers, highly and especially trained for this particular duty. Thei importance cannot be over-stimated.

For long range firing, 6000 yards or over, the spotters are stationed in the highest available part of the ship, usually in each "top" of the cage or fire-control masts. Large and comparatively powerful spotting telescopes are located in each "top", and the spotter stations himself at this.

When spotting for smaller caliber guns and sometimes under special conditions, a lower elevation is sometimes more advantageous and a special "low spotting position" is provided lower down in the cage mast.

After a shot has been fired, the spotter keeps the target or enemy ship closely in his field of view, and noted where the projectile lands with reference to the objective. By constant practice and with the aid of certain data he is able to judge in an almost inappreciably short time the change in range and deflection necessary to bring the next shot on the target.

There are two principal methods of spotting -- the direct flight and the splash method.

The DIRECT FLIGHT METHOD is used for short ranges only, and requires the actual observance of the projectile itself as it falls in, or passes through, the plane of the target or enemy ship. As the projectile passes through the field of view of your telescope, which has been kept on the target continuously since the shot was fired, it appears as a comparatively small, blurred, and rapidly moving spot.

When the projectile can be spotted in this fashion, it is not difficult to tell if a hit was made, and if not, to give the necessary correction.

The other method of spotting, used for long ranges, is called the "VERTICAL SPLASH METHOD". Spotting by this method requires a well-trained spotter. Briefly, the method is to observe the splash caused by the fall of the projectile, and from the position of the splash to judge the point in the water, beyond, in front, or to the right or left of the target, where the projectile fell. By projecting the line of vision from the spotter’s position, through the base of the splash, and also, in the same straight line, through the vertical plane of the target (actual or extended), you can judge at what point the projectile, either in the air or in the water, passed by or through the vertical plane of the target, by reference to a previously prepared "splash diagram". The corrections to the plotting room are given direct in yards of range and divisions of deflection.

Example -- Up 200, Right 4.

SPLASH DIAGRAMS are used to assist the spotter. These represent graphically, on a target or ship drawn to a small scale, the area on the water within which the projectile would have to fall in order to hit the target (the danger space). This danger space or parallelogram drawn in on the vertical plane of the target represents the space within which the projectile must appear to the spotter to have passed, if it hit the target. Range and deflection lines are also drawn around the small scale target, giving the corrections necessary to bring the projectile on the target on the next shot. These diagrams should be drawn up before a target practice. Tables contain data to be used in connection with the diagrams.

The correction to be of value must be accurately and quickly determined, and this requires in a spotter a keen sense of judgement and a quick mind.

SPOTTING SALVOS: Modern battle practice, we know, is more a matter of salvos of shots than single shots. Our spotters, then, must be especially trained in spotting salvos.

There is always more or less dispersion or spreading of shots in salvo firing, due to the individual errors of guns and to personal errors of pointing. These can hardly be avoided.

In spotting salvos with a wide dispersion of fire the spotter has a difficult task. He must first determine the mean point of fall of all shots, and then determine the correction for the amount in range and deflection necessary to bring this mean point on the target on the next salvo. In salvo firing the shots should "straddle" the target, half over, and half in front.

Single-shot spotting, as compared with salvo spotting, is a very simple proposition.

SPOTTING BOARDS AND RANGES

These are merely arrangements to represent on a small scale, reduced in proportion, the problem of the spotter. By using a miniature target, and miniature splashes, it is possible to have a fairly realistic and certainly a very beneficial "spotting drill".

GENERAL

In any spotting it is better to spot "under" than "over". You are more likely to hit her somewhere with a low shot than with a high one.

Excessive or radical spotting corrections should be avoided. If a shell hits somewhere, even though not right on the "bull", it is usually best to leave well enough alone and give no correction.

Copywrite would have expired after 70 years or 1988... Tirronan 02:01, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

Optical range-finding at sea from the deck or turret of a ship is limited due to the curvature of the Earth to a range of around 12-15 nautical miles, beyond this a spotting aircraft had to be used, until they were later replaced by the ship's radar in the 1930's. As the ship's guns increased over time in size and range, they eventually exceeded the ranges at which optical range-finding was useful, and as a 15" gun of the 1914-18 period had a range of twenty miles or so this meant that at ranges above twelve-fifteen miles the ship was essentially firing blind if a spotter was not available. The spotting aircraft was usually a float-plane carried by the ship herself and launched off a catapult when required. The larger 16" guns had a longer range still, and IIRC twenty-six years later HMS Rodney while stationed off the Normandy coast in 1944 was shooting up to 30 miles inland while supporting Allied forces during the Battle of Normandy. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 10:41, 6 December 2019 (UTC)

Admiral Spee's intentions

Ok we have a section here where the writer freely acknowledges that he hasn't a scrap of proof of what Adm. Spee's intentions were and proceeds to fill in the blank anyway. In WP:CITE this is totally unacceptable this is final warning given that this entire section will be removed within 48 hours and I am labeling this section with

Tirronan 15:16, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

I don't know if there is any rush on this. We can probably leave it for a few weeks if somebody wants to take on the challange of finding sources for this stuff. In the mean time, I have moved the speculative discussions to the end (where they generally are found) so they won't be in the way of the more solid content. I will also be salvaging some of the non-speculative content as useful content in the background section. -Gomm 20:26, 28 March 2007 (UTC)

Oh there is solid stuff here! It is just that I am unaware of Adm. Spee's intentions and every account I have read historians "assume" he was there to bombard the port. However there is no proof that I know of, so if someone can find some that would be a coup indeed! I'm in no rush this page isn't that frequented. Tirronan 20:39, 28 March 2007 (UTC)

Having waited for a couple of weeks without confirmation on a single thing in this section I am removing per WP:CITE WP:OR

Discussions and Interpretations

Final warning, I have waited 45 days for anything to back up this entire section at all. Mostly its undocumented speculation at best. Either proof will be submitted in 24 hours or the entire section goes as per WP:CITE WP:OR Tirronan 14:12, 19 June 2007 (UTC)

I've edited it down so its less OR/Uncite. a bit more work and there will be just a couple of uncited lines.GraemeLeggett 14:57, 19 June 2007 (UTC)

Ok in an effort to help I have put down some where I thought it could really use some in line citation. I am not going to kid you, this would be the least to keep this section in the article at all. I've never read anything remotely supporting most of this section. It would be a nice addition if it is true. Tirronan 22:10, 19 June 2007 (UTC)

This entire section is reproduced from a newspaper article. I have referenced it.GDD1000 (talk) 16:42, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

It looks to me as is the page you have referenced has been fed the original wikipedia article - see the Wikipedia link at the bottom! The page is now citing itself! Harlsbottom (talk) 16:47, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

OMG, I didn't notice that. Ok I will look for another reference and replace the reflist.GDD1000 (talk) 16:54, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

Well shut my mouth Massie talks about this at great detail and most of this is supportable. Tirronan (talk) 16:06, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

I'll see what I have kicking around my archive, I'm sure there'll be something there to cite some stuff, maybe add some more. Harlsbottom (talk) 16:34, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

Somebody took out my edits indicating that the idea that the British were sitting ducks while in harbor is controversial, despite the fact that we now have a citation-needed tag for the assertion that they were! There have been some excellent, scholarly, citation-laden discussions of this very issue on the better naval boards (the NavWeaps.com battleship-versus-battleship forum hosted by yuku and the unfortunately down due to hacking warship discussion forum from http://www.bobhenneman.info/). Simply put, knowledgeable scholars of these issues have some disagreement whether Spee could have achieved a substantially better outcome than historical by attacking at the outset. So I think the current discussion of this issue lacks balance, and I think the undoing of my edits, especially combined with the lack of citation, borders on vandalism. - N'Awlins Contrarian 23:01, 21 April 2010 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by N'Awlins Contrarian (talk • contribs)

