Wikipedia

Barbados Agreement

The Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All (in Spanish: Acuerdo parcial sobre la promoción de derechos políticos y garantías electorales para todos), most commonly known simply as the Barbados Agreement, is a pair of agreements signed by the Maduro government and the Venezuelan opposition Plataforma Unitaria Democrática in October 2023, in Bridgetown, Barbados.

History

edit

The agreement is part of broader efforts to ease dialogue between the Venezuelan government and the opposition as well as promoting negotiations aiming at free and fair elections in the country and the welfare of the Venezuelan people.[1][2] Norway has worked as the main mediator both in the broad talks and in the Partial Agreement.[improper synthesis?][3][4]

Text

edit

The agreement was:[5]

PARTIAL AGREEMENT ON THE PROMOTION OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ELECTORAL GUARANTEES FOR ALL

The parties, designated for the purposes of this process as the "Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" and the "Unitary Platform of Venezuela", acting in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding signed on August 13, 2021, in Ciudad de Mexico, United Mexican States:

Acting under the protection of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Organic Law of Electoral Processes and other applicable regulations;

Committed to strengthening an inclusive democracy and a culture of tolerance and political coexistence;

Ratifying the will to agree on the necessary conditions for the electoral processes enshrined in the Constitution to be carried out, with all the guarantees;

Rejecting any form of political violence against Venezuela, its State and its institutions:

Taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the agreed schedule, referring to "Political Rights for all" and "Electoral guarantees for all", based on the provisions of paragraph 2 of the "General Terms" contained in the Memorandum of Understanding referred to above,

AGREE

FIRST: the parties recognize and respect the right of each political actor to choose their candidate for the presidential elections freely and in accordance with their internal mechanisms, taking into account the provisions of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the law.

SECOND: the parties will jointly promote before the National Electoral Council, as the constitutional body governing the electoral processes, a set of electoral guarantees for all actors with a view to the upcoming presidential electoral process, based on the provisions of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Organic Law of Electoral Processes and other applicable legal norms.

THIRD: the electoral guarantees for all the actors referred to in this Partial Agreement, and which will be jointly promoted by the parties, will include the following aspects:

1. The proposal that the presidential electoral process be carried out in the second half of 2024, taking into account the constitutional schedule.

2. The execution of the update of the Permanent Electoral Registry, including:

a. Specific days to update registries and data.

b. Informational campaigns and promotion of registration and data updating.

c. Establishment of registration and update points throughout the national territory, with the presence of witnesses from political actors.

d. Continuation of the identification process throughout the country and development of special identification operations, in accordance with the law.

e. Carrying out sessions to update the Electoral Registry abroad, with no limitations other than those provided for in the Constitution and the law.

f. Clean-up of the Electoral Registry inconsistencies.

3. The enforcement all audits planned in the Venezuelan electoral system, including those related to the Electoral Registry, with the participation of all political actors, international observers and national companions, in accordance with the electoral law.

4. The request for invitation to agreed technical electoral observation missions, including the European Union, the UN Panel of Electoral Experts, the African Union, the Inter-American Union of Electoral Organizations and the Carter Center, for the purposes of observing the electoral process presidential, with strict adherence to the Constitution, the law and the agreements signed with the Electoral Branch, without prejudice to the right of political actors to invite national and international companions, within the framework of the law.

5. The promotion of public discourse and a political and social climate favorable to the development of a peaceful and participatory electoral process, without external interference, with respect for citizens, the electoral authority, political actors, the Constitution and the laws from the country. The parties reject any form of violence in the exercise of politics, as well as any type of actions that threaten the sovereignty, peace and territorial integrity of Venezuela.

6. The request to all political actors and public officials to respect and comply with the electoral regulations and the decisions of the National Electoral Council during the development of the campaign.

7. The requirement for the competent authorities to adopt measures to guarantee security, freedom of movement and assembly for all candidates throughout the national territory, with no limitations other than those provided for in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the law. The parties will promote the lifting of any measure that may affect the security of the candidates and other political actors.

8. The recognition of the right of political actors to have transparent financing mechanisms that ensure neatness in their origin and management, with no limitations other than those provided for in the Constitution and the law.

9. The promotion of balance in public and private media, as well as ensuring equality of all candidates in access to national and international media and social networks, as well as in public spaces under the administration of the State, within the framework of the provisions of national legislation.

10. The participation of all local, national and international media and social networks will be promoted in the coverage of the electoral campaign, in accordance with the provisions of the law and the procedures established by the competent authorities.

