Wikipedia

China and weapons of mass destruction

(Redirected from Nuclear weapons of China)

The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1966 at Lop Nur.[3] Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did not ratify it.[4] China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984[5] and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.[6] Since 2020, China has been wielding a nuclear triad,[7] alongside four other countries.

People's Republic of China
Controlled territory of PRC
First nuclear weapon testOctober 16, 1964
First thermonuclear weapon testDecember 28, 1966
Last nuclear testJuly 29, 1996
Largest yield test4 Mt
  • Atmospheric – 4 Mt (November 17, 1976)
  • Underground – 660~1,000 kt (May 21, 1992)
Current stockpile500 (estimated)[1]
Current strategic arsenal438 (estimated)[1]
Maximum missile range15,000 km[2]
NPT partyYes (1992, one of five recognized powers)

The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a state secret.[1] There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and Federation of American Scientists estimated in 2024 that China has a stockpile of approximately 438 nuclear warheads,[1][8] while the United States Department of Defense put the estimate at more than 500 operational nuclear warheads,[9] making it the third-largest in the world.

In 1964, China adopted a policy of no-first-use (NFU),[10][1] although some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture in the 2020s.[11][12]

Nuclear weapons

edit

History

edit
 
Zhou Enlai announces the success of China's atomic bomb test in 1964.
 
A celebration of Chinese nuclear missile tests in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1966.

Mao Zedong reportedly referred to nuclear weapons as a paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce.[13]: 44  He favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means."[13]: 44–45 

United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower's threats during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets in Fujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program.[14]: 89–90  While Mao did not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, he believed that even a few bombs would increase China's diplomatic credibility. As a result of the Anti-Party Group incident in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's position within the Eastern Bloc became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao. The CCP subsequently traded its support for Khrushchev for Soviet technology of nuclear weapons. The Agreement on New Technology for National Defence was later signed in October, which promised Soviet support for Chinese development of nuclear weapons.[15]

Construction of uranium-enrichment plants in Baotou and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production[16] and, in October 1957, agreed to provide a prototype boosted fission weapon, missiles, and related technology.[3] The Chinese, who preferred to import technology and components to developing them within China, exported uranium to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets sent two R-2 missiles in 1958.[17]

That year, however, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-Stalin policy of peaceful coexistence. Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In June 1959, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation,[17] and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program.[18] As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb.[3]

According to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director William Foster, the American government, under Kennedy and Johnson administration, was concerned about the program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested. China conducted its first nuclear test, code-named 596, on 16 October 1964.[16][17] Its first thermonuclear weapon test occurred on December 28, 1966.[3] Its last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996.[19]

In 2023, satellite open-source intelligence showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where nuclear weapons testing could resume.[20]

 
Satellite image of the testing site 4 days after China's first atomic bomb test

Size

edit

As of 2023, several non-official sources estimate that China has over 400 nuclear warheads.[1][8] In 2023, the United States Department of Defense estimated China possesses more than 500 operational nuclear warheads.[9]

 
A mock-up of China's first nuclear bomb.

The same year, United States Strategic Command indicated that China has equipped more nuclear warheads on its ICBMs than the United States (550 according to the New START treaty).[21]

In 2024, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that China has approximately 300 missile silos and is estimated to reach at least 1000 operational warheads by 2030.[22]

Nuclear use policy

edit

China's policy has traditionally been one of no first use while maintaining a secure second-strike capability.[23] Following its first test in 1964, China stated that it would "never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons."[24][25] In peacetime, it has traditionally stored nuclear warheads separately from their launching systems.[1][26] In the 2020s, some of its strategic forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture.[11][12]

In 2024, the United States Department of State described China's no-first-use policy as "ambiguous".[27] American defense analysts have contended that China is shifting away from a strict no-first-use strategy and toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture, which would allow it to retaliate upon the detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first.[12] These concerns increased after China began to expand its nuclear arsenal in the 2020s. The move was seen as a response to progress made in U.S. missile defense systems (such as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and long-range precision strike abilities (such as Conventional Prompt Strike), which decreases the survivability of a Chinese second strike, as well as the possibility that American strategy may require nukes to compensate for the numerical disadvantage of its conventional forces overseas. There is debate among Chinese strategists regarding the merits and drawbacks of a LOW posture similar to that of Russia and the United States, and as of 2023 the bulk of China's strategic forces had not moved to a LOW posture.[11]

Nuclear proliferation

edit
 
Large stockpile with global range (dark blue), smaller stockpile with global range (medium blue), smaller stockpile with limited range (light blue).

Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program before China ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1992. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon.[28] China also received stolen technology that Abdul Qadeer Khan brought back to Pakistan and Pakistan set up a centrifuge plant in China as revealed in his letters which state "(1)You know we had cooperation with China for 15 years. We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km south-west of Xi'an). We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges. Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time. Late minister Liu We, V. M. [vice minister] Li Chew, Vice Minister Jiang Shengjie used to visit us. (2)The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%). Chinese helped PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the rival organization to the Khan Research Laboratories] in setting up UF6 plant, production reactor for plutonium and reprocessing plant."[29]

Nuclear non-proliferation

edit

Before the 1980s, China viewed arms control and nuclear non-proliferation regimes as mechanisms through which Western powers (particularly the U.S.) sought to restrain China.[30]: 266–267  The Chinese government believed that the Treaty “[served] the interests of some States” and only favored the countries that already had nuclear weapons.[31] Additionally, the Chinese government thought this Treaty was discriminatory since many countries were attempting to restrict and deprive nuclear weapons of a country that had only just tested them successfully, rather than countries like the U.S. or U.S.S.R., which have at least 100 times more nuclear weapons.[32] Therefore, China chose not to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at that time.

Beginning in the 1980s, China's policy and attitude toward nuclear weapons and the NPT had changed under the administration of Deng Xiaoping.[31] Though China continued developing more advanced nuclear technology and weapons, by the 1980s, the country had indicated that it intended on accepting the terms of the NPT.[33] China acceded to the treaty in 1992.[34]

China was active in the six-party talks in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s.[30]: 71  The six-party talks ultimately failed,[30]: 75  and in 2006, China voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear program.[30]: 237 

The field of nuclear security has become a well-established area of successful U.S.-China cooperation.[35] In 2009, CCP general secretary Hu Jintao called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States President Barack Obama's earlier calls for a nuclear-free world.[30]: 237  Precipitated by a 2010 Nuclear Security Summit convened by the Obama administration, China and the U.S. launched a number of initiatives to secure potentially dangerous, Chinese-supplied, nuclear material in countries such as Ghana or Nigeria.[35] Through these initiatives, China and the U.S. have converted Chinese-origin Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSRs) from using highly enriched uranium to using low-enriched uranium fuel (which is not directly usable in weapons, thereby making reactors more proliferation resistant).[36]

China, along with all other nuclear weapon states and all members of NATO with the exception of the Netherlands, decided not to sign the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a binding agreement for negotiations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.[37]

China refused to join talks in 2020 between the U.S. and Russia on extending their bilateral New START nuclear arms reduction treaty, as the Trump administration requested. China's position is that as its nuclear warhead arsenal is a small fraction of the U.S. and Russia arsenals, their inclusion in an arms reduction treaty is unnecessary, and that it will join such talks when both U.S. and Russia has reduced their arsenal to near China's level.[38][39]

The United States has a classified strategy called Nuclear Employment Guidance, updated by president Joe Biden in March 2024, reported to refocus U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy more toward China.[40]

Delivery systems estimates

edit

Miniaturization

edit

China has made significant improvements in its miniaturization techniques since the 1980s. There have been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic missile technology.[41][42][43][44]

Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles

edit
Main articles: People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, DF-4, DF-5, DF-31, and DF-41

The Dongfeng 5A is a single-warhead, three-stage, liquid-fueled missile with a range of 13,000+ km. In 2000, General Eugene Habiger of the U.S. Air Force, then-commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified before Congress that China has 18 silo-based DF-5s.[45] Since the early 21st century, the Second Artillery Corps have also deployed up to 10 Solid-fueled mobile DF-31 ICBMs, with a range of 7,200+ km and possibly up to 3 MIRVs.[citation needed] China has also developed the DF-31A, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,200+ km with possibly 3–6 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability.[citation needed]

China stores many of its missiles in huge tunnel complexes; US Representative Michael Turner[46] referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said "This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear weapons and forces."[47] A People's Liberation Army newspaper calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of China.[48]

Medium-range ballistic missiles

edit

Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the medium-range category, targeted at regional theater targets.[49]: 61 

DF-3A/CSS-2

edit
Main article: DF-3A

DF-21/CSS-5

edit
Main article: DF-21

Tactical cruise missiles

edit

The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance in 2009 during a military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China as a part of the Second Artillery Corps' long-range conventional missile forces; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). A similar naval cruise missile, the YJ-62, was also revealed during the parade; the YJ-62 serves as the PLA Navy's latest development into naval rocketry.