Navel gazing discussions on Internet message boards are NOT reliable sources by wikipedia standards. Nor does Wikipedia allow original research, which is precisely what you're describing. Wikipedia is intended to be an encyclopedia not an academic history debating forum. Justin the Evil Scotsman talk 07:54, 22 April 2010 (UTC)

The present version's assertion, "Had Spee pressed the attack, . . . Sturdee's ships [would] have been easy targets," is at best controversial speculation. There is no reputable source cited, and the article even (correctly) admits the issue by tagging it as needing one. My point is that this assertion is not only unsourced, but unbalanced. I am NOT suggesting citation to an Internet discussion; I am suggesting that there are out there to be found discussions that cite reasonably reliable sources for various propositions that dispute Sturdee's alleged sitting-duck status, if somebody wants to dig a little. I think this part either should be balanced by recognizing that there are differences in respectable opinions about what would have happened, or else deleted. Really, it is all speculation. Either present the alternative speculation or delete all the specualtin. No? - N'Awlins Contrarian 06:02, 24 April 2010 (UTC)

I'd support the "at best controversial speculation" for the "sitting duck" status. Von Spee was a very capable officer, and he certainly didn't think he should send in his entire light cruiser force to bombard the ships at anchor. He may have been blind sighted by the fact German intelligence didn't alert him to the presence of battle cruisers in the South Atlantic, but he certainly didn't think that he would gain much by trying to shell Sturdee from offshore. The other big point missing here is that the Canopus fired 12" shells, and had actually fired on Gneisenau and Nurnberg. Von Spee's squadron fired nothing heavier than 8.25" shells. An efficient weapon, but not really enough to use against a battle cruiser. The Invincibles are seen (along with all battle cruisers) as having poor armour. But that's only true comparing them to full battleships. They were, in fact, at least as heavily armoured than von Spee's ships, and well protected against his main armourment. What is more, both the Invincibles and the Canopus outranged von Spee's squadron. In the actual battle, the battle cruisers were able to inflict very unequal damage due, in part, to the fact they outranged the Germans, and the battle cruisers were sufficiently protected against cruiser fire (whatever their inadequacies against the fire of capital ships). Von Spee would have, himself, been a "sitting target" for the Canopus, and been forced to approach the coast to the point where his manoeuvrability would have been severely compromised in any case. Clearly he believed his best action was to try to hold off the battle cruisers, and the rest of the Royal Navy force long enough to give the rest of his ships the opportunity to scatter and escape. Given that his entire force was destroyed at the ensuring battle, you could say that if he'd pressed his initial attack (it was actually a reconnaissance to verify that Port Stanley was unguarded) the result could hardly have been worse, but that's really just boilerplate. I'd suggest that von Spee was a better judge than most armchair experts, and wasn't to know the British were coaling anyway. I think he made the only decision any competent commander could have in the circumstances. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 158.89.1.33 (talk) 06:23, 5 July 2012 (UTC)

Which Abrolhos ?

This article and also the Battle of Coronel refer to "Abrolhos Rocks". Which is hyperlinked to the islands off the coast of Western Australia. This is clearly wrong. There must be some other Abrolhos Rocks near the Falkland Islands somewhere.Eregli bob (talk) 15:23, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

Campaign Boxes

Would not it make sense to include the campaign box concerning the German East Asian Squadron in this article, since this was the last battle fought by the squadron?

I don't see the reason why it was removed, it certainly isn't worth edit warring over. Justin talk 22:06, 24 July 2009 (UTC)

Casulties

in Battle

Scharnhorst took extensive damage with funnels flattened, fires and a list. The list became worse at 16:04 and she sank by 16:17. All hands were lost.

in Outcome

Out of the 765 officers and men from the Scharnhorst, only 7 survived.

Could someone please reconcile these two statements?

Bankrobber70 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 115.135.34.95 (talk) 07:09, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

Secret Service Section

A week or so ago, having read the memoirs of Fritz von Rintelen, a German naval officer and spy for the Admiralstab during World War I, I learned that Spee's squadron was lured to the Falkland Islands by a fake communique from the British naval codebreaking service, Room 40. Rintelen learned this himself in an interview with the head of British naval intelligence in 1925, Admiral Hall, and published this in his book, 'Dark Invader', in 1931. The book itself has a frontispiece signed by Admiral Hall himself which seems to be a pretty conclusive acknowledgement of the story. The story itself is confirmed in Patrick Beesley's studio of British naval codebreaking during World War 1, (Beesley, Patrick (1982). Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918. Long Acre, London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd. ISBN 0-241-108640).

A new addition has been made to this section, 'Secret Service Trap', by the editor Tirronan, which casts doubts on von Rintelen's account. However, Tirronan's source is a blog, specifically a decidedly non-academic review of the book 'Dark Invader' by an anonymous reviewer calling himself 'fredslibrary'. I submit that this attribution and source are not credible or verified, and propose to remove the addition unless a sounder source is cited within seven days of this post. Hubertgrove (talk) 10:57, 21 April 2011 (UTC)

I rather doubt the whole account, read Massie's Castles of Steel before you go much further. There you will see that an officer survived and gave account of why the attack was made. It mentioned nothing of orders. Removing cited material will land you on a blocked list rather quickly. Many spies lead rather colorful lives and colorful stories, the review was of the intelligence community some of what the man said was true and some pretty obviously was not. I'd rather believe an actual historian.Tirronan (talk) 11:44, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

I have read Massie - and an excellent book it is too. It does specifically mention the work of Room 40 and Admiral Hall's department. In the context of the Battle of the Falkland Islands, Massie does declare that Von Spee's communications with the German mission in Valparaiso - which had a German radio relay station - were open to the British (this comment is just made in passing and he does not go into any depth about the influence, or otherwise, of Room 40 on the actual battle).

The officer who survived - that you mention - was Fregattenkapitän Hans Pochhammer, and his report specifically states that Admiral von Spee's attack on the Falklands was irrational. I do not say this is a convincing argument that he had received a forwarded signal - sealed orders - from the 'Admiralstab' (ie. Room 40) but it definitely does not exclude the poosibility and , if anything, provides indirect confirmation.

Finally, von Rintelen's book (produced in the Thirties)has a foreword by Admiral Hall himself - dammit, when the head of British Naval Intelligence endorses the book of a German naval officer, I submit that says something about its credibility.

My point however is rather that your edit does breach Wikipedia's own edit guidelines. It is based on your own opinion - 'some spies lie', and verified by reference to a blog (not credible source by Wiki standards) that contains a review (not an academically verifiable piece of work by Wiki standards) by an anonymous reviwewer (not a named and recognised source as required by Wiki standards) - the review itself contains obvious and demonstrable errors of fact. Who knows, anyone could have written that review, maybe even you?

I therefore ask you to provide more credible sources or remove your edit or else allow it to be removed. Thank you. Hubertgrove (talk) 17:49, 23 April 2011 (UTC)

• Comment: I have tagged the wordpress source as an unreliable source, as it is a blog. I suggest that querying its use at the reliable sources noticeboard may offer more opinions if needed. I also note that saying, "Removing cited material will land you on a blocked list rather quickly.", is an unwarranted threat. Removing material supported by unreliable sources is perfectly proper. The addition of this source is discussed at WP:EAR#What is protocol for an edit dispute with a named Wikipedia editor Jezhotwells (talk) 22:22, 23 April 2011 (UTC)

I'll do a bit of research before removing said content. My opinion wouldn't matter a wit, no one in the intelligence community would believe most spies without other confirmation, that isn't my opinion its stated over and over in field-craft. It is part of the game. Look for all that anyone really knows perhaps its nothing but truth, however there seems to be a rush that this fellow is nothing but the truth and at least some seem to doubt his veracity. There are many stories about the Falklands battles and some of them are even true, but not all of them and I have never seen any other source bearing this as a fact. Did the British intelligence service make a claim to such? They were not very reticent about the ULTRA secret when the time passed and this was much earlier. I'm just not convinced.Tirronan (talk) 04:52, 24 April 2011 (UTC)