11. The authorization will be promoted to all presidential candidates and political parties, provided they meet the requirements established to participate in the presidential election, consistent with the procedures established in Venezuelan law; also in accordance with the principles of speed, efficiency and effectiveness included in the Constitution.

12. The public recognition of the results of the presidential elections.

FOURTH: The parties will ensure that the electoral conditions referred to in this agreement are equally applicable to the rest of the electoral processes that must be carried out, in accordance with the constitutional election schedule, without prejudice to the fact that they may be extended for said processes.

FIFTH: In accordance with point 7 of the agreed schedule contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, the parties have defined a monitoring and verification mechanism in accordance with the guidelines that govern the dialogue and negotiation process.

SIXTH: Within the framework of the schedule agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding, the parties will continue the process of dialogue and negotiation in relation to other measures aimed at strengthening an inclusive democracy and a culture of tolerance and political coexistence, as well as respect for human rights; understanding the need for sanctions against the Venezuelan State to be lifted and claiming independence, freedom, sovereignty, immunity, territorial integrity and national self-determination as inalienable rights of the nation.

Aftermath and reactions

edit

Five people jailed in Venezuela were released on October 19, 2023, including journalist Roland Carreno of the opposition party Popular Will and former legislator Juan Requesens of the Justice First party, who was under house arrest.[6]

National Assembly of Venezuela president and Maduro government negotiator Jorge Rodríguez called the agreement "the first step towards a civic culture of tolerance and search for agreements and dialogues." Opposition negotiator Gerardo Blyde [es] stated that "this is a first partial agreement. Many points that have already been contemplated in the memorandum of understanding signed in Mexico are yet to be met" adding that the agreements previously made have been progressively fulfilled.[7]

The United States and European Union celebrated the agreement.[8] On 17 October 2023, the U.S. government stated that it welcomes the agreement, as it "represents a necessary step in the continuation of an inclusive dialogue process and the restoration of democracy in Venezuela."[9] The U.S. also eased some of its sanctions on Venezuela oil, gas and gold sectors, warning that it could reverse the relief if the agreement collapses.[10] Human rights NGO Foro Penal, while celebrating the release of the five detainees, condemned the lack of transparency in the negotiations and declared that 270 political prisoners remained detained in Venezuela as of October 2023, when the agreement was signed.[11][12]

Broken agreement

edit

Despite the agreement, leading opposition candidate María Corina Machado was disqualified from the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election by Venezuela's Supreme Tribunal of Justice in January 2024.[13]

Following poor turnout in the 2023 Venezuelan referendum, the chief prosecutor of Venezuela, Tarek William Saab, accused opposition leaders of sabotaging the referendum and issued arrest warrants for 15 of them, with charges such as treason and conspiracy.[14] Saab—under sanctions for multiple alleged offenses—is charged by human rights organizations as "being one of the key people in the regime's efforts to use the Venezuelan justice system as an instrument of political persecution", according to an August 2024 Miami Herald article.[15]

With the main opposition candidate banned from running, the US stated that Maduro's government had "fallen short" on its commitments, and reinstated some sanctions in April 2024.[16][17]

Organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the European Union, and Human Rights Watch, and countries including Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Canada, United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany rejected Machado's disqualification.[18] Several foreign political leaders condemned the disqualification, including President Luis Lacalle Pou of Uruguay, President Mario Abdo Benítez of Paraguay, and President Gustavo Petro of Colombia.[19][20] At the Mercosur summit, President Alberto Fernández of Argentina and President Lula da Silva of Brazil declined to reject the disqualification.[21][22] Antony Blinken, US Secretary of State, called Machado's disqualification "deeply unfortunate".[23] The European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, stated that the disqualification "undermines democracy".[24][25] On 13 July 2023, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning the disqualification.[26]

