Talk:1996 Channel Tunnel fire

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This is a great article! --Mr. Blake 11:34, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Nice of you to take the time to say so. Personally, I think the descriptions are too complex. Some graphics would help but I haven't the time to do them. Ecb 21:47, 17 July 2006 (UTC)

Artfully sanitised.--Achim 19:45, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

Achim, looking at this and at our past discussions on Talk:Channel Tunnel, I get the feeling that your contribution above aims to damn this article with faint praise. If this is so, then I am offended.

I did not intend to write an "artfully sanitised" description of the fire, and I think I succeeded. The things that Eurotunnel were heavily criticised for (e.g. poor operational procedures) are emphasised: the things that were mentioned in passing (e.g. spalling concrete hampering the firefighting operations, no fire separation in the HGV carrier wagons) are hardly mentioned.

On Wikipedia, we ought to all assume good faith. So ironic comment (if that is what your contribution is?) is no use. If you can be more specific about what you believe has been sanitised, and can point to direct references that support your viewpoint, then we can modify the article to address those points.

Ecb 21:47, 17 July 2006 (UTC)

You included nothing about the applicability of STUVA findings or the Eureka findings, which have been incorporated into applicable codes on the continent. I repeated several of the references more than once on the previous talk page. It's an undersea tunnel with no fireproofing (incomprehensible in itself) and the fire chewed up the concrete down to a thickness of two inches, which was widely reported in fire protection cirlces outside the tunnel business. The project management cancelled the purpose-designed fire doors on the cars. All of this was described and you said nothing about any of it. But frankly, I'm tired or arguing about it because we've both been there and done that. It is inconceivable for any fire protection insider to think that Eureka findings and STUVA findings would be inapplicable to any underground traffic thoroughfare such as this. If it were inapplicable, why would so many European governments have actively participated? What more can I say? After all the time spent going over this material, on the record, I could easily be offended that you took absolutely no notice of it. After all that? You won't look at the role of passive fire protection despite an abundance of peer reviewed, empirical and interpreted evidence, which was provided to you in writing. There is no logical basis for ignoring such facts that I can think of, particularly, since the discussion of them are exclusively what led you to this re-write. --Achim 02:15, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

It is known in fire protection circles, that fire modelling had an influence on the design of the fire safety plan and systems in this facility. Contrary to common practice in many modern subterranean tunnel facilities, this tunnel omitted fireproofing, which resulted in the reduction of the concrete liner to a thickness of 2". Is there any official statement on the difference between the models used and what really happened and the cost cutting measures that were instituted on the basis of the models? What was the modelling program used and the experience of the party responsible for the modelling? Furthermore, what is the technological basis for continuing to omit fireproofing in this undersea tunnel? I offer the following as an intellectual framework on the topic of fire modelling and performance based codes:

http://www.geocities.com/achim_hering/Articles/performance_based_building_codes.html

As well, before judging passive fire protection measures for traffic tunnels, I suggest a look at the following: Eureka "Firetun" project:

http://www.sp.se/fire/Eng/Protection/Tunnel.htm

Also: http://www.stuva.de/index-e.html

Furthermore, pictures and data concerning this topic can be seen on this page: http://www.promat-tunnel.com/idprt001.htm

A balanced approach to fire protection includes all three aspects:

• passive fire protection
• active fire protection
• education

--Achim 22:17, 29 July 2006 (UTC)

Some clarification required

Red signals?

The article states that 7539 stopped at a red signal before entering the tunnel. In fact there are no line side signals in the TVM 430 in-cab signalling scheme. The stop indication is a flashing '000' on the in cab TVM430 display (the target speed), which instructs the driver to stop at the next section marker.

Position of the amenity car

The article gives a bit more than an impression that the amenity car was at the front of the train. The amenity car is in fact located at the French end of all HGV shuttle trains. It is not moved from one end of the train to the other as the journey direction changes. In the subject train where the train was heading towards the UK, the amenity car would have been at the rear of the train. The report that I read suggested that some smoke had entered the car while the train was still moving. This is consistent with the car being behind the source of that smoke.

86.132.205.207 10:54, 11 February 2007 (UTC)

User:86.132.205.207 has two objections here. I don't know or care whether the red signal was on the cab console or on a line side signal post, so I'll leave that to others. But the amenity coach was unquestionably at the front (UK end) of the train in November 1996, and that was the usual position.

The report of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority into the fire (first reference in the article, it's available online) shows clearly that in train 7539, the amenity coach was at the front the train (Figure 7). In chapter 1, paragraph 8 (page 6) the report confirms that this was normal practice at the time of the fire: it says that "The Amenity Coach is normally situated immediately behind the train's leading locomotive."

Eurotunnel's policy may well be different now (they might now put the amenity coach at the French end—I don't know) but it was definitely at the UK end in train 7539.