I'm sorry but the citations are authoritative and come from a contemporaneous participant(von Rintelen) and an academic historian (Patrick Beesly). Howeverm the ultimate confirmation is - and this is the third time I have said this - that Admiral Sir William Reginald Hall, the British Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) from 1914 to 1919, provided the foreword to Franz von Rintelen's memoirs in 1932. I don't mean to sound exasperated but I don't think you can get more cast-iron than that. As I mentioned before, unless real opposing evidence is cited, let's remove the re-edit by the 28th. Hubertgrove (talk) 07:28, 24 April 2011 (UTC)

Additional: having just consulted von Rintelen's book again, I see that after Admiral Hall's foreword, there is another preface. This one is by the famous English author AEW Mason who, as a major in the Royal Marines, was also an officer involved in the Naval Intelligence Department. He too verifies the accuracy of Rintelen's book in these words: "The history of those years is told in this book. The conversations which he records depend, of course, upon his memory; the main facts we are able to check, and we know them to be exact." Mason was also a politican, being a Liberal MP, which suggests he has some credibility as a source. Hubertgrove (talk) 09:11, 24 April 2011 (UTC)

Interesting that you cite academically verifiable, then accuse me of using my opinion, then of blogging up opposition to the article? What academic review would you so accuse me of in public like that? O.K., 1st off that is assumption of bad faith, twice, secondly, I will not be bullied into agreement when I doubt the source. If indeed you are so interested in academically verifiable, then surely sometime for proper research is warranted. I suggest that you cool off, keep the accusations of bad faith to yourself, and try however hard it is to be civil. I will do my research you may find my work in the Battle of Jutland article so I have quite a few sources I can check. I do not agree wiping out the single base available to the British was all that stupid unless he knew that there were superior forces in the area, which he obviously didn't. Why in the name of academically verifiability would you ever count a single source as truth? I think we can wait and I don't see the need to be rushed by you.Tirronan (talk) 04:56, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

Be calm. I did not mean to offend you. Your argument may or may not hold water but it's original research conducted by yourself and unsupported by credible evidence. You know Wikipedia's rules in that respect. You also know Wikipedia's rules about harassment. Come up with a proper source and citation otherwise I will, quite properly, remove your spoiler edit in three days - you can always restore it if you ever manage to dig up contrary evidence. Thanks. Hubertgrove (talk) 07:05, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

Just what is Beesly supposed to have confirmed? --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 11:01, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

At the heart of this issue is the presented fact that the attack on the Falkland's base was done by a falsified order to the task force by the British. I do know that the German naval code was broken, but this fact is the 1st I have heard of this. The British were not all that shy about sharing intelligence coups after the face, albeit sometimes long after the fact, but I've never heard of this before and we have only a single account of it without corroboration from any other source. Simon you have more sources than I do, do you know anything about this? It is fascinating, if true, since if the Germans discovered the ruse the British just showed how throughly their code was broken, quite the risk. When I did a search I got an article from an intelligence community source calling into question the veracity of the book the fellow wrote. Our fellow here seems to wish to push this as iron clad proof and my experience with such proofs hasn't been that good. If there is another source I'll gladly pull my objections.Tirronan (talk) 15:08, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

Tirronan, you're missing the issue which is that my edit is sourced and verified but yours ain't. In two days time I'm going to remove it. You'll then start some revert war which I will then ask to be reviewed, and then my edit will be restored.

Could you also review your posts on this page; they are hard to follow and inaccurate, like this: "When I did a search I got an article from an intelligence community source calling into question the veracity of the book the fellow wrote. Our fellow here seems to wish to push this as iron clad proof". That's simply wrong - your "intelligence community source" is an anonymous review on a blog, and I did NOT think of this review as an "iron-clad source" at all. Personally, I think it's nonsense and, since it suddenly appeared a day after my edit (and included a mistake - since corrected - in my edit), I suspect it's your sockpuppet.

Two more days. Hubertgrove (talk) 19:59, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

Hubertgrove, are you claiming that Beesly supports the contention that "Spee's squadron was lured to the Falkland Islands by a fake communique from the British naval codebreaking service, Room 40."? If so, having looked through the relevant section of Room 40, I see no evidence in it to support that claim. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 20:27, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

Hubertgrove, this is your last warning, one more personal attack of any sort and you and I are heading for the admins. My conversation with you are now over. You have one book with a claim that can't be verified, though it can be cited obviously. I don't own a sockpuppet, I don't blog, and I don't get involved in revert wars. I've had it with your insults and your claims against me. Do not address me again.Tirronan (talk) 21:42, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

Tirronan, I am genuinely sorry that you are angered. I hope this small incident will not cause further upset or compromise your otherwise excellent work on the Dreadnought era in Wikipedia. Thanks Hubertgrove (talk) 12:30, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

Given your behavior, or lack thereof I've posted a Wikiquette alert on your behavior. Any further actions of this sort and I will follow the RFC guidelines, I've put up with all I intend to with you Hubertgrove.Tirronan (talk) 02:19, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

• Comment: I see no posting by Tirronan at WP:WQA seen it now. I see no evidence produced to demonstrate that {http://spyinggame.wordpress.com/2011/04/08/the-dark-invader-by-captain-franz-von-rintelen-1998} is a reliable source, so I cannot understand what all of the heat and noise is about. Jezhotwells (talk) 02:28, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

You are correct. I am removing the edit.Hubertgrove (talk) 12:30, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

Hubertgrove, it is standard practice to include page numbers in one's references, and also to provide citations to back up all one's assertions in a paragraph - for example, Beesly makes no mention of Canaris being in Dresden, yet the casual reader would be given the impression that the citation given backs that up. You still haven't answered the question I posed earlier, either. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 13:07, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

Simon Harley, thank you for your advice - in future, I will provide page numbers. I can do so - if you're really going to insist on this - for the von Rintelen book. It will be harder for the Beesley book which I have now passed on to my father. However, since I used the same convention in citation for the Beesley book as was used in Wiki entries for other articles on this subject, it does seem that you may be holding me to a higher standard than you do others. Beesley's book confirms that Room 40 had broken the following German naval codes SKM, HVB and other codes, and used them to decipher communications with the Admiralstab and to traffick false signals. It does seem to me you may not be familiar with von Rintelen's book, with its foreword by Admiral William Hall and preface by Major AEW Mason. It's still available. I think you would enjoy it. Hubertgrove (talk) 19:23, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

I'm not holding you to a higher standard than anyone else, I am merely responding to this particular blip on my radar. It's likely that Hall did tell von Rintelen that the British lured the von Spee to the Falklands - whether the British did actually send such a signal is debatable. Beesly suggests it's a possibility, without mentioning von Rintelen or Mason. For my part, I would say that Hall was probably lying through his teeth just to muddy the waters - this is after all the man who boasted that he had tricked the Germans into bombing a High Court judge out of pure spite (see Beesly, pp. 37-38). --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 19:39, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

I can understand and appreciate what you say but, as it stands, yours is a hypothesis. With genuine respect, it doesn't provide any evidence to contradict von Rintelen's account - and he was, after all, a primary source, whose account was publicly endorsed by the head (or close to it) of the British secret service and one of his deputies.