Long-range ballistic missiles

edit

The Chinese categorize long-range ballistic missiles as ones with a range between 3000 and 8000 km.[49]: 103 

China "keeps most of its warheads at a central storage facility in the Qinling mountain range, though some are kept at smaller regional storage facilities."[50]

DF-4/CSS-3

edit
Main article: DF-4

The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS-3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It was thought to be deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980.[49]: 67  The DF-4 has a takeoff thrust of 1,224.00 kN, a takeoff weight of 82,000 kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of 28.05 m, and a fin span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2,190 kg nuclear warhead with 3,300 kt explosive yield, and its range is 5,500 km.[49]: 68  The missile uses inertial guidance, resulting in a relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.[citation needed]

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

edit

DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2

edit
Main article: DF-5

The Dongfeng 5 or DF-5 is a 3-stage Chinese ICBM. It has a length 32.6 m and a diameter of 3.35 m. It weighs 183 tonnes and has an estimated range of 12,000–15,000 kilometers.[49]: 71–72  The DF-5 had its first flight in 1971 and was in operational service 10 years later. One of the downsides of the missile was that it took between 30 and 60 minutes to fuel.[citation needed]

DF-31/CSS-10

edit
Main article: DF-31

The Dong Feng 31 (or CSS-10) is a medium-range, three stage, solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People's Republic of China. It is a land-based variant of the submarine-launched JL-2.

DF-41/CSS-X-10

edit
Main article: DF-41

The DF-41 (or CSS-X-10) is an intercontinental ballistic missile believed to be operational. It is designed to carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), delivering multiple nuclear warheads.[citation needed]

Nuclear cruise missiles

edit

The US DoD estimated in 2006 that the PRC was developing ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that could easily be converted to carry nuclear warheads once developed.[51]

DH-10

edit
Main article: DH-10

The DongHai 10 (DH-10) is a cruise missile developed in the People's Republic of China. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, the DH-10 is a second-generation land-attack cruise missile (LACM), with over 4,000 km range, integrated inertial navigation system, GPS, terrain contour mapping system, and digital scene-matching terminal-homing system. The missile is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters.

CJ-10

edit
Main article: CJ-10

The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile developed by China, based on the Hongniao missile family. It has a range of 2,200 km. Although not confirmed, it is suspected that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also been developed.[52]

HongNiao missile family

edit
Main article: Hongniao missile

There are three missiles in this family: the HN-1, HN-2, and HN-3. Reportedly based on the Kh-SD/65 missiles, the Hongniao (or Red Bird) missiles are some of the first nuclear-capable cruise missiles in China. The HN-1 has a range of 600 km, the HN-2 has a range of 1,800 km, and the HN-3 has a range of 3,000 km.[53]

ChangFeng missile family

edit
Main article: Changfeng missile

There are 2 missiles in the Chang Feng (or Long Wind) family: CF-1 and CF-2. These are the first domestically developed long-range cruise missiles for China. The CF-1 has a range of 400 km while the CF-2 has a range of 800 km. Both variants can carry a 10 kt nuclear warhead.[citation needed]

Sea-based weapons

edit
Main articles: People's Liberation Army Navy, JL-1, and JL-2

The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) stockpile of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is thought to be relatively new. China launched its first second-generation nuclear submarine in April 1981. The navy currently has a 1 Type 092 Xia class SSBN at roughly 8000 tons displacement. A second Type 092 was reportedly lost in an accident in 1985. The Type 092 is equipped with 12 JL-1 SLBMs with a range of 2150–2500 km. The JL-1 is a modified DF-21 missile. It is suspected that the Type 092 is being converted into a cruise missile submarine.

The Chinese navy has developed Type 094 ballistic missile submarine, open source satellite imagery has shown that at least 2 of these have been completed. This submarine will be capable of carrying 12 of the longer ranged, more modern JL-2s with a range of approximately 14000 km.[citation needed]

China is also developing the Type 096 submarine, claimed to be able to carry up to 24 JL-3 ballistic missiles each. Some Chinese sources state that the submarine is already undergoing trials.[54]

