The Ethica (Ethics), also known as Scito te ipsum (Know Yourself), is a twelfth-century philosophical treatise by Peter Abelard. In it, Abelard argues that sin or "scorn for God" is fundamentally a matter of consent, not deeds.
| Author | Peter Abelard |
|---|---|
| Language | Latin |
| Genre | Philosophy |
Publication date | c. 1138–1139 |
| Publication place | France |
Background and publication history
editAbelard and other medieval philosophers wrestled with the problem of sin. The essential penitentials of Abelard's time implied that both thoughts and actions constituted sin, with the Decretum by Burchard of Worms going so far as to suggest that planning to commit wrongful acts was indistinguishable from performing them.[1] These penitentials, however, neglected to consider the role of one's intentions or motives.[2]
Abelard departs from these prevailing conceptions of sin in the Ethica,[1][2] which he completed in 1138[3] or 1139,[4] shortly after finishing a commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. The subtitle of the work, Scito te ipsum,[a] was a "popular motto among monastic writers of the time".[6] Abelard's treatise was originally planned as a two-volume work, but he shelved the latter half (which would have revolved around what it means to live virtuously) after writing just one page.[7]
Most of the text's surviving copies were produced in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; two of the earliest known manuscripts of the Ethica, dating to the twelfth century, are housed in the Bavarian State Library.[8]
Content
editAbelard defines peccatum or sin as that which is worthy of God's damnation and must be repented of.[1] However, he also argues that the content of peccatum proprie (proper sin) is subjective: one is guilty of "scorn for God" if one does not do what one sincerely believes God requires one to do, even if one's beliefs are erroneous.[9][10] Abelard locates proper sin in one's consensus (consent) to perform an action,[b][12] not the voluntas (desire or will) to do it and less so the actual operationem peccati or performance of the action.[13] He elaborates that "we consent to that which is not allowed when we do not at all draw back from carrying it out and are entirely ready to do it, if the chance is given."[11]
Voluntas is not a necessary precondition for sin,[14] since one can unwillingly consent to sin: "Sometimes we sin without any bad will at all."[15] He cites the hypothetical example of a servant who, in a state of duress, kills his "bloodthirsty master" in self-defence.[c] Abelard maintains that the servant did not willingly consent to killing his master, although his consent arose from a certain will to live.[18] Accordingly, Abelard submits that willing to do something in order to achieve something else (for instance, "willing to kill to live") is fundamentally different from willing to do something (simply "willing to kill"), nor does the former imply the latter.[19] To avoid this confusion, Abelard subsequently proposes that what is said to be "willed", as in the case of the servant, should be more precisely described as "endured".[20]
Abelard then introduces the deontological[21] notion of quod non convenit, or "unfitting" deeds prohibited by God.[22] Recalling his earlier point that actual sin arises from knowingly consenting to what one merely believes to be unfitting, Abelard suggests that one could commit truly unfitting deeds without sinning, depending on one's intentio or reasons for consent.[22] He therefore concludes that, "properly speaking", infidels who sincerely believe themselves to be honouring God cannot be guilty of sin, even if their actions (and intentions) are, in fact, not good: "What contempt of God do they have in what they do for God and on account of which judge themselves to do well?"[23] Nevertheless, they are liable to divine punishment too, which is why Jesus cried out on the cross, "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do."[24]
It follows, in Abelard's telling, that divine moral precepts like the Ten Commandments fundamentally relate to one's consent of external actions, not the actions in and of themselves.[25][26][27] In practice, consent is apparently synonymous with irresistible temptation,[28] thus external actions are not within one's control, but consent is: "The less something is in our power, the less fitting it is to command it."[27] Moreover, Abelard submits that one's standing before God is fixed and cannot be altered "once an individual has consented to an act", even if it were possible to not perform it afterwards.[29] In Abelard's view, a sinner's reconciliation with God requires repentance, confession, and satisfaction through penance.[30]
Aftermath
editAbelard himself anticipated criticism of his theory of sin: "There are those who are not a little upset when they hear us say that the act of sin adds nothing to guilt or damnation before God."[31] Indeed, in 1140, at the urging of Bernard of Clairvaux, the Council of Sens formally condemned Abelard for suggesting that actions in themselves were "morally indifferent".[4][32] However, the ideas of the Ethica were echoed in many subsequent medieval treatises, including those of Richard of Saint Victor and Thomas Aquinas.[4][33]
Notes
edit- ^ According to Willemien Otten, "In the context of twelfth-century thought, this Socratic motto might be described as 'know yourself,' with a more autobiographical appeal, or alternatively as 'one does well to know oneself,' in a more generic, anthropological sense."[5]
- ^ The term consensus was frequently employed in writings that predated the Ethica, but not in the sense of "consent to perform an action".[11]
- ^ This example is borrowed from Augustine of Hippo's De libero arbitrio.[16][17]
References
editCitations
edit- ^ a b c Decosimo 2018, p. 32.
- ^ a b Porter 2000, p. 370.
- ^ Holopainen 2014, p. 213.
- ^ a b c Bejczy 2003, p. 2.
- ^ Otten 2005, p. 58.
- ^ Porter 2000, p. 374.
- ^ Mann 2016, p. 151.
- ^ Luscombe 1965, pp. 118–121.
- ^ Mann 2016, p. 162.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, pp. 32–33.
- ^ a b Marenbon 1997, p. 260.
- ^ Holopainen 2014, p. 215.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Porter 2000, p. 373.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, p. 35.
- ^ Mann 2016, p. 154.
- ^ Porter 2000, p. 383.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, p. 37.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, p. 39.
- ^ Holopainen 2014, p. 227.
- ^ a b Decosimo 2018, p. 48.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, p. 50.
- ^ Mann 2016, p. 163.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, p. 41.
- ^ Holopainen 2014, p. 220.
- ^ a b Porter 2000, p. 380.
- ^ Decosimo 2018, p. 46.
- ^ Porter 2000, p. 372.
- ^ Otten 2005, p. 63.
- ^ Porter 2000, p. 390.
- ^ Marenbon 1997, p. 256.
- ^ Porter 2000, p. 388.
Works cited
edit- Bejczy, István (2003). "Deeds Without Value: Exposing a Weak Spot in Abelard's Ethics". Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales. 70 (1): 1–21. doi:10.2143/RTPM.70.1.978. JSTOR 26170108.
- Decosimo, David (2018). "Sin, Consent, and Apparent Confusion in Abelard's Ethica". The Journal of Religion. 98 (1): 29–58. doi:10.1086/694691. S2CID 171665321.
- Holopainen, Taina M. (2014). "Intentions and Conscious Moral Choices in Peter Abelard's Know Yourself". Rethinking Abelard: A Collection of Critical Essays. Brill. pp. 213–229. ISBN 9789004262713.
- Luscombe, D.E. (1965). "Towards a new edition of Peter Abelard's Ethica or Scito te ipsum: An introduction to the manuscripts". Vivarium. 3 (1): 115–127. doi:10.1163/156853465X00061.
- Mann, William E. (2016). God, Belief, and Perplexity. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190459222.
- Marenbon, John (1997). The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780511582714.
- Otten, Willemien (2005). "In Conscience's Court: Abelard's Ethics as a Science of the Self". Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century. Brill. pp. 53–74. ISBN 9789004143272.
- Porter, Jean (2000). "Responsibility, Passion, and Sin: A Reassessment of Abelard's Ethics". Journal of Religious Ethics. 28 (3): 367–394. doi:10.1111/0384-9694.00054.