Now, I can understand that Hall might have been wilfully deceiving von Rintelen; however, there is no evidence that this is the case nor does Hall seem to have immediately apparent motive of hostility towards his former adversary. In fact, strange to say, there is primary evidence that after the war, Admiral Hall and von Rintelen were the complete opposite of enemies but close and mutually trusting family friends. Have a look at this. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,769867,00.html Interesting, no? Hubertgrove (talk) 01:14, 27 April 2011 (UTC)

And this is why Wikipedia will always be sneered at - a lack of value judgements means that any old tripe can appear in an article. For the record, having consulted my sources, A. E. W. Mason didn't join the Royal Marines until October, 1917 (he became a Major in a service battalion), and never served in the Intelligence Division. There's no way he can possibly be considered one of Hall's deputies. As to Hall and von Rintelen becoming friends, last time I checked, friends lie to each other all the time, it being human nature to conceal the truth where appropriate, so forgive me if I don't believe Hall would be completely frank with his former opponent. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 07:28, 28 April 2011 (UTC)

'Old tripe'? Please don't be aggressive, it's unnecessary. AEW Mason was involved in Admiralty espionage throughout the War. AEW Mason started out in the Manchester Regiment and then, through a circuitous route, ended up in the RMLI (he was involved in NID before he was gazzetted to the Marines). Why do you say: "There's no way he can possibly be considered one of Hall's deputies"? Please provide proof that contradicts AEW Mason himself - and others (Dictionary of Literary Biography, Donald H Dyal (Author), Catherine A Hastedt (Author), Steven E Smith (Author), Matthew J Bruccoli (Editor), C E Frazer, Jr. Clark (Editor), Richard Layman (Editor) Pub. Gale (20 Feb 1998)). I'm sorry if you don't like that but your suspicions are not evidence.

For your further information, plenty of soldiers - not naval or marine staff - service with the NID, for example Lord Herschell (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=137749&SearchInit=4&SearchType=6&CATREF=FO1011%2F278#summary) served with the Coldstream Guards like his father before him and his son.

I can forgive you, as you ask, for saying "I don't believe Hall would be completely frank with his former opponent" but whether you believe it or not doesn't matter. I have produced evidence that shows the Hall and Rintelen were, after the war, close friends. Otherwise, why would Hall have invited Rintelen to a family wedding and allowed Rinetelen's daughter to be a bridesmaid at the marriage of his own daughter twenty years after the war was over? Your speculation as to why he would do that is immaterial. Provide evidence to the contrary. I have already provided both evidentiary and circumstantial evidence to the positive. Can we now please close this matter? Hubertgrove (talk) 02:35, 29 April 2011 (UTC)

I'm not being aggressive, I'm merely stating an opinion. For your information, Herschell is documented as serving in the Intelligence Division from November, 1914 to June, 1919, with the rank of Commander in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. He was already a naval officer of some standing. Mason, on the other hand, was an agent of Hall with no official connection to the Intelligence Division, other than a late war appointment to H.M.S. President, but that satisfies the requirement that all officers be placed on the books of a ship for accounting duties, wherever they are in the world. One of Hall's real deputies, Captain (later Admiral Sir) William M. James, Assistant Director of Intelligence Division from June, 1917 to January, 1919, noted in his biography of Hall of Mason's alleged exploits, "It is impossible to say if these were actual experiences." --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 07:39, 29 April 2011 (UTC)

I don't think that it is going to be laid to rest, the problem remains, book or no, cite or no, this is hearsay from another person about an event that doesn't seem to have another shred of proof that it happened. My doubts remain that the British Intelligence Service would give notice that they had broken German codes by issuing false orders. There were German Embassies that could have intercepted the transmitted order and let Berlin know ASAP. I don't know any national service that would risk such a thing unless they were certain that the enemy knew that the code had already been broken. It just doesn't make sense. A book my be written that the sky is indeed yellow and we have to accept that all evidence, in this case complete lack thereof, to the contrary?Tirronan (talk) 03:48, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

I am sorry but this issue is laid to rest. It is recorded in an credible document produced by a reputable publishing house. It is verified by two primary sources Admiral William Hall and Major AEW Mason both of NID. The circumstances of the incident are attested by an academic historian. Your hypothesis - "A book my be written that the sky is indeed yellow and we have to accept that all evidence, in this case complete lack thereof, to the contrary?" - is demonstrably false. I am assuming, from your writing style, that English is not your first language, so I have tried to be as clear as possible. Leave this alone.

Added signature. Hubertgrove (talk) 09:40, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

I'm sorry you just don't have that kind of authority around here, and I have about had it with your insults as well, shall we go visit the admins about your behavior now? You don't order me, you don't order any other editor here either. I am not sure where you thought this behavior is acceptable but it clearly is not. So my fellow editor, either clean up your act or we can see about a ban from Wikipedia, is that clear enough for you? I'll continue to dig but if I don't find supporting evidence then this is going to go much further. I have a rather bad habit of not tolerating hoaxes parading as facts, regardless of the source of the hoax.Tirronan (talk) 19:47, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

You know it isn't a hoax. Leave this alone. Hubertgrove (talk) 03:02, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

It is a hoax and you make a joke of history articles by including this garbage and hearsay. We have an obligation to the public to publish the truth, not hearsay. You betray us all with your sorry actions.Tirronan (talk) 03:55, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

Look, let's not go back and forth. If you think it's a hoax, present evidence. I have provided testimony for my edit from three primary sources, supplementary evidence attesting to their relationship, a history published by a reputable publisher and corroborative evidence from an academic histrian. This is not "garbage and hearsay". Thank you. Hubertgrove (talk) 07:39, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

So far, Hubertgrove, you have provided in the article a reference to a memoir, and nothing more. You haven't even provided a page reference for it. As far as I can tell you've misrepresented Beesly, who says it's possible that Hall spread a rumour for von Spee to follow, not that he sent a direct signal to him. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 16:24, 6 May 2011 (UTC)

It's an untruth to say I have misrepresented Beesly. I have provided proofs and references for everything and everyone cited in my edit. They're all footnoted. Good luck. ;0) Hubertgrove (talk) 22:25, 6 May 2011 (UTC)

Simon, you have that book I do not, what exactly does that ref say?Tirronan (talk) 03:59, 8 May 2011 (UTC) Never mind I have ordered my own copy of Room 40, I'm also looking into what is available in public record in the British archives. It would be firmly in so it can not be used in the article but it certainly is alright to use to disprove an assertion.Tirronan (talk) 22:12, 10 May 2011 (UTC)

It would seem not one but two historians seem to disagree, hmmm, my we are getting a bit closer to the truth aren't we?Tirronan (talk) 00:08, 11 May 2011 (UTC)

FWIW, This is all that Beesly has which relates directly to the Falkland Islands, from 76-77. I don't think that it supports Hubertgrove's above claim that "The circumstances of the incident are attested by an academic historian." No-one's debating that SIGINT played a major role in the destruction of Dresden.

As far as I can tell the basis for Mason being the stellar witness Hubertgrove claims him to be is this sentence from the introduction to The Dark Invader: "The conversations which he records depend, of course, upon his memory; the main facts we are able to check, and we know them to be exact." A very dubious assertion for an overseas R.M.L.I. staff officer to make. Rintelen's claims regarding his conversations with Hall and Herschell are absurd. Tirronan, have a google and you'll find a copy of von Rintelen's book available from an Australian version of Project Gutenberg. I've been through a good number of the Room 40 material in Britain and so far have come across nothing to do with the Falkland Islands. In March I picked up the official reports of the Falkland Islands battle and there's no mention in there. Last week I copied both post-war Naval Staff Monographs (official histories) of the battle. There's nothing in those to substantiate von Rintelen's allegation, even though those works do deal with SIGINT and Room 40. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 07:59, 11 May 2011 (UTC)

“ Next morning von Spee, totally ignorant of their [British battle cruisers] presence in the South Atlantic, also approached this remote British coaling station with the intention of destroying the coal stocks and capturing the Governor. This time the tables were turned. It was the Germans who were outclassed and Scharnhorst, Gniesenau, Leipsig, and Nürnberg were all sunk with heavy loss of life, including that of gallant von Spee. Only Dresden managed to escape.

