Gao Gang

In this Chinese name, the family name is Gao.

Gao Gang (Chinese: 高岗; Wade–Giles: Kao Kang; 1905 – August 1954) was a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader during the Chinese Civil War and the early years of the People's Republic of China (PRC) before he became the victim of the first major purge within the party since before 1949. The events surrounding Gao's purge, the so-called "Gao Gang Affair", are still the subject of debate: a limited amount of research has been done on the topic, partly because of the relatively small amount of information available.

Gao Gang
Traditional Chinese	高崗
Simplified Chinese	高岗
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Gāo Gǎng Wade–Giles Kao Kang

Born in rural Shaanxi province in 1905, Gao Gang joined the party in 1926 and led a revolutionary guerrilla base there during the Chinese Civil War. He was of peasant background with a low level of education: he is said to have not been very literate. Among his colleagues in the party, he gained a reputation as having great confidence and ambition, as well as of being a womanizer. Trusted by Mao Zedong, Gao was dramatically promoted in the final years of the civil war to become the party state and military head of Manchuria, the key Northeast area of China. In 1952, he was ordered to Beijing to become head of the State Planning Commission of China (SPC), where he later attempted a leadership challenge against Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. His attempt failed and he committed suicide in August 1954.

Guerilla activities in Shaanxi

When his friend since middle school Liu Zhidan led a failed insurrection in 1928, Gao joined him in remote Northwest Shaanxi, where together they built up a guerrilla base. The deaths of local guerrilla leaders in the Northwest region distinguished Gao as the symbol of the revolutionary base. Gao met Mao Zedong in 1935 when the Long March ended in Shaanxi. Both developed a close relationship based on personal friendship and their agreement on Marxism–Leninism ideological matters. Gao spent many years during the Chinese Civil War coordinating party activities and became one of the top commanders in the region.

Northeast China

Gao Gang with military leaders in the Northeast, 1948. Left to right: Huang Kecheng, Tan Zheng, Nie Rongzhen, Xiao Hua, Luo Ronghuan, Liu Yalou, Gang, and Lin Biao

In 1945, Gao joined the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, and was transferred along with Lin Biao to northeast China (Dongbei), becoming head of the local party (the Northeastern Bureau), state and military apparatus. By 1947 Gao was the most important cadre in the region. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Gao was named one of the six chairmen of the State Council, under Mao Zedong.

Influence from the nearby Soviet Union meant that Soviet ideas of industrial organization and economic planning were prominent, and Gao strongly supported these methods as the area became China's center of heavy industry. Northeastern Chinese areas such as Manchuria held further significance to China due to its occupation by the Japanese earlier in the century, and the People's Liberation Army's symbolic liberation of it from the Kuomintang in 1948 gave the region greater appeal for the CCP's industrial plans. Gao Gang, now an influential local party cadre in the Northeastern region, detailed in a 1950 report that the CCP shall "recon[struct] the Northeast to serve as a starting point or important base for the industrialization of the whole country" Gao Gang was thus, a key contributing player in the country's economic reconstruction and general production management in the early years of the CCP regime. Due to its economic advancement, the northeast region was often used to test new Communist policies, something that increased both the prestige of the region and that of Gao himself. Gao also received significant propaganda coverage, as workers and peasants were encouraged to respond to his 'call' for increased industrial production; personal letters supporting him and salutations to his health were also published.

In July 1950, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Gao was placed in command of the 260,000-man "Northern Frontier Guards", stationed along the border with North Korea. Gao was then held responsible for preparing his forces for the possibility of China's participation in the war. When China finally entered the Korean War in November 1950, Chinese forces were commanded by Peng Dehuai.

Beijing

Gao Gang was transferred to Beijing in 1952 to take up the post of Chairman of the State Planning Commission of China (SPC), which made him principally responsible for carrying out the First Five-Year Plan, the national policy that introduced Soviet economic planning into the People's Republic of China. In addition to responsibility over the SPC, Gao was made in charge of eight major economic industries, including heavy industry, light industry, the first and second mechanical industries, fuel, construction, geological planning, and textiles. Despite Gao's increases in power and responsibility, sources point out that Mao orchestrated Gao's promotion to Beijing in order to reduce Zhou Enlai's authority, who Mao suspected was gaining too much influence over CCP policies and leadership alongside Chen Yun and Liu Shaoqi.Gao was also confirmed as a Politburo member, a Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council, and a Vice-Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council. Gao's facilitation of Sino-Soviet relations during the advising stages of the First Five-Year Plan were of particular importance to the party, making him a valuable, capable Politburo member to Mao and other senior party members. However, there is some evidence that Gao was reluctant to leave his power base in the Northeast and move to Beijing.