Nuclear bomber force

edit
Main article: People's Liberation Army Air Force

China's bomber force consists mostly of Chinese-made versions of Soviet aircraft. The People's Liberation Army Air Force has 120 H-6s (a variant of the Tupolev Tu-16). These bombers are outfitted to carry nuclear as well as conventional weapons. While the H-6 fleet is aging, it is not as old as the American B-52 Stratofortress.[49]: 93–98  The Chinese have also produced the Xian JH-7 Flying Leopard fighter-bomber with a range and payload exceeding the F-111 (currently about 80 are in service) capable of delivering a nuclear strike. China has also bought the advanced Sukhoi Su-30 from Russia; currently, about 100 Su-30s (MKK and MK2 variants) have been purchased by China. The Su-30 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.[49]: 102 

China is alleged to be testing new H-8 and Xian H-20 strategic bombers which are either described as an upgraded H-6 or an aircraft in the same class as the US B-2, able to carry nuclear weapons.[citation needed]

Fractional orbital bombardment system

edit

In 2021, following tests by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, United States Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall III stated that China was developing and testing a fractional orbital bombardment system.[55][56]

Missile ranges

edit
  •  
    Maximum Ranges for China's Conventional SRBM Force (2006). Note: China currently is capable of deploying ballistic missile forces to support a variety of regional contingencies.
  •  
    Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles (2007). Note: China currently is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF-31A, and JL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.
  •  
    Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait (2006). Note: This map depicts notional coverage provided by China's SA-10, SA-20 SAM systems, as well as the soon-to-be acquired S-300PMU2. Actual coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites.

Biological weapons

edit
Main article: Chinese biological weapons program
See also: Ethnic bioweapon

China is currently a signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention and Chinese officials have stated that China has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. However, China was reported to have had an active biological weapons program in the 1980s.[57]

Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet germ-warfare programs, said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites identified a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The Soviets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases.[58]

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations in a letter to Senator Bob Bennett (R-Utah) in January 1997.[59] Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Iranian government which concerned her and that the United States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive export controls to prevent assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. In response to this, China issued export control protocols on dual use biological technology in late 2002.[60]

A biological program in China was described in a 2015 detailed study by the Indian Ministry of Defence funded Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. It pointed to 42 facilities, some in the same compound, that had the capacity, possibly latently, of research, development, production or testing of biological weapons.[61]

According to Nuclear Threat Initiative, no evidence of the program's existence has been officially released.[62]

Chemical weapons

edit

The People's Republic of China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on April 25, 1997.[6]

China was found to have supplied Albania with a stockpile of chemical weapons in the 1970s during the Cold War.[63]

