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Baren Township Riot (Barin Revolution Uprising) | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Xinjiang conflict | |||||||
Akto, Xinjiang | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
East Turkestan Islamic Party | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Zeydin Yusup † | Jiang Zeming | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
200-500 militants | Several hundred policemen and soldiers | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
16 killed, 232 captured[citation needed] | 7 killed, 18 wounded |
The Baren Township Riot was an uprising and armed conflict that took place between radical Muslim Uyghur militants and Chinese government forces in April 1990, in Baren township, Akto county of Xinjiang's Kizilsu Kirgiz autonomous prefecture. [1][2][3]
Uprising
editOn April 4, several hundred Uyghurs attacked the local government office[[.]] About 2 hours after the attack started, authorities arrived at the site of turmoil, and were attacked by the Uyghur fighters, resulting in the deaths of six policemen and the injury of 13. Several rifles and hundreds of rounds of ammunition were captured. 19 of the Uyghur fighters were arrested[[.]]
Aftermath
editThe conflict ended on April 10, 1990, with an official report stating 23 dead total and 21 injured.[4] In July 1990 the Chinese government in Xinjiang announced the arrest of some 7,900 "criminal activities of ethnic splittists and other criminal offenders.". [5] An official account of civilian casualties is absent.
References
edit- ^ Patrick, MAJ Shawn M (2010). Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited The Uyghur Movement China’s Insurgency in Xinjiang (PDF). School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. p. 27.
- ^ "DOCUMENT - CHINA: GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION (INCLUDES ERRATUM)". Amnesty International. Retrieved 31 January 2013.
- ^ VAN WIE DAVIS, ELIZABETH. "Uighur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China." Asian Affairs 35, no. 1 (2008): 15-29. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27821503.
- ^ Guo, Rongxing (2015-07-15). China's Spatial (Dis)integration: Political Economy of the Interethnic Unrest in Xinjiang. Chandos Publishing. ISBN 9780081004036.
- ^ "Uighur Developments in the 1990s". www.globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 31 January 2013.
Clearly not here to contribute to the encyclopedia.
Soviet Involvement
editThis article needs additional citations for verification. |
The Soviet Union, although it did not take direct military action, provided intelligence and equipment support for Vietnam in the war. A large airlift was established by the Soviet Union to move Vietnamese troops from Cambodia to Northern Vietnam. Moscow also provided a total of 400 tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs), 500 mortar artillery and air defense artillery, 50 BM-21 rocket launchers, 400 portable surface-to-air missiles, 800 anti-tank missiles and 20 jet fighters. About 5,000-8,000 Soviet military advisers were present in Vietnam from August 1979 to mid-1979[clarification needed] to train Vietnamese soldiers.[1] The Soviet Union deployed troops at the Sino-Soviet and Mongolian-Chinese borders as an act of showing support to Vietnam, as well as tying up Chinese troops. [2] The Soviet Pacific Fleet also deployed 15 ships to the Vietnamese coast to relay Chinese battlefield communications to Vietnamese forces.[3]
However, the Soviet Union felt that there was simply no way that they could directly support Vietnam against China; the distances were too great to be an effective ally, and any Soviet reinforcements would have to cross territory controlled by China or U.S. allies. The only realistic option would be to restart the unresolved border conflict with China. Vietnam was important to Soviet policy but not enough for the Soviets to go to war over.[citation needed] When Moscow did not intervene, Beijing publicly proclaimed that the Soviet Union had broken its numerous promises to assist Vietnam.
Another reason why Moscow did not directly intervene was because Beijing had promised both Moscow and Washington that the invasion was only a limited war, and that Chinese forces would withdraw after a short incursion. Moscow decided to adopt a "wait and see" approach to see if Beijing would actually limit their offense. In order to reassure Moscow it was conducting a limited war, Deng Xiaoping ordered the Chinese navy and air force to remain out of the war; only limited support was provided by the air force.[4] When Beijing kept its promise, Moscow did not retaliate.
- ^ "Liên Xô "chia lửa" với Việt Nam trong chiến tranh biên giới thế nào?". dantri.com.vn. Retrieved July 31, 2016.
- ^ "Sino-Soviet Relations and the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict". ttu.edu. Retrieved July 31, 2016.
- ^ Kelemen, Paul (March 1984). "Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia: The Vietnam Factor". Asian Survey. 24 (3). University of California Press: 342. doi:10.1525/as.1984.24.3.01p0146p. ISSN 0004-4687. JSTOR 2644070.
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