Although Gao's transfer to Beijing made him more controllable by the Party center, it motivated him to achieve greater advancement within the Party hierarchy. He saw himself as the second most important leader in China, second only to Mao upon his promotion above Zhou Enlai. After his appointment to Beijing, he openly disagreed with the appointment of party leaders, rather than military leaders, to high government positions. In 1952 and 1953 there were several major changes in the central administrative structure. Peng Dehuai was recalled from Korea and placed in charge of the Central Military Commission, a post which had previously been held by Zhou Enlai. After transferring his military responsibilities to Peng, Zhou focused his efforts on devising China's first Five-Year Plan, with the participation of the Soviet Union. Mao indicated that he was not pleased with Zhou's performance; and, in late 1952 and late 1953, Mao initiated a major reshuffling of the central government hierarchy. Several regional commanders, including Gao Gang, Deng Xiaoping, and Rao Shushi, were also transferred to the Beijing to take over responsibilities from Zhou. Although he technically retained the position of the third most important man in the official hierarchy (after Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi), Zhou's position was considerably weakened. For example, while Zhou was in charge of foreign relations, Mao sent Gao Gang to receive and negotiate plans with the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, in 1953 during his arrival in November. A telegram from Zhou Enlai to Chai Junwu, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang, confirms that Mao specifically sent Gao to "discuss military operations and supplies in North Korea, the training and arrangement of the North Korea People’s Army and organs after they enter the Northeast, and other questions."

"Gao Gang Affair"

The "Gao Gang Affair" was Gao Gang's attempt to displace Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai from key posts in the government, and to increase his own personal standing within the party. Because of Mao Zedong's apparent displeasure with the previous failures of Liu and Zhou, Gao assumed that he had Mao's approval for such a move and began to approach senior cadres in the summer of 1953 asking for support. Gao leaked a list of Politburo members drafted by An Ziwen, the vice chief of the CCP Personnel Department, making Mao suspicious of Gao's intentions before the upcoming CCP Eighth Congress. While sources disagree on the reason for An's creation of the list, Gao mentioned and referred to the confidential document during meetings, believing that it was Liu's ploy to leverage his own position in the party. Gao had spoken to several other cadres about the matter including Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, who saw Gao's plan as an effort to overthrow Liu Shaoqi entirely. Deng revealed a more detailed account of Gao's "underground activities" in 1980, stating that "he tried to win me over and had formal negotiations with me in which he said that Comrade Liu Shaoqi was immature. He was trying to persuade me to join in his effort to topple Comrade Liu Shaoqi." When Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping officially informed Mao of Gao's activities, the Chairman declared them out of order, and efforts were undertaken to address the threat to party unity. Gao took his own life in August 1954.

Preliminary discussions with party leaders

Mao had a series of private conversations with Gao in late 1952 or early 1953 where it is believed he expressed a degree of dissatisfaction with Liu and Zhou, apparently remarking that they were too cautious in their attitude towards the pace of socialist transformation in China. The details of what Mao actually told Gao are still unclear: whether he approved any action towards Liu and Zhou or merely expressed his frustrations to a friend in private. What is significant is that Gao took Mao's words as consent for a move against these two senior cadres.

Following this, Gao approached senior party members, expressed his views regarding Liu and Zhou, and made the important point to hint that he had Mao's approval. Rao Shushi, a military figure who had his power base in East China and was chief of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party, gave his support to Gao. Immediately after his conference with Rao, Gao toured the southern and eastern provinces in order to discuss his views with other military leaders, primarily Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai, and Zhu De.

Lin Biao gave no practical support, but his agreement with Gao's views possibly influenced Gao to continue to seek backing. Peng Dehuai, who was known to have some antipathy against Gao's main target Liu Shaoqi, also expressed some support, but like Lin he did nothing in particular to aid Gao. When Gao approached Luo Ronghuan, Luo demanded to know Mao's exact thoughts. He was doubtful whether Mao had actually endorsed such suggestions and told Gao that their discussion on a matter of such significance was inappropriate.

Negative party reactions and death

When Gao expressed his thoughts to Li Xiannian, Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, they were all concerned that his attempts were a threat to party unity. Chen and Li informed Zhou Enlai first about Gao's activities and then spoke to Mao. Deng also approached Mao directly about Gao's approach. At a Politburo meeting on 24 December 1953, Mao confronted Gao and gave him a serious warning that his activities were a severe threat to party unity. At the conference, Mao's position was clear: he condemned Gao for forming "an anti-Party alliance".

This effectively marked the end of Gao's attempts to advance his position as he realized that he did not in fact have Mao's support. Mao then entrusted Liu Shaoqi, one of the targets of Gao's brief attempt to gain power, with the organization of a plenum in February 1954 that would focus on party unity. Mao's reaction was viewed as both a signal of Mao's lack of tolerance for those who sought to threaten the integrity of the party, and a public endorsement of Liu.