One of the mysteries about the battle of Falkland Islands is why von spee ever decided to try to attack them. Although without shore defences and in no sense a proper naval base, they were, it is true, an important British coaling and wireless station and in consequence constantly used by the Royal Navy's ships. Even before Coronel von Spee had been exchanging messages with the Admiralstab about the possibilities of a break for home and the arrangements for coal and supplies that would be needed, and agents in both North and South America were active in furthering these plans. Cradock achieved at least one thing at Coronel; he caused von Spee to use up a lot of ammunition, and this was something that could only be replaced from Germany. After that battle the die was cast; the East Asiatic Squadron had no option but to try to return to the Fatherland. Why then add to the dangers of an already perilous voyage by an attack on the Falklands? Certainly, there was much needed coal there and its destruction would be another blow to British prestige. On 15 November the German Consul at Punta Arenas informed Valparaiso that all British warships had left the Falklands, and that a German attack was feared. Although Valparaiso did not believe this report and did not forward it to von Spee, there is some evidence that he in fact received it from elsewhere, and a few days later he certainly instructed the commanding officer of one of his auxiliaries to try to find out if the British had abandoned the islands. Now, in some post-war notes by Hall for a lecture on Intelligence we find under the heading Propaganda: 'Can be used for various purposes. 1. To deceive the enemy in order to lead him to take a certain course for which you are prepared (Falkland Islands) ...' It seems at least possible that the rumours were another 'plant' by Hall; if so he certainly made a major contribution to Sturdee's victory because, had von Spee not so rashly approached the islands, it is quite likely that Sturdee would never have intercepted him at all. Whether von Spee could have successfully eluded all the other forces which would then have been hunting for him, is another matter.

”

The idea of targeting the the Falklands for attack wouldn't be strange so long as you were convinced that the British didn't have a squadron there, the next nearest station would have been the Ascension Islands over 800 miles away. In the days of coal, range was much more important that in the age of oil. The heat content of coal is lower and range is even more critical. Further the Falklands base was the hub of communications, either alone would have been enough to attack it, and at least two historians are reporting that German Intelligence was reporting that no squadron was near. The second part of this is much more serious, Giving a false order would have been picked up by 2 to 6 German Embassies and listening stations. These were the same codes that were so vital for the British and were still in use during the Battle of Jutland, and of incredible impact to the battle. Not that it is impossible, but my God what a risk. The most disturbing issue is that we have exactly one account anywhere that this happened. A endorsement in the preamble of a book is hardly a ringing endorsement of a single claim in the book. There is not a single historian backing this claim, not one that I can find. I've spent 3 days going through everything that I can lay hands to in the online British archive without a word on it. Honestly, should you have any substantial collaborating evidence it would be a great find and you would have my congratulations for having brought something new to the table, a rare thing indeed, but this isn't looking very good. Unfortunately, if something doesn't turn up to back this assertion, I'm going to consider it my duty to take this to a content dispute forums and see what we have in a subject matter expert to review what we have found. The reputation of the project's integrity is too important to risk on a single and, so far at least, unsupported fact from a book. While the fellow might have relayed what he thought was the truth, the fact that he was reporting what he heard from a friend and was not involved makes this even more dubious.Tirronan (talk) 16:39, 11 May 2011 (UTC)

Enough is enough, be advised that I have raised this issue with Wikipedia:Fringe theories/Noticeboard.Tirronan (talk) 01:51, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Good luck with that. A cursory read of this page by any neutral observer will show exactly the kind of person you are and the weight that should be ascribed to your arguments. Hubertgrove (talk) 13:07, 13 May 2011 (UTC)

Sigh, Hubertgrove it is my sincere hope that you take a moment and study Wikipedia:Civility before your behavior earns you a ban. Your behavior will not stop me from challenging a poorly supported fringe theory advanced by a single author without a shred of evidence. You quote scholarly behavior and ethics then proceed to violate every principle of it by your actions. Would you care to enlighten me as to which academic review you think your assertion would survive, or how an endorsement in a preamble somehow lent credence to this claim? Please be advised that this is going to be reviewed including your baseless accusations of me and unearned insults of me and thus can be referred for more serious actions. Personal attacks have no business in this kind of discussion, only the facts matter and the rest will matter not a wit to further your cause. It is hard to defend a position when you have a edit ban in effect. Accusing another editor of sock puppetry, or being illiterate, or being a bad person, all of which you have done here is more than enough to earn administrative action. It is counter productive at best.Tirronan (talk) 15:50, 14 May 2011 (UTC)

On to more relevant subjects, unless credible citation can be provided from another source within seven days, the Secret Service Trap theory will be removed as per Wikipedia:UNDUE.Tirronan (talk) 15:50, 14 May 2011 (UTC)

Removal of the Secret Service section, which has already been reviewed by other editors, will be an act of wilful vandalism. The section is verified by three primary sources, a contemporaneous memoir and secondary academic sources. If you continue in your harassment of me and your vandalism of this page, I will report you so that other editors can judge your behaviour. I have also reverted a spoiler edit placed by you. Tirronen, I beg you to be cautious in your next actions. Hubertgrove (talk) 15:59, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

You now have four days till I remove the section under Wikipedia:UNDUE, you have until then to show some real evidence that this indeed happened, please refrain from personal comments, again.Tirronan (talk) 17:48, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Do not vandalise this article, Tirronan. If you do so, I will make a request for arbitration here http://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration/Requests . I will also cite your threats and abuse on this page; on my talk page; and on editor User talk:Jezhotwells page. That cannot end well for you. Hubertgrove (talk) 20:02, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Perhaps your time would be better spent finding an actual citation that this happened, trying to make this personal just isn't going to work, four days.Tirronan (talk) 20:16, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Don't be silly, I have already provided the citations. You need to provde rebuttal. Hubertgrove (talk) 20:39, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

I think the section should be greatly reduced in size and the minor theory given very little weight per WP:NPOV. One paragraph of support, and one paragraph of rebuttal should be enough. None of the canard re Canaris. Certainly, WP:ATTRIBUTEPOV must be invoked for the minor viewpoint. The major viewpoint must not be attacked by snide little comments about mainstream historians not being in the battle. Binksternet (talk) 20:22, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

I have no obections to your suggestion Binksternet. My original edit was just two short paragraphs in length until Tirronan's intervention. Equally, I am not making snide objections to the historians' account; neither Massie nor Ferguson contradict in any way von Rintelen's assertions. Tirronan's edit says that Spee's 'intelligence informed him that the base was free of British inflence' (I paraphrase). Where Spee got his 'intelligence' about the South Atlantic from, is precisely the point of this whole edit. He had, after all, just come from the China Coast.

Also, what do you mean about the 'canard re canaris'. 'Canard' means 'lie'. Canaris was certainly at the battle; he was the Intelligence Officer on the battlecruiser in question; he later became head of the Abwehr. I'm sorry but I don't understand your objection here. Hubertgrove (talk) 20:35, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

In this reversion, you restored material that has been fact-challenged for four years. Why?

You suggest that my word "objectivity" would have been better as "perspective". Why did you not put your suggested word in as replacement?

The Canaris bit is an unnecessary sidebar to the battle. The paragraph about Canaris certainly has nothing to do with a trap laid by British intelligence. In my edit summary I used canard in the very light sense of "tale", with the enjoyment of the similarity to the German officer's name. Forgive me the edit summary pun but please explain your kneejerk reversion of useful changes to the article. Binksternet (talk) 21:29, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

If it was listed as a very minor theory, that is a compromise I can live with.Tirronan (talk) 21:44, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

I have no objections as presenting this edit as a minority opinion but to list it as a 'very minor theory' is to rubbish it and is therefore not acceptable. Hubertgrove (talk) 21:52, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

If I have restored material that has been 'fact-challenged' for four years, this was an error on my part. Naturally, I apologize. I assume you will revert?

I did not replace 'objectivity' with 'perspective' because I assumed I would have to discuss it at excruciating length on the discussion page here which I have had to do to all my edits in this tiny section. Since it is your proposal - with which I agree - that this section be trimmed down to two paragraphs, it will be immaterial anyway. If you wish to insert 'perspective' yourself before the editing, I will not revert.

Well, we obviously differ on what 'canard' means. If you object to mention of [then) Canaris and the destruction of the last German warship involved in the battle, then fair enough. It's not worth more pages of argument.