See also

edit

References

edit
  1. ^ "Venezuela delegation arrives in Mexico for talks with opposition". Reuters. 2022-11-26. Retrieved 2023-10-21.
  2. ^ "Maduro government, opposition sign 'partial agreements' – DW – 09/04/2021". dw.com. Retrieved 2023-10-21.
  3. ^ Torrado, Santiago (2021-08-19). "La diplomacia de la paz de Noruega deja huella en América Latina". El País (in Spanish). Retrieved 2023-10-21.
  4. ^ "Gobierno de Noruega tantea nuevo diálogo en Venezuela antes de elecciones en EE.UU". Voz de América (in Spanish). 2020-07-27. Retrieved 2023-10-21.
  5. ^ "Acuerdo parcial sobre la promoción de derechos políticos y garantías electorales para todos". Misión Verdad (in Spanish). 2023-10-18. Retrieved 2023-10-19.  This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  6. ^ "Five prisoners released in Venezuela after opposition deal, US demands". Reuters. 2023-10-19. Retrieved 2023-10-19.
  7. ^ "Detalles: Todos los puntos que contemplan los nuevos acuerdos entre el Gobierno de Venezuela y la oposición". El Universal (in Spanish). 2023-10-18. Retrieved 2023-10-19.
  8. ^ "EE.UU. y la UE celebran el acuerdo alcanzado con Venezuela para unas "elecciones justas"". Infobae (in Spanish). 2023-10-18. Retrieved 2023-10-21.
  9. ^ "Joint Statement on Venezuela Negotiations". United States Department of State. Retrieved 2023-10-19.
  10. ^ "US eases Venezuela oil sanctions after election deal". BBC News. 2023-10-19. Retrieved 2023-10-19.
  11. ^ "Foro Penal recordó que aún hay 270 presos políticos" [NGO Foro Penal recalled that there are still 270 political prisoners and called for their release]. El Pitazo (in Spanish). 2023-10-19. Retrieved 2023-10-20.
  12. ^ Suarez, Mariela (2023-10-19). "Foro Penal condena falta de transparencia en negociaciones: liberan cinco presos políticos y aún quedan 270". Foro Penal (in Spanish). Retrieved 2023-10-21.
  13. ^ "Venezuela's Supreme Court disqualifies opposition leader from running for president". Le Monde.fr. AFP. 27 January 2024. Archived from the original on 27 March 2024. Retrieved 8 March 2024.
  14. ^ Genevieve Glatsky; Isayen Herrera (6 December 2023). "Venezuela Orders Arrest of Top Opposition Figures, Claiming Treason". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 14 December 2023. Retrieved 7 December 2023.
  15. ^ Delgado, Antonio Maria (19 August 2024). "Venezuela could charge opposition leader Machado with murder, regime's prosecutor says". MiamiHerald. Retrieved 19 August 2024. Also available at Colorado Springs Gazette
  16. ^ "US reimposes oil sanctions on Venezuela after broken election promises". Archived from the original on 11 July 2024. Retrieved 11 July 2024.
  17. ^ Glatsky, Genevieve (17 April 2024). "U.S. Restores Oil Sanctions on Venezuela as Hopes Dim for Free Election". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 11 July 2024. Retrieved 11 July 2024.
  18. ^ "¿Cómo ha sido el apoyo de la comunidad internacional a María Corina Machado?" [How has the international community supported María Corina Machado?]. El Nacional (in Spanish). 8 July 2023. Archived from the original on 9 July 2023. Retrieved 12 July 2023.
  19. ^ Maza, Jesús (4 July 2023). "Mercosur: Luis Lacalle pide "alzar la voz" por la inhabilitación de María Corina Machado". La República (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 29 July 2024. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
  20. ^ "Presidente de Paraguay denuncia veto a María Corina Machado". Diario Las Américas (in Spanish). 4 July 2023. Archived from the original on 10 July 2023. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
  21. ^ "La reacción de Alberto Fernández luego de que Uruguay y Paraguay denunciaran la inhabilitación de María Corina Machado en Venezuela". infobae (in European Spanish). 4 July 2023. Archived from the original on 10 July 2023. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
  22. ^ "María Corina Machado, no es Sergio Moro, es Lula da Silva". Urgente24 – primer diario online con las últimas noticias de Argentina y el mundo en tiempo real (in European Spanish). Archived from the original on 10 July 2023. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
  23. ^ "Blinken: "Profundamente desafortunada" la inhabilitación de María Corina Machado en Venezuela". Voz de América (in Spanish). 7 July 2023. Archived from the original on 10 July 2023. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
  24. ^ "Unión Europea expresa "preocupación" por inhabilitación de precandidata María Corina Machado en Venezuela". El Comercio (in Spanish). AFP. 3 July 2023. ISSN 1605-3052. Archived from the original on 10 July 2023. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
  25. ^ "La UE rechazó la inhabilitación de María Corina Machado en Venezuela: "Le impiden ejercer su derecho político"". Infobae (in Spanish). 4 July 2023. Archived from the original on 10 July 2023. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
  26. ^ Gutiérrez, Jeanfreddy (11 July 2024). "ICS resucitó para publicar encuesta inconsistente con 56,9% para Maduro". Efecto Cocuyo (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 16 July 2024. Retrieved 16 July 2024.

Further reading

edit
Retrieved from "https://en.wiki.x.io/w/index.php?title=Barbados_Agreement&oldid=1245024838"