See also

edit
Library resources about
China and weapons of mass destruction

References

edit
  1. ^ a b c d e f g Kristensen, Hans M.; Korda, Matt; Johns, Eliana; Knight, Mackenzie (January 2, 2024). "Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 80 (1): 49–72. Bibcode:2024BuAtS..80a..49K. doi:10.1080/00963402.2023.2295206. ISSN 0096-3402.
  2. ^ "DF-41: China's answer to the US BMD efforts | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses". Archived from the original on July 29, 2013. Retrieved March 26, 2013.
  3. ^ a b c d Zhang, Hui (April 11, 2024). "The short march to China's hydrogen bomb". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Archived from the original on April 11, 2024. Retrieved April 15, 2024.
  4. ^ Borger, Julian (April 16, 2020). "China may have conducted low-level nuclear test, US claims". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on May 29, 2023. Retrieved May 29, 2023.
  5. ^ "China: Accession to Biological Weapons Convention". United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Archived from the original on August 9, 2020. Retrieved March 3, 2013.
  6. ^ a b "Evolution of the Status of Participation in the Convention". Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Archived from the original on May 29, 2023. Retrieved May 29, 2023.
  7. ^ "How is China Modernizing its Nuclear Forces?". Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved October 26, 2024.
  8. ^ a b "Status of World Nuclear Forces". Federation of American Scientists. March 31, 2023. Archived from the original on May 29, 2023. Retrieved May 29, 2023.
  9. ^ a b Feng, Emily (October 19, 2023). "New Pentagon report claims China now has over 500 operational nuclear warheads". NPR. Archived from the original on October 20, 2023. Retrieved October 19, 2023.
  10. ^ "Nuclear Disarmament China". Nuclear Threat Initiative. September 11, 2024. Retrieved October 12, 2024.
  11. ^ a b c Hiim, Henrik Stålhane; Fravel, M. Taylor; Trøan, Magnus Langset (January 4, 2023). "The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China's Changing Nuclear Posture". International Security. 47 (4): 147–187. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00457. ISSN 0162-2889.
  12. ^ a b c "A missile test by China marks its growing nuclear ambitions". The Economist. September 27, 2024. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on September 27, 2024. Retrieved September 27, 2024.
  13. ^ a b Meyskens, Covell F. (2020). Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-78478-8. OCLC 1145096137.
  14. ^ Crean, Jeffrey (2024). The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History. New Approaches to International History series. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1-350-23394-2.
  15. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick (1983). The Origins of the Cultural Revolution- 2. The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960. New York, Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, and the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University by Columbia University Press. pp. 11–12.
  16. ^ a b Burr, W.; Richelson, J. T. (2000–2001). "Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64". International Security. 25 (3): 54–99. doi:10.1162/016228800560525. JSTOR 2626706. S2CID 57560352.
  17. ^ a b c Jersild, Austin (October 8, 2013). "Sharing the Bomb among Friends: The Dilemmas of Sino-Soviet Strategic Cooperation". Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center. Archived from the original on October 29, 2013. Retrieved October 28, 2013.
  18. ^ Lewis, John W.; Xue, Litai (August 1, 1988). China Builds the Bomb. Stanford University Press. pp. 53, 61, 12. doi:10.1515/9781503621473. ISBN 978-1-5036-2147-3.
  19. ^ "CTBTO World Map". www.ctbto.org. Archived from the original on February 1, 2019. Retrieved January 31, 2019.
  20. ^ Broad, William J.; Buckley, Chris; Corum, Jonathan (December 20, 2023). "China Quietly Rebuilds Secretive Base for Nuclear Tests". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on December 21, 2023. Retrieved December 21, 2023.
  21. ^ "Chinese nukes real number". Defense News. December 7, 2022. Archived from the original on July 19, 2023. Retrieved February 10, 2023.
  22. ^ Capaccio, Anthony (October 23, 2024). "China Speeds Nuclear-Weapons Buildout, US Defense Agency Says". Bloomberg News. Retrieved October 23, 2024.
  23. ^ Logan, David C; Saunders, Philip C. (July 26, 2023). "Discerning the Drivers of China's Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data". National Defense University Press. Archived from the original on September 30, 2023. Retrieved September 16, 2023.
  24. ^ Zhenqiang, Pan (2016). China’s No First Use of Nuclear Weapons (Report). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. pp. 51–78. JSTOR resrep26903.7.
  25. ^ Zhao, Tong (September 2, 2022). "China and the international debate on no first use of nuclear weapons". Asian Security. 18 (3): 205–213. doi:10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654. ISSN 1479-9855.
  26. ^ Hugh Chalmers (January 2014). A Disturbance in the Force (PDF) (Report). Royal United Services Institute. p. 4. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 February 2014. Retrieved 4 February 2014.
  27. ^ Torode, Greg; Doyle, Gerry; Chen, Laurie (June 21, 2024). "U.S. and China hold first informal nuclear talks in 5 years, eyeing Taiwan". Reuters. Retrieved June 21, 2024.
  28. ^ Kroenig, Matthew (2010). Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (1 ed.). Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-4857-7. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctt7v7z8.
  29. ^ "A Letter Written by A.Q. Khan to His Wife". Fox News. March 27, 2015. Archived from the original on August 6, 2015. Retrieved March 14, 2017.
  30. ^ a b c d e Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy. Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9781503634152. ISBN 978-1-5036-3088-8. OCLC 1331741429.
  31. ^ a b Wu, Haotan (March 2017). "China's Non-proliferation Policy and the Implementation of WMD Regimes in the Middle East". Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. 11 (1): 65–82. doi:10.1080/25765949.2017.12023326. ISSN 2576-5949. S2CID 158461812.