"...but please explain your kneejerk reversion". Why? Because I made a five line edit to this article two months ago that was sourced and verified, and since then, I have had to put up with constant heckling, threats and abuse from the editor, Tirronan, both in this discussion page, on my own Talk page, on the Talk page of another editor, and in other forums. I understand that I was wrong to revert your edit. However, previous reverts that I have had to make have been legitimate. I hope you will accept my explanation and, again, my apology. Hubertgrove (talk) 21:50, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Bearing in mind, Binksternet's suggestions, I have reduced the text to three shorter paragraphs (one paragraph as set-up, one as major theory, one as minor theory). These do not yet carry citations but I will put these in if the edit is considered acceptable. The promosed text is:

After the disaster, German naval experts were baffled at why Admiral Spee attacked the base and how the two squadrons could have met so coincidentally in so many thousands miles of open waters. Kaiser William II's handwritten note on the official report of the battle reads: "It remains a mystery what made Spee attack the Falkland Islands. See 'Mahan's Naval Strategy'."

On the eve of the battle, Spee called a meeting of his officers and announced that he would attack the Falklands base, which acted as a coaling station and wireless relay station for the British, as his intelligence, received by the German wireless station at Valparaiso, reported the port to be free of warships. Despite the objection of three of his ships captains, the attack would proceed.

One possible explanation is deliberate ambush. 1925 the German naval officer, Franz von Rintelen, interviewed Admiral William Reginald Hall, Director of the Admiraltry's Naval Intelligence Division (NID), and was informed that the Spee Squadron had been lured towards the British battlecruisers squadron by means of a fake signal sent in a German naval code broken by British cryptographers. (Similarly, on 14th March 1915, the last surviving German ship of the battle, the SMS Dresden, was intercepted by British ships while taking on coal at sea in a location identified by NID codebreakers).

If anyone has edit suggestions, please go ahead otherwise, I will replace the existing section with this text over the weekend. Hubertgrove (talk) 09:08, 18 May 2011 (UTC)

Room 40 was providing updates on Spee's progress, so while the Germans would have been mystified I rather doubt the Brits were all that surprised except for the exact timing. I don't contend that there were intelligence operations just the method by which they were used. As a suggestion I would make two small changes. It is perfectly acceptable that there be major/minor theories it is just how they are presented. If presented as below you are showing the majority view then if the second says that von Rintelen reported in his book... you have covered the source without any additional weighting. My only issue has been the lack of any historian support, that would cover it.

Most historians hold that Spee mislead by German intelligence, thought the Falklands port the major British Communications and Coaling port in the area, was absent of any major British Naval presence. Spee called a meeting of his officers and announced that he would attack the Falklands base, which acted as a coaling station and wireless relay station for the British, as his intelligence, received by the German wireless station at Valparaiso, reported the port to be free of warships. Despite the objection of three of his ships captains, the attack would proceed.Tirronan (talk) 09:32, 18 May 2011 (UTC)

Your changes, I think, are to the second paragraph. Accepting your edits in principle, may I suggest we drop 'most historians' since, at the end of this paragraph, we will be putting Massie and Ferguson as citations. However, I do accept that you want this paragraph to establish that this is the majority opinion. The Falklands though was just one of many possible targets for the German squadron (not counting the trade ports, there were coaling stations and wireless facilities available in South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in the same region for example). I have removed one of the reference to the port as a coaling and wireless station (since it is mentioned twice) May I therefore propose?:

It is generally believed that Spee was mislead by the German admiralty into attacking the Falklands port. He called a meeting of his officers and announced that he would attack the base which acted as a coaling station and wireless relay station for the British, as his intelligence, received from the German wireless station at Valparaiso, reported the port to be free of Royal Navy warships. Despite the objection of three of his ships' captains, the attack proceeded.[THEN YOUR MASSEY AND FERGUSON CITATIONS WOULD GO HERE] Hubertgrove (talk) 10:19, 18 May 2011 (UTC)

Perfect.Tirronan (talk) 13:39, 18 May 2011 (UTC)

So, unless there are further amendments, the section will read:

After the disaster, German naval experts were baffled at why Admiral Spee attacked the base and how the two squadrons could have met so coincidentally in so many thousands miles of open waters. Kaiser William II's handwritten note on the official report of the battle reads: "It remains a mystery what made Spee attack the Falkland Islands. See 'Mahan's Naval Strategy'."

It is generally believed that Spee was mislead by the German admiralty into attacking the Falklands. He called a meeting of his officers and announced that he would attack the base which acted as a coaling station and wireless relay station for the British, as his intelligence, received from the German wireless station at Valparaiso, reported the port to be free of Royal Navy warships. Despite the objection of three of his ships' captains, the attack proceeded.

One possible explanation is deliberate ambush. 1925 the German naval officer, Franz von Rintelen, interviewed Admiral William Reginald Hall, Director of the Admiraltry's Naval Intelligence Division (NID), and was informed that the Spee Squadron had been lured towards the British battlecruisers squadron by means of a fake signal sent in a German naval code broken by British cryptographers. (Similarly, on 14th March 1915, the last surviving German ship of the battle, the SMS Dresden, was intercepted by British ships while taking on coal at sea in a location identified by NID codebreakers).

I will insert this edit this weekened unless there are further suggestions and add the citations already presented by Tirronan and myelf. Hubertgrove (talk) 09:14, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

I have placed the insert above in the piece. Almost immediately after it was inserted, it was changed by Binksternet who removed the last line with the rationale that this was irrelevant.I have reverted this edit for the following reasons:

1/. It is relevant to the section since it shows that the NID were active in operations against the Spee operations at the time of the Battle of the Falkland Islands 2/. The Dresden is mentioned earlier in the piece and this is the right place to mention her ultimate fate. 3/. This incident has a verifiable citation to an academic history - Beesly, Patrick (1982). Room 40. London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd.. pp. 77–78. ISBN 0241108640. 4/. This whole section has been subject to long debate on this discussion pages and it was believed, until this new edit, that a satisfactory solution had been arrived at. If this is not the case, may I suggest that the discussion continue on this page rather than on the consensus edit. Hubertgrove (talk) 22:05, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Broadcast of a false order in a broken naval code would have been against the British Naval Staff’s policy as noted by Rear-Admiral Herbert Hope “In a very few months we obtained a very good working knowledge of the organization, operations, and internal economy of the German Fleet. Had we been called upon by the Staff to do so, we could have furnished valuable information as to the movements of submarines, minefields, mine-sweeping, etc. But the Staff was obsessed by the idea of secrecy; they realized that they held the trump card and they worked on the principle that every effort must be made to keep our knowledge up our sleeves for a really great occasion such as the German Fleet coming out in all their strength to throw down the gage of battle. In other words the Staff determined to make use of our information defensively and not offensively” (Beesly, p. 41) No less than Winston Churchill replied most sharply to Admiral Jellico even mentioning the subject by telegraph specifically, so sharp was the concern that the breaking of the German Naval code might be uncovered.(Beesly, p.42) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Tirronen (talk • contribs)

Interesting find but irrelevant here. I have excised the addition. Both Hope's direction and the later Churchill telegram were post-Battle of the Falkland Islands (ie. after the false signal was sent - if one indeed was sent). As such, your discussion of how Room 40 used broken German naval codes should be in a NID/Room 40/British Secret Service article. Perhaps you could write one? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Hubertgrove (talk • contribs)

Hubertgrove, all of your recent reversions have restored the misspelling of Admiralty as "Admiraltry", and they have restored the awkward "battlecruisers squadron" from the more usual "battlecruiser squadron" (not plural). In this manner, your reversions are revealed as unthinking; "kneejerk" was the word I used earlier. Such unconsidered reversions do not aid collegiality between editors, and do not help your position. Binksternet (talk) 06:52, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Next time just correct the typos and keep your ragegasm to yourself. Hubertgrove (talk) 13:38, 10 November 2023 (UTC)

"Was informed that" vs "who said that"

I replaced "was informed that" with "who said that" because "informed" gives factual credence to Admiral Hall's words. Hall may not have relayed the facts, however. I used the words "who said that" regarding Hall because it is neutral relative to status as fact. Binksternet (talk) 22:11, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

This is stylistically and historically incorrect. Rintelen's memoirs are a reliable published source and meet Wikipedia's standards for verifiability. They state specifically that the author received the information about this incident from Admiral Hall (at the Garrick Club in 1925, if you're interested); Admiral Hall himself provides a frontispiece to the book; and AEW Mason, MP, writer and intelligence officer gives the introduction. Therefore 'was informed', the original wording, is already 'neutral relative'.