At the February meetings, Zhou Enlai made several accusations against Gao Gang. Zhou accused Gao first of setting up an "independent kingdom", a reference to Gao's power base in the northeast; and second of having "mixed up right and wrong in Soviet relations", a hint at Gao's alleged close ties to the Soviets; and finally of 'fabricating Comrade Mao Zedong's words', as Gao had told others that his plans had Mao's support. Zhou publicly contradicted Gao's belief that the military should play a preeminent role in Chinese politics, condemned Gao's attempts to spread "rumors" about Liu and other leaders, and concluded that Gao's intention was to sow discord and to usurp power within the party and the state. Zhou also condemned Gao's dissolute lifestyle.

A distraught Gao made several attempts to talk to Mao but was refused an audience with the Chairman. It has been speculated that Mao avoided facing Gao because of the secret talks between the two men that had prompted Gao's attempts to advance his own position. Gao tried to shoot himself during the February meetings and succeeded in poisoning himself in August 1954. In 1955, after his suicide, Gao was formally expelled from the Party. Gao's ally, Rao, was also expelled from the CCP, and was jailed until his death in 1975. Gao's death not only brought closure to the affair but also made sure that he was duly remembered in a dishonorable fashion as a traitor to the party. Many refer to the fall of Gao Gang, along with Rao Shushi, as a prime example of Mao's use of 'Character Assassination' to defeat surrounding political officials in the CCP hierarchy.

Analysis

Gao's assumption that Mao would support the elimination of Zhou and Liu, despite Mao's dissatisfaction with them, was mistaken. At the time, Mao was still relatively tolerant of differing opinions, but was confident that both Liu and Zhou would align their views with Mao if pressed. Mao was satisfied with the "unity" that had been achieved by the Yan'an Rectification Movement, and had no intention of altering the basic party structure that had been established at the 1945 Party Congress. Mao disagreed with Gao's own opinion of his role in the revolution (which Mao thought was inflated), and clearly believed that the party should retain a clear command over the state and the military. If Gao's views of the importance of the army in the revolution had prevailed, they would have contradicted Mao's interpretation of the party's history and would have threatened Mao's preeminent position of leadership.

The "Gao Gang Affair" showed the real risk of factional splits within the party during the first few years of the People's Republic of China, a period that is often seen to be an era of party unity. By attempting to exploit grievances held by some cadres against others, Gao was able to attract the interests of several significant cadres, even if none of them truly backed him. The "Gao Gang Affair" can be viewed simply as a stillborn coup attempt within the Politburo, but its significance is not that it failed to succeed or even to gather basic support. Rather, it showed that there was the possibility of power struggles within the Party that could involve the targeting of very senior Party members. Following the "Gao Gang Affair" there were calls for greater Party unity and there was an increase in centralization as the old regional administrations with their Party and military bodies were abolished, a change that had been planned for some time but that was no doubt spurred on by Gao's attempts to use his regional power to gain power at the center.

Another factor that has often been explored, and probably had great importance at the time, is the Soviet connection. Gao's attempt to gain power was certainly not seen as a Soviet-backed move against the Chinese Communists, but it is certain that Gao's connections with the Soviets made people suspicious of him. Because Sino-Soviet relations were tense but close (the party endorsed Soviet methods of economic planning but wanted to make sure that the Soviets did not gain increased influence over China) the impression, however slight, that Gao's attempts to gain power might have had links to his friendship with the Soviets would have been viewed with alarm. This can be seen in Zhou Enlai's public comments against Gao at the February 1954 meetings where he charged him with having "mixed up right and wrong in Soviet relations". According to the account Nikita Khrushchev provides in his memoirs, Gao was the Soviet leadership's primary source of information about "the mood in the Chinese Party" and Stalin, apparently driven by the desire to win Mao's trust, handed some of the diplomatic cables from Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Panyushkin over to Mao. In Khrushchev's opinion, the "betrayal" by Stalin was key to Gao Gang′s subsequent fate.

Perhaps even more significant is how the case shows the dominating power and manipulation of Mao Zedong, during a period when, as is often assumed, Mao's commitment to democratic centralism was at its highest. It was Mao's comments that influenced Gao and led him to believe that even though he was going against the party and senior cadres, his actions were justified because he had the Chairman's backing. Senior cadres like Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai expressed their (admittedly limited) support only because they thought Gao had Mao's approval. Gao's entire plot to deconstruct Liu Shaoqi's power was ended in one stroke by Mao, who needed only to express his true thoughts at one Politburo meeting in order to stop Gao's activities and make other cadres admit their mistakes. While Gao Gang had certainly set up his own demise by making rash decisions and overestimating his trust in Mao, it should be further noted that Mao had orchestrated the entire affair to put Gao into a disadvantaged position against the rest of the Politburo. In puppeting Gao Gang, Mao was not only able to test the loyalty of other CCP officials, but to make an example of those who wished to threaten the party's power dynamics.