As an aside, I'd be surprised if they do put the amenity coach at the rear of the train on a regular basis. If they've got a fire on a truck in the middle of a train stopped in the tunnel, the duty RCC has the choice of blowing smoke past the train driver (bad) or blowing smoke past the truck drivers and train crew (worse). Could a Eurotunnel employee comment?

Ecb 20:28, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

The HGV Shuttle travels in a figure of eight. The amenity coach is behind the lead locomotive, which always leads irrespective of the direction of travel. Edgepedia (talk) 05:21, 28 September 2008 (UTC)

Rake?

This article says "rake" alot but i think it is supposed to be "rack". Is "rake" a British spelling of "rack"? Or is it a bunch of typeos? Because rake usally refers to Rake (tool) --Nick Scratch 22:06, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

It's definitely rake, which is Eurotunnel's term for its rolling stock. See the attached link, which is the glossary from the inquiry report into the fire:

• http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/safetystandards/safety/ctsa/inquiry/inquiryintothefireonheavygoo3480?page=39#1056

I'll alter the text to explain what a rake is the first time it occurs in the text. Cheers, Ecb 16:49, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

Multiple issues

The lack of inline citations is a problem. However I have some factual issues that need resolving- the article claims that Eurotunnel "modified its HGV transporter wagons to incorporate water fog fire suppression" - I need a reference for that - specifically I doubt this - as it doesn't appear to have worked or been present in the later fire ??

Also the list of safety issues is problematic eg 1996_Channel_Tunnel_fire#Safety_features_at_the_time_of_the_fire - what exactly is the point of this section - the fire happened - therefor it is an absence of safety feature or control that is relavent surely.

The consequences section ignores some recommendations that were not carried out. [1] and [2]

It is also relavent that the original design specifications were ignored ( see around page 60+ and page 3 onwards ) specifically the original design called for the same safety features in the HGV wagons as in the car transporters, and subsequently downgraded. Imgaril (talk) 16:36, 7 July 2011 (UTC)

update - http://www.nce.co.uk/eurotunnel-calls-for-fire-suppression-rethink-after-channel-tunnel-fire/1948723.article pretty much sums up the lie - after two fires still rejecting installing a fire suppresion system in the HVG wagons ... The "fog mist" bits have been removed now - I think the article just needs a very heavy cleanup. The balance issues are still there.Imgaril (talk) 20:30, 7 July 2011 (UTC)

(after edit conflict) Water fog suppressors were not installed and if they were the fire-fighting stations in the tunnel being made operational by Eurotunnel some time this year would be not needed. I've removed that phase.

The article dates back to the earlier days of Wikipedia when inline citing was not a requirement or common and I agree it's a mess. I looked at it a couple of years ago and considered it needed major rewriting to ensure a NPOV and everthing referenced to a reliable source. I think the list of safety features and the timeline need to be rewritten - the safety features set the scene, the timeline tells you what happens and both need to be rewritten together. Deleting one section without looking at the subsequent sections is dangerous.

Do you think you are overcooking your comments about the design of the HGV Wagons? As far as I can see the design of the HGV wagons was not mentioned in either the report into this fire or the 2008 fire, and no recommendations were made. I can't see page 60 in the book you reference but page 3 talks about "design assumptions", different from "specification". Edgepedia (talk) 20:41, 7 July 2011 (UTC)

That lack of inline referencing is an issue, but some of the other points seem less credible to me. Yes, there was a fire - that is precisely the tiem fire safety measures come into operation. The fact that the fire happened does not make those provisions moot - consider that no one died. In a tunnel as long as the this simply keeping people supplied with breathable air represents a formidable challenge. A review of the provisions in place is needed to put the events into context.

As for the consequences, you are complaining that we do not cover something that was not a consequence. It is comparatively rare for the findings of an official report to be accepted in full and this was not one of those occassions. That possibly makes it background to subsequent events but does not affect what happened here. I would not object to some coverage of what you mention but we need to keep it in balance - a suggestion that recommendations were "ignored", for example, would never pass NPOV. Crispmuncher (talk) 20:58, 7 July 2011 (UTC).

Thanks for your replys - basically I think a modern cleanup would fix most of the issues. I would find it difficult to do this myself as I am not yet familiar with the accident reports, as well as finding it difficult staying on the right side of NPOV given my view of the fire occuring in the wagons that had no fire protection or suppression equipment as highly ironic.

Post fire the responses external to the enquiry include [3] Arup [4] Fire Brigades union , [5] Consumers' Association [6] Members of Parliament Gwyneth Dunwoody - quote

"Is he also aware that the safety authority originally recommended that semi-open wagons should not be used for the carriage of heavy goods vehicles ... Given that the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority changed its original advice, because it was told that it should take account of the costs and commercial interests of the channel tunnel operators.."

- this is regarding the design of the wagons I mentioned above

I hope someone can make use of these and make a better article. Good luck, I would have real difficulty remaining neutral on this one. (Opinion) Stupidity seems to be the key here since it cost eurotunnel €300 million lost revenue. Imgaril (talk) 22:16, 7 July 2011 (UTC)