The new edit seems to attempt to diminish the insert. The speculation that "Hall may not have relayed the facts" is baseless without evidence (I can actually provide evidence that Hall would have been likely to tell Rintelen the truth, if you wish?). Hall and Mason both endorsed Rintelen's book - being both MPs and officers, allowing their names to be associated with lies would have been exceptionally damaging to their public reputation. Perhaps you might find some specific contemporary or academic testimony that contradicts this? I have reverted.

On Friday, I thought we had agreed the edit? Hubertgrove (talk) 22:30, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Information was provided by Room #40 as to the location and sailing orders of Spee but there is some doubt that this actually arrived in time to effect the deployment of the Battle-Cruisers. This had been going on before and after the attempted attack on the Falklands and would be considered standard intelligence operations in as much as intercepting and decoding message traffic and outside the scope of what you have provided issuing of false orders in a broken code. The interception of Dresden's message traffic would be the same. One does not support the other. Again a singular reference without any historian backing it up or official documentation renders this a very weak minority view that should not be buttressed with irrelevant facts in support. If it is to remain it has to be as a minority view. Be aware that according to wp:undue lists per Jim Wales almost verbatim the fact this should not be included at all.Tirronan (talk) 23:00, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

You have posted this twice. Hubertgrove (talk) 23:24, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

No, this is not a stylistic change, nor is it anti-historical. It is a changing of the wording to a neutral tone: "said" for "informed". What is wrong with the word "said"? Nothing. What is wrong with the word "informed"? It adds gravity and weight, in this case helping a minority view sound more important.

Don't hold on too strongly to phrasing of the text you posted for approval on 19 May. I did not have a chance to look it over, so of course I did not agree to it. It will always be subject to amendment anyway, this being Wikipedia. Binksternet (talk) 06:32, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Okay, the word said is replacing informed as it is more neutral, not adding weight to a minority view. Binksternet (talk) 18:45, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

Similarly... Dresden

I removed this parenthetical sentence:

• "(Similarly, on 14th March 1915, the Dresden, was intercepted by British ships while taking on coal at sea in a location identified by NID codebreakers)"

The reference is Patrick Beesly's Room 40.

I removed this bit for two reasons: This article is not the article Battle of Más a Tierra in which the Dresden is located and sunk, and the Dresden bit is not at all related to a trap being laid by the Secret Service. I sense that the Dresden bit was stuck in for the purpose of bolstering the wobbly validity of the minor Secret Service trap view, but in this role it fails; it is a red herring. Binksternet (talk) 22:11, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

I will revert this for the following reasons: this article deals with the fate of the German ships that fought at the Battle of the Falkland Islands. The Dresden fled the battle and her interception was by two of Sturdee's ships who had also been at the battle. Their action was part of the pursuit of the battle and assisted by NID code intercepts which are part of the whole story of the battle. For all these reasons, I suggest the edit must be restored to its original.

Binkersnet talks about "the wobbly validity of the minor Secret Service trap view". That is original research and speculation http://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/Wikipedia:No_original_research. It should be rethought regarding bias http://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view . The desire to discredit this "view" is, by Wikipedia standards, not a good enough sole reason to make the edits - unless Binkersnet can provide a citation? Hubertgrove (talk) 22:21, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Information was provided by Room #40 as to the location and sailing orders of Spee but there is some doubt that this actually arrived in time to effect the deployment of the Battle-Cruisers. This had been going on before and after the attempted attack on the Falklands and would be considered standard intelligence operations in as much as intercepting and decoding message traffic and outside the scope of what you have provided issuing of false orders in a broken code. The interception of Dresden's message traffic would be the same. One does not support the other. Again a singular reference without any historian backing it up or official documentation renders this a very weak minority view that should not be buttressed with irrelevant facts in support. If it is to remain it has to be as a minority view. Be aware that according to wp:undue lists per Jim Wales almost verbatim the fact this should not be included at all.Tirronan (talk) 23:03, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

If I may address your points individually?;

"Information was provided by Room #40 as to the location and sailing orders of Spee but there is some doubt that this actually arrived in time to effect the deployment of the Battle-Cruisers." Surely this is not relevant since Spee and all his squadron except the Drseden and one auxilliary ship were already sunk? We are referring to post-battle follow-up operations which most certainly were directed by naval intelligence - the operation against the Dresden being the result of NID codebreaking and covered in Patrick Beesley's "Room 40".

"...standard intelligence operations in as much as intercepting and decoding message traffic and outside the scope of what you have provided issuing of false orders in a broken code..." Your opinions as to what constitutes "standard intelligence operations" are irrelevant. Sturdee's ships were able to intercept this ship because of NID's code warfare operations. That is historically verifiable.

"The interception of Dresden's message traffic would be the same. One does not support the other." That's your opinion. Wikipedia has strict guidelines regarding opinion. Verifiable published sources disagree.

"Again a singular reference without any historian backing it up or official documentation renders this a very weak minority view that should not be buttressed with irrelevant facts in support." It's not "a singular reference without any historian backing it up". To describe it this way is inaccurate. You're refighting an old battle. We agreed to the format of this edit. It went in the way you approved.

"Be aware that according to wp:undue lists per Jim Wales almost verbatim the fact this should not be included at all." Jim Wales statements on verifiability and bias say it most certainly should be. Read them here: wp:npov and wp:verifiability Hubertgrove (talk) 23:15, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes I disagree and your edit is reverted.Tirronan (talk) 23:53, 22 May 2011 (UTC)

I have answered all your points. Your reversion is vandalism. If you revert it again, you will be reported. At that stage, I will be able to present your own comment - Perfect.Tirronan (talk) 13:39, 18 May 2011 (UTC) - that you made on the original edit that you are now trying to vandalise. I beg you to think clearly now because a simple recounting of your actions to an impartial observer might make it seem that you are being stupid and spiteful. Hubertgrove (talk) 00:02, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes but the point was brought up that the Dresden sinking had nothing to do with issuing false orders and can't be used, sorry about that but you are reverted.Tirronan (talk) 00:06, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Yes, but that point was irrelevant. The Dresden sinking had everything to do with NID code warfare - as did the original Battle of the Falklands. For goodness sake, the whole section is about this very subject. I have reverted your spite edit once again. YOU ALREADY AGREED TO THIS COPY ON FRIDAY. Hubertgrove (talk) 00:10, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

I will ask that this revert be reviewed in a resolution dispute procedure by other editors tomorrow. Hubertgrove (talk) 01:10, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

The fate of the Dresden is already in the article, under "Outcome". There is no need to elaborate further in a new section called "Secret Service trap". The intelligence that led to the location and destruction of the Dresden has nothing to do with a notional Secret Service trap laid by false signals. Binksternet (talk) 06:46, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

I will be making no more edits for this page for the next 24 hours edit warring really is not approved of here.Tirronan (talk) 01:28, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

That is a wise decision. You should not have reverted the edit the second time at all. Your actions are discussed here:

http://en.wiki.x.io/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators%27_noticeboard/Edit_warring#User:Hubertgrove_reported_by_User:Tirronan_.28Result:_.29

Hubertgrove (talk) 02:27, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Okay, the "Similarly... Dresden" bit has been taken out as redundant. The fate of the Dresden is already discussed in Outcome. Binksternet (talk) 18:45, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

That still leaves the paragraph from Rear Admiral Hope about using the decodes defensively and not offensively, given that it is covers the area concerned intelligence and code breaking, and the time frame is appropriate I still think that it should be included. I rather doubt that it can ever be conclusively proven that such a signal could have been made, but it does illustrate that it would have been counter to every other code breaking effort run by British Intelligence during the war.Tirronan (talk) 20:09, 27 May 2011 (UTC)