  32. ^ "Chinese Nuclear Weapons | Development of Nuclear Program in China | NTI". Archived from the original on February 20, 2020. Retrieved May 17, 2021.
  33. ^ Zhu, Mingquan (March 1997). "The evolution of China's nuclear nonproliferation policy". The Nonproliferation Review. 4 (2): 40–48. doi:10.1080/10736709708436664. ISSN 1073-6700.
  34. ^ "UNTC". treaties.un.org. Retrieved October 22, 2024.
  35. ^ a b Moore, Scott (2022). China's Next Act: How Sustainability and Technology are Reshaping China's Rise and the World's Future. New York, NY. p. 210. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197603994.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-760401-4. OCLC 1316703008.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  36. ^ "The Little Known Success Story of U.S.-China Nuclear Security Cooperation". July 26, 2022. Archived from the original on July 26, 2022. Retrieved July 26, 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  37. ^ "122 countries adopt 'historic' UN treaty to ban nuclear weapons". CBC News. July 7, 2017. Archived from the original on August 14, 2019. Retrieved August 9, 2019.
  38. ^ Gramer, Robbie; Detsch, Jack (April 29, 2020). "Trump Fixates on China as Nuclear Arms Pact Nears Expiration". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on October 17, 2020. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
  39. ^ Pifer, Steven (July 1, 2020). "Unattainable conditions for New START extension?". Brookings Institution. Archived from the original on October 8, 2020. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
  40. ^ Sanger, David E. "Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat". The New York Times. Archived from the original on August 23, 2024. Retrieved August 23, 2024.
  41. ^ Broad, William J. (September 7, 1999). "Spies vs. Sweat: The Debate Over China's Nuclear Advance". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on September 18, 2017. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
  42. ^ "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment on Chinese Espionage". Archived from the original on March 30, 2017. Retrieved October 30, 2019.
  43. ^ Gerth, Jeff (March 6, 2003). "2 Companies Pay Penalties For Improving China Rockets". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on October 2, 2009. Retrieved May 29, 2023.
  44. ^ "Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today: Why China Won't Build U.S. Warheads". Archived from the original on November 5, 2005. Retrieved May 23, 2020.
  45. ^ Lewis, Jeffrey (May 1, 2005). "The ambiguous arsenal". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 61 (3): 52–59. doi:10.2968/061003013. ISSN 0096-3402.
  46. ^ "U.S. Lawmaker Warns of China's Nuclear Strategy". China Digital Times. October 17, 2011. Archived from the original on January 1, 2016. Retrieved October 18, 2011.
  47. ^ "US worries over China's underground nuclear network". www.spacewar.com. Agence France-Presse. October 14, 2011. Archived from the original on May 29, 2023. Retrieved May 29, 2023.
  48. ^ Hsiao, Russell (December 16, 2009). "China's "Underground Great Wall" and Nuclear Deterrence". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on May 29, 2023. Retrieved May 29, 2023.
  49. ^ a b c d e f g Kristensen, Hans M.; Norris, Robert S.; McKinzie, Matthew G. (2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Report). Federation of American Scientists. JSTOR resrep18927. Archived from the original on October 10, 2023. Retrieved October 1, 2023.
  50. ^ Kristensen, Hans; Korda, Matt (2020). "Chinese nuclear forces, 2020". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 76 (6): 443–457. Bibcode:2020BuAtS..76f.443K. doi:10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432. S2CID 228097051.
  51. ^ "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006". US Department of Defense. pp. 26, 27. Archived from the original on March 2, 2024. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  52. ^ "China's new cruise missile programme 'racing ahead'". Jane's Defence Weekly. January 12, 2000. Archived from the original on June 4, 2009.
  53. ^ "HN-2". CSIS Missile Threat. Archived from the original on November 4, 2016. Retrieved April 6, 2010.
  54. ^ "Global Security Newswire". NTI. Archived from the original on August 30, 2008. Retrieved April 6, 2010.
  55. ^ Axe, David (October 16, 2021). "Report: China Has Tested A Nuke That Can Dodge American Radars". Forbes. Archived from the original on October 17, 2021. Retrieved October 17, 2021.
  56. ^ Watt, Louise; Parekh, Marcus (October 17, 2021). "'We have no idea how they did this': Secret hypersonic launch shows China streaking ahead in arms race". The Daily Telegraph. ISSN 0307-1235. Archived from the original on March 22, 2023. Retrieved October 17, 2021.
  57. ^ Langford, R. Everett (February 19, 2004). Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Radiological, Chemical, and Biological. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0-471-46560-7.
  58. ^ Broad, William J.; Miller, Judith (April 5, 1999). "Soviet Defector Says China Had Accident at a Germ Plant". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on August 26, 2022. Retrieved May 29, 2023.
  59. ^ Leonard Spector, Chinese Assistance to Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs Archived 2009-06-11 at the Wayback Machine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 12, 1996
  60. ^ Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profile: China Archived 2011-08-27 at the Wayback Machine
  61. ^ Shoham, Dany (2015). "China's Biological Warfare Programme" (PDF). Journal of Defence Studies. 9 (2). New Delhi: Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: 132, 139. Archived (PDF) from the original on February 10, 2021. Retrieved July 4, 2021.
  62. ^ "China - Countries - NTI". www.nti.org. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Archived from the original on August 27, 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2021.
  63. ^ Warrick, Jo (January 10, 2005). "Albania's Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved May 29, 2023.
Retrieved from "https://en.wiki.x.io/w/index.php?title=China_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction&oldid=1256441429"