I've found the work "The Dark Invader". The main pages concerned are 80 to 83. You can find the work quite easily in freeview over the net now. The writer, von Rintelen, was a relatively junior intelligence officer in the German Admiralty, and was not present at the battle - so he's hardly an eye witness to events. He is repeating assertions he claims Lord Herschell and Admiral Hall made to him in 1925. The story supposedly given by Lord Herschell is that in order to trick German intelligence that dummy battle cruisers were constructed out of wood and canvas and towed into the Mediterranean, where they replaced the Invincible and Inflexible, which were guarding against any attempt by the Goeben to break out of the Dardanelles and were at anchor in the Aegean. The real battle cruisers left at night (so as not to be seen by the Islanders), and then proceeded past the Straight of Gibraltar, and then headed "south west" into the Atlantic, to the predetermined battle location of the Falkland Islands. Admiral Hall, supposedly claimed that one of his agents was present in Berlin, forged the German Admiralty seals, and send an encoded telegram to von Spee in Valparaiso. It was this telegram (not a direct radio transmission to von Spee) which supposedly ordered von Spee to attack the Falklands. The claim was this ruse was necessary so German intelligence wouldn't notice that any of the Royal Navy's battle cruisers were "missing".

How reliable is this assertion? Well for one thing, Lord Herschell's supposed story simply doesn't fit with the known facts. HMS Invincible wasn't in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of the War, and wasn't involved in the pursuit of SMS Goeben (that was HMS Indomitable and Inflexible). Instead she was refitting at home, and took part in the first battle of Helgoland. HMS Inflexible had been chasing SMS Goeben, but was ordered back on 18th August (6 weeks before the battle of Coronel), leaving HMS Indomitable to guard the Goeben. Furthermore both ships left from HMS Davenport at Plymouth, Invincible carrying some very unhappy civilian workers to reline her fireboxes and boilers. They didn't sail past Gibraltar and head "southwest" in the general direction of the Falklands! To my mind this makes the story highly suspect. Lord Herschell doesn't even seem to have been aware of the location of the battle cruisers before Sturdee was ordered to the South Atlantic, much less privy to the "inside information" as to how von Spee was "tricked"! Then the Admiral Hall story is that he had an agent in Berlin, who was given a fake message that was encoded in the latest German naval cipher, and sent it, apparently via a German telegram office! What a risk, giving the intelligence coup of the war (namely the breaking of the German codes) to an agent in the enemy's capital! The claim isn't that it was a fake signal (implying a radio message sent from Room 40), but a forged telegram sent by an agent in Berlin! The story sounds highly suspicious given there is no other source cited, particularly when obviously untrue assertions are made about Invincible and Inflexible being sent from the Aegean directly to the Falklands without any time in Britain whatsoever, particularly when both ships were in home waters by the time of the Battle of Coronel!

This book also seems to be the source of the claim that von Spee should have shelled Sturdee's fleet when his original ships made their first reconnaissance, and that he would, somehow, have won had he done this (a terrible slight on one of the German navy's finest commanders IMHO). In fact, as the main article states, Sturdee put to sea within 30 minutes of the Canopus opening fire on von Spee's ships. The battle cruisers would hardly have still been coaling at the time of the approach, as I cannot see how Sturdee could have completed coaling, fired his boilers and raised steam to leave the harbour in that short length of time. From what I can see, von Rintelen never held a sea going command, being primarily an intelligence officer, so I don't think he's particularly authoritative in this speculation - certainly no better than von Spee, who was actually there and a proven commander. Besides, whilst battle cruiser armour was "suspect" against capital ship weaponry, it was adequate against the 8.25" weapons of von Spee's armoured cruisers. It is also ignored that von Spee encountered Craddock's force at Coronel despite thousands of miles of ocean. Surely von Spee should have avoided all contact, since he was thousands of miles from a friendly port, with limited ability to replenish ammunition, and very limited ability to repair battle damage. I agree with Tirronan, there was nothing "risky" about attacking Port Stanley in and of itself. It was considerably less risky than attacking Craddock's force. It was also a means to damage Britain's war effort - surely von Spee's duty - and equivalent to SMS Emden's attack on the telegraph station at the Cocos Islands (which led to her demise at the hands of the Sydney). Von Spee was clearly attempting to return home, but harassing Britain's war effort en route. Port Stanley is close to Cape Horn, one of the "choke points" of seaborne traffic, and the trade ports cited were all in neutral countries - von Spee was hardly going to attack Argentine ports. But damaging Port Stanley would hamper British use of it as a base. If his aim was to simply engage in commerce raiding, he'd surely have broken up his squadron, and scattered them across the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic oceans. They'd have been much harder to track and destroy, and been able to cause far more damage. That's what he did with the Emden. He was known to fear the speed and firepower of the battle cruiser HMAS Australia, and with the Indian Ocean dominated by Britain, his best route back to Germany was via Cape Horn - there were at least substantial neutral harbours along the South American coast, and a much lower Royal Navy presence. Nor could he have stayed in Valparaiso – he could only stay 24 hours in a neutral port without being interred, unless he was making basic repairs to make his vessel seaworthy. His home base had already fallen, as had the German possessions in New Guinea, leaving him without a base. Keeping his squadron together suggests he was aiming to head home. Damaging Port Stanley would be en route to Germany, and surely something any diligent commander would have done in von Spee's position. As for attacking the Port bringing down the weight of the Royal Navy on the squadron - surely the same argument can be made against fighting Craddock's force! It was to avenge Coronel that the battle cruisers were sent hunting him, and, unlike the Falklands, Cradock's squadron could at least fire back and inflict damage on von Spee's ships that would have been difficult to repair in the circumstances. I think that undue weight is being placed in a single memoir of a former German intelligence officer, who is more notable for his acts of sabotage and conspiracy in the US during the War, than in his involvement in any naval planning. Even he isn't reporting on things he saw, merely the claims made by others years after the events, claims which are at divergence with the known facts in many cases. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 158.89.1.33 (talk) 09:10, 5 July 2012 (UTC)

Geopolitical Section

I've edited out the section that was glued on to the Secret Service Trap section. This deleted content veered into areas that just are not covered in battle articles normally and this seems a real stretch reading it. My stance is that this is just way too wide a subject for a small naval battle to get into. If there are strong feelings about this we can discuss.Tirronan (talk) 09:09, 22 November 2011 (UTC)

I would agree, this is a modern reinterpretation of events that isn't supported by the historical record. Von Spee's intention was to raid the Wireless station in Port Stanley, there was no intention to occupy the islands. Wee Curry Monster talk 09:34, 22 November 2011 (UTC)

Kwendolk (talk) 14:28, 24 May 2014 (UTC)

HMS Macedonia

Hello - I have been working on the Old Weather project, which in its first two phases transcribed the log pages of 318 Royal Navy ships, many of whom participated in WWI. In the course of this work, my colleagues realized we had the log books for all the British ships involved in the Battle of the Falkland Islands. HMS Macedonia, an armed merchant cruiser, participated in this battle, in company with HMS Bristol. She should be added to this article. This link, http://www.naval-history.net/OWShips-WW1-08-HMS_Macedonia.htm, will take you to her logs, which provide a detailed description of her activities during the battle. Per agreement, the log book transcriptions do not constitute original research and can be used in Wiki articles. This link: http://forum.oldweather.org/index.php?topic=4044.msg79273#msg79273 provides the format for log book citations in Wiki articles. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Kwendolk (talk • contribs) 14:22, 24 May 2014 (UTC)

Secret service?

Can someone knowledgeable please clarify, does "Secret Service" in the section Secret service trap refer to the Secret Intelligence Service? Or would it be the Naval Intelligence Division responsible for this sort of action during WWI? Billlion (talk) 09:00, 25 October 2014 (UTC)